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I. DUE PROCESS IN ICT STANDARDIZATION: INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Background to the study 
 
When we think about wireless networks, we usually imagine complex IT infrastructure and 
high-tech devices powered by cutting-edge scientific research. Rarely do we consider these 
technologies as a form of regulation, and the power behind them – as regulators. And yet, what 
would our daily life be without the ability to transfer data from one device to another? How 
will we be able to interact with different people, operate complex electronic equipment and 
take part in the majority of modern activities without interconnection between different 
electronic systems? In our globalized world, the behaviour of different market players, 
governmental authorities and civil society increasingly depends on wireless technologies that 
allow interactions between multiple applications, electronic components and networks. 
 
Take the example of the Internet of Things (IoT): the emerging communication networks will 
enable such innovations as smart cities, smart objects and autonomous driving vehicles, in fact 
creating a new ecosystem of connected environment.1 In this regard, the IoT technologies will 
not only empower the growth of emerging industries, but also transform many traditional 
sectors, such as automotive, healthcare and farming, offering new business opportunities and 
having a great societal impact. The hyper-connectivity between IoT devices and platforms will 
be largely enabled by the 5th generation of cellular networks and technologies (hereinafter: 5G), 
which have been in the limelight of recent political, academic and societal discussions.2 
As such, 5G is just one of the many examples of technologies that provide connectivity and 
compatibility between various systems. These technologies are codified in technical documents 
and specifications: Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) standards.3 By 
prescribing methods applied in electronic devices, coordinating transmission frequencies and 
defining protocols and procedures for internet connection, ICT standards provide written 
“rules” that hardware and software developers should follow in order for their products to 
operate properly and be compatible with other products on the market. The functioning of many 
electronic machines is based on hundreds of such ICT standards developed by different actors 
 
 
1 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), ‘The internet of things: seizing the 
benefits and addressing the challenges’ (24 May 2016) (DSTI/ICCP/CISP(2015)3/FINAL), 9-11. 
2 See European Commission, ‘2019 rolling plan for ICT standardization’ (March 2019), available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/2019-rolling-plan-ict-standardisation; US Department of 
Homeland Security, ‘Overview of risks introduced by 5G adoption in the United Sates: key findings’ (31 July 
2019) available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0731_cisa_5th-generation-mobile-
networks-overview_0.pdf; M. L. Pall, ‘5G: great risk for EU, U.S. and international health! Compelling evidence 
for eight distinct types of great harm caused by electromagnetic field’ (2018) available at 
https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/climatechange/resources/Pages/topic-17.aspx; ‘EU 5G appeal: scientists warn of 
potential serious health effects of 5G’ (13 September 2017) available at https://www.jrseco.com/european-union-
5g-appeal-scientists-warn-of-potential-serious-health-effects-of-5g/. 
3 This research takes a broad definition of the term “standard” that encompasses technical specifications, 
protocols and languages. 
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in technical committees of various industry-driven organizations.4 Being the product of science 
and market demands, ICT standards thus impose de facto norms on community, setting uniform 
expectations for manufacturers, consumers and even governments.  
Not surprisingly, due to their far-reaching implications, ICT standards are characterized by the 
presence of many, often conflicting, interests. Consider, again, the development and rolling out 
of 5G: while private companies compete for the market for 5G equipment and technologies,5 
governments express concerns related to the security of 5G networks,6 and some groups of 
societal actors fear the negative impact of 5G technologies on health and environment.7 The 
list of various interests and stakeholders affected by ICT standards is long and non-exhaustive; 
the bottom line is, ICT standardization is not merely an isolated technological phenomenon; 
rather, it has far-reaching regulatory, political, economic and societal consequences.  
Academic scholarship in the field of ICT standardization is typically devoted to analysing 
interactions and competitive forces among industry players in standards development 
committees, for instance when selecting technological components that are essential for 
standards’ functioning.8 There has been hitherto little research on how these technical 
committees are governed and which procedural guarantees do they offer to those affected by 
their standards.9 For a long time, the common understanding seems to be that most Standards 
Development Organizations (SDOs) by definition offer good processes that comply with 
overarching requirements imposed by international and national legal frameworks; yet, due to 
 
 
4  A study estimated that a modern laptop relies on between 250-500 interoperability standards, see B. 
Biddle, A. White and S. Woods, ‘How many standards in a laptop? (and other empirical questions)’ (2010) in 
proceedings from K-2010: ITU Kaleidoscope Academic Conference – Beyond the Internet? Innovations and for 
future networks and services, Pune, India, 13-15 December 2010. 
5 J. P. Kleinhans, ‘5G vs. national security: a European perspective’ (February 2019) available at 
www.stiftung-nv.de/sites/default/files/5g_vs._national_security.pdf;  IPlytics, ‘Who is leading in the 5G patent 
race? Analysis on declared standard essential patents, 3GPP contributions and attendance data’ (February 2019) 
(on file with the author). 
6 NIS Cooperation Group, ‘EU coordinated risk assessment of the cybersecurity of 5G Networks’ (9 
October 2019) available at https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-6049_en.htm; Europol, ‘Position paper of 
5G’ (10 April 2019) EDOC #1038503; US National Institute of Standards and Technology, ‘Interagency report 
on strategic U.S. government engagement in international standardization to achieve U.S. objectives for 
cybersecurity’ NISTIR 8074, Volume 1 (2015) available at ttttp://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8074v1. 
7 E.g. ITU-T,  ‘The impact of RF-EMF exposure limits stricter than the ICNIRP or IEEE guidelines on 4G 
and 5G mobile network deployment’, Supplement 14 to ITU-T K-series Recommendations (May 2018) available 
at https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-K.Sup14; Letter to The Honorable Brendan Carr, FCC Commissioner (3 
December 2018) available at  https:// https://www.jrseco.com/wp-content/uploads/2018-1203-Sen-Blumenthal-
Rep-Eshoo-to-FCC.pdf; International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection, ‘Revision of the HF 
Guidelines’ (7 December 2017) available at https://www.icnirp.org/en/activities/news/news-article/revision-of-
hf-guidelines-2017.html. 
8 See, among many others, L. Cabral and D. Salant, ‘Evolving technologies and standards regulation’ 
(2014) 36 International Journal of Industrial Organization 48-56; J. Farrell et al., ‘Standard setting, patents, and 
hold-up’ (2007) 74 Antitrust Law Review 603-70. 
9 Previous studies include the recent report on the governance and IPR Policies of Standard Development 
Organizations: J. Baron et al., ‘Making the rules: the governance of standard development organizations and their 
policies on intellectual property rights’ (2019) JRC Science for Policy Report, EUR 29655 EN available at 
https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC115004/sdo_governance_final_electronic_version.




the variety of SDOs and in the absence of research on SDOs’ procedures, it remains vague 
what the “good process” requirements actually entail and whether, and how, are they 
implemented in practice. In particular, it is the qualitative analysis of SDOs processes that has 
been strikingly missing from the legal scholarship on standardization. Since many standards 
have evolved from merely technical features and became endowed with policy-making and 
public interest functions, they should be analysed in the broader institutional and regulatory 
context in which they are developed and enforced.10   
 
This study argues that due to their increased regulatory role as well as the need to legitimize 
their standards in the eyes of their adopters and public regulators, SDOs should ensure 
substantive and procedural guarantees for a great variety of stakeholders. To that end, SDOs 
should indeed follow certain due process principles that allow participation in their processes, 
transparency of their decision-making and balance between different interests and 
stakeholders, preventing that their standards become driven by a single group of actors to the 
detriment of other interests’ groups. SDOs should also maintain internal procedures that allow 
stakeholders to call them to account and to challenge the decisions taken in SDOs’ technical 
and administrative bodies. This study cautions, however, that implementation of procedural 
principles should not preclude SDOs’ technical decision-making or reduce the quality of their 
standards.  
 
2. Research questions, hypothesis and outline 
 
The question this study seeks to answer is to what extent does current ICT standardization 
comply with the applicable procedural and substantive requirements, and whether increased 
scrutiny of SDOs operating in the ICT sector is desirable to guarantee due process. The ultimate 
aim of this research, however, is to bring theoretical considerations stemming from the 
applicable legislation, regulatory documents, judicial decisions and academic scholarship 
closer to practice by evaluating procedural guarantees in a number of SDOs in the light of 
current practices and tendencies in the industry.  
 
To answer the main research question, this study explains, in the first place, what are the 
procedural and substantive guarantees that should be respected in standards development; in 
other words, which  due processes principles should SDOs adhere to under different regulatory 
frameworks, and what does compliance with these principles entail. After defining the 
normative framework, the descriptive part of this study explores the extent to which SDOs 
comply with the applicable due process requirements by analysing the mechanics of prominent 
SDOs operating in the ICT sector in the context of the applicable regulatory frameworks. The 
third stage of this research aims to understand whether and how SDOs’ adherence to due 
 
 
10 See W. Mattli and N. Woods, ‘In whose benefit? Explaining regulatory change in global politics’, in W. 




process affects the legitimacy, effectiveness and quality of their standards. This question is 
largely answered by a qualitative empirical study that reveals experiences of industry experts 
with the processes of different SDOs. Finally, by evaluating the answers to the previous 
questions in the context of practical considerations, this study explores how to achieve and 
maintain due process in SDOs operating in the ICT sector. 
 
The study is premised on two hypotheses: first, that, given the increased regulatory importance 
of ICT standards, it has become challenging for SDOs to offer sufficient procedural and 
substantive guarantees to satisfy all stakeholders that have varying – and sometimes even 
conflicting – interests in standards development; and, second, that increased scrutiny of SDOs’ 
process by governmental authorities, when performed with caution and respect to the industry 
demands, can improve the quality of SDOs’ decision-making and, ultimately, the effectiveness 
of their standards. 
 
Against this backdrop, the outline of this manuscript is as follows. Chapter II discusses ICT 
standardization as a regime of private transnational governance and explains how voluntary 
standards created in committee processes of different types of SDOs may acquire binding force. 
It furthermore offers theoretical background on non-State regulatory arrangements by 
reviewing scholarship on legitimacy and effectiveness of private transnational regulation and 
introduces a non-exhaustive list of procedural meta-principles through which private 
regulatory regimes can be legitimized. This chapter concludes by identifying the gaps in the 
existing understanding of SDOs procedures and setting the framework for the analysis. 
 
Chapter III then proceeds with discussing the law of private standardization, and ICT 
standardization in particular, most notably: the agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade of 
the World Trade Organization (TBT); the EU and US national regulatory frameworks; EU 
competition law; and US antitrust law. It thereby reviews applicable legislation, case law and 
the relevant scholarship, and focuses on the procedural instruments that these regulatory 
frameworks offer for SDOs to legitimize their standards, and limit or escape certain liability 
under the applicable laws. While noting that there are certain differences and similarities in 
how the law treats SDOs that develop voluntary standards, the chapter offers a holistic analysis 
of the procedural principles introduced in all examined frameworks, to which it collectively 
refers to as “due process” principles and explores the relevance and suitability of these 
principles to ICT SDOs.  
 
In this context, Chapter IV examines the operational frameworks of certain prominent SDOs 
and provides a descriptive analysis of their governance and standards development processes, 
covering such aspects as membership; governance bodies; appeals processes; drafting of 
internal rules; and approval of standards. This chapter further analyses the extent to which the 
legal instruments discussed in Chapter III apply to the SDOs at issue, and evaluates SDOs’ 
rules and procedures against the due process requirements of these legal instruments. While 
this chapter provides some comparative observations, it acknowledges that each SDO has an 
operational framework that is unique and tailored to the industry needs of their members; 
hence, there are different ways to implement due process principles into SDOs’ procedures, 
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and the level of procedural guarantees offered during the different stages of SDOs’ decision-
making may also differ per organization.  
 
Building on the descriptive findings of the previous chapters, chapter V contributes with 
practical considerations from case studies and interviews. To that end, it reveals experiences 
of individuals that are actively involved in ICT standardization, mostly experts from leading 
private companies, with the processes of different SDOs, discussing such aspects as procedural 
guarantees in technical committees, dispute resolution by SDOs’ governance bodies and the 
differences between drafting SDOs’ internal rules and drafting standards. In particular, this 
chapter seeks to understand from a practical viewpoint, how SDOs’ compliance with due 
process requirements relates to the effectiveness and, ultimately, different types of legitimacy 
of their standards. 
 
Chapter VI concludes by outlining the main findings of this study and placing them in the 
broader perspective of global ICT standardization, discussing the arising challenges and 





While this study was largely conducted from a legal perspective, it also differs from previous 
legal studies in the field of standardization due to the selected interdisciplinary methodological 
approach. The major part of this study is performed by means of desk research, which involves 
reviewing the relevant primary sources of law, such as treaties, national legislation and 
applicable case law, as well as secondary sources, including communications and guidelines 
from governmental authorities, operational documents of SDOs (i.e. bylaws, membership 
agreements, policies), and the relevant academic scholarship in the field of law, economics, 
management and political science. Such interdisciplinary theoretical background is necessary 
to shed light onto (ICT) standardization from different analytical lenses and to understand its 
dynamics as an evolving mechanism of private transnational governance.  
 
The theoretical findings of the desk study are subsequently evaluated in a qualitative empirical 
study with a view to adding practical relevance to this academic study.11 This type of research 
method was selected for its contribution to the knowledge of the organizational phenomena in 
ICT standardization in real-life context.12 In that sense, it relies on multiple sources of 
evidence, such as various documents (case law, official statements, previous academic studies, 
organizational reports, communications and statements from parties, meetings’ minutes and e-
mail correspondence available in public domain), answers to the interview questions and 
comments from experts. The empirical part of this study is performed by two types of 
 
 
11 Methodology for the empirical research is borrowed from Yin’s case studies method, which is 
appropriate for political science but can also be applied to legal studies.  
12 R. K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 
2003), p. 3. 
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qualitative research methods, namely case studies on procedural disputes in SDOs and semi-
structured interviews with experts from SDOs and private companies. Case studies conducted 
in this research seek to reveal what can be learned from the experiences with SDOs’ procedural 
disputes and as such, have an exploratory purpose. In turn, personal interviews seek to reveal 
the experience of different stakeholders with regard to SDOs’ standardization processes and 
have a descriptive purpose.  
 
Several methodological choices were made in this research. The first choice related to the 
regulatory frameworks from which due process principles examined in Chapter III are derived. 
Since most ICT SDOs are incorporated in the US and EU, and given concerns related to 
technical barriers to trade, antitrust and intellectual property that arise from ICT 
standardization, it was decided to examine the following five regulatory regimes: international 
trade law, EU and US law, and EU and US competition law. Other regimes, such as 
procurement law, contract law or data protection law, while equally important for (ICT) 
standardization, were left outside the scope of this study.  
 
The second methodological choice concerned the SDOs whose governance and technical 
processes were analysed in Chapter IV. The five SDOs – ETSI, IEEE-SA, IETF, W3C and 
Bluetooth SIG – were selected due to their leading role in ICT standardization, significance 
and propagation of their standards, as well as their varied institutional settings and governance 
characteristics.  
 
The third choice related to case studies on dispute resolution in SDOs in Chapter V. In the three 
selected cases – litigation on antirust liability TruePosition vs Ericsson, ALU, Qualcomm, 
ETSI and 3GPP; appeal to IEEE and ANSI governance bodies regarding the process of IEEE 
2015 Patent Policy Update; and internal W3C appeal of the Director’s decision to approve 
controversial Encrypted Media Extensions as a W3C recommendation –  procedural guarantees 
in various processes were at stake, which made them an interesting topic for discussion.  
 
Ultimately, several choices were made in relation to the qualitative empirical study of Chapter 
V. This study was largely performed by conducting semi-structured interviews: such format 
allowed respondents to provide their opinions, experiences and observations. The interview 
questions were developed based on the findings of the descriptive study of SDOs’ operational 
frameworks, and were adapted to every interviewee based on his/her affiliation and experience. 
The interview subjects were primarily identified based on their affiliation, predominantly large 
multinational companies who are the leading stakeholders of ICT standardization, including: 
Cisco, Ericsson, IBM, Intel, Lenovo, Netflix, Orange, Philips and Signify.  
 
Other subjects invited to participate in the study were affiliated with consultancies, 
governmental organizations with expertise in the field of ICT standardization, and staff 
members of the leading global ICT SDOs and of national SDOs active in regional and global 
ICT standardization. Furthermore, interview subjects were identified based on their experience 
with and knowledge of governance and technical processes in different SDOs. A substantial 
majority of contacted experts were affiliated with Western companies, or SDOs and (non-) 
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governmental actors based either in the US or EU. Affiliates of Asian companies that have 
been approached for the purpose of this study were based in the US or European branches of 
these companies.   
 
In total, 52 individuals have been contacted with an invitation for an interview, and 25 
interviews were used in this study. From 25 interviewed experts, 8 were affiliated with “patent-
intensive” companies, 4 with “user” companies, 6 were staff/board members of SDOs, 4 
worked for consultancies or small private research bodies, and 1 was affiliated with a 
governmental body. Respondents were of mixed professional backgrounds (i.e. lawyers, 
management strategy advisors, engineers) and had an extensive experience with working for 
multiple private companies, SDOs’ secretariats or (non-)governmental bodies, where they held 
different leadership positions. All individuals have been involved in multiple standards 
development and governance processes. Regardless their affiliation, all experts were 
interviewed in their private capacity. Responses to the interview questions were subsequently 
grouped under separate topics and are discussed in Chapter V of this manuscript. 
 
For the detailed explanations on the methodology, selection sample and demographics of the 
respondents, as well as the limitations of this qualitative empirical study, I refer the reader to 




The limitations of this study stem from the research design as well as the methodology selected 
for its empirical part. Regarding the former, this research aimed to bring descriptive and 
practical insights about due process in SDOs, rather than to revisit the conceptual frameworks 
of legitimacy and accountability for private SDOs: the research question and research design 
have been formulated in the view of this aim. Related to that is the choice of the regulatory 
regimes: while the study did not focus on private laws regulating SDOs’ liability, copyright of 
their standards or their use for procurement purposes, only briefly covering these topics, these 
– and many other – legal frameworks are also relevant for the holistic understanding of the 
regulation of ICT standardization, and should be examined in the future research. In this regard, 
the title of the manuscript, “The Law and Practice of Global ICT Standardization,” was chosen 
to demonstrate the comprehensiveness of the study as well as its connection to practice, rather 
than as an attempt to make a definite contribution to the extensive field of law and 
standardization.  
 
The second set of limitations relates to the methodology and the results of the qualitative 
empirical study performed in this research. Firstly, the sample of the interview subjects is rather 
homogeneous, since the great majority of experts interviewed in the context of this study are 
affiliated with the leading ICT commercial enterprises; only a few contributors are linked to 
8 
 
smaller-scaled companies, governmental agencies or SDOs’ secretariats.13 Secondly, all 
interviewed individuals were affiliated with Western stakeholders, which admittedly does not 
represent the full picture of the “global” ICT standardization. Thirdly, not all approached 
individuals agreed to be interviewed: for this reason, the case studies do not represent the views 
of all parties, and the number of companies termed as “patent-intensive” and “user” is likewise 
not equal. Finally, while experts took part in the study in their private capacity, due account 
should be taken of the fact that their preferences or views may have been affected by their 
affiliation.  
 
Due to the mentioned limitations, the conclusion of the empirical part of the research – namely, 
that the correction of SDOs’ processes should be largely left to market forces – is not surprising. 
Yet, when juxtaposed with the findings of the normative and descriptive parts of this research, 
the findings of the empirical study, albeit anecdotal, allow to draw further conclusions 
regarding the current state of due process in ICT standardization, noting some possible and 
feasible improvements of SDOs’ governance and processes and introducing further challenges 
associated with procedural guarantees in global SDOs. This study is thus only the first step in 
a larger journey of empirical research on SDOs’ processes, that will hopefully encourage future 
interdisciplinary work in this area. 
 
5. Contributions and recommendations 
 
This study does not aim to make any explicit statements regarding SDOs’ compliance with the 
applicable laws and regulatory requirements. Rather, it aspires to become a reference point by 
providing a comprehensive analysis of legal rules, governance and technical processes in 
global ICT standardization in a manner that is explanatory as well as explorative, especially 
focusing on procedural guarantees in SDOs and their practical application.  
 
The contribution of this study is threefold. Firstly, it offers a holistic analysis of legal rules and 
procedural principles that different regulatory framework have in place for industry-driven 
SDOs, building on the existing literature in the field as well as examining updated legal 
documents. Secondly, it provides a systematic overview of SDOs’ governance and standards 
development procedures, introducing different implementation mechanisms for procedural 
safeguards. Lastly, this study gives due account to practical considerations from qualitative 
empirical evidence, attempting to bring theoretical legal research a step closer to reality and by 
this means, contributing to the understanding of due process. 
 
The evolution of ICT standardization as a form of governance, together with the great diversity 
of SDOs’ institutional landscape, poses the question whether due process principles, as 
currently formulated under a number of regulatory frameworks, are still fit for purpose. 
Arguably, these principles can be bent to suit a particular industry and tailored to a particular 
 
 
13 It should be recalled that some experts who have been approached in the capacity of SDOs leadership 
are also affiliated with private companies.  
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organizational structure. Arguably, the excessive involvement of governmental actors in the 
design of SDOs’ rules, while certainly facilitating due process, is undesirable and may distort 
SDOs’ technical decision-making. In this regard, SDOs’ are faced with a considerable 
challenge to follow due process requirements while being sufficiently flexible to adapt to 
market developments and evolving industry needs. Most importantly, SDOs should be able to 
maintain a balance among their stakeholders in a way that prevents abuse of SDOs’ processes 
and contributes to the global acceptance of their standards.  
 
In this regard, it is suggested that procedural improvements should be carried out by SDOs 
internally, rather than prescribed by the applicable legal requirements, although the latter can 
benefit from some clarifications regarding, for instance, the type of SDOs they apply to and 
the processes they cover (i.e. governance and technical processes). SDOs can achieve and 
maintain due process by improving their appeal mechanisms, or introducing other functional 
and accessible processes allowing their stakeholders to challenge the decisions of their 
technical and governance bodies (i.e. submission of comments or stakeholder consultation). 
Similarly, increasing openness and transparency, while improving SDOs’ legitimacy and 
accountability towards those affected by their standards, may contribute to reducing overlap of 
standardization activities, but also strengthen cooperation between SDOs, which is especially 
desirable in the light of IoT standardization.   
 
While this research focuses on SDOs compliance with due process principles and norms 
introduced in the regulatory documents, it does not by definition exclude the fact that these 
procedural requirements, as currently formulated, fall short in addressing the needs of ICT 
standardization. Indeed, due process principles have their origin in industrial practices of the 
pioneering technical SDOs established in late 1800s, and have later been assimilated by most 
national, regional and global SDOs and introduced as regulatory requirements in applicable 
legislation.14 From this perspective, legal rules governing SDOs processes, while constituting 
“best practice requirements” to be further implemented and adjusted by SDOs, can also be 
critically analysed as to their adequateness for the current landscape of ICT standardization, 
possibly leading to the development of an entirely new set of principles to which the applicable 
regulatory frameworks should adhere: this, however, is a topic for another research.  
 
This study has been conducted on the basis of the law as it stood in October  2019 and, despite 














By introducing theoretical background to regulation by non-State actors, this chapter clarifies 
the importance and relevance of exploring procedural guarantees in ICT standardization and 
as such, frames the topic of this study. To that end, this chapter starts with explaining the 
concepts of (ICT) standards and Standards Development Organizations (SDOs), reviews the 
relevant scholarship in the field of global governance, transnational private regulation and 
global administrative law and analyzes ICT standardization as a form of a transnational private 
regulatory regime. It continues with discussing legitimacy and effectiveness of non-State 
regulatory bodies and introducing procedural principles to be followed by private regulators 
for legitimizing their rule-making. Finally, this chapter identifies three main shortcomings of 
current research on ICT standardization, which will be further explored in the following three 
chapters.  
 
2. Setting the Scene: Standards and Standards Development Organizations 
 
2.1 Types and Functions of Standards  
 
Modern governance comprises various regulatory arrangements, many of which go beyond 
governmental legislation. One form of such non-state regulation is voluntary standardization. 
Standards are technical documents that  refer to a common set of characteristics of a particular 
good or service.15 Standards exist in a bewildering variety of forms and run across many 
domains, from quality of service in public passenger transport to technical protocols supporting 
data transmission across the Internet. To name some examples: the ISO 9001 standard series 
provide guidance for companies’ quality management,16 Codex Alimentarius standard 107-
1981[8] lays down requirements for labelling of food additives,17 and international financial 
reporting standards of International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) govern companies’ 
 
 
15 OECD, ‘Standard setting’ (8 March 2011) (DAF/COMP(2010)), available at 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/47381304.pdf, p. 9. The common definition of standards is provided by 
ISO/IEC Guide 2: ‘… a document, established by consensus and approved by a recognized body, that provides, 
for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or their results, aimed at the 
achievement of the optimum degree of order in a given context...’ and that ‘should be based on the consolidated 
results of science, technology and experience, and aimed at the promotion of optimum community benefits,’ 
Article 3.2 of the ISO/IEC Guide 2, Standardization and Related Activities: General Vocabulary (2004) available 
at https://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink?func=ll&objId=8389141&objAction=browse&sort=name; Brunsson et al.  
acknowledge that the term “standard” may have several definitions and may highlight different aspects of practice 
and theory. See N. Brunsson, A. Rasche and D. Seidl, ‘The dynamics of standardization: three perspectives on 
standards in organization studies’ (2012) 33 Organizational Studies 613-32 at 615. 
16 Series on Quality Management, ISO 9001, see https://www.iso.org/iso-9001-quality-management.html. 
17 Codex General Standard for the Labelling of Food Additives When Sold as Such, CODEX STAN 107-
1981[8], available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/Y2770E/y2770e03.htm. 
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financial accountability.18 In each field, standards represent the appropriate expertise,19 which 
makes them essential for almost all scientific, economic and social activities. 
 
Scholarship is rich on studies that unpack the variety of standards’ types, roles and purposes, 
where standards are praised for integrating diverse interests and providing uniform solutions 
for interconnecting things, methods and people.20 Standards control and modify behavior of 
different stakeholders (so-called “regulative function”), coordinate industry practices, and 
encourage cooperation (so-called “normative function”).21 Standards are also considered 
imperative in ensuring quality of goods and services, protecting consumer from hazardous risks 
(by excluding non-qualifying products or providing information on products’ quality)22 and 
enabling the functioning of user networks.23 By systemizing production, operation and transfer 
methods, standards expedite supply chain and lead to economies of scale; 24 likewise, standards 
generate network effects, allowing more users to join the networks and augmenting the demand 
for complementary production due to the increase of networks’ value.25 At the global level, 
standards harmonize States’ technical regulations and enable market access,26 encouraging 




18 See the list of IFRS Standards, available at http://www.ifrs.org/issued-standards/list-of-standards/. 
19 S. Botzem
 
and L. Dobusch, ‘Standardization cycles: a process perspective on the formation and diffusion 
of transnational standards’ (2012) 33 Organizational Studies 735-60. 
20 In this regard, see also H. De Vries, ‘Standardization – what’s in a name?’ (1997) 4 Terminology – 
International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Issues in Specialized Communication 55-83, who notes that 
standards are solving “matching” problems.  
21 P. Delimatsis, ‘Global standard-setting 2.0: how the WTO spotlights ISO and impacts the transnational 
standard-setting process’ (2018) 28 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 273-326 at 275, citing 
C. Lane, ‘The social regulation of inter-firm relations in Britain and Germany: market rules, legal norms and 
technical standards’ (1997) 21 Cambridge Journal of Economics 197-215. 
22 For example, the Chinese Taipei delegation to the OECD Standard Setting Roundtable noted that the 
use of standard for mineral water production provided better information for consumers, OECD, ‘Standard 
Setting’, p. 10. 
23 See the functional typology of standards introduced P. A. David, ‘Some new standards for the economics 
of standardization in Information Age’, in P. Dasgupta and P. Stoneman (eds.), Economic Policy and 
Technological Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) pp. 154-68. 
24 The costs for developing and commercializing of a product are reduced when producers comply with a 
standard that is already integrated on the market. P. Curran, ‘Standard-setting organizations: patents, price fixing, 
and per se legality’ (2003) 70 The University of Chicago Law Review 983-1009 at 988; OECD, ‘Standard Setting’, 
p. 28. 
25 Curran, ‘Standard-setting organizations’, p. 987. 
26 In the absence of harmonization, exporters need to comply with trade regulation of each of their trade 
partners; see A. Muir, ‘The race to safety: how private lawmaking and voluntary-standard adoption can inspire a 
global regime that strengthens and harmonizes product safety standards’ (2016) 23 Indiana Journal of Global 
Legal Studies 323-47; see also K. Karachalios and K. McCabe, ‘Standards, innovation, and their role in the context 
of the World Trade Organization’, Paper for E15 Expert Group on Trade and Innovation (2013) available at 
http://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/E15-Innovation-KarachaliosMcCabe-FINAL.pdf; J. L. Funk 
and D. T. Methe, ‘Market- and committee-based mechanisms in the creation and diffusion of global industry 
standards: the case of mobile communication’ (2001) 30 Research Policy 589-610. 
27 ‘Trade and public policies: a closer look at non-tariff measures in the 21st century’,  World Trade Report 
(2012) available at https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report12_e.pdf, at 21; W. 
Mattli and T. Büthe, ‘Setting international standards: technological rationality or primacy of power’ (2003) 56 
World Politics 1-42 at 2. 
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Save for few examples,28 standards are usually created by industry experts, either through 
completely private initiatives, or with some degrees of governmental involvement.29 
Furthermore, standards can be developed either through an extensive cooperation in groups 
and committees (“de jure” standardization)30 or by means of market-based processes, where 
the industry choses among competing technologies brought on the market by different firms 
(“de facto” standardization).31 The former aims to  strike a balance between various conflicting 
interests;32 the latter mostly prevails in efficiency and positive externalities.33 Preference for 
standards development schemes depends on multiple factors, such as regulatory choices and 
market characteristics, but also historical, cultural or even regional aspects.34 However, many 
standards emerge in interwoven processes containing the elements of committee-and market-




28 For instance, food safety industry in Latin American States has been governed by standards established 
by governmental authorities. P. Wiegmann, K. Blind and H. de Vries, ‘Multi-mode standardization: a critical 
review and a research agenda’ (2017) 46 Research Policy 1370-86, citing E. M. M. Q. Farina et al., ‘Private and 
public milk standards in Argentina and Brazil’ (2005) 30 Food Policy 302-15.  
29 See examples in Wiegmann, Blind and de Vries, ‘Multi-mode standardization’.  
30 The author is aware that the term “de jure” standardization may not be entirely correct, since it contradicts 
standards’ inherent voluntary nature; in this manuscript, however, the author uses the term “de jure” 
standardization as the opposite to “de facto” standardization, to highlight the differences between standards that 
are first developed and then brought on the market and standards that are developed in market-based processes. 
31 See Brunsson, Rasche and Seidl ‘Dynamics of standardization’, p. 619; I. Oshri and C. Weeber, 
‘Cooperation and competition standard-setting activities in the digitalized era: the case of wireless information 
devices’ (2006) 18 Technology Analysis and Strategic Management 265-83 at 267; T. Keil, ‘De-facto 
standardization through alliances: lessons from Bluetooth’ (2002) 26 Telecommunications Policy 205-13 at 206; 
J. Farrell and G. Saloner, ‘Coordination through committees and markets’ (1998) 19 The Rand Journal of 
Economics 235-52. A classic example of market selection of a standard is the rivalry between VHS and Betamax 
technologies, and between Blue-ray vs HD-DVD; to the contrary, new generations of wireless cellular standards 
were first developed in technical committees. 
32 As noted by Layne-Ferrar et al., collaboration among various industries is needed due to the global shift 
toward increasing products complexity; see A. Layne-Farrar, G. Llobet and J. Padilla, ‘Payment and participation: 
the incentive to join cooperating standard setting efforts’ (2014) 23 Journal of Economics and Management 
Strategy 24-49.  
33 Cabral and Salant observed that market-based standards result in a faster innovation than standards 
regulation, and that that the regulatory policy mandating compatible standards reduces investment incentives, 
retards innovation and may reduce consumer and social welfare; Cabral and Salant, ‘Evolving technologies’. 
34 See N. Gandal, D. Salant and L. Waverman, ‘Standards in wireless telephone networks’ (2003) 27 
Telecommunications Policy 325-32; J. Tate, ‘National varieties of standardization’, in P. A. Hall and D. Soskic 
(eds.), Varieties of Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
35 Wiegmann provides examples of standards developed jointly by committees and markets, such as 
Ethernet and LAN technologies; office document formats; USB; FireWire; BlueRay and HD DVD; by 
governments and committees, such as GSM; TCP/IP; and medical devices requirements in EU; by governments 
and markets, such as railway track gauges; and by governments, committees and markets, such food quality and 
safety and charging plugs in EU; see Wiegmann, Blind and de Vries, ‘Multi-mode standardization’. Moreover, 
standards crafted in committees may need to fight the rival standards to win the market; see J. van den Ende et 
al., ‘The paradox of standard flexibility: the effects of co-evolution between standard and interorganizational 
network’ (2012) 33 Organization. Studies 705-36. 
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Amid many types of standards,36 the relevant literature draws a distinction between “technical” 
and “non-technical” standards;37 while the latter are mostly found in such fields as quality 
control, management and financial reporting, technical, or interoperability, standards enable 
coordination between multiple products or processes.38 In particular, these standards are 
encountered in the domain of Information and Communication Technology (hereinafter: ICT), 
where they codify specifications for compatibility among various technological components.39 
In the past decades, ICT standards have particularly risen in prominence due to the increased 
digitalization, technological advancement and commercialization of the Internet,40 and ICT 
standardization processes evolved into a joint effort of various actors to develop multifaced 
technologies.41 
 
More specifically, ICT standards prescribe methods applied in electronic devises and enable 
connections between networks, interfaces and products of different vendors;42 they ensure 
interoperability between complex electronic mechanisms,43 coordinate radio frequencies and 
encryption software, and support data transmission across the Internet.44 ICT standards may 
range from general guidelines to definitions of complex technical features.45 Some examples 
 
 
36 Classification of standards would typically depend upon the scientific field or the approach taken by 
organizations or scholars. For instance, OECD classifies standards as quality, informational, uniformity, 
professional conduct and interoperability standards (see OECD, ‘Standard Setting’, p. 21), whereas Werle refers 
to standards for product or process which are either design-based or performance-based and have coordinative or 
regulative function; see R. Werle, ‘Standards in the international telecommunications regime’ (2001) HWWA 
Discussion Paper 157, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA), pp. 8-10. 
37 I.e. Brunsson, Rasche and Seidl, ‘Dynamics of Standardization’, p. 616.  
38 Ibid.; OECD, ‘Standard Setting’, p. 23. 
39 See M. A. Lemley, ‘Intellectual property rights and standard-setting organizations’ (2002) 90 California 
Law Review 1889-1980; Werle, ‘Standards’. 
40 See T. Simcoe, ‘Standard setting committees: consensus governance for shared technology platforms’ 
(2012) 102 American Economic Review 305-36; Mattli and Büthe, ‘Setting international standards’; S. M. Besen 
and J. Farrell, ‘Choosing how to compete: strategies and tactics in standardization’ (1994) 8 Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 117-31. 
41 J. A. Baron and T. Pohlmann, ‘Who cooperates in standards consortia: rivals or complementors?’ (2013) 
9 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 905-29.  
42 Lemley, ‘Intellectual property rights’, p. 1898; Werle ‘Standards’, p. 8; R. Garud and A. Kumaraswamy, 
‘Changing competitive dynamics in network industries: an exploration of Sun Microsystem’s open systems 
strategies’ (1993) 14 Strategic Management 351-69 at 353. 
43 Interoperability is best defined as a “capability of two or more networks, systems, devices, application 
or components to exchange and readily use meaningful actionable information in a secure and effective way”; 
National Institute of Standards and Technology, ‘NIST Framework and Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability 
Standards, Release 1.0’ (January 2010) NIST Special Publication 1108, p. 19.  
44 See, among others, H. R. Delcamp and A. Leiponen, ‘Innovating standards through informal consortia: 
the case of wireless telecommunications’ (2014) 36 International Journal of Industrial Organization 36-47; T. 
Weitzel, D. Beimborn and W. König, ‘A unified economic model of standard diffusion: the impact of 
standardization cost, network effects, and network topology’ (2006) 30 MIS Quarterly 489-514; N. Gandal, Salant 
and Waverman, ‘Standards in wireless telephone networks’; Werle, ‘Standards’; M. Tushman and L. Rosenkopf, 
‘Organizational determinants of technological change: towards a sociology of technological evolution’ (1992) 14 
Research in Organizational Behaviour 311-47; P. A. David and S. Greenstein, ‘The economics of compatibility 
standards: an introduction to recent research’ (1990) 1 Economics of Innovation and New Technology 3-41. 
45 By way of illustration, see the difference between Design Guidelines for Balanced Technology Extended 
(BTX) Chassis, Revision 1.1 (February 2007) and Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Mobile 
Station (MS) conformance specification; Part 1: Conformance specification (3GPP TS 51.010-1 version 10.3.0 
Release 10), ETSI Technical Specification (February 2013). 
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are the set of technical specifications for Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN), commonly 
known as Wi-Fi standards family; Bluetooth wireless specifications for Personal Area 
Networks (PANs); third and fourth generation of wireless mobile telecommunications 
standards (3G and 4G); MP3 audio encoding format; TCP/IP internet protocols; and 
telecommunications standards for voice and data communications, such as Evolution-Data 
Optimized  (EV-DO) standards or 1x network.46 Among less familiar standards, IEEE 802.15.4 
provides a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) for emergency notifications – a short-range 
communications system that gathers information from the monitored field and communicates 
it through wireless links, often used in health care and environment monitoring;47 and IEEE 
802.21, which allows for seamless handovers among Wi-Fi or 3G-based networks, whereby 
cellphone users do not experience any interruption of information stream when changing within 
network hotspots.48 
 
ICT standards are traditionally considered to perform a coordinative function: developed by 
high-tech companies and business associations, they reflect key industry requirements, reduce 
transaction costs and prevent negative externalities, while creating positive ones.49 For 
instance, to enable compatibility and synchronization between various electronic devises, 
companies on the downstream market have to design their products in a way suitable for 
implementation of common technological solutions.50 To that end, standards provide a 
common platform for the production of multiple, and even competing products, push back 
technologies frontiers and promote dissemination of innovation and development of new 
technologies. 
 
At the same time, due to the inherent ability of interoperability standards to constrain the 
behavior of various market players,51 they also perform a regulative function by preventing 
negative externalities through internalization, even without reliance on the market functioning. 
In other words, ICT standards create normative expectations with a purpose to achieve a 
particular aim or economic effect.52 This effect may even go beyond the intended regulation of 
 
 
46 The two standards have different bandwidth characteristics and allows users to place a call either through 
the public switched telephone network (1x network), or through an application routed through the internet (EV-
DO). For further explanation, see Broadcom Corporation v. Qualcomm Incorporated, 543 F 3d 683 (Fed. Cir 
2008). 
47 See C. Buratti et al. ‘An overview on wireless sensor networks technology and evolution’ (2009) 9 
Sensors 6869-96. 
48 See N. Dimitriou et al., ‘Vertical Handover (VHO) framework for future collaborative wireless 
networks’ (2011) 21 International Journal of Network Management 548-64. 
49 Werle, ‘Standards’, pp. 8-9. See also Abbott and Snidal discussing technological and regulatory 
externalities in standardization: K. W. Abbott and D. Snidal, ‘International “standards” and international 
governance’ (2011) 8 Journal of European Public Policy 345-70.  
50 Think about being able to access your email through connecting to the Internet network from different 
devices.  
51 After all, your devices can only connect to your email through (wireless)networks if they support 
(W)LAN or 3G/4G standards. 
52 Werle, ‘Standards’, p. 8; P. Delimatsis, ‘Into the abyss of standard-setting: an analysis of procedural and 
substantive guarantees within ISO’ (November 2014) TILEC Discussion Paper, 0042-2014, p. 2. 
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certain markets: Internet standards, for instance, have played an increasing role in shaping 
modern communication rights.53     
 
Some ICT standards, such as Wi-Fi specifications and standards for broadband cellular 
networks, are developed and published by voluntary associations driven by the industry actors 
with the necessary expertise and resources. Others, such as Betamax and VHS videotape 
recording formats, have emerged in the market as a consequence of “standard battles” - 
competition between technologies, either by means of spontaneous adoption by users and 
producers, or by the extensive promotion by dominant firms.54 While this study considers ICT 
standardization as a holistic process, its main focus lies on standardization in technical 
committees of industry organizations, to which it will refer as “Standards Development 
Organizations” (hereinafter: SDOs).55 
 
2.2 Typology of Standards Development Organizations  
 
SDOs are voluntary platforms that enable cooperation and coordination among those wishing 
to establish a standard.56 SDOs bring together various actors, ranging from private firms to 
governmental agencies and consumer associations, which are represented by a team of experts 
in SDOs’ committees and bodies. Standardization through SDOs is commended by many 
scholars and industry players due to voluntary participation in their standard-setting processes 
as well as the relative flexibility of SDOs institutional rules.57 
 
This study  distinguishes between two types of SDOs: private or semi-public bodies (implicitly) 
recognized by governmental authorities, and loosely organized, informal interest groups and 
industry consortia. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) are the prominent examples of the former: the fact that 
these two sister organizations are referred to in the Annexes of the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (hereinafter: TBT Agreement) grants them authority to issue standards that 
are (presumably) compatible with international trade law.58 The third recognized global SDO, 
the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), is a specialized agency of the United 
 
 
53 DeNardis provides examples of standards designing policies on privacy, access for disabled persons and 
the use of Internet space; see L. DeNardis, The Global War for Internet Governance (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2014), p. 65. 
54 S. Park, ‘Quantitative analysis of network externalities in competing technologies: the VCR Case’ (2004) 
86 The Review of Economics and Statistics 937-45; M. A. Cusumano et al., ‘Strategic maneuvering and ms-market 
dynamics: the triumph of VHS over beta’ (1992) 66 Business History Review 51-94. David and Greenstein 
distinguish between ‘sponsored’ and ‘unsponsored’ standards: whereas the latter exist in public domain without 
identified author(s) holding proprietary interest, sponsored standards are established by entities, suppliers or users; 
see David and Greenstein, ‘The economics of compatibility standards’, p. 4. 
55 Other terminology that is common for current standardization research is “Standard-Setting 
Organizations” (SSOs); in this study, the terms “SDO” and “SSO” are used interchangeably.  
56 Baron and Pohlmann, ‘Who cooperates’, p. 906; see also A. Leiponen, ‘Competing through cooperation: 
the organization of standard setting in wireless telecommunications’ (2008) 54 Management Science 1904-19. 
57 See Mattli and Büthe, ‘Setting international standards’; Curran ‘Standard-setting organizations’; Farrell 
and Saloner, ‘Coordination through committees. 
58 For explanation of the TBT Agreement, see Chapter III.3. 
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Nations that holds a monopoly over spectrum allocation and had hosted a number of ICT 
standardization activities, including the recent initiatives on 5G standardization.59 Within the 
European system, the ISO, IEC and ITU are recognized as the only international 
standardization bodies;60 their standards are quoted in national policy statements and enjoy a 
high profile within multinational corporations. Other examples of SDOs that enjoy a certain 
type of governmental recognition are regional and national bodies, which will be discussed 
below. 
 
Regardless of their status in national or international legal order, most of the formal SDOs 
share numerous institutional features. Those include member-driven character, openness 
towards a large amount of industry players and consensus-based decision-making. And while 
consensus generally implies the “absence of sustained opposition,”61 its definition may vary 
per SDO, but will almost never imply unanimity.62 Standards adopted in transparent and 
consensus-driven methods are believed to be more accurate than arbitrary decisions taken in 
an opaque process.63 At the same time, formal international SDOs are frequently put at a 
disadvantage due to their inflexibility and dominance by industrialized countries.64 
 
The second type of SDOs that this study terms as “informal” embodies smaller organizations 
or business associations that are focused on narrow technological fields. These relatively closed 
committees are typically comprised of companies sharing a particular interest to develop 
technology or markets, and started to bloom in mid 2000s as a response to bureaucratic and 
stagnant standard-setting processes in more larger and more “formalized” SDOs.65 The main 
institutional characteristics of these platforms is the difference between actors developing 
(“promotors”) and implementing (“adopters”) technical specifications.66 Consortia may adopt 
various forms: scholarship identifies single- and multiple - promoter consortia, the latter 
governed by promoters’ agreement; incorporated consortia, where the rules of stakeholders’ 
 
 
59 Note that the spectrum allocation occurs in ITU-R, the Radiocommunications Sector of the ITU.  
60 Article 2 of Regulation 1025/2012, OJ 2012 No. L316/12. 
61 See the definition provided in Article 1.7 of ISO/IEC Guide 2 (2004). 
62 R. Werle, ‘Institutional aspects of standardization: jurisdictional conflicts and the choice of 
standardization organizations’ (2001) 8 Journal of European Public Policy 392-410. 
63 Simcoe, ‘Standard setting committees’; Farrell and Saloner, ‘Coordination through committees’. 
64 ISO and IEC only open their membership to the National Bodies/Committees of UN Members States; 
Article 3.3 ISO Statutes (19th Edition, 2018) available at https://www.iso.org/obp/ui#iso:pub:PUB100322;  and 
Article 4 IEC Statutes and Rules of Procedure (2001 edition, 2018) available at 
https://www.iec.ch/members_experts/refdocs/. In ITU, only UN Member States have voting power, Article 2 ITU 
Constitution (Edition 2019) available at https://www.itu.int/en/history/Pages/ConstitutionAndConvention.aspx. 
For the commentary, see Delimatsis, ‘Global standard-setting 2.0’; J. Braun and C. Koenig, ‘The international 
regulatory framework of EC telecommunications law: the law of the WTO and the ITU as a yardstick for the EC 
law’, in A. Bartosch et al. (eds.), EC Competition and Telecommunications Law (Netherlands: Kluwer Law 
International, 2009) 21; C. Murphy and J. Yates, The International Organization for Standardization (ISO): Global 
Governance Through Voluntary Consensus (London: Routledge, 2009); J Hinricher, ‘The law-making of the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU): providing a new source of international law?’ (2004) 64 ZaöR 
489-501. 
65 T. Pohlmann, ‘The evolution of ICT standards consortia’ (2014) 93 Digiworld Economic Journal 17-40. 
66 B. Biddle et al., ‘The expanding role and importance of standards in the information and communications 
technology industry’ (2012) 52 Jurimetrics 177-208. 
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participation are provided by multilateral contracts; and hybrid consortia, independent 
incorporated non-profit entities whose work is overseen by another organization.67 
 
In the realm of ICT and wireless technologies, industry consortia appear to prevail over their 
formal counterparts, since they offer rapid standards development processes.68 Empirical 
research has demonstrated an overall correlation between the narrow spectrum of a 
consortium’s standardization activity and the low amount of its members;69 in such small 
homogeneous groups, decision-making occurs faster.70 Especially when it concerns Intellectual 
Property (IP) issues, consortia have demonstrated their ability to provide quick and satisfactory 
solutions. 
 
In spite of these advantages, informal SDOs are presumed to fall short on the level of 
procedural and substantive guarantees compared to the formal alternatives,71 which allegedly 
may also affect their standardization outcome.72 For  instance, standards development in these 
private groups often lacks consensus or cannot be challenged in the SDO due to the absence of 
dispute resolution mechanisms.73 Moreover, the clear separation between promoters and other 
members suggests limited participation opportunities for stakeholders who may be interested 
in a standardization activity or become affected by it.74 
 
The choice of a standards development platform largely depends on stakeholders’ ambition for 
a particular standardization project. Companies wishing to rapidly promote their technology 
typically opt for informal committees,75 while those pursuing bigger network externalities or 
seeking formal endorsement would carry out their projects in larger organizations.76 By the 
same token, companies that attach more weight to quality of a standard than to pace of its 
 
 
67 In the US, incorporated consortia enjoy tax-exemption and non-profit corporation status; they also allow 
for owning and licensing trademarks, associated with their technical specifications; see Biddle et al., ‘The 
expanding role’, pp. 188-89.  
68 The increasing central role of technical consortia in the ICT sector was suggested, inter alia, in Delcamp 
and Leiponen, ‘Innovating standards’; Pohlmann, ‘Evolution’; and Biddle et al., ‘The expanding role’. Blind and 
Gauch demonstrated that while narrow consortia can usually be found more often in the telecom and e-commerce 
industry, manufacturing usually has a broader focus; K. Blind and S. Gauch, ‘Trends in ICT standards in European 
standardization bodies and standards consortia’ (2008) 32 Telecommunication Policy 503-13. 
69 Pohlmann, ‘Evolution’. 
70 See, in general, A. Dixit, ‘Trade expansion and contract enforcement’ (2003) 111 Journal of Political 
Economy 1293-1317; M. Böstrom and K. Tamm Hallström, ‘Global multi-stakeholder standard setters: how 
fragile are they’ (2013) 9 Journal of Global Ethics 93-110. 
71 Delcamp and Leiponen, ‘Innovating standards’, pp. 38-9.  
72 See above n. 63. 
73 Delcamp and Leiponen, ‘Innovating standards’; B. Chiao, J. Lerner and J. Tirole, ‘The rules of standard-
setting organizations: an empirical analysis’ (2007) 38 RAND Journal of Economics 905-30.  
74 Biddle et al., ‘The expanding role’, p. 184.   
75 Delcamp and Leiponen, ‘Innovating standards’; Pohlmann, ‘Evolution’; and Biddle et al., ‘The 
expanding role’. 
76 See, for instance, Pohlmann, ‘Evolution’; J. Lerner and J. Tirole, ‘A model of forum shopping’ (2006) 
96 American Economic Review 1091-113; N. Brunsson and B. Jacobsson, ‘The contemporary expansion of 
standardization’, in N. Brunsson and B. Jacobsson (eds.), A World of Standards (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), p. 1; M. Weiss and M. Sirbu, ‘Technological choice in voluntary standards committees: an empirical 
analysis’ (1990) 1 Economics of Innovation and New Technologies 111-33.  
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development are likely to join SDOs that follow consensus-based procedures.77 Loosely 
organized groups with lower institutional costs may attract less internationally competitive 
firms aspiring to develop regional standards, whereas formal organizations are considered to 
provide fertile ground for the establishment of global standards.78 It may also occur that 
recognized SDOs, despite their alleged weaknesses, yield better results than informal groups:  
for instance, the ITU managed to complete standardization of 56K modems, initially carried 
out in two competing consortia, due to the support from all major market players and successful 
resolution of patent issues.79 
 
What formal and informal SDOs have in common is a practical necessity to balance among 
different, and often conflicting, interests. Actors often invest in standard-setting without 
knowing if the final result will be commercially successful.80 In the ambit of technological 
standardization, the stakes are particularly high since next to the “regular” standards 
development costs, such as meeting fees and travel arrangements for experts, it is also 
accompanied by large-scale R&D investment and expenses for technology implementation. To 
attract participants, SDOs need to provide an adequate coordination of standardization efforts 
and acts in the interest of their members. For this reason, each SDO maintains a set of common 
rules defining its membership requirements, governance and standards-development processes.  
 
Earlier scholarship suggested that SDOs’ governance models follow a certain pattern, 
mirroring each other’s procedures.81 Homogeneity of  SDOs’ organizational forms has been 
described as “mimetic isomorphism”82 that stems from organizations’ responses to 
uncertainties as well as limited institutional variations to be selected from, leading new 
organizations to follow the model that has proven successful.83  Arguably, however, imitation 
in SDOs governance and processes can also be explained by “coercive isomorphism” - political 
and societal pressure from other organizations, which are especially evident due to SDOs 
increased regulatory importance.84  
 
2.3 Hierarchy of Standards Development Organizations  
 
An SDO rarely operates independently from other SDOs: as such, institutions of 
standardizations are entwined in a system of networks. The most typical approach to 
 
 
77 Simcoe, ‘Standard setting committees’. 
78 M. T. Austin and H. V. Milner, ‘Strategies of European standardization’ (2001) 8 Journal of European 
Public Policy 411-31. 
79 S. M. Greenstein and M. Rysman, ‘Coordination costs and standard setting: lessons from 56K modems’ 
(2004) Center for the Study of Industrial Organization, Working Paper #0056, p. 23. 
80 L. Froeb and M. Shor, ‘Innovators, implementers, and two-sided hold-up’ (August 2015) 14 The 
Antitrust Source 1-10. Difficulty to predict standards’ success was also noted by many experts interviewed for the 
purpose of this study.   
81 Werle, ‘Standards’, p. 17; and Werle, ‘Institutional aspects’, p. 11. 
82 Werle, ‘Institutional aspects’. 
83 P. J. DiMaggio and W. W. Powell, ‘The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective 
rationality in organizational fields’, in W. W. Powell and P. J. DiMaggio (eds.), The New Institutionalism in 
Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) 63-82.  
84 Werle, ‘Institutional aspects’. 
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systematize SDOs is to follow a vertical, “top-down” hierarchical structure of international, 
regional and national organizations developing, accordingly, international, regional and 
national standards.85 In this system, general rules and principles are defined at the highest 
hierarchical level in accordance with hard and soft law instruments of public law:86 by the same 
token, the endorsement of standards by SDOs at the highest hierarchical level grants those 
standards increased legitimacy.  
 
At the top of this hierarchy are the three international standards bodies, the ISO, IEC and ITU, 
whose infrastructure is founded on national level and when necessary, extends to regional 
activities.87 Lower down the hierarchical ladder are regional bodies, common examples being 
the three European Standards Organizations (hereinafter: ESOs): European Committee for 
Standardization (CEN), European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization 
(CENELEC), and European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). The ESOs 
typically follow a hierarchical structure set by EU law and the European Commission. At the 
third level are National Standards Organizations (hereinafter: NSOs), designated to represent 
national interests in regional or international standardization fora:88 in ISO, for example, the 
United Kingdom (UK) is represented by the British Standards Institute (BSI), Japan by the 
Japanese Industrial Standards Committee (JISC) and China by the Standardization 
Administration of China (SAC).89 Depending on a country’s standardization regime, NSOs can 
be either privately-driven associations or constitute a part of governmental agencies,90 and may 
even be entrusted with defining national standardization strategies.91 In the EU, NSOs typically 
follow the rules and procedures of ESOs.92  
 
Naturally, standardization work of the SDOs at the different hierarchical levels can overlap. In 
this regard, there are various mechanisms to preserve coherence and consistency of global 
 
 
85 See Articles 3.2 and 3.3 of ISO/IEC Guide 2 (2004). As will be explained in Chapter III.3, especially 
the notion of “international” standard is important due to its consequences for trade law.  
86 See JRC Report, p. 60.  
87 Article 1.2 of ISO/IEC Guide 59 (1994). Such terminology is also maintained in the other ISO/IEC 
Guides, for instance ISO/IEC Guide 21 (2005).  
88 Note that while the European NSOs represent the interests of their respective countries by participating 
in ISO’s committees and working groups, ANSI represents the interests of the US by appointing the Technical 
Advisory Groups (TAGs); see ANSI, ‘ANSI procedures for U.S. participation in the international standards 
activities of ISO’ (January 2019) available at 
https://share.ansi.org/Shared%20Documents/Standards%20Activities/International%20Standardization/2019-
ANSI-International-Procedures.pdf. International SDOs also maintain different terminology for their 
memberships: for instance, ISO speaks of “Member Bodies,” IEC refers to its members as “National Committees” 
and ITU distinguishes between “Member States” and “Sector Members.” 
89 Note that SAC as such does not create standards.  
90 For example, German DIN is a nonprofit association, which signed the Normenvertrag with the 
government where it is recognized as a competent standards body; BSI is a non-profit organization recognized in 
the MoU in 1982; AFNOR is association under private law but subject to governmental control, and fulfils a 
public function under the French Administrative Law. See H. Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance: 
Product Standards in the Regulation of Integrating Markets (Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2005) 111-
144.  




standardization.93 NSOs hold membership of regional and international bodies;94 those, in turn, 
have cooperation agreements and memoranda of understanding at different hierarchical levels 
(i.e. regional and international, or international and international).95 Moreover,  the applicable 
legislation requires national and regional SDOs to adopt standards produced by SDOs at the 
higher hierarchical levels.96 In ICT standardization at the highest hierarchical level, ISO and 
IEC join forces in the Joint Technical Committee (JTC), the ISO/IEC JTC1, which endorses 
prominent global ICT standards in the voting procedure by national bodies.97  
 
However, such “top-down” hierarchical approach only takes into account those SDOs to which 
this study refers as “formal.” In this regard, SDOs’ networks can also be systematized as a 
“bottom-up” vertical hierarchy, where groups of professionals or academics establish 
themselves as informal associations or consortia operating separately from any formal SDOs. 
Unlike the “top-down” networks, these informal groups usually do not implement governance 
models of existing SDOs and prefer having their own rules and policies.98 Internet and web 
SDOs are a typical example of such “bottom-up” hierarchy. Yet, while most of these SDOs do 
not seek any accreditation by formal SDOs, such as ANSI in the US,99 they nevertheless may 
have liaisons or partnership with other SDOs or consortia, or seek legitimization of their 
standards by formal bodies.100 
 
Due to their sheer abundance and the overlap of their technical activities, SDOs networks are 
also interlinked through horizontal relationships: as it will be clarified later in this study, SDOs 
cooperate and compete with each other, endorse and absorb each other’s standards and adopt 
each other’s governance rules, such as intellectual property policies. In future, these networks 
may become even more complex due to standardization of IoT systems that relies on increased 
cooperation among various types of SDOs and governmental actors.  
 
3. Standardization as Global Governance: Theoretical Conceptualization 
 




93 Note that “coherence and coordination” as procedural principles of standardization are discussed in 
Chapter III.6. 
94 The first version of Guide 59 distinguished between a standardizing body, which can be many in one 
country, and national standards body which can be the member of regional and international organizations; Article 
1.3 of ISO/IEC Guide 59 (1994). 
95 I.e. Agreement on Technical Cooperation Between ISO and CEN (Vienna Agreement) (1991); IEC-
CENELEC Agreement on Common Planning of New Work and Parallel Voting (Frankfurt Cooperation 
Agreement) (2016); MoU between IEC, ISO, ITU and UN/ECE concerning standardization in the field of 
electronic business (2000). 
96 See Chapter III.3 and 4 discussing, accordingly, obligations to adopt international standards as a basis 
for country’s technical regulations to preclude unnecessary trade barriers, as well to withdraw national standards 
conflicting with European harmonized standards.    
97 See “About” available at https://jtc1info.org/page-3/. 
98 JRC Report, p. 59-60. 
99 Ibid., p. 60. 




Many governance regimes are established and maintained by non-governmental players acting 
either autonomously, or together with (or under supervision of) the State.101 Examples of such 
normative arrangements range from the diamond industry and private prisons to professional 
societies and Internet-routine.102 Regulation “in the shadow” of legislation commonly emerges 
as a response to the inefficiencies of States in protecting property rights103 or addressing market 
failures,104 or simply due to their lack of expertise in a particular regulatory field.105 Legal and 
economic orders are then shaped by various institutions:106 while driven by expert-community 
or industry actors, such institutions do not only provide benefits for their members, but also 





101 See examples in M. Mataija, Private Regualtion and the Internal Market: Sports, Legal Services and 
Standard Setting in EU Economic Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 2; T. G. Weiss, and R. Thakur, 
The UN and Global Governance: An Unfinished Journey (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press: 2010), p. 
10. See also Mattli and Woods, ‘In whose benefit?’. 
102 E.g. P. Delimatsis, ‘The future of transnational self-regulation enforcement and compliance in 
professional services’ (2017) 40 Hasting International and Comparative Law Review 1-67; O. Hart, A. Shleifer 
and R. W. Vishny ‘The proper scope of government: theory and an application to prisons’ (1997) 112 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 1127-61.  
103 For example, the inability of medieval national laws to regulate geographically dynamic activities gave 
rise to the system of lex mercatoria, formed by merchants’ communities executing both rule-making, adjudicative 
and enforcement tasks. See S. E. Masten and J. Prüfer, ‘On the evolution of collective enforcement institutions: 
communities and courts’ (2014) 43 Journal of Legal Studies 359-400 at 379, who refer to H. J. Berman, Law and 
Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), 
p. 347; and C. Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law in the Global Political 
Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 111 and 138. 
104 Those market failures typically stem from uncertainty and information asymmetry; see R. O. Keohane, 
After Hegemony (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 93.  
105 See A. Peters, L. Koechlin and G. Fenner Zinkernagel, ‘Non-state actors as standard setters: framing 
the issue in an interdisciplinary fashion’, in A. Peters et al. (eds.), Non-State Actors as Standard-Setters 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 1-32. 
106 At least, from a neoliberal perspective, see K. O’Neill, J. Balsiger and S.D. VanDeveer, ‘Actors, norms, 
and impact: recent international cooperation theory and the influence of the agent-structure debate’ (2004) 7 
Annual Review of Political Science 149-75 at 164. Note that in this regard, institutions can be defined differently: 
Black, for instance, defines institutions as ‘cognitive and moral structures, rules, norms, conventions or operating 
procedures which are regarded as socially or legally binding but are not self-enforcing’; J. Black, ‘Legitimacy, 
accountability and polycentric regulation: dilemmas, trilemmas and organisational response’, in Peters et al. 
(eds.), Non-State Actors as Standard Setters (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 250-51. This 
study assumes a broad definition of “institutions”, covering not only organizations, but also markets or companies 
coordinating economic activity.  
107 M. Larrain Aylwin and J. Prüfer, ‘Trade associations, lobbying and endogenous institutions’ (2015) 7 
Journal of Legal Analysis 467-516. Historical examples are discussed in the scholarship on private ordering: see, 
for instance, A. Greif, P. Milgrom and B. Weingast, ‘Coordination, commitment and enforcement: the case of 
Merchant Guild’ (1994) 102 The Journal of Political Economy 745-76; P. Milgrom, D. C. North and B. R. 
Weingast, ‘The role of institutions in the revival of trade: the law merchant, private judges, and the champagne 
fairs’ (199) 2 Economics and Politics 1-23. 
108 See M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1965), who suggests that the actors provide public goods only if underlying costs are 
lower than expected benefits. In the scholarship of governance of collective action, the stance is taken that 
institutions should specify certain behaviour as “wrong” and generate mechanisms whereby their members 
collectively punish ‘wrongdoers’; see G. K. Hadfield and B. R. Weingast, ‘What is law? A coordination model of 
the characteristics of legal order’ (2012) 4 Journal of Legal Analysis 471-514. This study will not discuss 
standardization as a governance of collective action, leaving it to future research. 
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As such, non-legal forms of regulatory arrangements pertain to the realm of international and 
global governance, meaning the provision of formal and informal rules, relationships and 
institutions by networks of legislative bodies, business and civil society actors.109 They serve 
to complement State-driven regulation by allocating resources and coordinating activities in a 
society or economy.110 SDOs and their standards are viewed as subcategories of this type of 
governance:111 situated between contract and property,112 SDOs create standards that reach far 
beyond their membership.113 By facilitating legal and economic integration, such standards 
often manage to create normative orders. The following examples illustrate how private and 
semi-public standardization schemes may exert normative requirements and result in an uptake 
by “regulated” communities.  
 
3.2. Standards as normative requirements 
 
3.2.1 Voluntary nature of standards 
 
Following the strand of the scholarship on standardization and non-State regulation, standards 
are “microcosms of social practices, political preferences, economic calculations, scientific 
necessity and professional judgment”,114 situated in a “grey zone of law, morals, economics 
and politics.”115 Since standards development occurs through lengthy discussions, bargaining, 
deliberation and compromise processes, it to some extent resembles drafting of legislation:116 
this does not mean, however, that standards development should be seen as equal to law-
making.117 At the same time, “standards retain certain legal features” and ”in practical terms, 
may be seen as hard legal obligations,”118 despite their formally voluntary character. For 
example, developers of Internet specifications for different levels of network architecture are 
sometimes compared to law-makers, as they affect the behavior of actors in a way similar to 
 
 
109 This terminology is suggested for “international governance” in Abbott and Snidal, ‘International 
“standards”’, p. 346. For global governance, see G. F. Callies and M. Renner, ‘Between law and social norms: the 
evolution of global governance’ (2009) 22 Ratio Juris 260-80, referring to O. E. Williamson, ‘The economics of 
governance’ (2005) 95 American Economic Review 1-18; J. A. Scholte, ‘Global governance, accountability and 
civil society’, in J. A. Scholte (ed.), Building Global Democracy: Civil Society and Accountable Global 
Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 8-41.  
110 See M. Bexell, ‘Global governance, legitimacy and (de-)legitimation’ (2014) 11 Globalization 289-99, 
who highlights that such private arrangements do not aim to replace State-driven regulation.  
111 Abbott and Snidal, ‘International “standards”’, p. 346. 
112 H. E. Smith, ‘Property as platform: coordinating standards as technological innovation’ (2013) 9 
Journal of Competition Law and Economics 1057-89 at 1071.   
113 However, it becomes problematic when a firm let its individual interests to influence standards 
development process to the detriment of the group and society, Smith, ‘Property as platform’, p. 1072. 
114 H. Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance, p. 6. 
115 Peters et al., Non-state Actors as Standard Setters (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 
13.  
116 B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch and R. B. Stewart, ‘The emergence of global administrative law’ (2005) 68 
Law and Contemporary Problems 15-61; yet, standard-setting is generally carried out by more diverse actors than 
law-making. 
117 See Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, ‘The emergence of global administrative law’; Schepel, The 
Constitution of Private Governance.  
118 Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance, pp. 12-13. 
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the legislators: the idea that “code is law” is not unfamiliar among the scholars of Internet 
governance.119  
 
Obligatory nature of standards may be imposed by a range of factors, incorporation into law or 
market functioning, to name a few. This study distinguishes between three routes that standards 
can follow to be transformed into normative requirements: reference in a governmental 
regulation, adoption by a competent organization and compliance pull from the relevant 
market.  
 
3.2.2 Regulatory Incorporation  
 
Industry standards may be implemented into national legislation, or referenced by governments 
in any other way, with a purpose of facilitating industry regulation, providing consumer 
protection or safeguarding certain health and safety requirements.120 The recourse of 
lawmakers to industry expertise is perfectly comprehensible: by and large, regulatory agencies 
prefer using existing standards due to their own inefficacy in defining detailed technical 
norms.121 Likewise, strictly governmental standards deemed relatively inefficient: unlike 
private standards, they typically are crafted in endogenous processes, bypassing market 
competition.122 
 
But even when developed by bodies specifically designated by States (i.e. CEN or CENELEC 
in the EU), standards  may only exert legal obligations by virtue of a regulatory citation.123 In 
the EU, it is the publication of a reference to a Harmonized Standard in the Official Journal of 
the European Union (OJEU) that increases the normative value of these standards;124 
regardless, the use of such standards remains voluntary.125 
 
The US standardization system, in turn, furnishes the adoption of private model codes by semi-
 
 
119 See L. Lessig, Codes and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999). 
120 T. Büthe, ‘Engineering uncontestedness? The origins and institutional development of the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)’ (2010) 12 Business and Politics 1-62 at 3; M. De Bellis, ‘The public 
enforcement of global private standard setting: the role of credit rating agencies in Basel II’, in S. Cassese et al. 
(eds.), Global Administrative Law: Cases and Materials (2008) available at 
http://www.iilj.org/gal/documents/galcasebook.pdf, at 23-8; C. Murphy and J. Yates, ‘Coordinating international 
standards: the formation of the ISO’ (2006), available at 
http://web.mit.edu/iandeseminar/Papers/Fall2006/Yates.pdf, at 26. 
121 S. Cassese, ‘Administrative law without the state? The challenge of global regulation’ (2005) 37 N.Y.U. 
International Law and Politics 663-94 at 671. 
122 D. F. Spulber, ‘Innovation economics: the interplay among technology standards, competitive conduct, 
and economic performance’ (2013) 9 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 777-825 at 787-8.  
123 Related to that, Delimatsis demonstrates that States remain omnipresent in regulation of profession 
services despite the endorsement of professional associations with self-regulatory power; Delimatsis, ‘The future 
of transnational self-regulation’, p. 66. 
124 See Case C-613/14, James Elliott Construction Ltd v. Irish Asphalt Ltd [2016]; for further analysis, see 
Chapter III.4.   
125 Case C-613/14, James Elliott Construction Ltd v. Irish Asphalt Ltd, para. 42. In principle, other means 
to demonstrate compliance with EU law than harmonized standards also exist. See B. Van Leeuwen, European 
Standardization of Services and its Impact on Private Law: Paradoxes of Convergence (Oxford: Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2017), p. 17. For further explanation of harmonized standards, see Chapter III.4. 
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public organizations as well as a direct reference to private standards by federal authorities. To 
provide an example, the American Bar Association's Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility has been adopted by many State Supreme Courts, and standards established by 
the Gas Industry Standards Board are embedded in regulations of the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission.126 Unlike it is the case in the EU system, the application of referenced 
standards in the US is not voluntary: the requirement of “voluntary consensus” rather applies 
to standards development process.127  
 
Ultimately, the use of a particular standard may also be mandated by a legal contract between 
private or governmental parties.128 Such practice is common in many industry sectors, 
including construction and oil and gas, where firms incorporate “minimum requirements” of 
global standards into their codes. 
 
3.2.3 Virtue of a force of another organization  
 
Even in the absence of a regulatory reference or an explicit delegation of powers, private norms 
can harden into a mandatory requirement when appropriated by a recognized organization. This 
type of transformation is demonstrated by the WTO obligation to use relevant international 
standards as a basis for countries’ mandatory technical regulations.129 Measures adopted in 
accordance with such standards, meaning that there is a “very strong and substantial 
relationship between a regulation and the substance of the international standard,”130 enjoy a 
rebuttable presumption of conformity with applicable provisions of WTO law.131  
 
Private sector standards may also be endorsed ex post in a fast or “fast-track” process of SDOs 
in high vertical hierarchical position, such as the ISO or IEC: in this case, a technical document 
is directly submitted for the (final) approval of a working group or even the whole SDO 
membership, side-stepping the initial stages of standards development.132 The examples are the 
 
 
126 See Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance, pp. 158-9; E. S. Bremer, ‘American and 
European perspectives on private standards in public law’ (2016) 91 Tulane Law Review 325-70 at 364-5. 
127 P. C. Mavroidis and R. Wolfe, ‘Private standards and the WTO: reclusive no more’ (2017) 16 World 
Trade Review 1-24. See also ANSI, ‘Overview of the US Standardization System: voluntary consensus standards 
and conformity assessment activities’ (2007) available at 
https://share.ansi.org/Shared%20Documents/News%20and%20Publications/Brochures/U.S.%20Standardization
%20System-07.pdf, p. 3. 
128 P. Verbruggen, ‘Introduction: regulating private regulators: understanding the role of private law’ 
(2019) 2 European Review of Private Law 175-196 at 181; Van Leeuwen, European Standardization, pp. 17-18. 
129 Article 2.4 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 1868 UNTS 120 (hereinafter: TBT 
Agreement); R. Howse and R. Teitel, ‘Beyond compliance: rethinking why international law really matters’ 
(2010) 1 Global Policy 127-136 at 132.  
130 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R 
(Sep. 26, 2002) para. 245. The burden of proof in this case lies on complaining Member(s).  
131 Article 2.5 of the TBT Agreement; the legitimate objectives to deviate from international standards are 
listed in Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement. For further analysis, see Chapter III.3. 




Linux’ standard for operating system, which was formally adopted by the ISO/IEC;133 the 
Portable Document Format (PDF) developed by Adobe and incorporated into an ISO 
standard;134 and specifications drafted by the International Color Consortium that were used as 
a basis for the IEC 61966-series of “color management” standards.135  
 
Endorsement by a recognized organization or SDO grants private sector standards a certain 
degree of legitimacy, enlarges their scope of application136 and arguably, strengthens their 
enforcement.137 Moreover, when going through a fast-track process of a formal SDO, such 
industry norms arguably become subjected to a greater level of scrutiny, which improves their 
quality and consistency.138 Yet, it should be noted that while increasing legitimacy and quality, 
this practice as such does not render a standard mandatory, without it being referenced in, or 
used as a basis for national legislation.139 However, due to its increased legitimacy, a standard 
that is endorsed by a recognized organization is more likely to be incorporated into law or to 
provide a groundwork for regulators to build on.  
 
3.2.4 Compliance pull and market pressure 
 
It appears that to acquire binding force, standards require an act of recognition, such as a 
reference to a standard in a contract or national legislation, decision of a (national) Court, or 
endorsement as an international standard within the WTO system. Yet, the use of standards 
may also be rendered compulsory when they ensure the functioning of the market or are 
preferred by consumers in the absence of other regulatory alternatives.140 The obligatory nature 
of standards then stems from industry-mediated processes and reflects the requirements of 
specific markets.141 The extent to which these standards mirror a legal obligation depends on 
 
 
133 ISO/IEC 23360, Linux Standard Base (LSB) core specification 3.1- Part 1 to 8; the reference to the parts 
of the standard are available at http://standards.iso.org/ittf/PubliclyAvailableStandards/. 
134 ISO 19005 series, Document management -Electronic document file format for long-term preservation. 
(PDF/A-1, PDF/A-2, PDF/A-3). 
135 Büthe, ‘Engineering uncontestedness?’, p. 14, n. 65. 
136 See, for instance, Brunsson and Jacobsson, ‘The contemporary expansion’. 
137 Some authors have argued that due to this transformation, there is a shift in implementation, monitoring 
and enforcement of standards: while in voluntary standardization, these functions are typically performed by 
private sector or market actors, once standards are “hardened” through the WTO endorsement, these tasks become 
the matter of States, relevant WTO Committees and Dispute Settlement Bodies. See F. Fontanelli, “ISO and 
Codex standards and international trade law: what gets said is not what’s heard” (2011) 60 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 895-932, who analyses the  regulatory processes of ISO and Codex Alimentarius 
using the ANIME approach (Agenda-setting, Negotiation and adoption, Implementation, Monitoring and 
Enforcement ), referring to K. W. Abbott and D. Snidal, ‘The governance triangle: regulatory standards institution 
and the shadow of the state’, in W. Mattli and N. Woods (eds.), The Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press 2009) 44-88. 
138 For industry’s view on the legitimacy of standards approved via “fast-track” procedures, see Chapter 
V.3. 
139 In spite of that, some authors have argued that “absorbance” of standards into the WTO regulatory 
framework may be viewed as an interaction between the WTO and SDOs at instance of regulatory delegation; see 
T. Büthe, ‘The globalization of health and safety standards: delegation of regulatory authority in the SPS-
Agreement of 1994 Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization’ (2008) 71 Law and Contemporary 
Problems 219-55. 
140 See Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance, pp. 3-6. 
141 Büthe, ‘Engineering uncontestedness?’, p. 2. 
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products- or process-characteristics: for instance, technical specifications are more likely to 
exert normative pull in a culture where they are connected with wider normative and cognitive 
frames, which in turn put a strong emphasis on technical skills.142  
 
Standards that become binding according to this method, similarly to standards that are 
referenced in a governmental act or endorsed by a recognized body, de facto assume the 
character of a technical regulation.143 While the market pressure is not sufficient to realize 
convergence in law,144 this type of standards may still considerably influence firms’ capacity 
to innovate and conduct business overseas.145 Companies that comply with de facto standards 
have good reputation among their business partners.146 On a global scale, such standards may 
serve as indirect trade instruments and are likely to bear similar practical consequences as 
mandated standards, being prerequisites for market access and reshaping the reality of 
international commerce.147  
 
While in principle, ICT standards may become binding following the first two paths,148 they 
are mostly capable of creating normative orders by the third method. The decisive factors 
behind the market power of an ICT standard are its network effects and switching costs,149 as 
well as the willingness of consumers to adopt certain technology.150 Interoperability of 
technological platforms is crucial for achieving a critical mass of actors to expand the size of 
the market.151 Take an example of WLAN technical specifications: there exist no law that 
obliges a device manufacturer to implement this standard; and yet, selling of a smartphone that 
 
 
142 See Lane, ‘Social regulation’. In this regard, see also Pauwelyn, Wessel and Wouters, who argue that 
there is “informal law” which may still have legal effects and/or be subject to legal constraints, and therefore 
needs justification by law; J. Pauwelyn, R. A. Wessel and J. Wouters, ‘When structures become shackles: 
stagnation and dynamics in international law-making’ (2014) 25 The European Journal of International Law 733-
63 at 755-9. 
143 Werle, ‘Standards’, p. 10. 
144 Van Leeuwen, European Standardization, p. 20. 
145  According to the European Commission, this also applies to SMEs, which may not have been involved 
in standard-setting processes nor have any operational interest in using the standard; see ‘Independent review of 
the European standardization system’, Final Report of the European Commission, Directorate-General for Internal 
Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (March 2015) available at 
ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/10444/attachments/2/translations/en/.../pdf. For further research on SMEs in 
technology standardization, see C. Tapia and H. Tsilikas, ‘SMEs and Standard Essential Patents: licensing 
efficiently in the internet of things’ (2017) 4 LII les Nouvelles - Journal of the Licensing Executives Society 170-
76; K. Gupta, ‘The role of SMEs and startups in standards development’ (2017) available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3001513. 
146 Büthe, ‘Engineering uncontestedness?’, p. 3. 
147 ‘Trade and public policies’, World Trade Report, p. 21; S. Bernstein and E. Hannah, ‘Non-state global 
standard-setting and the WTO: legitimacy and the need for regulatory space’ (2008) 11 Journal of International 
Economic Law 575-608 at 586.  
148 For instance, WLAN specifications developed in IEEE are submitted to ISO/IEC/JTC1, and become 
international standards through the endorsement by ISO.  
149 Curran, ‘Standard-setting organizations’, p. 987. 
150 See L. Fuentelsaz, J. P. Maicas and Y. Polo, ‘Switching costs, network effects, and competition in the 
European mobile telecommunications industry’ (2012) 23 Information Systems Research 93-108. Yet, Cabral and 
Salant suggested that consumers are more concerned with prices rather than with network effects; Cabral and 
Salant, ‘Evolving technologies’, p. 52. 
151 This is illustrated by an example of the cellular phone users; E. M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations: 
Modifications of a Model for Telecommunications (New York: The Free Press New York, 1995), p. 245. 
27 
 
does not support Wi-Fi connection is doomed to failure. Similar logic applies to Bluetooth and 
USB specifications and standards for cellular mobile networks, which for a long time have 
been endorsed by telecoms and ICT industry. Even a single-actor scheme may gain popularity 
amongst the industry,152 as long as a group of actors sharing interest or preference for a certain 
standard is established. For instance, prior to its acknowledgement by the ISO, the 
aforementioned PDF standard developed by Adobe has already become de facto market 
requirement.153  
 
3.3 Private actors as governance suppliers: theoretical approach  
 
Rules, practices and processes laid down by sector-specific communities other than national 
governments or interstate organizations, and that produce strong distributional effects between 
private actors, have been extensively addressed in scholarship on transnational governance154 
and in particular, on transnational private regulation.155 As such, transnational private 
regulation is marked by redistribution of the regulatory power from domestic governments to 
private actors operating at the global level.156 It is generally believed to resolve collective action 
failures and to facilitate compromises between conflicting interests157 and, as a consequence, 
offers more advantages than an uncoordinated action by all relevant actors.158 For the very 
same reason, transnational regulation may be prone to escape governmental influence and to 
be guided by technocratic decision-making: the legitimacy of transnational private regulatory 
regimes then relies on general consent, participatory commitment and mutual monitoring.159 
 
Over the past decades, transnational private regimes grew in importance due to emergence of 
new regulatory spaces and advancement of industry domains that have typically been under 
hegemony of private actors. Where balkanized domestic laws are often inadequate at 
addressing regulatory challenges of globalization and increased market liberalization, 
transnational private regulation proves more dynamic and adjustable to industry 
 
 
152 K. A. Jakobsen, ‘Revisiting standard-setting organizations’ patent policies’ (2004) 3 Northwestern 
Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property (2004) 43-60 at 59. 
153 E. Wijkstrom and D. McDaniels, ‘International standards and the WTO TBT Agreement: improving 
governance for regulatory alignment’ Staff Working Paper ERSD-2013-06 (2013) available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201306_e.pdf, p. 17.  
154 See, among many others, K. W. Abbott and D. Snidal, ‘Hard and soft law in international governance’ 
(2000) 54 International Organizations 421-56.  
155 I.e. F. Cafaggi, ‘New foundations of transnational private regulation’ (2011) 38 Journal of Law and 
Society 20-49; C. Scott, F. Cafaggi and L. Senden, ‘The conceptual and constitutional challenge of transnational 
private regulation’ (2011) 38 Journal of Law and Society 1-19. For an elaborative literature review, see P. W. J. 
Verbruggen and P. M. Paiement, ‘Transnational private regulation’, in Oxford Bibliographies in Political Science 
(July 2017) available at https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199756223/obo-
9780199756223-0226.xml.   
156 Cafaggi, ‘New foundations’, p. 21. 
157 Ibid., pp. 48-54. 
158 In this regard, transnational regulatory regimes can be compared to cartels, where members join and 
stay because the existence of a joint initiative is more beneficial, despite a constant temptation to seek self-interest. 
M. Shapiro, ‘“Deliberative,” “independent” technocracy v. democratic politics: will the globe echo the EU?’ 
(2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 341-56 at 349.  
159 Cafaggi, ‘New foundations’, p. 47.  
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requirements.160 Implementation of such normative schemes yet depends on a large number of 
factors, including the balance of power in a particular sector and the willingness of stakeholders 
to reach compromises.161  
 
Sector-specific communities, in particular professional associations and business networks, 
may as well prefer to abide the rules developed by themselves and for themselves. Regulatory 
regimes where industry actors are both norm-setters and norm-addressees are commonly 
referred to as self-regulation;162 they are considered more business-friendly than other types of 
private regulatory arrangements since they can be fine-tuned to individual situations, while 
minimizing compliance costs and avoiding damaging intrusions from outsiders.163 Similarly to 
transnational private regulation, self-regulation is characterized by increased flexibility and 
non-binding outcomes, which may nevertheless “harden” into compulsory sector-specific 
rules. Having been witnessed already in Medieval times,164 self-regulation currently spans from 
market governance mechanisms to product safety regulation and designing of software and 
Internet protocols.165 
 
Arguably, the absence of non-State regulation in emerging regulatory field, together with 
limited entry possibility for industry actors, is likely to incentivize less effective governmental 
action: this “legislative threat” may have as well served as a background factor for the 
widespread recognition of many private or self-regulatory regimes.166 However, regulation in 
the shadow of States does not per se exclude governmental actors, who may encourage the 
adoption of self-regulatory arrangements by private sector – a so-called meta-regulation.167 
Governments may even act as initiators of private or self-regulation: in fact, “co-regulation”, 
where private normative regimes are underpinned by legislation, are witnessed even more often 
than pure self-regulatory regimes.168  
 
 
160 In this regard, Trubek predicts that in the future of law, there will be less attention to courts, and more 
to the regulatory agencies; D. M. Trubek, ‘The political economy of the rule of law: the challenge of the new 
developmental state’ (2009) 1 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 28-32 at 30-31. 
161 See, for example, T. Bartley, ‘Institutional emergence in an era of globalization: the rise of transnational 
private regulation of labor and environmental conditions’ (2009) 113 American Journal of Sociology 297-351 at 
300 (on forest certification and labor standards). 
162 See J. A. Cannataci and J. P. M. Bonnici, ‘Can self-regulation satisfy the transnational requisite of 
successful internet regulation?’ (2010) 17 International Review of Law Computers & Technology 51-61 at 54; F. 
Cafaggi and A. Janczuk, ‘Private regulation and legal integration: the European example’ (2010) 12 Business and 
Politics 1-40. 
163 See Mattli and Woods, ‘In whose benefit?’; Abbott and Snidal, ‘Hard and soft law’. 
164 See above n. 103. 
165 Gunningham and Rees call it economic and social self-regulation; N. Gunningham and J. Rees, 
‘Industry self-regulation: an institutional perspective’ (1997) 19 Law and Policy 363-414 at 364. However, 
Cannataci and Bonnici note that a single definition of self-regulation does not exist; see Cannataci and Bonnici, 
‘Can self-regulation satisfy the transnational requisite’. 
166 A. Héritier and S. Eckert, ‘New modes of governance in the shadow of hierarchy: self-regulation by 
industry in Europe’ (2007) 28 Journal of Public Policy 113-38; E. Meidinger, ‘Administrative law of global 
private-public regulation: the case of forestry’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 47-87 at 59.  
167 See C. Coglianese and E. Mendelson, ‘Meta-regulation and self-regulation’ (2012) U of Penn Law 
School, Public Law Research Paper No. 12-11. 
168 M. E. Price and S. G. Verhulst, ‘In search of the self: charting the course of self-regulation on the 




3.4 Governance Characteristics of  ICT Standardization  
 
While technical, and especially ICT standardization has traditionally been considered a matter 
of industry expertise,169 it has also been accompanied by the presence of public sector.170 With  
increased digital convergence,171 ICT standards became linked to governmental policies: in the 
EU, for instance, they convey technological requirements for privacy, security and 
accessibility, but also support the objectives of the Digital Single Market.172 Similarly to all 
technical standards, ICT standards can obscure commercial and political preferences and moral 
evaluations.173  
 
ICT standards are developed by a great variety of stakeholders, including manufacturers of 
components for network systems, software and hardware developers, network operators, 
national regulatory agencies, consumers and even societal actors.174 Many of these 
stakeholders often have vested interests in standardization processes: for instance, some 
companies may offer their proprietary technologies for inclusion into a standard and as a 
consequence, will expect to monetize their patents once the standard is adopted; others, to the 
contrary, would be interested in a less restrictive access to those technologies.175 But 
eventually, for almost each and every stakeholder, ICT devices form an essential part of their 
quotidian life: traffic lights need to manage the traffic at roads and crosswalks; phone calls 
should be placed; Internet connection should be present to perform many daily activities (think 
about paying utility bills, sending work-or leisure-related e-mails, booking flight tickets), at 
least in the Western world. With many devices interconnected through different technological 
 
 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=216111 (2000). Ernst in this regard mentions the role of 
government in US standardization as enabler, coordinator or enforcer, while noting that the clear definition of 
government role in standardization is absent: rather, it is direct and indirect influences to consider; see D. Ernst, 
‘America’s voluntary standards system: a “best practice” model for innovation policy?’ (February 2012) East-
West Center Working Paper No. 128, available at EastWestCenter.org/ewcworkingpapers, p. 3. For examples of 
co-regulation in standard-setting, see P. J. Weiser, ‘Internet governance, standard setting and self-regulation’ 
(2001) 28 Northern Kentucky Law Review 822-46. 
169 See P. Larouche and G. Van Overwalle, ‘Interoperability standards, patents and competition policy’ in 
P. Delimatsis (ed.), The Law, Economics and Politics of International Standardization (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015) 367-93; L. Casini and R. Carotti, ‘A hybrid public-private regime: the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and the governance of the internet’, in S. Cassese (ed.), 
Global Administrative Law (2008) 29-37; K. Nadvi, ‘Global standards, global governance and the organization 
of global value chains’ (2008) 8 Journal of Economic Geography 323-43 at 330; Mattli and Büthe, ‘Setting 
international standards’, pp. 1 and 4. 
170 In fact, with increased economic integration, trade expansion and industry transformation in the second 
half of XX century, national administration were allowed to have their share in formulation of technical standards. 
R. Van Gestel and H. Micklitz, ‘European integration through standardization: how judicial review is breaking 
down the club house of private standardization bodies’ (2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 145-81 at 154-5. 
171 Digitalization, or digital convergence, refers to conversion of information into digital form, and 
subsequent possibility to access this information from everywhere; see Oshri and Weeber, ‘Cooperation and 
Competition’, p. 269.  
172 See European Commission, ‘2019 Rolling Plan for ICT standardization’ (March 2019) available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/2019-rolling-plan-ict-standardisation. 
173 Werle and Iversen, ‘Promoting legitimacy’, p. 23. 
174 To understand the variety of the actors, it is sufficient to look at the membership of many SDOs. 
175 On the issues of intellectual property rights and standards, see Chapter III.5. 
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layers, ICT standards constitute building blocks of information society and are ubiquitous in 
the modern society.176  
 
Perhaps the best example to appreciate the range of actors affected by ICT standards is the 
development of 5th generation (5G) specifications for cellular networks. Being the backbone 
of IoT innovation, 5G reaches a great variety of non-traditional ICT players, including such 
sectors as automotive and agriculture, with the objectives of enabling connected society and 
socioeconomic transformations.177 Due to this long reach, 5G is likely to influence network 
society, international commerce and technology innovation to the extent much greater than its 
predecessors, and hence is also likely to re-shape society. 
 
Against this backdrop, the question arises whether (ICT) standards supplied by SDOs may be 
considered public goods. Such designation is supposedly precluded by the fact that standards 
by definition provide some sort of exclusion – either due to limitations for participation in 
standards development processes,178 or due to access limitation resulting from intellectual 
property rights which may grant some actors stronger bargaining power (i.e. standard essential 
patents and copyrights over standard document). Scholarship typically characterizes standards 
as collective goods or club goods – excludable but non-rivalrous.179  
 
A different picture emerges if one does not consider standards but rather the general outcome 
they aim to achieve; for ICT standards, this outcome is interoperability. As illustrated by the 
example of 5G and IoT, but also by the past generations of wireless standards and protocols, 
interoperability is multidimensional; interoperability ensures network externalities, shapes 
competition on the market and enables communication between people and devices.180 
Although supplied by ICT standards, interoperability still possesses characteristics of a public 
good - non-excludable and non-rivalry. 
 
By shaping and coordinating interactions between people and devices, ICT standards affect 
normative conditions under which firms, governments and societal actors operate. Even if an 
ICT community indeed functions by consent rather than coercion,181 a certain degree of 
coercion is still present in voluntary ICT standards, since those wishing to be a part of network 
society should choose to comply with particular standards.182 By developing ICT standards, 
 
 
176 Werle and Iversen, ‘Promoting legitimacy’. 
177 See European Commission, ‘2019 Rolling Plan for ICT standardization’. 
178 Especially in consortia, where standards may be used to block competitors and deter market entrants 
and are thus “impure public goods”; see P. A. Samuelson, ‘The pure theory of public expenditures’ (1954) 36 The 
Review of Economics and Statistics 387-9.  
179 See Samuelson, ‘The pure theory of public expenditures’, on collective goods; and R. Cornes and T. 
Sandler, The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996) on club goods. Some authors find that standards can be either private or collective goods; C. P. 
Kindleberger, ‘Standards as public, collective and private goods’ (1983) 36 Kyklos 377-96. 
180 See W. A. Sheremata, ‘Competing through innovation in network markets: strategies for challengers’ 
(2004) 29 The Academy of Management Review 359-77.  
181 Werle and Iversen, ‘Promoting legitimacy’. 
182 This compliance and market-pressure is what makes firms to engage in “peer-monitoring” and ostracism 
(i.e. when the market rejects a product), when a device is not compliant with a standard.  
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SDOs thus set normative obligations which govern global network society through an amalgam 
formal and informal rules and regulative arrangements that go beyond governmental 
legislation.183 
 
4. Effectiveness and Legitimacy of Private Governance Regimes 
 
4.1 Defining and measuring effectiveness of non-state regulation 
 
Governance regimes can only exist if they are successful in addressing market failures and 
achieving the goals they were set up to achieve: in that respect, regulation is effective when it 
succeeds in the objectives it pursues.184 In scholarship on private ordering, effectiveness is 
strongly correlated with the performance of institutions: the fundamental elements of 
successful governance of collective action are the stability of the group185 and good information 
flow among its members.186 From the viewpoint of transnational private regulation, 
effectiveness of a regulatory regimes is affected by such governance elements as functional 
separation, membership diversity, inclusiveness, transparency and balanced funding which, 
altogether, ensure balanced and effective decision-making.187 
 
By incentivizing cooperation among different actors, controlling free riding and balancing 
diverse interests, institutions facilitate compliance with their regulatory regimes.188 
Compliance, in turn, is considered one of the key indicators for the effectiveness of 
transnational private regulation.189 It has, however, also been suggested that regulation’s 
effectiveness can be measured by assessing whether a particular rule resolves the intended 
regulatory challenge through its impact, cost-effectiveness, net-benefits, and distributional 
 
 
183 Although tempted by oscillations in the perception of private voluntary standards, this research does 
not join the global chorus of studies aiming to establish the difference between laws and standards; nor does it 
delve into continuous philosophic discussion on what the concept of law is or odd to be, but merely offers a 
theoretical framework for the descriptive and empirical part of the research.  
184 See F. Cafaggi, ‘A comparative analysis of transnational private regulation: legitimacy, quality, 
effectiveness and enforcement’ (2014) EUI Department of Law Research Paper No. 2014/145, p. 5. Note the 
difference with efficiency, which is rather focused on the costs and benefits of the regulatory process than whether 
or not the process actually achieves the stated objectives.  
185 Next tot stability, group’s size and homogeneity are important: the larger the group, the more 
challenging is it for information flows; the more diversified the group, the more difficult it is to coordinate. A. 
Dixit, ‘Governance institutions and economic activity’ (2009) 99 American Economic Review 5-24 at 16. 
186 Ibid.; Information should be available regarding their identify, behaviour, but also which decision is 
considered wrong. Importantly, classification of unacceptable behaviour must match with the information 
available for the actors, see Dixit, ‘Trade expansion’. This is also supported by the fact that heterogenous 
institutions may often lack lobbying strength and struggle to coordinate members behaviour; see, in general, E. 
Ostrom, Governing the Commons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).  
187 See Cafaggi, ‘A comparative analysis’. 
188 Ibid.; Abbott and Snidal, ‘Hard and soft law’. 
189 Other indicators mentioned in established body of literature are the degree of regulatory competition, 
power concentration, number of participants in a regulatory scheme, enforcement, quality of rules and self-
assessment; see Cafaggi, ‘A comparative analysis’. Note, however, that a regime may be ineffective when 
individuals do not engage in joint problem-solving, even though their individual compliance with the norm is 
high; ibid., p. 5. 
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fairness (not necessarily placed into monetary terms),190 and whether it manages to change 
actors’ behavior in a way that solves, reduces or ameliorates the identified regulatory 
problem.191  
 
Admittedly, in the ICT industry, where success or failure are defined by return-on investments 
and speed-to-market,192 assessing the effectiveness of a particular standardization regime is an 
immensely complex multidisciplinary exercise. Hence, rather than delving on an in-depth 
analysis whether a “regulatory regime” invoked by each particular ICT standard scores high or 
low for each of the possible indicators, this study follows a less systematic, but holistic 
approach to effectiveness. It assumes that from the regulator’s perspective, a rule’s 
effectiveness is observed through its uptake and actual implementation: accordingly, in such 
voluntary regulatory setting as standardization, the relevant question to ask would be “why do 
the regulated actors chose to comply with the “rules” (standards)?” From the perspective of the 
regulated, a rule is effective and will induce compliance when it achieves its objectives: adapted 
for ICT standardization, a standard is effective when provides the intended technological 
compatibility, connections or functions; in other words, when it “works.”193  
 
4.2 The nexus between effectiveness and legitimacy in (semi-)private governance    
 
In shaping success of rule-making, effectiveness of a regulatory regime is linked to its 
legitimacy. In the context of non-state regulation, legitimacy as a property attributed to an 
organization has been subjected to a wider academic debate.194 This is not surprising: by 
increasing their capacity to regulate in the most important economic and social sectors,195 
industry rule-makers may misbalance traditional governance structure and change the pattern 
of power.196 Moreover, while affecting a large range of stakeholders, regulation – when 
provided by a homogeneous group of actors – may be captured by particular interests. ICT 
standardization fits to this scenario: despite the infinitely large group of “norm-addressees,” 
 
 
190 Namely, the OECD Expert Paper of 2012 introduces a framework that systematically evaluated the 
performance of regulation and regulatory policies. It describes regulation either as a form adopted by governments 
or other institutional sources, acknowledging that regulation can take different form, and can be a “collection of 
rules.” OECD, ‘Measuring regulatory performance: evaluating the impact of regulation and regulatory policy’ 
(August 2012) Expert Paper No. 1 by C. Coglianese, available at https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-
policy/1_coglianese%20web.pdf. 
191 OECD, ‘Measuring regulatory performance’, pp. 9-10. While this study does not aim to evaluate the 
effectiveness of different standardization regimes as regulation, further studies on process and effectiveness of 
standards using this framework may be helpful to assess specific cases. Note, however, that this framework may 
not be fitting to measure the effectiveness of ICT standards due to the time lapse between bringing the standard 
on the market and standards’ uptake by the industry, as it was explained by the experts. See Chapter V.3. 
192 Ernst, ‘America’s voluntary standards system’, p. 5.  
193 The author acknowledges that this formulation has it flows. However, it is appropriate given that the 
purpose of this study is not to analyse the effectiveness of (a) particular standard(s). 
194 Whilst the legitimacy of private regulatory frameworks was discussed by numerous scholars, the very 
concept of legitimacy is multidimensional and preserves certain obscurity. See A. Hurrelmann, S. Schneider and 
J.  Steffek, ‘Conclusion: legitimacy: making sense of an essentially contested concept’, in A. Hurrelmann, S. 
Schneider and J. Steffek (eds.), Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) 229-
37; see also Bexell, ‘Global governance’, p. 292, discussing legitimacy as organizational property.  
195 See Nadvi, ‘Global standards’, p. 327. 
196 Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance, p. 4.  
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not all affected by ICT standards are equally represented in standards development committees; 
after all, standardization is not a strictly democratic process, but rather a type of epistemic 
regulation bound for creating tensions with democratic control of public and regulatory 
policy.197 
 
Typically understood as one of the elements of the rule’s validity198 and as a justification for 
the authority’s capacity to govern, 199 legitimacy is multifaceted. In a democracy, legitimacy is 
an aspect of governance that is exercised through the right process which initiates a pull 
towards compliance with the rules.200 By the same token, legitimacy informs States’ obedience 
to the rules of international law.201 In multilateral organizations, legitimacy claims are typically 
substantiated by the inclusion of all affected interests,202 which in turn also strengthens the 
effectiveness of the organization’s decisions.203 It is also worth noting that, since the perception 
of the relevance and the validity of institutional activities may vary per actor, legitimacy claims 
may as well compete, posing a challenge on an institution of satisfying them all.204  
 
In rule-making beyond the States, legitimacy claims cannot be derived from legislation or 
governmental administration.205 Rather, legitimacy of transnational private regulation may 
depend on the number of market-based mechanisms it deployed (market legitimacy)206 as well 
as on its voluntary nature and consent of those affected by the regulation (legitimacy of 
arrangement).207 Legitimacy may also be based on the nature of distributional consequences of 
the regulation: in this regard, account should be taken of whether a regulation meets the shared 
broader norms and values of a particular community (substantive legitimacy).208 When 
 
 
197 Since the ultimate decision-making is entrusted to the experts, and not representatives of the whole 
community affected by the regulation. 
198 See N. Hachez and J. Wouters, ‘Promoting the rule of law: a benchmarks approach’ (2013) KU Leuven 
Centre for Global Governance Studies Working Paper No. 105. 
199 See A. Buchannan and R. O. Keohane, ‘The legitimacy of global governance institutions’ (2006) 20 
Ethics and International Affairs 405-37. 
200 See the definition in T. M. Franck, ‘Democracy, legitimacy and the rule of law: linkages’ (1999) 
Working Paper 2, New York University School of Law Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers Series. 
Franck uses an example or an open debate of statutes in congress after public hearing, and the passing of statutes 
by majority.  
201 See, in general, T. M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1990) 
202 This is a “necessary but not sufficient” condition for legitimacy; R. O. Keohane, ‘The contingent 
legitimacy of multilateralism’ (2006) GARNET Working Paper: No 09/06, p. 14. 
203 In this context, legitimacy, quality effectiveness and enforcement are interrelated. Cafaggi, ‘A 
comparative analysis’. However, inclusiveness may also have negative consequences for effectiveness due to cost 
externalization; ibid., 52. 
204 Black, ‘Legitimacy, accountability and polycentric regulation’, p. 253. 
205 See D. Curtin and L. Senden, ‘Public accountability of transnational private regulation: chimera or 
reality?’ (2011) Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance Working Paper Series 2011-06. However, 
when non-State rule-making takes place in non-governmental organizations or professional associations, its 
legitimacy can be derived from organizations’ constitutional documents, such as bylaws and rules of procedure.  
206 Cafaggi, ‘A comparative analysis’, p. 55. 
207 Note that this applies to consent as much as to descent. Value and forms of consent may differ according 
to institutional environment of the organization and regulatory space; Cafaggi, ‘A comparative analysis’, p. 1.  
208 Bexell, ‘Global governance’, p. 2. 
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legitimacy of a regulatory solution is assessed by its potential to address collective action 
problems (output legitimacy),209 it is strongly intertwined with effectiveness.  
 
For obvious reasons, legitimacy in epistemic regulation is informed differently from 
governance schemes that are democratic or underpinned by cross-governmental arrangements.  
Technical complexity and expert-driven decision-making often result in under-representation 
or exclusion of certain interests: to illustrate, environmental and radiation concerns associated 
with the installation of 5G infrastructure have been rarely discussed in SDOs.210 At the same 
time, the continuous need to keep specifications, networks and infrastructure up to date requires 
a rapid and flexible decision-making process, which may often occur at the costs of 
inclusiveness and due process. Arguably, legitimacy in epistemic rule-making can be achieved 
through the structure of the governance process and decision-making mechanisms of an 
institution (procedural legitimacy or input-based legitimacy),211 or derived from the reference 
to the relevant expertise (expert-based legitimacy).212  
 
4.3 Legitimacy in standardization 
 
As it will be demonstrated in the following chapters, standards’ legitimacy is multifaceted. 
Next to their voluntary adoption, inclusiveness and technical quality,213 standards may also be 
legitimized when they are developed by certain SDOs or in accordance with certain procedures. 
In the realm of trade law, standards achieve legitimacy through the development processes of 
international bodies with “recognized standardization activities.”214 At the national level, 
standards can be legitimized through their use in public law, for instance through incorporation 
by reference of voluntary private standards by US regulatory agencies, or through the use of 
ICT standards by the European Commission for its procurement purposes.215 In a similar vein, 
standards can also be legitimized through their accreditation or endorsement by the SDOs of a 
high hierarchical status, such as ANSI or ISO/IEC/JTC1.216 
 
 
209 Output legitimacy debate was initially sparked in political science by Fritz Scharpf; see A. Hurrell, 
‘Legitimacy and the use of force: can the circle be squared?’ (2005) 31 Review of International Studies 15-32. 
Steffek, however, sees output legitimacy as an important democratic dimension, rather than merely the synonym 
for effectiveness; J. Steffek, ‘The output legitimacy of international organizations and the global public interest’ 
(2015) 7 International Theory 263-93. 
210 The author is not in a capacity to judge to which extent these concerns were substantiated. 
211 See Cafaggi, ‘A comparative analysis’; Bexell, ‘Global governance’. 
212 See A. C. Cutler, ‘The legitimacy of private transnational governance: experts and the transnational 
market for force’ (2010) 8 Socio-Economic Review 157-85. 
213 Botzem
 
and Dobusch, ‘Standardization cycles’; M. Boström, and K. Tamm Hallström, ‘NGO power in 
global social and environmental standard-setting’ (2010) 10 Glob. Environmental Politics 36-59; N. Brunsson, 
‘Organizations, markets and standardization’, in N. Brunsson and B. Jacobsson (eds.), A World of Standards (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 23. See Chapter V for further discussion on legitimacy of private 
standards.  
214 As per Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and 
Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R (June 13, 2012), such bodies would have good 
processes in place. See Chapter III.3.  
215 Such recognition arguably signals that standards were developed following follow a correct procedures, 
although it is on regulatory agencies to ultimately verify this. See Chapter III.4. 




As a matter of course, legitimacy of ICT standards would largely depend on their effectiveness 
and acceptance by the industry. Yet, as it will be argued in the following chapters, there are 
more dimensions to the legitimacy of ICT standards than merely their technical excellence. 
Similarly to other types of standards, ICT standards can be legitimized, although admittedly 
only in part, through SDOs’ processes and their compliance with overarching procedural 
requirements of different regulatory frameworks. In this regard, the traditional legitimacy 
mechanisms of private governance regimes, such as those discussed below, may still apply in 
epistemic rule-making, albeit for different reasons than those traditionally invoked in non-State 
regulation, such as accountability of the regulators and democratic deficit.217 
 
5. Good Governance Principles and Meta-Regulation of Industry Rule-Makers 
 
5.1 Legitimacy through accountability and procedural guarantees 
An large body of scholarship on global governance is devoted to the process of legitimation of 
non-state regulatory regimes, justifying or challenging their rule-making authority.218 The 
uptake of regulation arguably depends the process of its legitimation, and whether it meets the 
expectations, believes and interests of its addressees.219 In this regard, legitimacy often appears 
two-dimensional: for a regulation to be legitimate, it should not only be based on correct 
processes (input legitimacy), but also provide effective results (output legitimacy). Yet, good 
rule-making processes may not always lead to good regulatory outcomes, and a strong  pull 
towards compliance with a rule does not necessarily imply that that rule was created following 
the “correct” processes.220  
In this context, one of the crucial components of legitimacy in globalized institutions is 
accountability.221 Accountability in essence represents the process of holding an authority to 
“account” and seeking justification for its actions and decisions.222  Accountability also implies 
the process of “giving account,” whereby regulators are judged based on prior established rules 
and may face consequences in a form of formal or informal sanctions.223 It has been suggested 
in the scholarship that all “power-wielders,” irrespective of the nature of their regulative 
 
 
217 See Chapter V on discussion on legitimacy of ICT standards. 
218 For the overview, see Bexell, who understands “legitimation” as the activity of either seeking or 
granting legitimacy; Bexell, ‘Global governance’. 
219 See Curtin and Senden, ‘Public accountability’, p. 10. 
220 In this regard, Bodansky notes that even when governance norms enjoy popular acceptance, they may 
still be hardly justified from the normative viewpoint, and vice versa. D. Bodansky, ‘The legitimacy of 
international governance: a coming challenge for international environmental law?’ (1999) 93 American Journal 
of International Law 596-624. 
221 Curtain and Senden mention accountability alongside with such principles as authorization and 
representation; Curtin and Senden, ‘Public accountability’, p. 6.  
222 R. W. Grant and R. O. Keohane, ‘Accountability and abuses of power in world politics’ (2005) 99 
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capacity and the regulatory regime in which they operate, should be held accountable to those 
affected by their decisions,224 although such accountability mechanisms may vary depending 
on the impact, forum and authority.225  
In traditional governance models, accountability helps to prevent abuse of power.226 This 
“constitutional” function cannot be easily transformed to international law where, due to the 
limited democratic setting, accountability has been provided through State responsibility and 
liability.227 In global regulatory space, accountability serves as a control mechanism for 
stakeholders affected by regulatory decisions,228 providing (semi-) regulatory institutions with 
the external scrutiny grip and offering opportunities for further learning through improvement 
or public exposure of failure.229 In this regard, accountability represents a form of social 
mechanism that focuses on institutional arrangements where an actor or an organization can 
justify their conduct ex post,230 and is often tied in with such procedural principles as 
transparency, participation and review.231  
While accountability is argued to be a participative and ongoing process that provides ample 
information for the regulated to require justifications from the regulators,232 it is sometimes 
insufficient to address the challenges of global regulation. Some scholars have suggested that 
concerns of global governance bodies giving greater regard to interests of stronger economic 
actors, while ignoring those of less powerful actors, weight more than the alleged 
“accountability crisis” of global governance.233 In certain instances, as when the global 
regulator is pursuing specialized tasks, such “disregard” of some interests may be legitimate; 
yet, the so-called “unjustified disregard” that emerges as a consequence of institutional 
 
 
224 R. O. Keohane, ‘Global governance and democratic accountability’, in D. Held and M. Koenig-
Archibugi (eds.), Taming Globalization: Frontiers of Governance (Oxford: Polity Press, 2003), pp. 130-59; in 
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interests and its alternatives’ (2007) 35 Philosophy and Public Affairs 40-68. 
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accountable standard setters’, in A. Peters et al., Non-State Actors as Standard Setters (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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law’ (2007) 36 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 3-20.  
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229 Ibid., p. 26; see also J. Black, ‘Learning from regulatory disasters’ (2014) LSE Law, Society and 
Economy Working Papers 24/2014. 
230 Curtin and Senden call it “accountability in a narrow sense” as opposed to a “broader sense,” and explain 
it as a normative concept for evaluation of actors’ behaviour and setting certain benchmarks for quality of 
decision-making; Curtin and Senden, ‘Public accountability’, p. 6.  
231 Meidinger, ‘Administrative law’, p. 81; Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, ‘The emergence of global 
administrative law’, p. 17. 
232 Peters, Förster and Koechlin, ‘Towards non-state actors’, p. 524. 
233 See R. B. Stewart, ‘Remedying disregard in global regulatory governance: accountability, participation 
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circumstances of global regulatory governance may become particularly harmful and 
disadvantageous to those weaker parties that are directly affected by the regulatory decision,234 
and lack any effective safeguards to challenge them.  
In light of the concerns of unaccountability and democratic deficit of non-State and expertise-
driven regulation, the growing body of scholarship on global governance has devoted 
scrupulous attention to procedural frameworks of global institutions.235 A normative 
framework for developing and using specific institutional arrangements to address 
accountability, inequity and imbalance of decision-making of the global regulatory bodies is 
often given a connotation of “global administrative law.” As such, global administrative law is 
believed to offer “private law framework for public institutions”236 in times of increased 
proliferation of transnational and global administrative bodies; in that sense, it introduces 
normative elements that may function as mechanisms of constrain and control global rule-
making.237 Procedural principles discussed in the scholarship on global administrative law are 
rooted in national administrative law,238 and can be accommodated in the procedures of many 
institutions, ranging from private bodies to hybrid, heterogeneous groupings with regulatory 
function.239  
5.2 Procedural principles for good global governance 
 
Global regulatory bodies may be governed by different institutional mechanisms, including 
their decision-making rules, tools to hold them or their officials accountable, and regard-
promoting practices such as reason-giving, market competition or reputational influences.240 
The existence and relevance of these mechanisms may vary per sector.241  Nevertheless, some 
normative elements are often regarded by scholars as fundamental procedural principles of 
globalized rule-making.  
One of the most essential mechanism for accountability in global governance is participation. 
Participation facilitates effective policy shaping by providing possibilities to consult those 
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journal of International Law 187-214 at 201. 
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38 
 
affected by a regulatory outcome at the early stage of rule-making and to exchange past 
regulatory experiences.242 Participation can be decisional, relating to the right to vote or have 
an active role in decision-making, and non-decisional, implying the possibilities to provide 
input or submit views to decision-makers.243 At the same time, it is believed that participation 
should be meaningful and effective in the sense that it should allow actors to change the 
outcome by approval or acceptance processes.244  
Depending on the setting and decision to be made, active and effective participation has certain 
flaws. Making international bargaining more accessible might have detrimental effects, 
possibly leading to breakdowns in negotiations.245 To support organizational effectiveness, 
global institutions with specialized tasks  may restrict decision-making authority to those actors 
having specific knowledge and expertise in the matter.246 However, while such institutional 
setting may seem beneficial for some sectors, cherry-picking of participation rules may 
jeopardize the functioning of accountability mechanisms, rendering them “a meaningless ritual 
of justifying conduct by answering only those questions that the answer-able party has decided 
upon.”247  
When discussing participation in regulatory decision-making, political science and theory often 
make a recourse to the so-called “all affected principle” – a rationale that those affected by a 
decision should be able to take part in the processes that reached that decision.248 While initially 
understood as providing for democratic legitimation,249 the all affected principle remains of 
relevance in a non-democratic setting.250 Naturally, the critique on the principle is its 
impracticality to involve virtually everyone in decision-making processes,251 possible 
constraints of legal systems due to extraterritorial application of many national laws,252  as well 
as its incoherence and uncertainty with regard to the benchmark of “being affected.”253 And 
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while some scholars argued for a broad, “possibilist” interpretation of this principle,254 others 
suggest that exclusion of certain actors does not per se generate a democratic deficit; rather,  
those effectively affected by a particular regulatory choice should be identified empirically, 
and their involvement in decision-making should then be assessed on the basis of this empirical 
analysis.255  
Another institutional tool of global governance is transparency. To be considered transparent, 
an organization should provide its stakeholders with information that is accessible and 
timely:256 to facilitate the operation of accountability mechanisms, such information should 
include, for example, financial statements, evaluations and reports.257 In terms of public 
scrutiny, transparency would imply, inter alia, the availability of an organization’s regulatory 
outcomes, the visibility of its decisions and access to the resources that motivate the regulatory 
outcomes and decisions.258 The provision of this information may be “active” as well as 
“passive,” the latter meaning that the information is supplied upon request.259 Transparency is 
essential for the functioning of a multi-stakeholder organization,260 for its absence generally 
results in information asymmetry within the group of interested actors, and affects the uptake 
of the regulation.261  
 
Accountability of global governance regimes is further facilitated by the requirement to give 
reasons for regulatory decisions.262 Justifying regulatory choices increases the quality of the 
rule and its chance to be endorsed by the regulated actors.263 It also restrains the power of 
stronger parties and ideally, ensures the balance between regulatory actors.264 Since reason- 
giving requires financial, human and regulatory resources, possibilities to comment on 
proposed decisions and obtain review of these comments is mostly used in better financed and 
better organized institutions; in many global regimes, the lack of obligation of reason-giving is 
restricted not only by resource constraints, but also by consideration of confidentiality or 
administrative efficiency.265 To avoid organizational inefficiency and unnecessary 
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administrative or legal burdens, reason-giving should fit the specialized mission and goals of 
the regulator.266  
Availability of appeal and/or review mechanism, while being an important part of 
contemporary Western administrative systems, is also relevant in the context of global 
governance 267 Yet, whereas in domestic administrative law, the right of an individual affected 
by a decision to have it reviewed by an independent tribunal is essential,268 this is not always 
the case for global and transnational setting, where organizations might maintain their own 
adjudication or review mechanisms. In this regard, review can be either direct – to determine 
the validity of a particular regulatory decision, – or indirect, when the decision is invoked in 
the proceedings before a court.269 It should be noted, however, that adjudicatory review of an 
institution’s decision may sometimes disrupt interactions within this institution and impede its 
proper societal functioning, since such independent review often lacks knowledge of the 
special needs of the specific transaction.270 
The suggested list of normative elements for global governance is rather illustrative and should 
be viewed as meta-regulation: the discussed procedural principles provide guidance to global 
regulatory bodies when designing their governance frameworks. Implementation of these 
principles will largely depend on the institutions’ mission, specialized tasks and operational 
sector. Yet, these principles prove extremely useful when setting the benchmark for good 
governance practices in global regulatory space, and hence are relevant for the further analysis 
of this study.  
5.3 Legitimation through procedures  
  
The surveyed literature on transnational law, transnational private regulation and global 
administrative law suggests that non-State regulatory regimes can be legitimized through their 
institutional and procedural settings,271 including such features as participation of affected 
stakeholders, transparency and review of decisions. By and large, this rationale applies to 
specialized bodies whose decisions constrain the behavior of different actors, including SDOs 
producing global ICT standards for interoperability and wireless connectivity. Arguably, while 
the processes shaping these behaviors ought to be legitimized by those whom they constrain,272 
“disregard” of some interests may be justifiable once the specialized interests’ group is 
narrowed down to those effectively affected by the regulatory decision.273 In this context, 
procedural mechanisms in the governance bodies serve as plausible tools to address and 
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268 Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, ‘The emergence of global administrative law’, p. 39.  
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balance this disregard, as long as the “weaker” parties make an effective use of such 
mechanisms. Hence, it takes both regulators and regulated to ensure that the good governance 
principles are implemented and functioning in various global governance regimes. 
 
6. Problematization and Research Agenda 
 
6.1 Further research on SDOs as institutions of global governance 
 
As noted earlier, by regulating markets and defining infrastructure for one of the most 
important economic sectors, ICT standardization affects a wide range of actors: ICT standards 
constrain the behavior of companies on downstream and upstream market, spark the interest of 
regulatory agencies due to such intrinsic issues as radio frequencies allocation, privacy and 
cybersecurity and, by contributing to the provision of public goods, also affect civil society. 
ICT standardization is thus a form of global governance, albeit extremely complex and highly 
specialized. And, although the proper functioning of this governance regime largely depends 
on industry experts, inclusion of non-technical concerns and public interest consideration 
becomes increasingly relevant due to the rapid evolvement and promulgation of global ICT 
standardization bodies. 
 
What mechanisms exist to achieve the balance of different interests in ICT standardization? 
How can the decision-making processes of SDOs be shielded from capture by a single actor or 
a particular interest group? To what extent, if at all, are the procedural meta principles for 
global regimes implemented in the frameworks of SDOs? How should these principles be 
implemented not to hamper SDOs’ specialized mission and not to affect their technical 
performance, while at the same time, ensuring the legitimacy of their decisions? And finally, 
how does the institutional structure of SDOs influence the uptake of their standards, if at all?  
 
These questions are challenging, especially given the great variety of SDOs and the wide range 
of their standards. They become even more challenging for SDOs operating in ICT sector since, 
more than other types of standards, ICT standards are subjected to continuous updates, 
modifications and adjustment to the market needs: after all, ICT standardization is an ongoing 
process where technologies are developed in parallel with, or “on top of” other technologies, 
often through the work of multiple bodies.274 The processes of ICT standardization are 
moreover complicated by the fact that implementation of a standard may be rendered 
conditional upon the access to essential proprietary technologies - this, as such, complicates 
the analysis of ICT standardization as a global governance regime providing public goods, and 
may even question the appropriateness of  the meta principles for non-State regulatory bodies. 
Against this backdrop, a comparative institutional analysis of ICT standardization bodies is 
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necessary to shed light on their procedural safeguards, accountability mechanisms and 
legitimacy from public policy viewpoint.275 
 
6.2. Addressing the research gaps   
 
6.2.1 Legal framework: comparative and sectoral analysis 
 
Legal framework governing standard-setting and standards development processes has been 
thoroughly studied in the relevant scholarship. Yet, while the procedural safeguards of the 
WTO, EU and US legal systems governing standardization processes have been analysed on 
numerous occasions,276 a comparative study on different legal frameworks is still missing. 
Similarly, only very few studies have addressed the sectoral application of these procedural 
principles,277 and even fewer of them were related to the ICT industry.278 Meanwhile, the 
substantial majority of academic work on ICT standardization tends to overlook the issue of 
governance and procedural principles of standards development, focusing on intellectual 
property and antitrust concerns. Hence, a comparative study on the most relevant procedural 
frameworks governing ICT standardization will make a positive contribution to the current 
body of scholarship.   
Especially in the EU context, normative analysis of procedural principles against which SDOs 
can be scrutinized is appropriate due to the recent jurisprudence of the CJEU. In its landmark 
decision in the case James Elliott, the Court confirmed its jurisdiction over harmonized 
European standards developed by ESOs;279 yet, given, the unlikelihood of the judges 
examining the substance of technical standards, it is feasible that the Court will examine the 
procedure that lead to the establishment of these standards. This also applies to the US system, 
where private standards and codes and often referenced by federal governments: in fact, the 
issue of openness and these standards in terms of their accessibility has been frequently 
discussed by US Courts.280 Hence, even if the development of ICT standards is driven entirely 
by the efforts of industry, public law frameworks are nevertheless relevant for organizational 
success of private SDOs.281 
 





275 For the need for sectoral analysis, see also Mattli and Büthe, ‘Setting international standards’. 
276 I.e. Delimatsis, ‘Global standard-setting 2.0’. 
277 I.e. sustainability; E. Partiti ‘What use of an unloaded gun? The substantive discipline of the WTO TBT 
Code of Good Practice and its application to private standards pursuing public objectives’ (2017) 20 Journal of 
International Economic Law 829-54. 
278 JRC Report. 
279 Case C-613/14, James Elliott Ltd. v. Irish Asphalt Ltd. 
280 See the recent case American Society for Testing & Materials v. Public.Resource.org, Inc. No. 1:13-
cv-01215 (TSC), 2017 WL 473822, (DDC Feb. 2, 2017).   
281 After all, successful governance in standardization is often a blend of private and public ordering, 




As mentioned earlier, most of the studies on ICT standardization fall short on analysing the 
issues related to the governance and procedural issues: a notable exception would be the SDOs’ 
policies on disclosure and licensing of patented technologies.282 Yet, a comprehensive analysis 
of SDOs mechanics and governance models is crucial for understanding whether and how can 
the principles of good governance be embodies into their institutional architecture, and to what 
extent have these meta principles already been implemented in the governance frameworks of 
different SDOs.  
 
This type of analysis should not be limited to SDOs’ standards development; rather, the 
institutional frameworks should be examined holistically, including such processes as 
nominating or electing executive organizations’ officials, accepting new members and 
contributors, drafting procedures for selecting and approving technical specifications and 
standards, and resolving disagreements between members and contributors. In this regard, 
Ostrom suggest that a smooth functioning of organization is ensured by the three 
complementary “levels” of rules namely operational,283 collective-choice284 and constitutional-
choice rules,285 where a change at one level of rules also influences the other levels.286 SDOs’ 
technical processes, as well as eventually their outcomes, are thus affected by broad set of 
institutional rules, which may both offer procedural guarantees and open avenues for strategic 
behavior and even free-riding. It is only by grasping the different level of rules that SDOs’ 
governance processes may be fully understood and further analysed in the context of 
procedural safeguards and legitimacy.   
 
Earlier scholarship suggested the “mimetic isomorphism” of SDOs’ organizational 
structures.287 Yet, SDOs in ICT sector vary a lot in terms of their institutional architecture and 
governance models, in part due to the increased proliferation of consortia in narrow 
technological fields. Accordingly, it should be acknowledged from the outset that no single 
form of governance mechanisms can be considered “best,” and that the analysis of an SDO’s 
institutional architecture should be performed with due consideration to that SDO’s operational 
field as well as to the legal context in which that SDO operate. Nevertheless, a comparative 
study of different SDOs is appropriate in the context of this research, since it allows to observe 
how the elements of good governance are implemented in different institutional settings and 
which alternatives are feasible when the traditional administrative principles of due process are 
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unavailable. This, in turn, contributes to the broader understanding of SDO’s resilience and 
evolvement as institutions of global governance.  
 
6.2.3 Empirical evidence on procedural guarantees 
 
Institutional analysis of SDOs’ governance will be only marginally relevant without practical 
considerations. As such, an empirical analysis of procedural safeguards in SDOs is largely 
absent in the scholarship on ICT standardization. How do SDOs implement the good 
governance principles in practice?288 What are the experiences of different actors of ICT 
standardization with different governance models? These questions can be answered by means 
of qualitative case studies, empirical observations and experiences shared by those 
participation in the work of  SDOs.289 Naturally, the answers to these questions come with 
caveats: case studies may be limited, empirical observations may not provide sufficient 
evidence to draw any conclusions, and experts’ views may be subjective. Yet, empirical 
findings will greatly facilitate understanding of the multifaceted ecosystem of ICT 
standardization and will make an important  step towards bringing the theory on SDOs’ 




Amid various forms of private regulatory arrangements, ICT standardization is one of the most 
multifaceted types of non-State governance. Its complexity lies not only in sophisticated 
technological features of ICT infrastructure, but also in the fact that as such, the regulatory role 
of ICT standards is not always apparent. Indeed, standards are voluntary technical rules 
supplied by industry players operating in many expert-driven SDOs. Yet, with the increased 
reliance on technical interoperability and connectivity between devices, such voluntary ICT 
standards have a remarkable capacity to steer the behavior of market actors and societal 
stakeholders, and ultimately constitute an important part of non-State rule-making. The 
question arises how can standards developers safeguard the interests of those affected by their 
decisions, and whether accountability mechanisms for ICT standardization governance are 
sufficient to address the arising regulatory concerns. 
 
To compensate for the short-comings of non-democratic regulation, private governance 
regimes offer procedural mechanisms to hold private regulators accountable and to ensure 
legitimacy of their rule-making. These processes are addressed in this chapter as “good 
governance principles” and include participation, transparency and review. Although discussed 
by a rich body of scholarship, these procedural principles will only become valuable when fine-
tuned to a specialized regulatory regime.  
 
 
288 See also Kallestrup, who concludes that there is a need for further empirical research for assessing 
stakeholders’ participation in European standardization process in the light of its nature as co-regulation; M. 
Kallestrup, ‘Stakeholder participation in European standardization: a mapping and an assessment of three 
categories of regulation’ (2017) 44 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 381-94. 




ICT standardization is thus complex not only from the technical viewpoint, but also from the 
viewpoint of law and governance, and further legal, institutional and empirical analysis are 
required to properly appreciate the global ecosystem of ICT standardization. In this regard, the 
next chapter will discuss which legal rules and procedural mechanisms are applicable to global 








By and large, SDOs are self-governing institutions and conduct their business according to the 
operational rules established by their governing authorities. Next to those “internal” 
constraints, SDOs operate within “external” constraints placed by public law.290 Unlike their 
governance and operational rules, SDOs have no direct control over these constraints and, in 
principle, have to comply with these external requirements in order for their standards to be 
legitimized under a particular legal system or even, not to breach certain legal provisions that 
apply to SDOs’ activities.  
 
This chapter addresses such “external” constraints by discussing the regulatory frameworks 
that apply to global ICT SDOs, namely those of the World Trade Organization (WTO), United 
States (US) and European Union (EU) national and competition/antitrust law frameworks.291 
To that end, it reviews the applicable legal provisions and the relevant case law. Given the 
importance of procedural safeguards for legitimation of private rule-making, this chapter 
further focuses on procedural principles stemming from each of these frameworks, and 
provides a holistic overview of the meaning of these principles under the applicable regulatory 
frameworks. Ultimately, the chapter concludes by identifying the shortcomings of each of the 
legal mechanisms with regard to the current challenges in ICT standardization.  
 
2. Regulatory Regimes for Standardization 
 
2.1 Addressing private standardization under public law    
In spite of their voluntary nature, standards may penetrate public law dimension by being 
transformed into binding requirements, for instance when referenced by public law provisions 
on in private contracts;292 likewise, standards may also be used to pursue public interest 
objectives that are typically promoted by governmental bodies, such as product safety or 
consumer protection.293 Since technical standardization by industry-driven bodies possesses 
attributes of public function,294 it comes as no surprise that SDOs, while enjoying a high degree 
of self-regulation, operate under certain legal constraints imposed by public law frameworks. 
In this context, public dimension of ICT and interoperability standards mainly arises from their 
effects on trade and competition;295 this, however, does not exclude administrative or 
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contractual law concerns that may arise from the use of interoperability standards.296 Hence, 
SDOs are constrained by multiple legal frameworks, each of them offering a mechanism for 
legitimization of standards in a particular legal domain.  
Given standards’ technical complexity and narrow focus, there is little likelihood of their 
content to be regulated or interpreted by public legal frameworks or by courts: such active 
governmental involvement in the substance of industry requirements may further undermine 
expertise-driven processes and risks regulatory capture.297 Instead, as it appears from the 
remainder of this chapter, legal constraints and mechanisms for judicial review are directed at 
the processes of developing, adopting and implementing technical standards and specification, 
and aim to ensure that those do not emerge as a result of an unlawful conduct.  
 
2.2 Identifying regulatory regimes governing SDOs’ activities  
 
In one way or another, every SDO that has offices and is administered by staff members 
operates under constraints of national laws: for instance, a standard-setting institution may be 
incorporated as a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) (i.e. IEEE, USB Implementers 
Forum), an association of professionals (i.e. International Bar Association, Association of 
Climate Change Officers) or a semi-public body (i.e. ISO/IEC, ETSI). Hence, even when 
producing global standards, SDOs cannot escape legal requirements of the State of their 
incorporation, including the relevant provisions of national administrative, corporate and 
competition law. By and large, most global ICT SDOs are incorporated in the US and the EU, 
even though some regional SDOs are important players in global ICT standardization 
partnership (i.e. Association of Radio Industries and Businesses (ARIB), China 
Communications Standards Association (CCSA) and Telecommunications Standards 
Development Society of India (TSDSI)).298 
 
Next to national legal requirements, SDOs are also expected to observe the rules of 
international commerce. Trade law concerns associated with standardization arise from the fact 
that standards may be manipulated to create trade barriers by imposing regulatory requirements 
that are unnecessary stringent or discriminative, or by simply pushing up compliance costs for 
companies.299 The latter is especially burdensome for producers and exporters from developing 
 
 
296 Think about the disputes on the licensing rates of intellectual property embedded into standards, that in 
most States take place in the realm of contractual law; or the obligatory nature of private ICT standards, such as 
ISO 14001 for cybersecurity, in the realm of national administrative law. 
297 See Chapter II n. 136 and accompanied text.  
298 Those organizations are also partners in the leading global SDOs developing 5G and IoT standards, 
such as 3GPP and OneM2M.  
299 See, for instance, R. W. Staiger and A. Sykes, ‘International trade, national treatment and domestic 
tegulation’ (2011) 40 Journal of Legal Studies 149-203; R. Howse, ‘A new device for creating international legal 
normativity: the technical barriers to trade agreement and international standards’, in C. Joerges and E. U. 
Petersmann (eds.), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation (Hart Publishing: 
2006). In the past decade, the amount of regulatory measures based on standards and that were notified to TBT 
Committee, as well as the number of Specific Trade Concerns (STCs) raised by Members in the TBT Committee 
meetings, have increased; see the graphs from ‘Technical barriers to trade: reducing trade friction from standards 
and regulation’ (2015) available at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/20y_e/tbt_brochure2015_e.pdf; 
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countries due to lack of resources, knowledge or infrastructure, which often results in these 
States’ isolation from a number of Western markets.300 Moreover,  recent years have witnessed 
mounting concerns of trade obstacles arising from the use of technologies: measures related to 
the prevention of cyber-attacks or espionage, such as mandatory security certification of 
network elements,301 prohibition for governmental agencies to use hardware supplied by 
foreign manufacturers,302 and refusal to cooperate with certain infrastructure suppliers in the 
rollout of the new generation of cellular networks due to the threat to national security303 are 
gradually emerging into the wider arena of international trade.  
 
Alongside these controversial trade issues, standardization processes are characterized by 
competition and antitrust concerns. While in the realm of network industries, coordination of 
technologies is critical for innovative efficiency,304 information sharing between undertakings 
during standards development meetings poses the risk of SDOs becoming vehicles of 
collusion.305 Cases of alleged exclusion from standardization process or conspiracy against 
certain SDO member(s) have been considered, among other, in the US and EU, where they  
served as a basis for clarifying competition law frameworks applicable to standardization 
activities.306  
 
More frequently, however, competition concerns arising from ICT standardization relate to 
single-firm conducts, namely when owners of technologies that are essential for a standards’ 
functioning abuse their dominant position by setting excessive licensing fees and seeking 
injunctions against implementers that are not willing to accept the proposed royalty rates.307 
 
 
G/TBT/37; Seventh Triennial Review of the Operation and Implementation of the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade under Article 15.4 (3 December 2015) WTO Doc. G/TBT/37, Chart 1 – Total TBT Notifications 
in per Triennial Review period, at 12. 
300 Think of mandatory testing in the laboratories of importing countries as well as the requirements for 
laboratories of exporting countries; see Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Minutes of the Meeting of 9-
10 March 2016, G/TBT/M/68, paras. 2.2.3.39, 2.2.3.49, and more specifically para. 2.322. 
301 Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Minutes of the Meeting of 9-10 March 2016, G/TBT/M/68, 
para. 2.2.3.3, where India deviates from Common Criteria Recognition Arrangements (CCRA) for testing 
procedures: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/ccra/.  
302 H.R. 4747, 115th Cong. (2018); Federal Acquisition Regulation; FAR Case 2018-017, Prohibition on 
Contracting for Certain Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services or Equipment (August 7, 2019) (to 
be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3, 12, 13, 39, & 52). 
303 For further explanation of 5G and national security issues, see J. P. Kleinhans, ‘5G vs. national security: 
a European perspective’ (February 2019) available at www.stiftung-
nv.de/sites/default/files/5g_vs._national_security.pdf. 
304 See C. Shapiro and H. W. Varian, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy. 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 1998). 
305 US Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, ‘Can there be a “one-world approach” to competition 
law?’, remarks of principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Renata B. Hesse at the Chatham House Conference 
on Globalization of Competition Policy (2016) available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/principal-deputy-
assistant-attorney-general-renata-b-hesse-delivers-remarks-chatham-house, where Mrs. Hesse highlights the near 
unanimity around the world about the importance of discovering and prosecuting cartels.  
306 See section 5 of this chapter.  
307 Licenses disputes generally take place more often than injunctions; see R. Sikorski, ‘Enforcing patent 
pledges under EU law’, in J. L. Contreras and M. Jacob (eds.), Patent Pledges: Global Perspectives on Patent 
Law’s Private Ordering Frontier (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2017) 168-88. Note that competition law concerns 
discussed here arise not as much as regarding patents but their application. Note also that this study does not 
discuss the issue of patentability. 
49 
 
While royalty payments protect innovators against free-riding on their creations and, ideally, 
ensure their appropriate reward308 and encourage future innovative contributions, access to 
technologies incorporated into standards for the reason of their technical or commercial 
essentiality remains imperative for making devices standard-compliant.309 This may result in a 
two-dimensional problem: from the one side, technology-owners may employ strategies that 
effectively preclude access to a standard; from the other, technology-implementers may agree 
on practices that will devaluate the technology and result in licensing rates that are extremely 
low in the current market context.310   
 
Whereas legal concerns related to ICT standardization also stem from such legal fields as  
contract law, privacy law and data protection law, the scope of this study is limited to the three 
analytical frameworks, systematically analysed in this chapter: international trade law, 
national/regional law and competition law. Requirements imposed by international trade law 
are the evident starting point of every legal analysis of standardization processes since, as it 
will be demonstrated in the further section, other procedural frameworks rely on the principles 
introduced by the WTO. For national/regional law and competition, the evident choices are the 
US and the EU regulatory frameworks: first, most of the global SDOs developing ICT 
standards have legal ties to either of the two States and second, Western standardization 
systems served as examples for the emerging regional standardization models.311   
 
3. The WTO regulatory framework 
 
3.1 Standards under WTO law  
 
Regulation of standards and their development by the WTO, even if only partial, is not 
astonishing, given standards’ significance for international trade. As a government-driven 
international organization,312 the WTO formulates rules of international commerce and 
provides for its Members mechanisms to establish a common framework for trade-related 
measures, as well as to seek solutions to arising concerns, either by means of discussions in 
one of the WTO Committees,313 or through the unique dispute settlement mechanism.314 In this 
 
 
308 Cabral and Salant, ‘Evolving technologies’, p. 51.  
309 Note that technical essentiality implies that technologies become essential due to the lack of any 
alternative methods, while commercial essentiality – that alternative methods are commercial or substantially 
inferior. J. Baron and T. Pohlmann, ‘Mapping standards to patents using databases of declared standard-essential 
patents and systems of technological classification’ (2015) available at 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-
faculty/searlecenter/innovationeconomics/documents/Baron_Pohlmann_Mapping_Standards.pdf, at 2, n. 3.  
310 See N. Zingales and O. Kanevskaia, ‘The IEEE-SA patent policy update under the lens of EU 
competition law’ (2016) 12 European Competition Journal 195-235 at 205. 
311 See, in this regard, Ernst, ‘America’s voluntary standards system’. 
312 At the moment of writing, WTO counts 164 States as Members and 23 as Observers. 
313 The WTO Committees cover different topics and provide a forum to discuss measures adopted by 
Members and to seek resolutions to arising disputes (i.e. Trade and Development Committee, Committee on Trade 
in Financial Services, Committee on Market Access, etc.). For the overview of all current WTO bodies and 
Committees, see ‘WTO Organizational Chart’ https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org2_e.htm. 
314 For the further discussion of the WTO dispute settlement see, among many others, D. McRae, 
‘Measuring the effectiveness of WTO dispute settlement system’ (2008) 3 Asian Journal of WTO & International 
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regard, the WTO system attaches cardinal importance to regulatory consistency in Members’ 
trade policies. The requirements of eliminating discriminatory, unnecessary trade-restrictive 
regulations were introduced already with the establishment of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)315 and are widely employed in WTO Agreements and case law.316  
 
Most standards discussed in the context of WTO law are established by non-governmental 
bodies in the field of food safety, labelling or environment.317 Concerns associated with those 
standards relate to their potential to create trade barriers and impede access to Members’ 
markets.318 Legal provisions governing the use and development of standards are introduced 
in the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), its Annexes and decisions,319 and are 
often referred to in global standardization practices. In this context, it has been argued that the 
TBT Agreement provides mechanisms to extend Members’ substantive obligations as regards 
standards development processes to various types of SDOs.320 These obligations, together with 
the relevant provisions of the TBT Agreement, are explained the next section.  
 
3.2 TBT Agreement  
 
The TBT Agreement entered into force in 1995, replacing the – comparatively limited – 
plurilateral “Standards Code” of 1979. Requirements imposed by the TBT are supplementary 
 
 
Health Law and Policy 1-20 and J. Weiler ‘The rule of lawyers and the ethos of diplomats: reflections on the 
internal and external legitimacy of WTO dispute settlement’ (2000) Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/00.  
315 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947), 61 Stat. pt. 5 TIAS 1700 55 UNTS 194 (hereinafter: 
GATT) 
316 A. O. Sykes, ‘Regulatory consistency requirements in international trade’ (2017) 49 Arizona State Law 
Journal 821-66. The principles of Most-Favored Nations and National Treatment of GATT, Articles I and III:4 
respectively, are fundamental in the WTO system, and require no discrimination for foreign imports either against 
their own products or products from other Members.   
317 See examples in E. Partiti ‘What use of an unloaded gun?’. 
318 See above n. 299. 
319 While not as such relevant for the purpose of these study, the other WTO agreement covering standards 
is the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 1867 UNTS 493 (SPS Agreement), 
which only applies to binding measures and, while containing provisions that are parallel to TBT, has a narrower 
scope. Another WTO agreement that may apply to ICT standards is the General Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property, 1869 UNTS 299 33 ILM 1197 (TRIPS). Yet also this agreement is rather limited; 
so far, the topic of technology standardization and cross-border trade have only been raised in bilateral and 
multilateral trade dialogues, such as the US - China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, although some 
Members have also voiced their concerns regarding the regulation of ICT standardization at the meetings of TRIPS 
and TBT Committees. See X. Wu, ‘Interplay between patents and standards in the information and communication 
technology (ICT) sector and its relevance to the implementation of the WTO Agreements’ (2017) WTO Working 
Paper ERSD - 2017-08; B. An, ‘Intellectual property rights in information and communications technology 
standardization: highly profiled disputes and collaboration potentials between the United States and China’ (2009) 
45 Texas International Law Journal 175-99. See also US-China Joint Fact Sheets on the 25th, 26th and 27th U.S.- 




320 See, among others, M. Mataija, ‘Leveraging trade law for governance reform: the impact of the WTO 
agreement on technical barriers to trade on private standard-setting’ (2019) 2 European Review of Private Law 
293-318; E. van der Zee, ‘Disciplining private standards under the SPS and TBT Agreement: a plea for market-
state procedural guidelines’ (2018) 52 Journal of World Trade 393-414; Partiti, ‘What use of an unloaded gun?’. 
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to those arising from the GATT;321 yet, the TBT does not only assess whether a certain measure 
constitutes an unjustifiable trade obstacle, but also deals with its preparation and application. 
The Agreement covers three types of measures: technical regulations, (international) standards 
and conformity assessment procedures (the latter used to determine whether requirements in 
the technical regulations or standards are fulfilled and as such, fall outside the scope of this 
study.)322 The main distinction between technical regulations and standards appears from 
Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement which mirrors the definitions of the ISO/IEC Guide 2 (2004)323 
and characterizes technical regulations as “mandatory,” and standards as “not mandatory.324 
The difference between these two types of measures is crucial for the proper application of the 
TBT provisions and was further clarified by WTO case law.  
 
3.2.1 Technical Regulation 
  
Annex 1of the TBT Agreements defines technical regulation as a document that lays down 
characteristics for products and processes, such as terminology, packaging or labelling, with 
which compliance is mandatory.325 In EC –Asbestos, the Appellate Body326 noted that technical 
regulations should cover identifiable products and provide for mandatory compliance.327 This 
case law was further developed in EC-Sardines, which took a rather broad approach and put 
forward three conditions for a measure to be considered technical regulation under the TBT 
Agreement: (1) application to an identifiable product or group of products; (2) specification of 
one or more products characteristic; (3) mandatory compliance.328 With regard to the second 
prong, the Appellate Body appears to accept a broad range of requirements as product 
characteristics;329 with regard to the third prong, the Appellate Body emphasized legal 
implications of a measure for product’s marketing as a significant factor of its classification as 
a technical regulation.330 Remarkably, the Appellate Body has also accepted classification of 
 
 
321 Appellate Body Report, EC-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos – Containing Products, 
WT/DS135/AB/R (12 March 2001) (hereinafter: EC-Asbestos), para. 80; a measure qualifying is as a technical 
regulation, discussed under the TBT, should also be dealt with under Article XX(b) of the GATT when it when it 
relates to health concerns; see M. Matsushita et al., The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice, and Policy 
(Oxford: Oxford International Law Library, 2015), p. 488, with reference to ABR European Communities – 
Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (hereinafter: EC-Bananas), issued 9 September 
1997. However, when a technical regulation constitutes an SPS measure, it is considered under the SPS 
Agreement; see Article 1.5 of the TBT Agreement. 
322 See the definitions in Annex 1.3 of the TBT Agreement.  
323 ISO/IEC Guide 2 (2004). 
324 Annex1.1 and 2 of the TBT Agreement. 
325 Annex 1.1 of TBT Agreement.  
326 The Appellate Body is the main adjudicative body of the WTO. 
327 EC-Asbestos, paras. 68, 70-72. 
328 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R 
(Sep. 26, 2002) (hereinafter: EC-Sardines), paras. 176-186. 
329 The examples are the measures discussed in Appellate Body Report, US – Certain Country of Origin 
Labelling (COOL) Requirements WTO Doc. WT/DS384/ARB, WT/DS386/ARB (June 29, 2012) (hereinafter: 
US-COOL) and Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and 
Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R (June 13, 2012) (hereinafter: US-Tuna II), which 
went beyond physical characteristics of products or the method of their production.  
330 EC-Sardines, paras. 251-7. 
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measures that were seemingly voluntary as “technical regulation,” when the use of alternative 
measures to prove compliance with certain legal requirements was prohibited.331 
 
The TBT Agreement essentially aims to balance Members’ right to adopt technical regulations 
pursuing legitimate objectives of its Article 2.2, such as protection of human health or safety, 
with the WTO’s aim to promote liberalization of international trade.332 Consequently, it 
provides Members with certain flexibility to develop restrictive policies while acting in 
accordance with the Agreement,333 and ensures that such policy space is not abused by 
Members seeking to protect their own markets. Next to the general Most-Favored Nation 
(MFN) Treatment and National Treatment obligations,334 the TBT Agreement includes 
elements of negative integration, requiring that Members’ technical regulations are not 
designed to frustrate trade,335 are not more trade-restrictive than necessary for fulfilling 
legitimate policy objectives,336 and are not maintained in case the objective of circumstances 
have changed.337 
 
3.2.2 Standards and International Standards 
Within the context of this study, technical regulations become especially relevant when 
standards that are in principle voluntary, are converted into mandatory requirements.338 In this 
regard, article 2.4 TBT obliges Members to use international (emphasis added) standards as a 
basis for their technical regulations,339 meaning that there should be “a very strong and 
substantive relationship between the regulation and the substance of a standard.”340 Technical 
regulations adopted in accordance with this provision enjoy a rebuttable presumption of not 
impeding international trade. Members may depart from international standards when those are 
“ineffective or inappropriate” for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued by 
Members’ technical regulation:341 a lion’s share of trade concerns raised in the TBT Committee 
deals exactly with Members’ technical regulations deviating from international standards, for 
instance for the reason of security. 
 
 
331 US-Tuna II; Mataija, ‘Leveraging trade law’, p. 301.  
332 ABR United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes WTO Doc. 
WT/DS406/AB/R (4 April 2012) (hereinafter: US-Clove Cigarettes), issued 4 April 2012, para. 96. Note that this 
list is not limited - the EC-Sardines specified market transparency, consumer protection and fair competition as 
legitimate objective.  
333 Wijkstrom and McDaniels, ‘International standards’, p. 4. 
334 Article 2.1 of TBT Agreement. 
335 Article 2.2 of TBT Agreement. 
336 Ibid. For the definition of necessity under Article 2.2, see US-COOL, paras. 374-9.  
337 Article 2.3 of TBT Agreement. 
338 See Chapter II.3. 
339 Except when those are ineffective to achieve the legitimate objective. According to Howse, this 
requirement should be understood in terms of reasonableness, meaning that there must be a reasonable relationship 
between the international standard and the domestic regulation; see Howse, ‘A new device’. Note however that 
the notion of reasonable relationship was been rejected by the Appellate Body in EC-Sardines, paras. 247-8. The 
burden of proof in this case lies on complaining Member(s).  
340 EC-Sardines, para. 245.  
341 Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.  
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A standard is defined under the TBT Agreement as document that is approved by a recognized 
body and with which compliance is not mandatory.342 The concept of a “recognized body” 
comes to the forefront when assessing whether a standard can be classified as an international 
standard within the meaning of the TBT,343 for international standards are approved by an 
international body or system offering its membership to all WTO members344 and whose 
standardization activities have been “recognized” by them.345 Moreover, as confirmed by the 
Appellate Body in US-Tuna II, international bodies with “recognized standardization 
activities” retain certain procedural and substantive features encompassed in the TBT 
Committee Decision346 discussed below.   
The TBT Agreement provides no further definition of the  term “international standard.” While 
its’ Annex 1 stipulates that standards prepared by the international standardization community 
are based on consensus, the Agreement also appears to cover standards that are not consensus-
based.347 In its ruling in US –Tuna II, the Appellate Body clarified that for the purpose of the 
TBT Agreement, international standards do not need to be based on consensus, as long as the 
usual procedure of the body that has adopted the standard follows the consensus-
requirement.348 While discussions on whether an international standard should be based on 
consensus arose even before the US-Tuna II report was adopted,349 the reasoning of the 
Appellate Body was claimed unsettling not only due to its departure from entrenched 
consensus-based nature of standards, but also because it opened avenues for those 
organizations whose standards are not widely used, to be considered as relevant standards 
bodies, possibly aggravating concerns of legitimacy of international standards regimes. 
 
 
342 Annex 1.2 of TBT Agreement. Note that although relying on ISO/IEC Guide 2 (2004) the WTO 
definition of standards deviates from it: for instance, it does not deal with standards for services (this is logical 
since TBT deals with goods); also, ISO/IEC Guide 2 (2004) covers standards that are both mandatory and 
voluntary; see explanatory note to Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement. 
343 Mataija argues that the TBT Agreement applies only to standards adopted by recognized bodies; see 
Mataija, ‘Leveraging trade law’. 
344 Annex 1.4 of TBT Agreement. 
345 So-called “factual” dimension which means that WTO Members are aware of the existence of the body’s 
standardization activities; Mataija, ‘Leveraging trade law’, p. 309. Note that while Annex 1 provides definitions 
of “central” or “governmental” bodies, it does not as such provide what “recognized” means. For the further 
discussion on “recognized bodies” see P. Delimatsis, ‘Relevant international standards and “recognized 
standardization bodies” under the TBT Agreement’, in P. Delimatsis (ed.), The Law, Economics and Politics of 
International Standardisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2015) 104-36. 
346 Mataija terms it as a “normative” dimension; Mataija, ‘Leveraging trade law’, p. 309. US-Tuna II, para. 
376, referring to the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Second Triennial Review of the Operation and 
Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Annex 4: Decision on Principles for the 
Development of International Standards, Guides and Recommendations with Relation to Articles 2, 5 and Annex 
3 of the TBT Agreement, WTO Doc. G/TBT/9 (Nov 13, 2000) (hereinafter: TBT Committee Decision). 
347 See the Explanatory Note to Annex 1.2 of TBT Agreement. 
348 US-Tuna II, para. 353. Earlier on, EC-Sardines extended the scope of the TBT Agreement beyond 
standards crafted in ISO and IEC, but nevertheless referred to the ISO/IEC Guide 2 (2004) for the definition of a 
standard; EC-Sardines, paras. 219-33 and 255. 
349 Wijkstrom and D. McDaniels, ‘International standards’, p. 7, describing that the US argued that a 
standard for transportation packaging of lithium batteries established by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) was not an international standard for the reason that it was adopted by voting, and not 
consensus, and hence this document should not have been used as a basis for national technical regulation. 
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3.3 Procedural instruments of the TBT Agreement  
 
3.3.1 TBT Code of Good Practice  
 
The distinction between “standards” and “international standards” is furthermore important in 
the light of the procedural mechanisms that apply to the bodies establishing them. While the 
TBT Committee Decision (2000) introduces principles to be adhered to by international 
standards bodies, 350 it does not apply to organizations producing standards that are not 
“international” within the meaning of the TBT. Rather, these standards bodies are covered by 
the Members’ obligation under Article 4 of the Agreement to ensure that their central 
government standardizing bodies accept and comply with the Code of Good Practice and take 
“reasonable measures as may be available to them”351 to ensure that the local and non-
governmental bodies within their territories do so as well.352 Standards bodies that have 
accepted the Code of Good Practice and comply with its provisions are presumed to act in 
conformity with the TBT Agreement.353 
Members’ obligations to ensure compliance of (non-)governmental standardizing bodies with 
the Code of Good Practice apply regardless whether or not these bodies have accepted the 
Code.354 Yet, it remains unclear which “reasonable measures” should be taken by Members to 
ensure that their local and non-governmental bodies fulfil the requirements of Article 4.1 and 
Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement,355 and which consequences will be faced by Members who 
do not comply with this obligation.356 Until December 2018, no Member has notified the 
acceptance of the Code of Good Practice by a non-governmental body within its territory: the 




350 Note that this section uses the WTO term “standards body” or “international standards body” when 
referring to SDOs.  
351. Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards, Annex of TBT 
Agreement (hereinafter: Code of Good Practice). 
352 Article 4.1 of TBT Agreement and Annex 3 (B) of Code of Good Practice. For the definition of 
standardization bodies, see Annex 1.4-8 of TBT Agreement. 
353 Article 4.2 of TBT Agreement. 
354 Article 4.1 of TBT Agreement. For the requirements related to the notification of acceptance of or 
withdrawal from the Code of Good Practice, see Annex 3(C) TBT Agreement. 
355 V. Thorstensen, R. Weissinger and X. Sun, ‘Private standards: implications for trade, development and 
governance’ (2015) Think Piece of E15 Initiative on Regulatory Systems Coherence, International Centre for 
Trade and Sustainable Development, p 2. Partiti notes that “reasonable” implies “a degree of flexibility that 
involves consideration of all of the circumstances of a particular case” and “involves consideration of economic 
and technical feasibilities,” referring to the Appellate Body Report, Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-
Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WT/ DS184/AB/R (24 July 2001), para. 84, and suggests that identifications 
whether the measure is reasonably available may be costs of enforcement or capacity of member in question. 
Partiti, ‘What use of an unloaded gun?’, p. 837. Some scholars have argued that taking “reasonable measures to 
ensure compliance” is an “empty obligation”, or at least just an obligation of process or as a result; Van der Zee, 
‘Disciplining private standards’, p. 409. 
356 See Partiti, ‘What use of an unloaded gun?’. 
357 See Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Notification under paragraph C of the WTO TBT Code 
of Good Practice, G/TBT/CS/N/199 (February 20, 2019). While no specific reasons have been provided for the 
decision to accept the Code of Good Practice, close cooperation between CallConnect and ISO may perhaps have 
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The substantive requirements of the Code of Good Practice that apply to standards bodies 
generally mirror the TBT obligations for technical regulations, such as MFN and national 
treatment.358 By the same token, the Code requires standards bodies to ensure that their 
standards do no result in unnecessary trade barriers,359 are based on international standards, 
unless those are ineffective or inappropriate,360 and that national standards bodies are engaged, 
to the extent possible, in the development of such international standards by international 
standard bodies.361 Other procedural and substantive obligations imposed by the Code include 
harmonization of international standards, coherence at the national, regional and international 
level, transparency, submission and review of comments, and consultations with other 
standards bodies, 362 and will be discussed further in this chapter.  
 
3.3.2 TBT Committee Decision  
 
As explained above, the TBT Committee Decision (2000) introduces procedural principles that 
bodies adopting international standards should adhere to; to act in accordance with the TBT 
Agreement, Members should base their technical regulations on international standards 
developed by these bodies.363 As such, the introduction of the Decision and its principles was 
incited by the lacunae of the TBT Agreement as well as by concerns regarding standards’ 
effectiveness and relevance for the global trade development, which were frequently raised at 
the TBT Committee meetings.364 At the same time, the Decision is believed to be largely driven 





been one of the factors that have triggered the acceptance of the Code. See further ‘Alignment to international 
principles – WTO TBT principles for the development of international standards, guides and recommendations’ 
CallConnect Report CC/R/WD 10100:2018, available at https://standards.calconnect.org/csd/csd-wto-tbt-
principles.html#toc16. For the full list of SDOs that have accepted the Code of Good Practice, see 
https://tbtcode.iso.org/sites/wto-tbt/list-of-standardizing-bodies.html. 
358 Annex 3(D) of TBT Agreement also implemented by Article 5.3 of ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019). 
359 Annex 3(E) of TBT Agreement, also implemented by Article 5.4 of ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019), which 
suggests broader participation of representatives from other countries in national bodies, to understand global 
trade implications of national standards. 
360 Annex 3(F) of TBT Agreement. Article 5.5 of ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019) specifies that such standards 
are developed by ISO or IEC.  
361 Annex 3(G) of TBT Agreement implemented by Article 5.6 of ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019). Partiti argues 
that these “good governance” requirements of the TBT are carried over to the Code and to the bodies accepting 
it, and that by this means the code extends Members’ obligations to private standardization activity unconnected 
to public authority. Partiti, ‘What use of an unloaded gun?’. 
362 Note that similar requirements were taken over in ISO/IEC Guide 59, Code of Good Practice for 
Standardization (1994). 
363 Article 2.4 of TBT Agreement.  
364 See in this regard First Triennial Review of the Operation and Implementation of the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade, G/TBT/5 (19 November 1997). 
365 Delimatsis, ‘Global standard-setting 2.0’, p. 284. It should be noted that the Decision did not eliminate 
frictions between the US, the WTO Secretariat and other Members; see, for instance, the letter of 23 June 2006 
from the US Permanent Mission to the WTO to Director-General Singh expressing concerns of the broad 




Despite its non-binding character, the Decision serves as a tool for interpretation and 
application of the TBT Agreement, since the Appellate Body considered it as a subsequent 
agreement within the meaning of Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention.366 The six 
procedural principles for international standards development set forth by the Committee 
Decision (transparency, openness, impartiality and consensus, effectiveness and relevance, 
coherence and develop dimension) are widely implemented in national legal requirements and 
operational frameworks of SDOs.367  Similar to the procedural principles of the TBT Code of 
Good Practice, these principles will be analysed in due course. 
 
3.3.3 ISO/IEC Guide 59 
 
The third instrument to be discussed in the context of the WTO framework is the ISO/IEC 
Guide 59 on recommended practices for standardization. The first version of the Guide was 
adopted by ISO/IEC members in 1993368 and predated the TBT Agreement and the Code of 
Good Practice.369 In 2019, ISO/IEC Guide 59 was updated with provisions implementing the 
TBT instruments: as carefully noted in the Guide 59 (2019), the new edition does not intend to 
replace not interpret the TBT documents, but rather provides recommendations on their 
implementation.370 Compliance with the Guide 59 (2019) is thus insufficient to guarantee 
compliance with the TBT instruments.  
 
One of the most remarkable changes of the updated Guide 59 is the clarification of its scope. 
While the previous version of the Guide 59 was to be used by “any standardization body, 
whether governmental or non-governmental, at international, regional, national or sub-national 
level,”371 the updated Guide 59 is intended to be used by the national bodies (emphasis 
added),372 which it defines as any current or future national members of ISO and IEC.373 
Furthermore, where the previous version merely stated that the adoption of the Guide 59 is 
voluntary and intends to “ensure openness and transparency, together with an optimum degree 
of order, and coherence and effectiveness in worldwide standardization processes,”374 the new 
version adds that it is further up to national bodies to set guidelines on their organizational 
 
 
366 US-Tuna II, para. 371. Recall that adherence to the principles introduced in the Decision is one of the 
conditions for a body to be considered as having “recognized standardization activities”; US-Tuna II, para. 376. 
367 E.g. Rec. 2 of Regulation 1025/2012, OJ 2012 No. L316/12. 
368 See Introduction, ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019). 
369 Note that The Tokyo Round “Standards Code” of 1979 did not have a comparable “Code of Good 
Practice,” and that the Code was introduced with the TBT Agreement only in 1995. European Commission, Press 
Release, ‘Balance sheet of seven years of negotiations’ available at https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-
94-24_en.htm; Tokyo Round Standards Code (1979) Document coce LT/TR/A/5, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/prewto_legal_e.htm. Curiously, similarly to the TBT Committee 
Decision, the Standards Code is also believed to have been driven by the US; see ‘Standards Code of the Trade 
Agreement Act of 1979, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Commerce and the Committee 
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce House of Representatives. Ninety-sixth Congress, First Session,’ US 
Government Printing Office (June 28, 1979), at 38. 
370 Introduction, ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019). 
371 Article 3.1 of ISO/IEC Guide 59 (1994).  
372 Article 1 of ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019). 
373 Ibid., Article 3.8. 
374 Article 1.4 of ISO/IEC Guide 59 (1994).   
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culture and to follow the ISO/IEC Codes of Conduct that include responsibilities to consider 
inclusiveness, consensus-building attitude and skills, compliance with the procedures, 
efficiency, impartiality, commitment to quality and dedication of personnel and experts.375 
 
While the updated Guide 59 implements a number of definitions from ISO/IEC Guide 2 (2004) 
(i.e. those of a “standard” and “consensus”), it also introduces some new concepts. For 
instance, the term “stakeholder” is defined as an “organization, company public entity or 
individual that can affect, be affected by or perceive itself to be affected by a decision or 
activity coming from a standardization process or its deliverables,” and is deemed equivalent 
to the term “interested party;” 376 in turn, a “participant” is a stakeholder that becomes involved 
in the standards development process.377 
 
3.4 WTO and private standards 
 
3.4.1 Coverage of private standards by the TBT Agreement  
 
Whether the TBT Agreement covers private standards has been a matter of a long longstanding 
discussion in the TBT Committee as well as in the relevant scholarship. In this context, it 
remains questionable whether the procedural instruments of the TBT can indeed “discipline” 
intrinsically private standards bodies developing global standards,378 when those bodies have 
not accepted the Code of Good Practice, and whether the TBT Committee Decision (2000) can 
play a role in ensuring that such global private standards bodies offer sufficient procedural and 
substantive guarantees.379 These considerations are important because compliance with private 
standards, even when those are not adopted as technical regulations, is often a prerequisite for 
accessing a large number of developed country markets, which creates confusion for exporters 
who already have to comply with requirements set by other “recognized” standard setters.380 
Concerns regarding the absence of a coherent WTO framework for private standards are 
regularly expressed by WTO Members,381 but even meagre attempts have not been met with a 
 
 
375 Introduction, ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019). 
376 Ibid., Article 3. 
377 Ibid., Article 3.7. 
378 The examples of such private SDOs without any accreditation or connection to governmental bodies 
are Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG) and USB Implementers Forum.  
379 The rationale is that if the standard is an international standard, the body developing it should adhere to 
the six principles. At the same time, it is compliance with the six procedural principles of the Decision that enables 
the SDOs to develop “international standards.”   
380 ‘Effects of SPS-related private standards: compilation of replies’, Note by the WTO Secretariat. 
G/SPS/GEN/932/Rev.1 (10 December 2009); Thorstensen, Weissinger and Sun, ‘Private standards’, p. 4. 
381 I.e. Fifth Triennial Review of the Operation and Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers 
to Trade under Article 15.4, G/TBT/26 (13 November 2009), para. 26. A discussion on private standards in TBT 
Committee was recently suggested by China; however, China’s proposal to draft a TBT guide on the use of private 
voluntary standards was actively opposed by the US and the EU; see Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
Minutes of the Meetings, G/TBT/M/69 (15-16 June 2016), para. 3.2.4.3.2. Members also expressed concerns 
under the SPS Agreement: in particular, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines were concerned that the operation of a 
EurepGAP scheme in relation to trade in bananas with supermarkets in the UK was not covered by WTO 




great enthusiasm by the wider WTO community.382 
 
Currently, the discussion on private standards seems to have reached an impasse. On the one 
hand, extending the scope of the TBT Agreement and its principles to private standards would 
inevitably require increased governmental involvement in industry-driven processes, since the 
obligations imposed by TBT and its instruments are designed for WTO Members.383 This may 
shake the intergovernmental structure of the WTO system and provoke widespread discontent 
among industry actors. On the other hand, allowing private standards to avoid WTO scrutiny 
opens a Pandora box of unresolved issues: is it legitimate that exporters and producers from 
developing countries, who are typically unable to participate in private standards bodies, should 
bear additional compliance costs to access developed markets? Do private standards bodies 
weaken the roles of international standards bodies? Does the low degree of openness and 
inclusiveness in private standards bodies undermine the legitimacy of international trading 
system? 384 
 
In this respect, the importance of creating informal guidelines or recommendations of good 
practices for the preparation and application of private standards was stressed by a number of 
scholars.385 Such arrangements, however, should be sufficiently flexible to preserve the 
advantages of industry standardization.386 As a solution to address capacity constraints in 
developing countries and to maximize positive effects of private standards, while still allowing 
the WTO to act as an ultimate arbiter of standards affecting international trade, it was proposed 
to launch an international body or forum on private standards, potentially outside WTO, which 
will negotiate rules for standards, represent interests of stakeholders and ensure better 
cooperation between SDOs, governments, stakeholders. This  will arguably promote regulatory 
cooperation as resource sharing and transparency.387 It is yet the question whether such 
initiative will be welcomed by private standards bodies and WTO Members.  
 
3.4.2 ICT standards  
 
The question whether TBT procedural requirements apply to private standards bodies is 
particularly relevant for this research. By and large, ICT and Internet standards embody 
voluntary technical specifications created by industry-driven platforms, and not mandated 
technical regulations or international standards drafted by “recognized bodies” within the 
 
 
382 Attempts in SPS were not crowned with success, since Members failed to agree even on the definition 
of a “private standard”; Mavroidis and Wolfe, ‘Private standards and the WTO’, p. 12. 
383 Article 1 of TBT Agreement. 
384 Mavroidis and Wolfe, ‘Private standards and the WTO’; Thorstensen, Weissinger and Sun, ‘Private 
standards’, p. 6.  
385 Ibid. 
386 Mavroidis and Wolfe, ‘Private standards and the WTO’; J. P. Trachtman, ‘Toward open recognition? 
Standardization and regional integration under Article XXIV of GATT’ (2002) available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=317858.  
387 An example is the suggestions of United Nations Forum on Sustainability Standards (UNFSS), 




meaning of the TBT Agreement.388 Hence, despite their evident role in multilateral trade, ICT 
and technological standards have for a long time managed to escape the direct purview of the 
WTO.389  
 
At the same time, concerns related to ICT standards are being increasingly discussed in the 
WTO Committees, especially when these standards become mandatory under Members’ 
national law and thus take a form of “technical regulations.”390 One of the most remarkable 
examples was the case of China’s WLAN Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure (WAPI) 
standard. Asserting that the global WLAN (or, put simply, Wi-Fi) specifications did not meet 
the objectives of ensuring safety of wireless networks,391 China drafted its own homegrown 
proprietary encryption standard for WLAN.392 The standard was developed in a secret 
procedure, which however was in compliance with Chinese standardization law of that time, 
ran on a different security protocol that its “Western” counterpart and embedded a number of 
proprietary encryption algorithms owned by Chinese companies.393 
 
Upon WAPI’s approval, which was initially scheduled for May 2003,394 all WLAN devices 
marketed in China were obliged to comply with WAPI standard. Since WAPI was not 
interoperable with WLAN specifications developed by IEEE, this resulted in a practical 
nightmare for all foreign equipment vendors: in order to maintain their presence at both global 
and Chinese markets, wireless devices had to be equipped with technologies reading two sets 
of  specifications.395 The lack of licensing obligations for Chinese companies, some of which 
were rivals to foreign producers, and their freedom to set royalty rates without adhering to any 
 
 
388 That said, these voluntary specifications can become international standards within the meaning of TBT 
by approval of ISO, as it is the case for the WLAN/Wi-Fi standards. See Chapter 2, n. 118. 
389 This applies not only to ICT standards, but to private standards in general. Scholarship has even 
suggested that implicit governmental endorsement of a private standards body could allow that government to 
escape its WTO obligations (unless the measure at issue could indeed be attributed to the government, that is). J. 
Wouters and D. Geraets, ‘Private food standards and the World Trade Organization: some legal considerations’ 
(2012) 11 World Trade Review 479-89 at 485.  
390 Note, however, that Members seem reluctant to discuss issues related to interoperability standards in 
the TBT Committee. For instance, when US expressed concerns regarding Korea’s draft regulation to mandate 
the standard on Wireless Internet Platform for Interoperability (WIPI), Korea believed that this issue should be 
raised under the GATS and not the TBT Agreement, since WIPI was “a technical interface standard that governed 
interconnection among networks of wireless Internet service providers,” adding that the notification of the 
measure under the TBT Agreement was submitted merely for transparency purposes. Minutes of the Meeting held 
on 20 March 2003, G/TBT/M/29 (May 19, 2003), para. 54-5. 
391 T. Berger, ‘Balancing barriers to trade and technical standards: potential impact on ICT industries’ 
(2015) XVII International Trade and Business Law Review 315 at 338. Apparently, the reported flaws were 
reported, but then corrected by a new IEEE standard.  
392 USTR, ‘2005 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance’ available at 
https://china.usc.edu/2005-report-congress-china%E2%80%99s-wto-compliance, p. 43; For the overview of 
WAPI case study, see C. S. Gibson, ‘Globalization and technology standards game: balancing concerns of 
protectionism and intellectual property in international standards’ (2007) 22 Berkley Technology Law Review 
1403-84.  
393 The Standardization Administration of China (SAC) Directive 237 issued by China’s State Council, the 
country’s highest administrative body; see InfoWorld, ‘Clouds hang low over Chinese WLAN standard’ (19 
December 2003) available at  http://www.infoworld.com/article/03/12/19/HNchinesewlan_1.html. 
394 Eventually, transition period was extended and the deadline for mandatory compliance became June 
2004.  
395 See Berger, ‘Balancing barriers’. 
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FRAND-type of commitment added fuel to the fire.396 From the trade law perspective, the issue 
was complicated by the fact that WLAN specifications developed by the IEEE were formally 
approved as ISO/IEC 8802-11, while WAPI’s adoption as an ISO standard was rejected.397 
This led some WTO members to claim that WAPI is not compliant with 2.4 TBT Agreement 
since it is not based on the existing international standard. It is perhaps this failure to promote 
WAPI as an international standard, as well as a strong counterbalance from the US and EU 
delegations in the WTO, which led China to abandon the mandatory nature of WAPI.398 
 
It is true that in a multilateral trading system, import restrictions may be justified by legitimate 
concerns of, for instance, national security or protection of human health or safety; same 
national or regional trade policies may however incarnate protectionism by promoting 
domestic manufacturers and suppliers and discouraging imports.399 Given the size of Chinese 
market for wireless devices, the distributional effects of wireless networks and revenues 
generated from licensing of intellectual property, there may be suspicious as to whether 
mandated WAPI specifications intended to target foreign importers, rather than increase 
national security. That said, it should be noted that the effects of standards on international 
trade generally depend on many factors and may vary per sector.400  
 
 
4. Regional  Regulatory Frameworks 
 
4.1 European Union   
 




396 H. W. Liu, ‘International standards in flux: a Balkanized ICT standard-setting paradigm and its 
implications for the WTO’ (2014) 13 Journal of International Economic Law 551-600. It is therefore also not 
surprising that trade concerns were raised by the US and the EU. For explanation of FRAND and licensing rules, 
see section 5 of this chapter. 
397 See Gibson, ‘Globalization and technology standards game’. Arguably, since WAPI development 
lacked openness, although China submitted that this was a result of Western bias against it.  
398 Ibid. See also D. Ernst and S. Martin, ‘Adjusting to the global knowledge economy? Recent 
developments in China’s WAPI Standard’ (2010) Unpublished manuscript, East-West Center, Honolulu. EU–
China IPR2 2009, ‘Third revision of China’s patent law: legal texts and documents on the drafting process, 2006–
2009’, available at http://www.ipr2.org/im-ages/eu_patent_law-final.pdf. 
399 For example, a standard adopted by the Japanese Consumer Product Safety Association provided that, 
in order to get a consumer safety seal (and thus gain access to the Japanese market), ski’s had to comply with 
particular product design specifications, which in turn were impossible to reach by foreign ski producers; P. 
Mavroidis, Trade in Goods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 673; T. Büthe and W. Mattli, The New 
Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2011), p. 135. 
400 In this regard, see Trachtman discussing standards and welfare: for instance, standards may both support 
the provision of public goods and diminish welfare through suppression of efficient variation and regulatory 
competition, depending on the particular type of product, and the preferences of individuals and states; Trachtman, 
‘Toward open recognition?’, p. 36. 
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Involving private parties in administrative rule-making is fairly common in the EU.401 In this 
regard, EU standardization system serves as a good example of “co-regulation” between the 
European and national public institutions and private technical bodies.402 Standards play an 
essential role in EU policy since they ensure technical harmonization across the Member States 
and support the functioning of the Internal Market. Therefore, albeit some discrepancies that 
fall outside the scope of this study,403 the European regulatory framework governing private 
standardization has effect on national standardization policies of Member States.404  
 
To understand the current standardization ecosystem of the EU standardization, it should be 
considered how the EU regulatory framework has evolved in time.405 From the outset, 
European standards were specified in the patchwork of Directives, with the Low Voltage 
Directive of 1973 as one of the most prominent examples.406 Yet, the complexity and detail of 
the legal instruments was ineffective to provide rapid technical harmonization:407 before the 
introduction of the Information Directive in 1983, the European Community was adopting 
around ten Directives a year.408 In addition, standardization processes of those times were 
criticized for the lack of accountability and legitimacy, and achievement of consensus on 
technical content of a standard among Member States was politically challenging.409 
Meanwhile, the European markets remained balkanized by national standards and regulations, 
which posed major obstacles for intercommunity trade and precluded the completion of the 
Internal Market.410   
 
The response to these inadequacies followed in 1985 with the introduction of the “New 
Approach,” which aimed to accelerate technical harmonization at the Council level while 
offering sufficient flexibility for the industry.411 The “New Approach”  Directives merely cover 
general (“essential”) requirements, such as health, safety and consumers or environment 
protection, while development of harmonized technical standards that can be used to comply 
with these requirements is left to the three private European Standardization Organizations 
 
 
401 See M. Eliantonio and M. Medzmariashvili, ‘Hybridity under scrutiny: how European standardization 
shakes the foundations of EU constitutional and internal market law’ (2017) 44 Legal Issues of Economic 
Integration 323-35. For the explanation of private governance, see Chapter II. 
402 Ibid., p. 324; see also Kallestrup, ‘Stakeholder participation’. 
403 One of such issue is the copyright of standards, which is not specifically addressed in European or 
national standardization frameworks.  
404 As will appear further, conflicting national standards should be withdrawn once a European standard is 
published. 
405 For a comprehensive overview, see H. Schepel, ‘New approach to New Approach: the juridification of 
harmonized standards in EU Law’ (2013) 12 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 521-33; Van 
Gestel and Micklitz, ‘European integration’; J. Pelkmans, ‘The new approach to technical harmonization and 
standardization’ (1987) 3 XXV Journal of Common Market Studies 249-69. 
406 Council Directive of 19 February 1973 on the harmonization of the laws of Member States relating to 
electrical equipment designed for use within certain voltage limits, OJEU No L77/30, 19 February 1973. 
407 Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance, p. 63.  
408 Pelkmans, ‘The new approach’, p. 251. 
409 Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance, p. 63. See also Cafaggi and Janczuk, ‘Private 
Regulation’; Pelkmans, ‘The new approach’. 
410 Schepel, ‘New approach to New Approach’, p. 522. 
411 Council Resolution of 7 May 1985 on a New Approach to Technical Harmonisation and Standards, OJ 
C 136/1, 7 May 1985. 
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(ESOs): CEN, CENELEC and ETSI.412 Companies can participate in the ESOs through 
National Standards Organizations (NSOs),413 which the respective Member States are obliged 
to notify to the Commission as “notified bodies.”414  
 
However, the New Approach legislation of 1985 became outdated in due time as a consequence 
of the growing role of consortia standards and standards for services, as well as the 
advancement of the Internal Market.415 The major update to EU standardization system was 
introduced with the Regulation 1025/2012, which formulated a number of long-term objectives 
to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of standards as EU policy and regulatory tools, with 
a view to promoting international trade and cooperation.416 In particular, the Regulation set out 
an elaborate system for standardization agenda-setting,417 addressed the importance of ICT 
standards for providing interoperability in single market and facilitating users’ freedom of 
choice, and offered a procedural framework for the development of interoperability standards 
and their identification for referencing by the EC, which is discussed below.    
 
While the decentralized standardization system of the New Approach was generally praised by 
policy-makers and the ESOs for enabling participation of a wide range of stakeholders and 
ensuring that the views of the industry as well as the EU institutions are represented in decision-
making,418 the New Approach policy and its implementation have also been subjected to some 
critique from the scholarship.419 To this day, European standardization system is presented with 
a challenge of balancing the efficiency of private rule-making with legitimacy concerns.420 
 
 
412 Annex I of EU Regulation 1025/2012. For the list of New Approach Directives and Regulations see 
http://www.newapproach.org/Directives/DirectiveList.asp.  
413 Rec. 2 and 15 of EU Regulation 1025/2012. Article 27 of the Regulation requires the list of NSOs to be 
published in the OJEU. Note, however, that companies can directly participate in ETSI.  
414 Certification and notified body fall outside the scope of this study. For more information on this topic, 
see P. Verbruggen and B. Van Leeuwen, ‘The liability of notified bodies under the EU’s new approach’ (2018) 
43 European Law Review 394-498; J. P. Galland, ‘The difficulties of regulating markets and risks in Europe 
through notified bodies’ (2013) 4 European Journal of Risk Regulation 365-73. Note that this requirement does 
not require an adoption of a national legal act by a Member State that explicitly recognizes a body as an NSOs, 
and that the Member States enjoy a wide discretion to determine their notified bodies. 
415 Services initially fell outside the scope of Directive 98/34/EC, and ICT standards were only covered by 
Council Decision 87/95/EEC of 22 December 1986 on standardisation in the field of information technology and 
telecommunications. In this light, a number of strategic recommendations regarding European standardization 
system were suggested by, for instance, by the European Parliament’s Resolution of 21 October 2010 on the future 
of European standardization 2010/2051(INI) and by the Expert Panel for the Review of the European 
Standardization System (Express) of February 2010 in its report  ‘Standardization for a competitive and innovative 
Europe: a vision for 2020’, EXP 384 final, available at  
http://www.anec.eu/attachments/Definitive%20EXPRESS%20report.pdf. For further critique, see L. Goerke and 
M. Holler ‘Strategic standardization in Europe: a public choice perspective’ (1998) 6 European Journal of Law 
and Economics 95-112. 
416 Rec. 6 of EU Regulation 1025/2012. 
417 See Article 8 and 10 EU Regulation 1025/2012. 
418 For instance, Commission has a power to set the agenda, mandate standards and marginally review the 
work of SDOs.  
419 Among others, a recent study suggested that the intentions and obligations to ensure stakeholder 
participation may not have materialized in a sufficient manner. Kallestrup, ‘Stakeholder participation’. 
420 See J. Hettne, ‘Standards, barriers to trade and EU internal market rules: need for a renewed Approach?’ 
(2017) 44 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 409-20. 
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Arguably, trust in European standardization process can be reinforced by effective participation 
of affected stakeholders, as well as the ex post judicial review of standards development 
processes.421 
 
4.1.2. Standards interpretation and binding force in the EU 
 
4.1.2.1 Harmonized European Standards  
 
Amid many documents developed by the ESOs,422 Harmonized European Standards 
(hereinafter: HESs) are by far the most influential instrument in EU technical harmonization. 
The development of HESs typically follows a specific process within the ESOs, requiring 
review and approval by NSOs,423 and can be mandated by the Commission424 or initiated by 
the ESOs’ Members. References to adopted HESs are published in the Official Journal of the 
European Union (OJEU),425 and the act of publication of the references can be subjected to 
legal review through the formal objection procedure initiated by Member States and the 
European Parliament and under which the Commission may decide, upon consultations with 
experts,426 whether to publish or maintain a harmonized standard.427  
 
In line with the principle of mutual recognition of Casis the Dijon,428 the Member States are 
obliged to transpose HESs into their national standardization systems and to withdraw any 
conflicting national standards (a so-called “standstill” obligation).429 Compliance with HESs 
remains voluntary, but grants presumption of conformity with the essential requirements of the 
New Approach Directives for the purpose of free circulation in all Member States. This implies 
that, while manufacturers may choose any other means to demonstrate conformity of their 
 
 
421 Eliantonio and Medzmariashvili, ‘Hybridity under scrutiny’; L. Senden, ‘The constitutional fit of 
European standardization put to the test’ (2017) 44 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 337-52. 
422 Such as guidelines and technical specifications.  
423 As example, see the description of ETSI processes in Chapter IV.4. 
424 Article 10 of EU Regulation 1025/2012. At the same time, the Commission denies any responsibility 
or accountability that an endorsed standard meet the “technical requirements”; see Schepel, ‘New approach to 
new approach’, p. 524.  
425 Article 10(6) of EU Regulation 1025/2012. Note that under the “old” approach, publication was merely 
informative.  
426 Commission follows either the advisory or examination procedure, Article 11(2)(3) of EU Regulation 
1025/2012; this regard, see also Regulation No 182/2011 of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general 
principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing 
power, L 55/14, 16 February 2011.  
427 Articles 1 and 11 of EU Regulation 1025/2012. This ex post action is however not often invoked by the 
Member States, see the list of formal objections at https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/european-
standards/harmonised-standards/formal-objections_en. Schepel argued that the act of publication of the references 
to harmonized standards is an act susceptible to legality review in direct actions; Schepel, ‘New approach to New 
Approach’, p. 529. The decision to publish a reference to a standard in the OJEU is challengeable under Article 
263 of the Treaty of Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).  
428 Case C-120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 1979 -
00649. 
429 Rec. 14 of EU Regulation 1025/2012. The obligation is further implemented in the operational 
framework of each of the ESOs. 
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products with the essential requirements of the Directives, in practice, adherence to HESs 
appears a preferred option among economic operators.430  
 
It is the legal puzzle of whether and how do the free movements provisions apply to private 
standardization and certification activity, that the European Court of Justice (CJEU) has been 
challenged to resolve. In Commission v Belgium, the Court found  that a voluntary mark 
developed by l’Institut Belge de Normalisation (IBN), and compliance with which granted 
presumption of conformity with legislative requirements, restricted free movement of goods 
within the meaning of 34 of the Treaty of Functioning of the EU (TFEU).431 The fact that IBN 
was found a “public body” acting  in public interest and under the supervision of the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs rendered its actions attributable to the Belgian State, which in turn 
“encouraged” compliance with national marks for products that were lawfully marketed in 
other Member States.432 Later on, the CJEU ruled in Latchways that a publication of a reference 
to a mandated standard, which did not concern the particular equipment and did not provide it 
the presumption of conformity with the EU Directive, did not accord the provisions related to 
that equipment the status of a HES;433 hence, the Court concluded, these provisions did not 
constitute a part of EU law.434  
 
In Fra.bo, the Court had to render the decision whether private (emphasis added) 
standardization and certification bodies monitoring compliance with technical standards can 
be scrutinized under the free movement provisions of EU law.435 Deutsche Vereinigung des 
Gas- und Wasserfaches (DVGW) was a private, non-profit body that developed technical 
standards for the water industry and certified compliance with those standards. Certification by 
the DVGW resulted in a presumption of conformity with the legal requirements of 
AVBWasserV (Regulation on General Conditions for Water Supply), establishing voluntary 
sale conditions for water supply undertakings. Fra.bo, an Italian producer of copper fitting, was 
denied the DVGW certification when it failed to prove compliance with the amended DVGW 
standard; moreover, DVGW refused to recognize a certificate of an Italian accredited 
laboratory. Since in practice, almost all German consumers purchased copper fitting that were 
certified by the DVGW in accordance with the AVBWasserV, compliance with DVGW 
standards was the only option to for the copper fitting manufacturers to market their products 
in Germany.436 Accordingly, Fra.bo argued that DVGW’s refusal to certify its copper fittings 
impeded its access to the German market. In its reasoning, the Court largely followed the 
opinion of the Advocate General (AG) and found that, despite being a private body, DVGW 
could de facto regulate market access “in the light of inter alia the legislative and regulatory 
 
 
430 Van Leeuwen, European Standardization, p. 42. See also Schepel, ‘New approach to New Approach’, 
p. 528. 
431 Case C-227/06, Commission v. Belgium [2008] ECR 2008 I-00046. 
432 Case C-227/06, Commission v. Belgium, paras. 37-9. See also Schepel, ‘New approach to New 
Approach’, pp. 525-6. 
433 Case C-185/08 Latchways [2010] ECR I-99830, paras. 31-4. 
434 Case C-185/08 Latchways, para. 35. 
435 Case C-171/11 Fra.bo SpA v. Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches [2012]. 
436 Case C-171/11 Fra.bo SpA v. Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches, para. 30. See also 
Schepel, ‘New approach to New Approach’.  
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context in which it operates,”437 opening the avenues for horizontal direct effect of Article 34 
TFEU.  
 
The CJEU’s landmark decision in James Elliott concerned the national version of a HES for 
construction materials that was incorporated in a sales contract between private parties. 
Although acknowledging the voluntary nature of HESs and the private status of the ESOs, the 
Court nevertheless ruled that, given the publication of a reference in the OJEU, HESs were 
measures implementing or applying an act of EU law, and hence should be viewed as its part,438 
allowing private parties to challenge HESs in a preliminary reference procedure.439 Shortly 
after, the CJEU stated in Schmitt that although the liability of Technischer 
Überwachungsverein (TÜV), a German notified certification body, towards private parties is 
governed by national private law, it nevertheless owns a duty of care, albeit a very narrow one, 
to end-users of the products that obtained its certification.440  
 
The discussed case law reflects CJEU’s consistent trend towards the constitutionalization of 
private industry regulation.441 While Fra.bo limited the Member States’ options to escape the 
purview of EU legislation by “subcontracting” regulatory activities to private bodies,442 James 
Elliott allowed the CJEU to interpret HESs, that are in essence private and voluntary, and even 
possibly paved the way for third parties affected by these standards to obtain judicial 
protection, and Schmitt obliged notified bodies to act with all due diligence when performing 
conformity assessment.443 According to some scholars, the more standards enter the realm of 
law, the more the Commission that in fact delegates regulatory competence to the ESOs, should 
comply with the delegation principles of Meroni.444 Others, in turn, suggested the lawfulness 
of such delegation is ensured by the existence of adequate control mechanisms.445 
 
 
437 Case C-171/11 Fra.bo SpA v. Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches, para. 26. In other 
words, state measures that infringe free movement of goods by encouraging compliance with private standards 
will not become lawful by virtue of the fact that those standards are private, See also Schepel, ‘New approach to 
New Approach’, p. 527. 
438 See Case C-613/14, James Elliott Construction Ltd v. Irish Asphalt Ltd, paras. 32-40. 
439 Case C-613/14, James Elliott Construction Ltd v. Irish Asphalt Ltd, para 47. See also A. Volpato, 
‘Harmonised standards before the ECJ: James Elliott Construction’ (2017) 54 Common Market Law Review 591-
603; K. Purnhagen, ‘Voluntary “new approach” technical standards are subject to judicial scrutiny by the CJEU!: 
the remarkable CJEU judgment “Elliott” on private standards’ (2017) 2017/05 Wageningen Working Papers in 
Law and Governance. 
440 Case C-219/15, Elisabeth Schmitt v. TÜV Rheinland LGA Products GmbH [2017]. 
441 See Verbruggen and Van Leeuwen, ‘The liability of notified bodies’. 
442 Van Gestel and Micklitz (‘European integration’) found this reasoning convincing. 
443 Verbruggen and Van Leeuwen, ‘The liability of notified bodies’. 
444 Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance, pp. 225-27. In essence, Meroni prohibited delegation 
of power that is too broadly and insufficiently defined, stating that the Commission can entrust certain tasks to 
private law bodies provided that it only delegates those powers that it enjoys itself and that are “strictly executive” 
and not “discretionary;” the exercise of delegated powers is accompanied by the same guarantees as if they had 
been exercised directly by the Commission, such as juridical review and transparency; the delegated powers 
remain subject to conditions determined by the Commission and subject to its supervision; and the institutional 
balance between the institutions of the European Community is not distorted. See Cases 9/56 and 10/56, Meroni 
& Co, Industrie Metallurgiche v. High Authority [1957-1958] ECR 133. 
445 See, for instance, Senden, ‘The constitutional fit’; M. Medzmariashvili, ‘Delegation of rulemaking 
power to European standards organizations: reconsidered’ (2017) 44 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 353-




At the same time, some have also noted that when submitting voluntary standards to 
fundamental principles of EU law, the Court opened the Pandora box of issues concerning the 
copyright protection of HESs:446 if a publication of the reference to a HES is a part of EU law, 
should standards then be publicly accessible? In this context, it should be noted that standards 
development, administration and other related activities of the ESOs are co-financed by the 
European Union,447 and questions on their availability and copyrights should be discussed 
bearing in mind the funding mechanisms for HESs. From the three ESOs, only ETSI puts its 
standards in public domain.448 While the matter on standards accessibility has been addressed 
by some national courts, to this point, the CJEU did not have a chance to elaborate on the 
consequences of James Elliott decision for the ESO’s copyright model.449 
 
4.1.2.2 National standards  
 
While Member States’ national standardization frameworks and NSOs are not examined in this 
study,450 some national case law is relevant for the discussion on the legal value and 
interpretation of private voluntary standards. The Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) 
stated that standards developed by the Deutsches Institut für Normung (DIN) and which are 
referenced in a national legislative act, are excluded from copyright protection granted by the 
applicable German law. Such standards, the Court found, produced a certain external effect 
and thus are “pulled” into the public domain.451 In Court’s consideration, later approved by the 
Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), public interest of free access to these 




270/12, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. European Parliament and Council (ESMA) 
[2014]. 
446 See B. Lundqvist, ‘European harmonized standards as “part of EU law”: the implications of the James 
Elliott case for copyright protection and, possibly, for EU Competition Law’ (2017) 44 Legal Issues of Economic 
Integration 421-36, who also argued that the James Elliott decision raises questions for competition law claims, 
and more specifically, whether ESOs are not to be considered as (association of) undertakings if standards are 
“law”. The author however disagrees with it, since the Court did not change the status of ESOs. 
447 Articles 15 and 16 of EU Regulation 1025/2012. 
448 Perhaps the reason for that is that ETSI members, being mostly large commercial firms, are prepared to 
pay higher membership dues to compensate for the ‘loss of income” from standards’ selling; note that such 
financial model would not work for CEN and CENELEC, where only NSOs can become members and where the 
nature of standardization activities, and thus the companies involved via NSOs, is different. 
449 The JRC Report noted that the most recent copyright decisions of the CJEU increasingly harmonized 
the notion of a work, including potential exclusions from copyright-ability on the public interest grounds; see JRC 
Report, p. 51, referring to Case C-310/17 Levola Hengelo BV. v. Smidle Food BV [2018]. Accessibility of private 
standards and their copyrights was however addressed by CEN and CENELEC shortly after the James Elliott 
judgement was issued. CEN/CENELEC position on the consequences of the judgment of the European Court of 
Justice on James Elliott Construction Limited v. Asphalt Limited (2017) available at 
https://www.cencenelec.eu/news/policy_opinions/PolicyOpinions/PositionPaper_Consequences_Judgment_Elli
ott%20case.pdf. 
450 For further reading on this topic, see H. Schepel and J. Falke, ‘Legal aspects of standardization in 
member states of the EC and EFTA, volume 1’ (25 February 2000) European Commission Publications, available 
at https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/9acd4259-13c6-436f-8c12-2740ccf7bb71. 
451 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] (30 June 1983), GRUR 1984.  
452 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] (29 July 1998), ZUM 1998.  
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In a similar vein, the Dutch District Court (Gerechtshof), followed by the Supreme Court of 
the Netherlands (Hoge Raad) had to decide on the legal status of the Nederlandse Normalisatie 
Instituut (NEN), a private SDO, and the accessibility of the technical standards it produced.453 
In this case, however, the Courts found that the Building Decree which referred to the particular 
NEN standard was not published following the procedure specified in applicable Dutch law, 
and hence the standard was not legally binding, meaning that NEN is entitled to charge fees 
for and collect copyrights from the sale of the standard.454 The question remains, whether this, 
so far fairly limited, case law provide possible guidelines for European Courts on how to deal 
with issue of copyright of HESs – the issue which is likely to arise in the near future in view 
of the CJEU’s tendency towards juridification of HESs.455 
 
4.1.3 Procedural framework of EU law: Regulation 1025/2012 
 
As noted above, Regulation 1025/2012 (hereinafter: the Regulation) establishes procedural 
rules that govern EU standardization. The Regulation emphasizes that standards are private 
voluntary instruments.456 Its definition of a standard generally comprises the elements of 
ISO/IEC Guide 2 (2004), with the exception of consensus;457 though, the Regulation repeatedly 
acknowledges consensus-building as the essence of European standardization.458 The 
Regulation states that European standardization is based on the WTO standardization 
principles, to which it refers as “the founding principles,” and which include consensus, but 
also coherence, openness and independence from special interests.459 Furthermore, it highlights 
the importance of transparency and stakeholder participation, especially for consumers, 
environment and societal organizations, SMEs, and public authorities.460 Procedural principles 
encapsulated in the Regulation should be respected by ESOs as well as NSOs in drafting their 
rules and procedures.461  
 
Crucially, the Regulation allows the Commission to identify, either following a proposal from 
a Member States or on its own initiative, ICT technical specifications developed by private 
SDOs462 to be referenced for EU public procurement purposes, where such specifications do 
not conflict with European standards and have been accepted by the market, meaning that there 
 
 
453 Hoge Raad (22 June 2012), LJN: BW0393. 
454 See the analysis in Van Gestel and Micklitz, ‘European integration’. 
455 The author is aware that some discussions with regard to copyrights of standards are taking place in 
NSOs.  
456 Note that the Regulation does not discuss the legal value of HESs standards, just noting that they are 
voluntary and thus not equal to legal requirements. 
457 Article 2(1) of EU Regulation 1025/2012. 
458 An example is Article 10(1) of EU Regulation 1025/2012: “European standards and European 
standardisation deliverables shall be market-driven, take into account the public interest as well as the policy 
objectives clearly stated in the Commission’s request and based on consensus” (emphasis added). 
459 Rec. 2 of EU Regulation 1025/2012. 
460 See generally Articles 3-7, 15 and 16 of EU Regulation 1025/2012.  
461 NSOs are members of CEN and follow CEN Guides, which in turn reflect the procedural principles of 
the Regulation and the WTO. 
462 The Regulation defines those private SDOs as non-for-profit organization of professionals that are not 
national, European or International organizations; Annex II.3 EU Regulation 1025/2012.  
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are “operational examples of compliant implementations from different vendors”.463 
Commission takes the decision after consulting European multi-stakeholder platform, whose 
evaluation and advice may also be submitted to sectoral experts.464 The identified ICT 
specifications constitute “common technical specifications” referred to by the EU 
legislation;465 the Decisions on the Commission to identify (a) certain ICT specification(s) are 
published in the OJEU and can thus be challenged ex post following the procedure of 263 
TFEU.  
 
Regulation 1025/2012 further stipulates that to have their standards identified by the 
Commission, SDOs developing ICT standards and specifications should comply with 
procedural requirements of Annex II.466 These requirements, in turn, include the familiar 
principles of openness, transparency and consensus, but also refer to the qualitative 
characteristics of ICT standards, FRAND licensing terms for essential IPRs and public 
availability of technical specifications on reasonable terms, i.e. either for a reasonable fee or 
free of charge (note that the Regulation does not explain the meaning of “reasonable”).467  
When the conditions of Annex II are not (longer) met, the Commission may decide, upon 
consulting with European multi-stakeholder platform on ICT standardization and sectoral 
experts, to modify or withdraw the identification.468 At the moment of writing, the Commission 
has issued 8 Decisions where it identified ICT technical specifications for EU public 
procurement, developed by, among others, IETF, OASIS, ECMA and W3C.469 Hence, the EU 
public law framework on standardization provides mechanisms to regulate standards 
development processes in ICT consortia, albeit only for procurement purposes.  
 
4.2 US law  
 
4.2.1 US standardization system 
 
As opposed to the coordinated and hierarchical system of the EU, US standardization is largely 
based on decentralization and public-private partnership:470 US federal policy encourages 
federal agencies to use private sector standards to fulfil their regulatory needs.471 This practice 
is vividly illustrated in industry. US building, construction and mechanical model codes for a 
long time have been representing a mixture of industry standards, semi-public codes and public 
 
 
463 Article 13 of EU Regulation 1025/2012. The “existing EU framework” on common technical 
specifications in public procurement refers to Directives 2004/17/EC, 2004/18/EC and 2009/81/EC, and 
Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2342/2002; see Annex II of EU Regulation 1025/2012. 
464 This process is also described, for instance, in the Commission Implementing Decision 2017/1358 on 
the identification of ICT Technical Specifications for Referencing in public procurement, L 190/16, 20 July 2017. 
465 See above n. 463. 
466 Article 13 of EU Regulation 1025/2012. 
467 See Annex II of EU Regulation 1025/2012.  
468 Article 13(3) and 14 of EU Regulation 1025/2012. The European multi-stakeholder platform is 
comprised of ESOs, Member States and relevant stakeholders. 
469 The list of the decisions is available at https://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/policy/ict-
standardisation/ict-technical-specifications_en. 
470 Mattli and Büthe, ‘Setting international standards’. 
471 This was noted, among others, by J. L. Rubin, ‘Patents, antitrust and rivalry in standard-setting’ (2007) 
38 Rutgers Law Journal 509-38 at 517.  
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law.472 The US Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA) advices the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission to use voluntary consumer product safety standards to eliminate or reduce the risk 
of injury.473 Model codes referenced in legislation are drafted by private bodies (such as the 
International Code Council) which, however, may only confer voting rights exclusively on 
governmental stakeholders; in turn, these codes refer to private standards drafted by other 
private associations.474 For instance, the US Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) was obliged by the Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Act of 1974 to 
consult private stakeholders when drafting building standards. To fulfill this condition, HUD 
sought recourse to private standards, but due to the abundance of the applicable industry norms, 
HUD was compelled to select a private body to facilitate its regulative activities.475 
Furthermore, in 2013, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) recognized three 
categories of private interoperability standards, namely risk-management for connected and 
networked environment; interoperability standards establishing nomenclature, frameworks and 
medical-device-specific communication; and cyber security standards for media devices.476 It 
further listed twenty-five private standards, of which twelve belong to IEEE 11073 set of 
specifications for medical device-communication, to serve as a guidance for manufacturers. 477 
The differences and similarities between the EU and US regulatory frameworks governing 
standardization have been extensively analysed in the scholarship.478 It appears that both States 
rely on privately-driven SDOs that support their regulatory policies and, in one way or another, 
reference standards developed by these SDOs in their regulation; yet, whereas “incorporation 
by reference” of private standards in the US yields these standards a formal legal effect, HESs 
remain voluntary even after the reference to them is published in the OJEU479 and regardless 
the CJEU’s ruling in James Elliott. Moreover, the EU Commission, at least in theory, has a 
power to request standards development, while US federal agencies would typically have to 
choose from the already existing private standards:480 there are no “formally” recognized SDOs 
in the US, as opposed to the ESOs and NSOs in the EU system, and private standards are 
principally developed in private bodies for non-governmental purposes. Furthermore, unlike in 
the EU, standardization ecosystem of the US is not governed by a single legal instrument, but 
rather by a Statute document and executive policy, as well as procedural rules introduced by a 
private SDO fulfilling a specific function.  
 
 
472 Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance, p. 153. 
473 See ‘Patents, antitrust and rivalry’, p. 517, citing 15 USC § 2056(b)(1) (2000). 
474 Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance, p. 155. 
475 Ibid., pp. 90-1. 
476 R. Schneiderman, Modern Standardization: Case Studies at the Crossroads of Technology, Economics 
and Politics, Standards Information Network (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2015), pp.133-4 provides the 
full list of examples of these standards recognized by FDA.  
477 Ibid. 
478 See, predominantly, the work of Bremer, Schepel, Mattli and Büthe. 
479 Bremer, ‘American and European perspectives’, p. 328. 
480 Although in exceptional cases, an agency can request an SDO with which it is working to develop or 
update a standard; ibid., pp. 327-8. 
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Despite that US and EU standardization systems bear some similarities in relying on private 
standardization efforts (as opposed, for instance, for standardization systems in China or the 
former Soviet Union),481 the challenges arise when the US and EU use different standards to 
regulate the same goods or processes: the (so far, stalled) negotiations of Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP),482 as well as discussions on post-Brexit trade between the 
US and UK and the UK and EU respectively, serve as a good illustration for challenges that 
arise due to the differences between US and EU standards.483 Another concern related to the 
fact that the US-based SDOs cannot directly participate in the ESOs’ development of HESs – 
standards that, although voluntary, affect foreign companies’ presence on the EU market;484 
meanwhile, nothing precludes EU companies from directly participating in US SDOs that 
develop standards to be referenced in law.485 Ultimately, one of the main challenges of the US 
standardization as such remains pacing the federal rule-making processes to the development 
and update of standards that have to respond to the changing market conditions, and as a result 
the existence of outdated references.486  
 
4.2.2 US voluntary consensus standards  
 
US federal policy does not specify which SDOs can produce standards to be incorporated by 
reference into public regulation: as explained below, the legitimacy of private standards 
depends on the process followed during their development, rather than any kind of formal 
recognition of the SD in which these processes have taken place. The applicable legal 
instruments define a (technical) standard as a “performance-based or design-specific technical 
specifications and related management systems practices” (note the departure from the 
definition in ISO/IEC Guide 2 (2004), which does not include professional standards of 
personal conduct or institutional codes of ethics,487 and largely refer to the notion of “voluntary 
consensus standards” developed by “voluntary consensus bodies.” A standard running on 
patented technologies can only be qualified as a “voluntary consensus standard” when it is 
easily accessible and accompanied by clear rules on disclosure and licensing of the proprietary 




481 See, for instance, W. Ping, ‘A brief history of standards and standardization organizations: a Chinese 
perspective’ (2011) East-West Center Working Papers: Economic Series No.117. 
482 See Bremer, ‘American and European perspectives’, pp. 328-9. 
483 For instance, whether the UK will allow the import of chlorine-washed poultry meat from the US, which 
is currently prohibited by EU standards.  
484 While companies can join ETSI, the decision to adopt a standards as a HESs largely depends on NSOs 
vote (see Chapter IV.4); moreover, US companies would not be able to obtain membership of CEN/CENELEC, 
which are comprised of NSOs.  
485 Bremer, ‘American and European perspectives’, p. 329. 
486 See E. S. Bremer, ‘On the costs of private standards in public law’ (2015) 61 Kansas Law Review 279-
333. 
487 Section 12(5) of US National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Public Law 103–
13, 110 STAT. 775 (1996) (hereinafter: NTTAA) and para. 2(1)(2) OMB Circular No. A-119, Federal 
Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment 
Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 4673 (2016) (hereinafter: OMB Circular).  
488 Para. 5(a)(iii)(v) of OMB Circular. 
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As it is the case in the EU, copyrights of US standards referenced in law is increasingly 
becoming a topic of discussion. Reproduction or distribution of US standards document is 
effectively prevented by their private ownership: this implies that placing private standards 
referenced in law into public domain risks violating SDOs copyright over these standards. In 
this regard, a relevant point to consider is that while the development of HESs may obtain a 
limited funding from the Commission,489 US standardization is financed privately, with each 
individual SDOs responsible for its funding and the copyright being an important “source of 
income.”490 Fortunately, unlike the EU, the US Courts have on a number of occasions ruled on 
the issue of access to copyrighted standards referenced in regulation. In their decisions, the US 
Courts attempted to strike a balance between dual policy objectives: on the one hand, the 
incentives of regulators to produce law and on the other, public domain considerations on due 
process and free access.491  
 
In BOCA, the disagreement arose between an author of a private building code, offered for sale 
against a fee, and a copier who put the code into public domain once it was embedded into a 
state regulation.492 A comparable dispute took place in CCC, where the “Red Book” published 
by a private author and containing information on used car values, was valued as an alternative 
standard to set minimum loss payoffs.493 In both cases, the judges were reluctant to provide a 
definite statement regarding the legal value of private codes, but concluded that an author loses 
the copyright over its standard once it was referenced in a legal act, following the established 
case law that judicial and legislative works are free of copyright claims.494 In Practice 
Management, a governmental regulation instructed the Health Care Financing Administration 
(HCFA) to establish a uniform system for identification of physicians’ services used in claim 
forms. HCFA used the code of American Medical Association (AMA), with which it signed a 
contract requiring the use of AMA’s system. This time, the Court granted AMA the right to 
claim copyright, taking into consideration the facts that standards were easily available to 
public and that the opposite decision would provoke controversy about the copyrights of other 
private model codes and standards.495   
 
The landmark decision on the issue of copyright of standards incorporated into law was issued 
by the US Court of Appeals in Veeck,496 where the Court confirmed, similarly to the German 
Bundesgerichtshof, that once put into public domain, the code in question was transformed into 
 
 
489 See above n. 447 and accompanied text. 
490 Bremer observes that SDOs’ are funded primarily through the membership fees, but then also through 
copyrights and charitable contributions. See ‘American and European Perspectives’, pp. 342-3. Note however that 
the argument on copyrights as a source of SDOs’ income was rejected by the Court in Veeck and as well as in 
ASTM v. PRO.  
491 L. A. Cunningham, ‘Private standards in public law: copyright, lawmaking and the case of accounting’ 
(2005) 104 Michigan Law Review (2005) 291-344 at 303. 
492 Bldg. Officials and Code Admin. v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F 2d 730 (1st Cir. 1980). 
493 CCC Info. Servs. Inc. v. MacLean Hunter Mkt. Rep., Inc., 44 F 3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994). 
494 E.g. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 US (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). 
495 Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F 3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997), amended by 133 F 3d 
1140 (9th Cir. 1998). 
496 En banc, Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’I, Inc., 293 F 3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied 539 US 
969 (2003) (hereinafter Veeck v. SBCCI). 
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law and hence fell outside the purview of copyright provisions.497 After a privately drafted 
Southern Building Code (SBC) was adopted by two municipalities in Texas, it was published 
on a website by an individual, despite the explicit prohibition thereof and without specifying 
its author. The Southern Building Code Congress International (SBCCI), a private association 
that drafted the code at issue, claimed the protection of its copyright. While the District Court 
ruled in favor of SBCCI, the decision was quashed on appeal. In en banc session, the US Court 
of Appeals stated by majority that once put into public domain, the code was transformed into 
law and hence fell outside the purview of copyright provisions.498 Moreover, the Court 
considered the “merger doctrine” in copyright law, stating that the code became a “fact” or 
“idea” incapable of expression in any way except as embodied, and is therefore off 
copyright.499 The Court did not accept SBCCI’s argument regarding the lack of revenues as a 
consequence of the denial of copyrights, since the association had been active for quite some 
time and had an interest in promoting its codes. Despite the lack of unanimity, the appeal 
decision was not revised by the Supreme Court.500  
 
In the recent dispute ASTM v PRO, four SDOs have initially obtained permanent injunctions 
against any authorized used of their incorporated standards by PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG 
(hereinafter: PRO), a non-profit organization concerned with availability of governmental 
materials.501 On appeal, PRO questioned the validity SDOs’ property rights over the standards 
in the light of prohibition to copyright the work of US Government.502 To that end, it observed 
that US government employees may have taken part in drafting processes of standards at issue 
and suggested that incorporation by reference renders private standards “a part of the law.”503 
Most intriguing, however, was PRO’s critique on current standardization system, alleging that 
by lobbying to have their standards adopted into law and then limiting access to the standards 
document with copyright, SDOs ignore the right to access the text of the law.504 The Court of 
Appeal restated that binding laws should be available free of charge to US citizens,505 but was 
cautious with drawing any further conclusions regarding public access to copyrighted 
standards, merely stating that standards incorporated by reference into law are “at the outer 
edge of “copyright’s protective purposes.”506 The Court thus refused to address broader 
 
 
497 Ibid., para. 26. 
498 Ibid. 
499 Ibid., para. 31-6. 
500 For further analysis of US case law on copyright of private standards, see Cunningham, ‘Private 
standards’. Note that the Court explicitly stated that Veeck did not revolve around standards incorporated by 
reference (which, according to the Court, do not become law “merely because a statute refers to them”), but 
concerned the wholesale adoption of a model code promoted by the SDOs that drafted this code for the purpose 
to be used as legislation. Accordingly, the decisions and “hypothetical situations” in CCC and Practice 
Management should be distinguished from the one in Veeck, since in the latter, the model code “served no other 
purpose than to become law.” Veeck v. SBCCI, paras. 41-4. 
501 American Society for Testing & Materials v. Public.Resource.org, Inc. (ASTM), No. 1:13-cv-01215 
(TSC), 2017 WL 473822, (DDC Feb. 2, 2017), amended by No. 17-7035 (DC. Cir. 2018). 
502 ASTM, 2017 WL 473822, at 15 et seq. 
503 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
504 Ibid., p. 28. 
505 ASTM, 2018 No. 17-7035, at 24, quoting Howell v. Miller, 91 F 129, 137 (6th Cir. 1898). 
506 Ibid., p. 24. 
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constitutional issues that arise from permitting private ownership of standards referenced in 
law, suggesting a case by case approach.507 
 




Statutory requirements that apply to private standardization are introduced in the National 
Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA). While recognizing that 
industrial innovation in US depends on actions by businesses, the act emphasizes governmental 
cooperation with private entities and addresses a wide range of issues related to the US 
technical development,508 such as governmental cooperation with private sector and the 
protection of IP rights for technology inventions.509  
 
NTTAA covers the development, adoption, or application of any standard, technical regulation, 
or conformity assessment procedure. Importantly, the act requires governmental bodies to use 
voluntary consensus standards developed by voluntary consensus standards organizations in 
lieu of governmental regulation for the purpose of achieving their policy objectives,510 with 
“use” meaning incorporation of a standard as a whole, in part or by reference for procurement 
purposes, or inclusion of (a part of ) a standard, or by reference in regulations.511 In this regard, 
federal agencies and departments are also required to consult with SDOs and to participate in 
their standards development processes.512 In case an agency refuses to follow a private 
consensus standard, it can use standards developed by other bodies than voluntary consensus 
SDOs, as long as they provide the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) with a valid 
explanation:513 for instance, when the existing private standard is inconsistent with applicable 
law, such refusal would be deemed appropriate.514 In a similar vein, an agency that opts to use 
governmental standard instead of available private voluntary standard, must report the 




507 Ibid., p. 19. 
508 Section 2(2) of NTTAA.  
509 Section 4 of NTTAA. 
510 Section 2(1) and Section 11 of NTTAA. See also ‘American National Standard, value of the ANS 
designation’, available at 
https://share.ansi.org/shared%20documents/News%20and%20Publications/Brochures/Value%20of%20the%20
ANS.pdf. 
511 This is clarified in Section 5(c)(i) OMB Circular (2016). Moreover, the preference of US standardization 
system is for performance standards and in view of trade development, international standards, 5(e) of OMB 
Circular. 
512 See Section 6 of OMB Circular (2016). 
513 Section 15(d)(3) of NTTAA. OMB then summarizes all explanation and transmit them to Congress. 
514 The OMB Circular also notes that standards are “impractical” when use of such standards would fail to 
serve agency’s program needs or impose more burdens or be less useful then another standard, 5(c)(ii) OMB 
Circular (2016). 
515 NIST is a non-regulatory agency of the US Department of Commerce, responsible for facilitating the 
implementation of federal standards policy.  
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However, despite introducing the crucial provisions in the US standardization system, the 
NTTAA does not explain how and when agencies should assess voluntary consensus standards 
for their fitness to be referenced in their regulatory documents. To address this gap, section 
12(d) of the NTTAA and the related executive orders of the US Government516 are further 
implemented by the federal policy in the OMB Circular A-119 (hereinafter: the OMB Circular), 
which covers standards referenced by incorporation for the purpose of public procurement. 517 
 
4.2.3.2 OMB Circular  
 
The OMB Circular was enacted already in 1982;518 yet, its ambiguity provided little guidance 
as to how standards should be implemented by regulatory agencies.519 The Circular was 
practically ignored until 1995, when the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) of the Department of Commerce gained control over standardization and conformity 
assessment policy and, as explained above, mandated agencies to use voluntary consensus 
standards in lieu of governmental standards.  
 
Subsequently, the Circular has undergone a number of revisions, in consultation with the 
relevant stakeholders:520 among others, the updates clarified the role of federal agencies in US 
standardization activities, addressed the issue of national implementation of private voluntary 
standards  and provided agencies with a certain flexibility to adopt the most suitable conformity 
assessment program and, where needed, to issue additional guidance for the use of standards.521 
The latest revision at the moment of writing took place in 2016 and addressed some adjustments 
in regulatory, standardization and trade policy: for instance, it provided additional guidance for 
federal agencies serving on SDOs’ boards and technical committees; set out factors for 
evaluation when referencing a standard in regulation; called for increased internal coordination 
on standards; explained how federal agencies should implement the Circular (2016) in their 
regulatory frameworks; and encouraged agencies to provide a public notification when 
considering participation in a standards development process. With regard to the standards 
 
 
516 Those were adopted after 1998 revision of the Circular: Executive Order 12866 (‘Regulatory planning 
and review’); Executive Order 13563 (‘Improving regulation and regulatory review’); Executive Order 13609 
(‘Promoting international regulatory cooperation’); Executive Order 13610 (‘Identifying and reducing Regulatory 
burdens’). These documents can be retrieved at https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders.  
517 Authority to issue this Circular is based on 31 USC § 1111, which gives the OMB a broad power to 
establish policies for the improved management of the Executive Branch to improve regulatory and policy 
outcomes.  
518 OMB Circular No. A-119, Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus 
Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,496 (1982). 
519 See Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance, p. 88, n. 49. 
520 In order to gather relevant information for this revision, the OMB published a Request for Information 
(RFI) in the Federal Register on 30 March 2012 (77 Fed. Reg. 19357) on “whether and how to supplement Circular 
A-119” and held a public workshop on 15 May 2012, announced in the notice. The OMB issued a Request for 
Comment on a Proposed Revision of OMB Circular A-119, ‘Federal participation in the development and use of 
voluntary consensus standards and in conformity assessment activities,’ on 11 February 2014 (79 Fed. Reg. 8207). 
OMB received over 80 comments from a wide range of stakeholders, including companies, trade associations, 
academics, public interest groups, SDOs, conformity assessment bodies, and individuals. The comments can be 
retrieved from https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=OMB-2012-0003-0001 and 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=OMB-2014-0001-000. 
521 Section 7 of OMB Circular (2016).  
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development processes, the updated Circular (2016) refers to openness, balance of interests, 
due process, appeal process and consensus, to be discussed further in this chapter.  
 
Crucially, the Circular (2016) introduced factors to be considered by agencies when deciding 
to reference a private standard, such as effectiveness and suitability of that standard for 
agency’s needs, the extent to which it falls under the definition of a “voluntary consensus 
standard” (that is, developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies in a voluntary 
consensus standards development process),522 and whether the standard is “reasonably 
available”523 – the latter, remarkably, is not echoed in Regulation 1025/2012 apart from the 
reference to “reasonable terms” in case of ICT standards identified by the Commission for EU 
procurement.524 Whether the standard should be implemented in the absence of any of these 
factors is left at the discretion of the agencies, which are also expected to collaborate with 
SDOs for ensuring appropriate access for stakeholders and to be able to justify the reasoning 
for their choice of a particular standard.525  
 
It is the notion of “reasonable availability” of a standard that generated a wide-ranging 
discussion during the last revision process and prompted a number of questions concerning 
standards’ accessibility in a non-regulatory context, availability for “the class of persons 
affected” and the necessity of a “freely available, non-technical summary.”526  While the 
definition of “reasonable availability” remains a matter of the Office of the Federal Register 
(OFR),527 the Circular (2016) nevertheless clarified certain factors that can assist agencies in 
determining whether a standard is indeed reasonably available to interested parties, including: 
accessibility of a read-only version of a standard during the comment period; costs associated 
with the access to a standard and incorporated materials; the degree to which such access is 
required to achieve agency’s policy goals; and availability of a summary explaining the content 
of a standard to those lacking relevant technical expertise.528 Surprisingly, the issue of 
standards’ copyright, while being especially pertinent in the US, did not seem to have played 
a significant role in deliberations on standards’ availability during the revision of the Circular.  
 
4.2.3.3 ANSI Essential Requirements 
 
The third instrument governing US standardization does not stem from Statutes or Federal 
policy, but from a private, non-for profit organization: the American National Standards 
Institute (ANSI). ANSI does not develop its own standards, and neither does it mandate 
 
 
522 Section 2(d)(e) of OMB Circular (2016). 
523 Section 5(f) of OMB Circular (2016). 
524 See Annex II of EU Regulation 1025/2012, which says that standard is reasonable available when it is 
offered for free or against a reasonable fee.  
525 OMB Circular (2016), p. 7. 
526 This is the “reasonably available” requirement of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 USC Sect. 
552 (a) (1), as amended by Public Law No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048. 
527 USC §552(a)(1). The statutory obligation of OFR on reasonable availability is balanced with U.S. 
copyright law, U.S. international trade obligations, and agencies' ability to substantively regulate under their 
authorizing statutes; see 79 Fed. Reg 66267. 
528 Section 5(f) of OMB Circular (2016). 
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standards development; rather, ANSI’s role is the one of an “administrator and coordinator” of 
the US standardization system.529 In this capacity, ANSI defines essential requirements for 
standard development that apply to US-based SDOs and to their standards.530 By overseeing 
compliance with these requirements, ANSI aims to contribute to the increase of global 
competitiveness of US businesses and to maintain the integrity of standards developers.531  In 
1998, NIST and ANSI signed an MoU which, despite being not enforceable, clearly stressed 
the allocation of tasks between the two bodies: for NIST, to ensure that private standards 
respond to policy needs and are used by the governments and for ANSI, to monitor that private 
standards  are developed according to its procedural principles.532 
 
ANSI’s Essential Requirements target standard development processes and constitute “the 
minimum acceptable due process requirements for the development of consensus.”533 These 
due process principles include openness, lack of dominance, balance, coordination and 
harmonization, notification of standards development, consideration of views and objections, 
consensus vote, appeals, written procedures, and compliance with IPR and Antitrust Policies. 
Only those SDOs whose governance and standards procedures are in line with ANSI’s 
Essential Requirements are accredited as American Standards Developers (ASDs).534 The same 
set of due process principles is used in accrediting private standard as American National 
Standards (ANSs).535 In principle, however, an SDO does not need to be designated as an ASD 
for its standards to be incorporated by reference, and regulators can also implement standards 
that are not ANSs: ANSI’s two independent accreditation processes thus either grant 
presumption of compliance with the Circular to SDOs, or confer legitimacy to particular 
standards, but cannot be seen as regulatory requirements. Some SDOs producing standards that 
are already well-established on the global market have even indicated to give little 
consideration to ANSI’s accreditation of their standards.536 
 
5. Competition/Antitrust law 
 




529 Bremer, ‘American and European perspectives’, p. 341. 
530  ANSI Essential Requirements, Due Process Requirements for American National Standards (Edition: 
January 2019) (hereinafter: ANSI Essential Requirements) available at https://share.ansi.org/. 
531  See About ANSI, available at  https://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/overview/overview?menuid1. 
532 The new version of MoU was signed on 29 April 2019, which reaffirmed the need for coordinated 
approach to US standardization. The MoU is available at https://share.ansi.org/. 
533 Sections 1.0 and 2.0 of ANSI Essential Requirements. 
534 See ANSI Accreditation of American National Standards Developers, available at 
https://www.ansi.org/standards_activities/domestic_programs/accreditation_as_developer/accredit. 
535 To access standards incorporated by reference in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, see 
https://ibr.ansi.org/.  
536 Recent example is the withdrawal of ANSI accreditation of an updated version of 802.11 WLAN 
standard; although no official explanation has been provided on this matter, anecdotal evidence and conversations 
with IEEE staff suggested that the loss of ANSI accreditation is not of importance; rather, they attached greater 
value to the endorsement of the new standards by ISO/IEC/JTC1.  
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Standardization and competition/antitrust law is in itself an extensive topic, especially when 
dealing with the issues of licensing of intellectual property (IP) embedded into a standard. It is 
therefore not surprising that a large body of legal and economic scholarship in the domain of 
ICT standardization is devoted to competition, and that by far the greatest amount of 
standardization case law exists exactly on this turf. For the purpose of this study, antitrust 
regulatory frameworks are preliminary interesting due to procedural principles they offer for 
SDOs to alleviate concerns associated with anti-competitive practices. Yet, to apprehend the 
dynamics of ICT standardization, a general overview of the major antitrust issues that arise in 
global standards development is appropriate. That said, it is not the objective of this section to 
provide a comprehensive competition law analysis of ICT standardization practices, but rather 
to sketch the current regulatory landscape on competition in private SDOs.  
 
Since most of global SDOs operating in the ICT sector are established in the US and EU, 
competition rules of these two states that are examined in this study. This does not mean, 
however, that US and EU antitrust frameworks only apply to organizations or undertakings 
established in these countries, and that US and EU antitrust officials have their hands tied when 
a conduct of a foreign company negatively affects national trade and competition. Moreover, 
organizations that are based in the EU can be subjected to US antitrust law, and vice versa.  
 
Extraterritorial application of EU competition law has been previously accepted on many 
occasions by the CJEU.537 Likewise, the Commission confirmed application of EU competition 
law to foreign undertakings in one of its guidelines.538 In turn, the US has embraced the effects 
doctrine, allowing any State to impose liabilities for a conduct outside its borders, if that 
conduct has effects within its borders.539 The US Sherman Act of 1890 applies to a conduct 
involving trade or commerce with foreign nations, when that conduct has a direct, substantial 
 
 
537 See, for instance, Case 48/69, Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Commission [1972] ECR 619 
(Dyestuffs), establishing an “economic entity” doctrine (a “ratione personae,” when  subsidiary and parent 
company are regarded as one economic entity); Joined Cases 89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116/85, 117/85 and 125/85 
to 129/85 Ahlstrom and Others v. Commission [1988] ECR 5193 (Woodpulp), establishing “implementation 
doctrine” (when, regardless their origin, agreements between companies are implemented in the EU territory and 
trade between Member States is affected). The General Court has also endorsed a theory of “qualified effects,” 
extending Commission’s jurisdiction to conducts that have immediate, substantial and foreseeable effects in the 
EU; see Case T-102/96, Gencor v. Commission [1999] ECR II-753 and T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. Commission. In 
its recent decision, the General Court held that “implementation doctrine” and “effects doctrine” are alternative 
principles, while the latter was accepted by the Court on appeal, Case C-413/14, Intel Corp v. European 
Commission [2017]. 
538 Guidelines on the Effect on Trade Concept Contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (27 April 
2004) OJ C 101/81. Note that the guidelines are generally soft law instruments, which are however referred to by 
the Courts.   
539 See US v. Aluminum Co of America, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
148 F 2d 416 (1945), para. 44. However, this view has not always been accepted (see, for instance, American 
Banana Co v. United Fruit Co, 213 US 347 (1909), where the Court decided that the Sherman Act did not apply 
to activities outside the US). See also Hoffman La Roche v. Empagran SA, No 03-724 (2004), where it was 
discussed whether foreign plaintiff can sue for damages in US court even when harm occurred outside the US; 




and foreseeable effect on trade or commerce in the US,540 or when a foreign conduct was meant 
to produce and indeed produced substantial effects in the US territory.541 US antitrust laws may 
also be applied in case a foreign regulation impedes market access for US companies.542  
 
Hence, many global SDOs whose standards are widely adopted may fall under the scope of the 
US and EU competition laws and have to consider these frameworks in their standards 
development practices.  
 
5.2 Collusion in SDOs  
 
5.2.1 Prohibition of restrictive agreements  
 
Collaboration in SDOs’ working groups and technical committees is by definition prone to 
antitrust concerns: after all, SDOs’ members  and participants are usually rival companies, and 
their engagement in committee-based standards development would necessarily require 
exchange of some information, or even employment of various business strategies to increase 
their benefit from the developed standards (which, by the way, do not always have to be 
illegal).543 In this context, the threat to global standardization emerges when standard 
development processes become unbalanced or dominated by a particular group of interests, and 
when other groups are excluded: a standard established in such processes does not represent 
the view of the industry and runs afoul with the idea of open, consensus-based 
standardization.544 Especially in the ICT sector, where the majority of SDOs are private and do 
not, in principle, benefit from any public authority exception, SDOs that allow collusive 
behavior risk breaching national competition rules. While SDOs typically maintain Antitrust 
Guidelines and provide antitrust trainings to their members,545 whether or not they risk 
becoming vehicles of collusion ultimately depends on their adherence to the applicable legal 
rules.  
 
In the EU, collusion is prohibited by article 101(1) of the TFEU, which forbids decisions taken 
by associations and agreements between undertakings that may affect intercommunity trade 
and have as their object or effect the distortion of competition within the internal market. SDOs 
are considered associations of undertakings since their membership consists of various 
 
 
540 US Foreign Trade Antitrust Amendment Act of 1982, The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 USC 
(hereinafter: the Sherman Act).  
541 See Hartford Fire Insurance Co v. California. 113 S. Ct 2891 (1993).  
542 For instance, the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII), where the Department of Justice (DoJ) 
intended to apply US antitrust rules against Japanese restrictive practice which had as effect exclusion of US 
exporters from Japanese markets; see M. Matsushita, ‘The structural impediments initiative: an example of 
bilateral trade negotiation’ (1991) 12 Michigan Journal of International Law 436-49. 
543 Some strategies may include companies sending multiple experts to the meeting, or “hiring away” 
employees, See J. L. Contreras, ‘Divergent patterns of engagement in internet standardization: Japan, Korea and 
China’ (2014) 38 Telecommunications Policy 916-34.  
544 See the recent case of DensiFi, where members of IEEE working group were colluding prior to voting 
on standardization meeting, which resulted in exclusion of certain actors; see JRC Report, pp. 69-70.  
545 See Chapter IV for examples.  
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companies engaged in economic activity:546 accordingly, Article 101 TFEU applies to 
decisions of SDOs, including its standards or policies,547 even when an SDO has a status of a 
national body.548 Similar reasoning pertains to the US legal system, where any contracts or 
conspiracies between two or more enterprises aiming to limit trade or commerce are prohibited 
under §1 of the Sherman Act.549 Under both legal frameworks, standardization agreements550 
are granted presumption of pro-competitiveness and as such, are rarely found to breach the 
applicable competition rules, unless a collusive practice has indeed taken place. SDOs are 
typically exempted from antitrust liability provided that their processes comply with a set of 
principles, which is discussed further in this section.  
 
5.2.2 SDOs and collusion in the EU  
 
5.2.2.1 Decisions on cartels  
 
Not every investigation on cartels in standardization agreements by the Commission have led 
to the findings of the breach of 101 TFEU: yet, they provide a good overview of which practices 
in SDOs would be considered anticompetitive. In one of its first investigations, the 
Videocassette recorders (VCR), the Commission found a cross-licensing agreement between 
Sony, Philips and other VCR producers, which prohibited parties to implement other systems 
or standards, to preclude introduction of better systems and hence, negatively affect 
competition.551 IGR Stereo Television/Salora also revolved around licensing practices: IGR 
licensed its technology to German colour TV manufacturers with whom it formed a patent 
pool,552 and provided limited licenses to other companies only later.553 The complaint was 
 
 
546 The CJEU defined undertaking as “every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal 
status of the entity or the way in which it is financed”; in Case C-41/90 Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v. Macrotron 
GmbH [1991] ECR I-01979. See also opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-67/96, Albany International BV and 
Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie [1999] ECR I-0575. See further Case C-1/12 Ordem dos 
Técnicos Oficiais de Contas v. Autoridade da Concorrência [2013], finding that an “association of undertakings” 
within the meaning of 101 TFEU can be a trade association or even a professional body; Case C-309/99, J.CJ. 
Wouters, J.W. Savelbergh, Price Waterhouse Belastingadviseurs BV and Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse 
Orde van Advocaten [2002] ECR I-01577. In certain cases, an association can be held accountable instead of its 
individual members, Joined Cases T-217/03 and T-245/03 Fédération nationale de la coopération bétail and 
viande (FNCBV) e.a. v. Commission [2006] ECR II-04987. 
547 A constitution of a trade association, as well as the regulations governing its operation, can be regarded 
as its decision; see Case T-66/89, Publishers Association v. Commission [1992] ECR II-01995. 
548 See case Wouters and Summary of Commission Decision in MasterCard, Case COMP/34.579 (6 
November 2009) OJ C 264. Note that legal exception of 101(3) TFEU would still apply, if the agreement 
contributes to improving conditions for production or distribution or promotes technical or economic progress to 
the benefit of consumers, meaning that consumers should have a “fair share” of the resulting benefit; and does not 
impose on the firms concerned indispensable restrictions for attaining of the abovementioned objectives, or 
provide these firms with the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products 
at issue. 
549 The decisions of single economic entities fall outside the scope of this article, see Copperweld Corp. v. 
Independence Tube Corp., 467 US 752. 
550 This terminology is used for the purpose of competition/antitrust law.   
551 See Commission Decision Videocassette Recorders, OJ 1977 No. L 47/42. 
552 In patent pools, licensors typically agree to license their IPRs in a bundle. An example is AVANCI, a 
patent pool for the IoT, see http://avanci.com/.  
553 See B. Lundqvist, Standardization under EU Competition Rules and US Antitrust Laws: The Rise and 
Limits of Self-Regulation (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014), p. 206. 
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brought to the Commission by a company who was refused a license by IGR and hence was 
prevented from accessing the market. The case was dropped after IGR agreed to grant licenses 
as to any quantity, presumably due to the high possibility that the Commission will find 
licensing practices among the patent pool members collusive and excluding competitors from 
the market.554  
 
In Pre-Insulated Pipes Cartel, the Commission found a standard for pre-insulated pipes to 
reduce product diversification and delay introduction of a new technology, which in turn 
enabled a price cartel and hence violated 101(1) TFEU (ex 81(1) EC Treaty).555 The 
Commission also investigated the Conseil Européen de la Construction d'Appareils 
Domestiques (CECED), a Belgian association of manufacturers of domestic appliances 
operating in various Member States,556 and found that CECED standard for energy efficiency, 
with which all manufacturers and importers had to comply, fell outside the scope of 101(1) (ex. 
81(1)): despite narrowing down consumer choice and restricting competition between the 
parties, the agreement was found to contribute to economic and technical progress by reducing 
electricity consumption and hence, providing collective benefits for users and consumers by 
reducing the pollution. The agreement was thus exempted by virtue of fulfilment of the 
cumulative conditions of 101(3) (ex 81(3)).557  
 
A number of landmark decisions in the domain of collusion and standards agreements was 
issued by the European Courts. In SELEX, the General Court held that Eurocontrol, an 
international standard-setting body in the field of air traffic management,558 did not have a 
market of its “standardization services,” could not be considered a service provider and 
accordingly, has not been engaged in an economic activity.559 Hence, since standard-setting 
fell within the public task of Eurocontrol, competition law provisions did not apply.560 In its 
decision, the Court distinguished between Eurocontrol’s tasks in preparation and adoption of 
standards, and the adoption of standards by the Council of Eurocontrol,561 which subsequently 
 
 
554 Ibid., p. 212. 
555 Decision of the Commission, Pre-insulated pipes (1999) COMP IV/35.691/E.4 (21 October 1998) OJ 
L 24, 30.1. 
556 Manufacturers could become CECED membership either by acquiring direct membership or through 
their membership in national trade associations.  
557 Decision of the Commission (1999) Case IV.F.1/36.718. CECED (24 January 1999) L 187/47.  
558 Case T-155/04, SELEX Sistemi Integrati SpA v. Commission of the European Communities [2006] ECR 
II-04797. The European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol) developed standards in the 
area of air navigation services and airspace use; the case was concerned with three areas of activities of the 
Eurocontrol, namely regulation, standardization and validation; research and development; and assistance for 
administration of MSs in the field of planning, specification and creation of Air Traffic Management (ATM) 
services. SELEX Sistemi Integrati SpA, an Italian company, challenged the inaction of the Commission against 
the regime of intellectual property rights for the prototypes of ATM equipment, set by Eurocontrol under the 
second area of its activities, which, following SELEX, created factual monopolies in the systems which become 
standards since the firms providing the prototypes were in an advantageous position.   
559 Case T-155/04, SELEX, para. 61.  
560 Ibid., paras. 59-61. 
561 The Council of Eurocontrol comprised directors of the civil aviation administration of each Member 
State of the organization, appointed by their respective States for the purpose of adopting technical 
specifications which will be binding in all those States; Case T-155/04, SELEX, para. 59. 
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became binding for all States of the organization; it considered the latter to be a “clearly 
legislative activity (…) which directly concerns the exercise by those States of their powers of 
public authority”562 and that the role of Eurocontrol is “akin to that of a minister who, at 
national level, prepares legislative or regulatory measures which are then adopted by the 
government.”563 On appeal, the CJEU found that production of standards could not be 
separated from their adoption and hence, from the public task of the Eurocontrol, supporting 
its line of reasoning with the Convention of the Safety of Air Navigation:564 yet, the CJEU 
upheld the decision of the General Court that Eurocontrol’s technical standardization activities 
were not an economic activity and fell outside the scope of competition law.565 
 
On  other occasions, however, the Court found a breach of antitrust provisions of private bodies 
developing voluntary technical standards. In early 1980th, the Court held that an agreement 
concluded between Belgian trade associations of manufacturers and sole importers of 
dishwashers and washing machines was restricting parallel trade.566 The arrangement 
stipulated that only those devices which comply with Belgian standards and carry a label of 
Communauté de l'Électricité (CEG), a Belgian noon-for profit organization, could be 
connected to the water supply system; yet, CEG only provided the labels to official 
manufacturers and importers with whom it had entered into special agreements.567 In Stichting 
Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf (SCK), a Dutch certification institution which obliged the 
certified companies to comply with statutory requirements regarding the management of a 
crane-hire firm and the use of cranes, and prohibited certified firms to sub-contract their 
activities to non-certified firm, was found restraining parallel trade and creating barrier for 
market access.568 The CJEU classified SCK as an undertaking: SCK carried out an economic 
activity akin to a private undertaking and, since certification was provided upon the payment, 
was also seeking profits.569  
 
The CJEU also scrutinized a Portugal-based association for Charter Accountants that 
established the system of compulsory trainings.570 Upon finding that the Ordem dos Técnicos 
Oficiais de Contas v Autoridade da Concorrência (OTOC) held a public service mission and 
was de facto acting in a relevant market for professional trainings of charted accountants, the 
 
 
562 Case T-155/04, SELEX para. 59. 
563 Ibid.  
564 Case C-113/07, SELEX Sistemi Integrati SpA v. Commission of the European Communities [2009] ECR 
I-02207, paras. 89-92. 
565 Ibid., para. 93. Note however, that in some earlier cases Courts rejected this type of “immunity.”  
566 Joined Cases 96 to 102, 104, 105, 108 and 110/82, N V IAZ International Belgium e.a. v. Commission 
[1983] ECR 03369. 
567 Ibid. 
568 In that specific sector, hiring cranes from sub-contractors was essential to be able to meet the demand, 
see Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance, p. 290.  
569 Joined Cases T-213/95 and T-18/96, Stichting Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf (SCK), Federatie van 
Nederlandse Kraanverhuurbedrijven (FNK) v. Commission [1997] ECR II-01739, para. 117; see also N. Petit, 
‘The IEEE-SA revised patent policy and its definition of “reasonable” rates: a transatlantic antitrust divide?’ 
(2017) 27 Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 211-51 at 226-7; Schepel, The 
Constitution of Private Governance, p. 291. 
570 Case C-1/12 Ordem dos Técnicos Oficiais. The association allowed competing bodies to provide 
compulsory training but claimed certain courses exclusively.  
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Court held that the rules of OTOC laid down discriminatory conditions to the detriment of its 
competitors and hence reflected an exclusionary agreement among the members of the 
organizations in breach of Article 101 TFEU.571 
 
The key decision for the purpose of this study was issued by the CJEU in  EMC Development. 
A Sweden-based cement manufacturer accused the European Portland cement producers, the 
European Cement Association (Cembureau) and CEN of creating entry barriers for European 
cement market by means of an industrial standard.572 The standard at issue was developed in a 
CEN Technical Committee under the mandate of the Commission and the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA). The cement offered by EMC was produced with different materials and 
did not fit into the five main cement types stipulated in the standard; accordingly, the EMC 
alleged to have been excluded from the relevant market. Crucially, the EMC also stated that 
the procedure of guiding the development of the standard has been influenced by Cembureau 
and was neither transparent nor open, and that the standard was de facto binding. The 
Commission, and later the Court, dismissed the claims of EMC based on the lack of evidence 
for its allegations,573 but accepted the possibility to scrutinize CEN’s standard-setting against 
the procedural requirements of the safe harbor, bypassing the analyses on alleged 
cartelization:574 accordingly, it is only the process of drafting a standardization agreement, not 
its effects, which were subject to scrutiny under competition law. This case illustrates that 
standards crafted within CEN could be potentially addressed under the 101 (1), despite that the 
earlier case law found CEN to be an ESO entrusted with general economic interest.575 Although 
the Commission stated that CEN’s members could be considered undertakings for the purpose 
of EU competition law,576 the question remained whether, and under which circumstances, 
should the work of a Technical Committee of an SDO be considered as an agreement between 
undertakings.  
 
It appears that voluntary standardization agreements can breach 101(1) TFEU once they reduce 
product diversity and de facto exclude competing standards while having collusive price 
effects. At the same time, the Commission seems to be willing to exempt such agreements 
under the “efficiency defense” of 101(3) TFEU, provided that the cumulative conditions of this 
article are fulfilled. With regard to SDOs’ liability under competition law, the CJEU has indeed 
accepted a public-body exception in Eurocontrol, but still allowed examination of CEN’s 
processes for the purpose of establishing an antitrust violation: in this regard, the EMC 
Development case is of a particular importance since it illustrates how compliance with certain 
procedural principles can bring SDOs outside the scope of 101 TFEU.  
 
 
571 Ibid., para. 97. Although this case rather deals with associations establishing training rules, a parallel 
can be drawn with SDOs; see also Lundqvist, Standardization under EU Competition Rules, pp. 190-91, who 
suggests that following the decision in OTOC, SDOs connected to trade associations would be considered 
associations of undertakings according to 101 TFEU.  
572 Case T-432/05, EMC Development AB v. European Commission [2010] ECR II-01629. 
573 Ibid., para. 87. 
574 Ibid., paras. 94-104.  
575 Case T-4/92, Evangelos Vardakas v. Commission [1993] ECR II-00357, para. 47.  




5.2.2.2 Procedural framework  
 
Despite that agreements between competitors are generally not desirable, the Commission 
recognizes that certain types of horizontal cooperation between rival companies might boost 
the economy, increase welfare and bring benefits for consumers. In 2001, it adopted the 
guidelines that apply for six types of horizontal cooperation agreements (hereinafter: the 
Guidelines), including standardization. The Guidelines were updated in 2011 following a series 
of investigations of Rambus and Qualcomm.577  
 
The Guidelines (2011) describe standardization agreements as having a primary objective the 
definition of technical or quality requirements with which current of future products, 
production processes or methods may comply,578 and that may affect competition on four 
markets, namely product market, technology market, service market for standard-setting and 
market for conformity assessment.579 Next to recognizing standards’ benefits, the Guidelines 
warn that standardization agreement might harm competition by reducing prices, foreclosing 
innovative technologies and preventing effective access to the standard580 - all three scenarios 
related to the issue of IPR licensing and royalty pricing. The Guidelines do not cover standards 
crafted as an execution of public power or professional rules;581 neither do they appear to cover 
the activities of ESOs, provided that those cannot be considered undertakings or association of 
undertakings under 101 and 102(3) TFEU.582 Market share held by firms is not considered 
when assessing the effects of standardization agreement, since it is not always feasible to 
establish at the beginning of standards development, whether the standard will be adopted by 




577 Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
to horizontal co-operation agreements (2011) C 11/1 (hereinafter: Horizontal Guidelines). It is suggested that the 
2011 guidelines are less formalistic and adopt a dynamic view; see R. Whish and D. Bailey, Competition Law 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 645. It is also suggested that the aim of the Horizontal 
Guidelines 
 was to establish a “safe harbor” for SDOs akin to  the one that already existed in the US; Lundqvist, 
Standardization under EU Competition Rules, p. 197. 
578 Horizontal Guidelines (2011), para. 257.  
579 Ibid., para. 261. Lundqvist finds these definitions rather broad and preferred the Commission to focus 
on narrower standards that may be problematic from competition law perspective. Lundqvist, Standardization 
under EU Competition Rules, p. 198. 
580 Horizontal Guidelines, para. 264. It should be noted that access can be restricted both with regard to a 
standard and the IPRs essential for its implementation.  
581 Ibid., paras. 39-44 and 92.  
582 Ibid., para. 258; Lundqvist suggests that a plaintiff that would like to bring an action against CEN is 
better off using both internal market provisions (Article 34 TFEU) and competition law provisions (101 and 102 
TFEU); Lundqvist, Standardization under EU Competition Rules, p. 199 (the question remains, however, how 
does this provision of Horizontal Guidelines square with the decision in EMC Development). It was also suggested 
that standards development of the three ESOs, if considered as exercise services of general economic interest, 
may under circumstances also benefit from the exception of Article 106(2) TFEU; Mataija, Private Regulation, 
p. 243, n.109.  
583 Horizontal Guidelines (2011), para. 296. See also F. Wijckmans and F. Tuytschaever, Vertical 
Agreements in EU Competition Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 420.  
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Similar to any agreement under the scope of 101 TFEU, standardization agreements may be 
restrictive either by object or by effect. An example of the former is when the use of standards 
is aimed at preventing or delaying the introduction of new technologies on the market,584 when 
the most restrictive licensing terms are disclosed prior to the adoption of a standard as a cover 
for jointly price fixing,585 or when the members of standardization group can only sell products 
which comply with the standard created by them,586 - in short, when standardization is used in 
a discriminatory manner or as a tool for exclusion of actual or potential competitors.587 This 
type of agreements do not benefit from the exceptional treatment under the Guidelines, and 
should be dealt with under the Article 101(3).588  
 
The Guidelines (2011) further introduce procedural principles to which SDOs have to adhere 
not to breach the EU competition rules. Standards development processes would normally 
(emphasis added) fall outside the scope of 101(1), as long as they follow the four cumulative 
conditions of the ‘safe harbor’ of the Guidelines, which are moreover consistent with the 
principles developed in the judgement EMC Development v Commission: unrestricted 
participation in standard-setting, transparent procedure for adopting the standard in question, 
no obligation to comply with the standard and providing access to the standard on fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.589 The latter condition also encourages SDOs to 
implement a clear and balanced IPR policy adapted to the particular industry and to the needs 
of the SDO: such policy should be based on FRAND-commitments, as determined by 
companies, subject to a transfer obligation, but should still allow patent-holders to exclude 
technology from licensing.590 The failure to fulfil any of the conditions of safe harbor does not 
directly lead to a presumption of anticompetitive conduct:591 an effect-based assessment is 
required to establish whether the agreement at issue falls under 101(1) TFEU, and whether it 
can be “saved” by the 101(3).592  
 
5.2.3 SDOs and collusion in the US 
 
5.2.3.1 Decisions on cartels   
 
The issue of collusion and standardization has also been discussed by US Courts. Early cases 
included Standard Sanitary, where patents for process were used as a mechanism to fix 
 
 
584 See the decision in Pre-Insulated Pipes Cartel, above n. 555 and accompanied text. 
585 Horizontal Guidelines (2011), para. 274. 
586 Ibid., para. 293.  
587 Ibid., para. 273. See also Wijckmans and Tuytschaever, Vertical Agreements, p. 419. Lundqvist refers 
to such agreements as “fraud” standardization agreements; Lundqvist, Standardization under EU Competition 
Rules, p. 199. 
588 Horizontal Guidelines (2011), para. 19.  
589 Ibid., para. 280.  
590 See JRC Report, p. 140. 
591 Horizontal Guidelines (2011), para. 279. 
592 Horizontal Guidelines (2011), para. 273; D. Geradin, ‘The European Commission policy towards the 
licensing of standard-essential patents: where do we stand?’ (2013) 9 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 




prices.593 A number of manufacturers of sanitary products agreed to develop their products 
following a certain process, owned and licensed to them by a “ring-leader,” and subsequently 
agreed on prices for their products on the US market. Products that did not follow this process 
were effectively prohibited from being sold within the US, which naturally reduced product 
variety and was eventually confirmed by the Supreme Court as breaching §1 of Sherman Act. 
Standard Oil dealt with a patent pool created by several firms developing “cracking” processes 
- a process heating the oil under pressure in order to produce gasoline - as a response to the 
complexities around patents’ scope and ownership; here, the Supreme Court found the patent 
pool beneficial, or even essential, since the license agreements ensure the division of royalties 
between the patent-holders.594  
In Macaroni, a shortage of durum semolina was mitigated by adopting a product standard for 
pasta which required less durum semolina: this modification of a standard allowed 
manufacturers to suppress their costs and therefore, the price of their products.595 In C-O Two 
and Household Radiators, creating a narrow standard that reduced product differentiation was 
found collusive.596 In Radiant Burners, SDO members decided not to certify a specific burner: 
without this certification, however, gas companies, who also happened to be member of this 
SDO, refused to provide gas. This conduct was found to constitute an antitrust violation since 
the intent of the SDO’s members was to exclude competition.597 Hence, already from early on, 
the Court assigned a high value for products’ choice and differentiation and considered the 
intent behind an agreement among SDOs’ members.   
The US Courts have also found practices that aimed to exclude companies from a standard to 
violate the Sherman Act, and confirmed that antitrust liability can be attributed both to SDOs’ 
members as well as to the SDOs. A remarkable decisions in this context was issued in  ASME 
v. Hydrolevel, where the Supreme Court found that SDOs can be held liable for the acts of their 
agents’ misuse of standard-setting processes with an anti-competitive objective, even if those 
SDOs have never ratified, authorized or derived any benefit from the activity of the latter. 
Hydrolevel, a water boiler manufacturer and a new successful player on the market, suspected 
that some undertakings which were members of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
(ASME), a consensus-based SDO developing standards for mechanical devices, manipulated 
an interpretation of ASME’s Code, which was adopted as a regulatory requirement in most US 
States. The companies’ officials, who were also serving as volunteers in ASME’s committees, 
requested a dedicated subcommittee to interpret whether Hydrolevel’s processes are compliant 
with the ASME’s Boiler Code; the interpretation was indeed provided by the chair of the 
committee, affiliated with one of Hydrolevel’s competitors, in a form of an “unofficial 
 
 
593 Standards Sanitary Mfg. Co v. United States, 226 US 20 (1912). 
594 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 US 293 (1949). On more cases on patent pools and Sherman 
Act; see D. Homiller, ‘Patent misuse in patent pool licensing: from national harrow to “the nine no-nos” to not 
likely’ (2006) 5 Duke Law and Technology Review 1-21. 
595 National Macaroni Manufacturers Association, et al. v. Federal Trade Commission, No. 14713 (1965).  
596 C-O-Two Fire Equip. v. United States, 197 F 2d (1952), United States v. Am Radiator and Standard 
Sanitary Corp 433 F 2d 174 (1971). 
597 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Co., 364 US 656 (1961). 
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response,” and subsequently used by companies to “warn” the potential Hydrolevel customers 
about its alleged non-compliance with the ASME Boiler Code, which resulted in Hydrolevel’s 
loss of its customer base. While the conspiracy case against the individuals involved ended up 
with a settlement, the Supreme Court ultimately rejected ASME’s claim that it cannot be held 
responsible for the actions of its volunteers, since the ASME officials, the “agents” have acted 
under the “apparent authority” of the ASME, “the principal”.598 
 
In another landmark case, Allied Tube and Conduit Corp vs. Indian Head Inc., the standards 
development process of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) was brought under 
the scrutiny of antitrust law.599 The NFPA was a private SDO developing fire protection 
standards that were subsequently adopted as state law and codified in the National Electric 
Code. Within the NFPA, a standard was selected by the means of voting. Allied Tube, a 
manufacturer of plastic electrical conduit in the new Code, proposed to include that type of 
conduit into the 1981 Code and initially got approval by an NFPA panel; later, some of NFPA 
members agreed to introduce new members to the SDO with a purpose to defeat the proposal 
- as a result, the proposal was overthrown with the help of 230 new members. The Supreme 
Court found such conduct to represent unreasonable restrains on trade and violation of the 
Sherman Act, and stated that, in order to be considered pro-competitive, private standard-
setting programs should be based on the merits of objective expert judgment and follow 
procedures that prevent standards development processes from being biased by members with 
economic interests in stifling competition. Remarkably, the Court also held that “statutory 
adoption of private standard does not determine whether that private entity’s conduct is 
immune from the antitrust laws.”600  
 
On a number of occasions, the conduct of SDO’s members was found not to violate the 
provisions of the Sherman act. For instance, when the Open Software Foundation (OSF), an 
SDO entrusted with developing of an alternative UNIX operating system (OFT-1),601 did not 
select an expensive and complex software offered by a security software developer Adamaxx 
to be included in the standard, both the District Court and the Circuit Court agreed that under 
the rule of reason and on the facts, Adamaxx’s loss was not caused by the conduct of the SDO; 
hence the OSF was not found to be excluding competitors and creating monopsony. In the 
famous Golden Bridge line of cases, lawsuits were filed against members of the 3GPP who 
allegedly restricted the 3G standard in such way that the essential technology of the plaintiff 
could not anymore be included in the standard, which resulted in lost revenues due to the 
delisting of SEPs.602 Despite the submitted evidence of members’ discussions outside the 
 
 
598 American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corporation, 456 US 556 (1982). 
599 Allied Tube v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 US 492 (1988). 
600 The defended claimed the so-called Noerr-Pennington protection, which rendered concentrated effort 
to restrain or monopolize trade by petitioning government officials immune from antitrust laws, since the standard 
was implemented as law; see Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 US 127, 
135 (1961).  
601 Adamaxx v. Open Software Foundation, No. 97-1807 (1998). The standard in the end was not 
successful. 
602 See, as an example, Golden Bridge Technology Inc. v. Motorola, Inc. 547 F 3d 266 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
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Technical Committees, the District Court did not establish conspiracy: the decision to remove 
the plaintiff’s technology from a standard was taken at a meeting that Golden Bridge 
Technology Inc. did not attend, and it was approved without objections of the Working Group 
members.  
 
It appears that to avoid antitrust liability under §1 of the Sherman Act, SDOs should prevent 
their processes to be dominated by companies with anti-competitive intent, while also 
guarantee sufficient balance that can be achieved through inclusive, transparent and consensus-
based processes. These procedural requirements were also at stake in Trueposition v Ericsson, 
discussed in Chapter V, where Trueposition claimed that its technology was excluded from 
being adopted into a standard by conspiracy of competitors who held leadership position in the 
SDO.  
 
5.2.3.2 Procedural Framework 
 
In the US, R&D activities benefit from the so-called “rules of reason” treatment of the National 
Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993 (NCRPA),603 and are found illegal only 
when “their effect is unreasonably trade restrictive.”604 In 2004, as a result of case law, NCPRA 
was amended by the Standards Development Organizations Advancement Act of 2004 
(SDOAA),605 which extended the protection of US antitrust laws to SDOs by expanding the 
scope of the rule of reason to private standards development organizations.606 Pursuant to this 
provision, the conduct of these organizations should be judged based on its reasonableness, 
taking into account all relevant factors affecting competition with regard to their antitrust 
liability. The act aimed to address matters related to inclusion of proprietary technology in 
private voluntary standards, such as the disclosure of IPRs and proposed licensing terms by 
patents-holders.607  
 
The act defines standards development activity as “any action taken by an SDO organization 
for the purpose of developing, promulgating, revising, amending, reissuing, interpreting, or 
otherwise maintaining a voluntary consensus standard, or using such standard in conformity 
assessment activities, including actions relating to the intellectual property policies of the 
 
 
603 Pursuant to Lundqvist, the NCPRA disincentives private plaintiffs and antitrust enforcement agencies 
to bring to the court companies operating in R&D; Lundqvist, Standardization under EU Competition Rules, p. 
149. 
604 The agreements on market sharing or price fixing are considered per se illegal; other agreements which 
may be covered by Sherman act, must be analysed under the rule of reason, see Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. 
United States, 175 US 211 (1899). Interestingly, the IEEE Business Review Letter of 2007 indicates that the rule 
of reason treatment will be applied to joint negotiations of licensing terms in the standard-setting context; 
Lundqvist, Standardization under EU Competition Rules, p. 181. 
605 Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004 (2004), Public Law 108–237, 188 Stat. 
661 (2002) (hereinafter: SDOAA 2004). 
606 Section 102(8) of SDOAA (2004). Although private developers of standards used by government 
seemed to lack antitrust protection, in practice, SDOs were using the NCPRA even before the amendment since 
the definition of “research” was very wide and could cover activities of SDOs; Lundqvist, Standardization under 
EU Competition Rules, p. 151. Note that the SDOAA not extend to the conduct of SDOs’ members. 
607 See Rubin, ‘Patents, antitrust and rivalry’. 
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standards development organization” (emphasis added).608 This definition is remarkable 
because it clearly addresses the policy-making of SDOs, albeit only in the context of IPR 
policies.609 The SDOAA (2004) excludes from the definition of “standards development 
activities” any practices of information exchange, price-fixing or market-sharing610 
(presumably due to their clear anti-competitive intention). The act further provides that the 
policies and procedures of an SDO must fulfil the set of due process requirements, such as 
openness, balance of interests, due process, an appeals process, and consensus, which should 
be incorporated in a manner consistent with OMB Circular.611 The wording of SDOAA (2004) 
suggests that an organization which does not comply with the mentioned principles, is not 
considered an SDO within the meaning of the SDOAA, and hence, cannot benefit from the rule 
of reason treatment.  
 
5.3 Unilateral conduct and abuse of power  
 
5.3.1 Abuse of dominance through SEPs  
 
Considerations on the inclusion of proprietary methods and techniques into a standard, and 
strategic use of functional utility patents in standard-setting have for a long time remained at 
the forefront of many academic discussions on ICT standardization. A single electronic device 
may ran on more than hundred standards, and each of these standards may embody numerous 
proprietary technologies essential for its proper implementation. This is particularly the case 
for mobile communications sector, which  accounts for the largest number of Standards 
Essential Patents (SEP) declarations,612 as well as for standards developed in consortia.613 Since 
the functioning of a standard often relies on essential technologies implemented in it, access to 
such standards depends on access to these technologies, which patent-holders provide by 
granting licenses to implementers. At the same time, patent-holders may seek injunctions 
against companies breaching their patents by using their technologies without having obtained 
a valid license. A situation when a standard runs on a large number of SEPs is known as “patent 
thicket:” arguably, the increased transaction costs resulted from the patent thickets may 
discourage the use of the standard and create an entry barrier for new firms.614  
 
A widespread concern associated with SEPs relates to the threat of opportunism from patent-
holders, who may abuse their position on the market by employing a number of strategies, 
 
 
608 Sec 103(7) of SDOAA (2004). 
609 Although this might also be viewed as a possibility to exclude IP agreements from antitrust laws; 
Lundqvist, Standardization under EU Competition Rules, p. 153. 
610 Section 103(c) of SDOAA (2004). 
611 Section 103(8) of SDOAA (2004). 
612 J. Baron and T. Pohlmann, ‘Mapping standards’, at 18; Geradin, ‘The European Commission policy’. 
613 J. Baron, Y. Ménière and T. Pohlmann, ‘Standards, consortia and innovation’ (2014) 36 International 
Journal of Industrial Organization 22-35. 
614 C. Shapiro, ‘Navigating the patent thicket: cross licenses, patent pools, and standard setting’ (2001) 1 
Innovation Policy and the Economy 119-50. But the effect is difficult to predict due to limited empirical evidence; 
K. Gupta, ‘The patent policy debate in a high-tech world’ (2013) 9 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 
827-58 at 841; N. Gandal and R. Régibeau, ‘Standard-setting organizations’, in P. Delimatsis (ed.), The Law, 
Economics and Politics of International Standardization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
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which have been thoroughly examined by the relevant scholarship. In this regard, most of the 
discussions are centered around the risk of patent hold-up, described as a situation when a 
patent holder increases royalty rates after its technology was adopted into a standard, while the 
industry is “locked into” the technology since sunk costs of implementing a standard have 
already been made;615 and the risk of  royalty-stacking - “accumulation of hold-up positions” 
when individual SEP holders collectively demand royalties that cumulatively are excessive.616 
These strategies, however, have been put into question by several scholars, predominantly due 
to the lack of conclusive empirical evidence on the matter.617 Furthermore, SEP-holders, 
having extreme bargaining power due to the relationship-specific investments, may engage in 
patent ambush by deciding not to declare the relevant patents prior the adoption of a 
standard.618  
 
Similarly to patent implementers, patent-holders deal with a number of uncertainties: once a 
patent application is filed, it remains unclear whether the patent will actually be granted, and 
to which release of technical specification it will be relevant, if at all.619 Moreover, patent-
holders rely on the return of their R&D investments to continue innovating. At the same time, 
it should be mentioned that the effect of patents on the industry may differ per sector as well 
as per licensing practices: in software industry, large patent portfolios are deemed to affect 
firm’s market value in a positive way, whereas fragmentation of patents rights is believed to 
reduce firm’s market value but, at the same time, increase their R&D.620 Moreover, patent 
holders may also choose to license their patents through patents pools, independently from 
 
 
615 Cabral and Salant, ‘Evolving technologies’; M. A. Lemley and C. Shapiro, ‘Patent holdup and royalty 
Stacking’ (2007) 85 Texas Law Review 1991-2049; Farrell et al., ‘Standard setting’. 
616  See for the further discussion, J. Lerner and J. Tirole, ‘Standard-Essential Patents’ (2015) 123 Journal 
of Political Economy 547-86; Gupta, ‘The patent policy’; D. Geradin, A. Layne-Farrar and J. Padilla, ‘Royalty 
stacking in high tech industries: separating myth from reality’ (2007) CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6091. 
Gandal and Régibeau note that royalty-stacking is not a competition policy issue, since it arises from sub-
optimality of independent price setting decisions in the presence of strong complementarity links; Gandal and 
Régibeau, ‘Standard-setting organizations’. 
617 See, for instance, Gupta, ‘The patent policy’; CEN-CENELEC’s position paper ‘Standard essential 
patents and fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory commitments’ (September 2016) available at 
http://www.cencenelec.eu/News/Policy_Opinions/PolicyOpinions/EssentialPatents.pdf, p. 3. Gupta and Snyder 
found the litigation in smart phone industry to be driven by disputes arising from the implementation of design –
patents rather than functional utility patents, and that litigation outcomes are driven by patent quality rather than 
patent essentiality; K. Gupta and M. Snyder, ‘Smart phone litigation and standard essential patents’ (2014) 
Working Paper Series No. 14006, Hoover Institution Working Group on Intellectual Property, Innovation, and 
Prosperity Stanford University. It has also been suggested that patent holders’ risk to be subject of “patent holdout” 
once implementers are allowed to escape licensing negotiations; A. Layne-Farrar, ‘Why patent holdout is not just 
a fancy name for plain old patent infringement’ (February 2016) Competition Policy International, available at 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/why-patent-holdout-is-not-just-a-fancy-name-for-plain-old-
patent-infringement/. 
618 E.g. M. Rysman and T. Simcoe, ‘Patents and the performance of voluntary standard-setting 
organizations’ (2008) 54 Management Science 1920-34. 
619 Interview with an industry expert, 1 February 2018, on file with the author. 
620 M. Noel and M. Schankerman, ‘Strategic patenting and software innovation’ (2013) 61 The Journal of 
Industrial Economics 481-520. 
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SDOs.621 All this adds to the overall complexity of SEP issues and arising concerns under 
competition law. 
 
To strike a balance between the rights of patent-holders and patent implementers, SDOs adopt 
Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter: IPR) policies that prescribe the rules and the 
procedures applicable to SEPs’ identification and disclosure.622 Disclosure obligation requires 
participants of standard-setting to reveal their existing patents and patents applications, that 
might become essential to the standard in development process.623 Patent disclosure is a 
continuous process,624 and while generally aiming to provide SDOs’ members with more 
clarity, it does not tell much about the actual quality of patents, or may create even more 
uncertainty by risking over and under disclosure.625 In turn, a licensing obligation requires 
patent holders to license their SEPs either of fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms 
(FRAND),626 or on royalty-free basis, the latter often being a common practice in Internet and 
software SDOs.627 Ambiguity of the concept of FRAND, and attempts to clarify it, have often 
been in the limelight of recent legal and policy discussions, and becomes even more relevant 
in the debate of open standards and open source licensing practices.628  
 
SEP holders that do not follow the prescribed disclosure and licensing rules, or employ one of 
the strategies discussed above, risk to be found engaging in abusing practices and violating the 
applicable provisions of competition law. In the EU, abuse of dominant power is prohibited by 
Article 102 TFEU;629 in the US, by § 2 of the Sherman Act and §5 of the Federal Trade 
 
 
621 JRC Report, p. 153, which also notes that an objective evaluator must find the patents that have been 
contributed to be pool essential to the standard, which is not the case with SEPs subject to licensing commitment 
by patent holder; see note 153.  
622 While these policies are sometimes referred to as “patent policies,” this study uses the term “IPR 
policies,” which goes beyond the SDOs requirements with regard to patents.  
623 See J. Contreras, ‘An Empirical study of the effects of ex ante licensing disclosure policies on the 
development of voluntary technical standards’ (2011), conducted for the National Institute for Standards and 
Technology (NIST), US Department of Commerce, available at 
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/nistgcr_11_934_empircalstudyofeffectsexantelicensing2011_0.pdf. 
624 Gandal and Régibeau, ‘Standard-setting organizations’. 
625 Ibid.; Rysman and Simcoe, ‘Patents and the performance of voluntary standard-setting organizations’, 
p. 1920. This was also confirmed by a number of experts interviewed for the purpose of this project. 
626 While some studies refer to “RAND,” both FRAND and RAND are typically used interchangeably. 
Under the US doctrine, FRAND is regarded as a form of “contractual” commitment. For further clarification, see 
J. L. Contreras, ‘Patent pledge enforcement theories’, in J. L. Contreras and M. Jacob (eds.), Patent Pledges: 
Global Perspectives on Patent Law’s Private Ordering Frontier (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2017). Along 
similar lines, some scholars have described SDOs’ licensing policies as “incomplete contracts”; T. S. Simcoe and 
A. L. Shampine, ‘Economics of patents and standardization: network effects, hold-up, hold-out, stacking’, in J. 
L. Contreras (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Technical Standardization Law: Competition, Antitrust and 
Patents (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), p. 111.  
627 T. Stoll, ‘Are you still in? The impact of licensing requirements on the composition of 
standards setting organizations’ (2014) Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper No. 
14. 
628 See M. Husovec, ‘Standardization, open source and innovation: sketching the effect of IPR policies’, 
forthcoming in J. L. Contreras (ed.), Cambridge Handbook of Technical Standardization Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2019). 
629 Certain exceptions, including the requirement of a “new product” suggested by CJEU on a number of 
occasions were subject to critique in legal scholarship. See, for instance, N. Petit, ‘Injunctions for FRAND- 
91 
 
Commission (FTC) Act.630 And while these provisions as such do not introduce any procedural 
frameworks to be used for the purpose of this study, ICT standardization cannot be discussed 
in isolation from SEPs issues and related abuse of dominance. This section thus aims to 
illustrate the major decisions around SEPs and provide a general context in which further 
empirical analysis will be discussed.   
 
5.3.2 EU law: decisions on abuse of power 
 
In 2007, the Commission accused Rambus, a US-based company chipmaker, of engaging in  
patent ambush: the Commission asserted that Rambus was intentionally not disclosing its SEPs 
and patent applications in Joint Electron Device Engineering Council (JEDEC) and claimed 
excessive royalties for these patents after the standard running on them was adopted, thereby 
breaching Article 102 TFEU (ex. 82 TEC).631 Rambus eventually agreed to lower its royalty 
rates, and the case ended with a settlement. Another investigation on excessive royalties was 
launched against Qualcomm, a SEP-holder for the Wideband Code Division Multiple Access 
(WCDMA) standard,632 accused by a number of mobile phone equipment manufacturers of 
breaching its FRAND commitment under ETSI IPR policy; the Commission, however, could 
not demonstrate that royalty rates asked by Qualcomm were indeed “exploitative” within the 
meaning of 102 TFEU.633  
 
With regard to injunctive relief and abuse of dominance, Commission’s position has for a long 
time remained vague. In its decision on the merger between Google and Motorola Mobility, 
the Commission recognized that seeking injunctions by patent-holders who have made a 
FRAND commitment might be abusive, but failed to define the circumstances when this is the 
case, in particular, when a licensee is acting in “good faith” and is “willing” to purchase a 
license.634 More guidance was provided in the investigation against Samsung Electronics and 
Google/Motorola (MMI), where companies that made FRAND licensing commitment and 
were seeking injunctions against implementers were accused of abusing their dominant 
 
 
Pledged SEPs: the quest for an appropriate test of abuse under Art. 102 TFEU’ (2017) 9 European Competition 
Journal 677-719. 
630 Note that a conduct may violate the FTC even without breaching the provisions of the Sherman Act. 
FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co, 405 US 233 (1972), para. 239.  
631 Commission’s preliminary view was that Rambus would not have been able to charge the royalty rates 
as it did without the conduct leading to “patent ambush”; see Antitrust: Commission confirms sending a Statement 
of Objections to Rambus (2007) MEMO/07/330, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_07_330 
632 Press Release, ‘Commission initiates formal proceedings against Qualcomm’ (2007) MEMO/07/389. 
The complaints were filed by Broadcom, Ericsson, NEC, Nokia, Panasonic, and Texas Instruments, and 
were based on the understanding of FRAND commitments that essential patent holders should not be able to 
exploit the extra power they have gained as a result of having technology based on their patent incorporated in 
the standard. 
633 See Press Release, ‘Commission closes formal proceedings against Qualcomm’ (2009) MEMO/09/516. 
Qualcomm however entered into a settlement with the complainants; see Geradin, ‘The European Commission 
policy’, p. 1132. 
634 Ibid., p. 1138. See Google/Motorola Mobility (2012) COMP/M.6381, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6381_20120213_20310_2277480_EN.pdf. It was 
understood that Google wanted to acquire Motorola to gain access to its SEPs portfolio. 
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position and distorting competition on the market of mobile devices.635 Whereas in the case of 
Samsung, the Commission confirmed that patent-holders should be able to seek injunctions 
when its potential licensees are unwilling to purchase a license on FRAND terms,636 it did not 
come to the same conclusion for MMI,637 illustrating its “case-by-case considerations” as 
regards abusive licensing practices.  
 
The decisions of the Commission demonstrated its struggle in determining when the royalties 
sought by patent holds the “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” or “exploitative.”638 It has 
been suggested that the modification of the Guidelines for Horizontal Cooperation on 101 
TFEU was somewhat motivated by the frustration of the Commission in the outcomes of its 
investigations, which did not allow it to specify any guidelines for standards development 
activities and licensing practices.639  
 
Courts in the EU have followed the Orange Book line of cases, based on the ruling of the 
German Federal Court of Justice confirmed that a SEP-holder requesting injunctive relief may 
indeed be in breach of Article 102 TFEU.640 The long-awaited guidance for determining when 
a SEP holder abuses its dominant position by seeking injunctive relief was provided by the 
CJEU in Huawei v ZTE.641 The Court found that a patent-owner who has committed to license 
its IPR under the FRAND terms, may still seek injunctive relief after he has notified the alleged 
infringer by defining and specifying the violation, and in case when the alleged infringer has 
expressed its willing to conclude a licensing agreement on FRAND terms,642 but has not 
diligently responded to the offer of this agreement.643 The Court thus proposed a procedural 
meaning of FRAND,644 implying that this notion requires commitments from both SEP owners 
and (potential) licensees. The CJEU’s rejection of the understanding of FRAND as a pricing 
mechanism appeared to be shared by CEN and CENELEC, who suggested that FRAND should 
be considered as a “participative instrument that seeks to foster stakeholders’ ex ante incentives 




635 Press Release, ‘Commission opens proceedings against Samsung’ (2012) IP/12/89; Press 
Release, ‘Commission opens proceedings against Motorola’ (2012) IP/12/345.  
636 Press Release, ‘Commission sends Statement of Objections to Samsung on potential misuse of 
mobile phone standard-essential patents’ (2012) IP/12/1448. 
637 Press Release, ‘Commission sends Statement of Objections to Motorola Mobility on potential misuse 
of mobile phone standard-essential patents’ (2013) IP/13/406. 
638 This determination typically happens pursuant the CJEU decision in Case 27/76, United Brands v. 
Commission [1978] ECR 00207 and according to Geradin, is context specific; Geradin, ‘The European 
Commission policy’, p. 1133.  
639 Ibid. 
640 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] (2009) 180 BGHZ 312.  
641 Case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp [2015]. 
642 This agreement should be presented to that infringer as a specific, written offer for a licence on such 
terms, identifying, in particular, the royalty and the way in which it is to be calculated.  
643 Meaning in accordance with recognised commercial practices in the field and in good faith.  
644 In contrast to a “content obligation” of licensing terms.  
645 CEN-CENELEC’s position paper, p. 14.  
93 
 
Despite providing a recipe for future SEP disputes, Huawei v ZTE still leaves certain questions 
unanswered, one of them being the definition of good faith. In the recent UK decision in 
Unwired Planet v Huawei, Justice Birss stated that failure to satisfy the Huawei vs ZTE 
requirement does not automatically lead to the finding that a patent-holder abuses its dominant 
position, and that the request for injunctions filed by such patent-holder should be rejected; 
accordingly, the Court ruled that the Unwired Planet did not abuse its dominant position by 
prematurely issuing proceedings against Huawei, neither by claiming a “global” license, 
seeking injunctions, or bundling SEPs and patents that were not essential.646 On appeal, the 
Court stated that there is no obligation to satisfy the requirements of Huawei v ZTE prior to 
seeking injunctive relief: rather, these conditions provide a safe harbor for SEP-holders, and 
failure to comply with them does not necessarily breach 102 TFUE.647 In other post-Huawei 
judgements, the Courts were stricter in applying the Huawei framework: for instance, the 
Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht-OLG) of Düsseldorf held that a SEP-holder should 
fulfill the requirements set forth in Huawei before applying for a preliminary injunction,648 and 
in NTT DoCoMo v HTC, the Court referred to the Huawei judgement for the rules of due 
conduct in SEP-licensing negotiations.649  
 
5.3.1 US law: decisions on abuse of power 
 
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DoJ) addressed the issue of SEP disclosure 
in its Business Review Letter to VMEbus International Trade Association (VITA),650 where it 
analysed VITA’s proposed Patent Policy requiring Members of standardization groups to state 
minimum royalties and the most restrictive additional terms for essential patent claims, and to 
allow royalty-free licensing of essential patents in case a patent-owner fails to disclosure it or 
to declare the most restrictive licensing terms.651 To that end, the DoJ recalled the necessity to 
preserve competition and to avoid unreasonable patent licensing terms, and recognized that 
disputes over IPR licensing can delay adoption and implementation of a standard.652 By the 
same token, the DoJ welcomed modifications of the IEEE Patent Policy in 2007,653 which 
allowed public disclosure and commitment to most restrictive licensing terms, including 
 
 
646 Unwired Planet Int ltd and Unwired Planet LLC v. Huawei Technologies Co ltd and Huawei 
Technologies UK Co ltd [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat). The Court of Appeal later confirmed that the global license 
offered was FRAND. 
647 Unwired Planet Int ltd and Unwired Planet LLC v. Huawei Technologies Co ltd and Huawei 
Technologies UK Co ltd [2017] [2018] EWCA Civ 2344. 
648 OLG Düsseldorf (2017) I-2 U 23/17.  
649 NTT DoCoMo v. HTC Case No. 7 O 66/15. 
650 When asking for a Business Review Letter (BRL), firms or SDOs can ask the Antitrust Division of the 
US Justice Department if the proposed modifications or joint ventures would constitute a violation of US antitrust 
laws. The DoJ is not bound by the letters and may still proceed with investigations in future. 
651 DoJ, Response to Vmebus International Trade Association (VITA)’s request for Business Review Letter 
(30 October 2006), available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/response-vmebus-international-trade-association-
vitas-request-business-review-letter. The BRL considered VITA policy a sensible effort to address standard-
setting challenges.  
652 Ibid. 
653 DoJ, Response to the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.’s Request for Business Letter 




maximum royalty rates, and stated that the commitments demonstrated in the Letters of 
Assurance (LoA)654 were binding for the future patent holders and their (non-member) 
affiliates, unless specifically excluded. The subsequent modifications of the Institute’s Patent 
Policy in 2015, which, inter alia, recommended a method of calculation of FRAND royalty 
rates and significantly limited the possibilities of SEP-holders to seek injunctive relief, was 
likewise approved by the Antitrust Division.655  
 
The US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) conducted a great share of investigations related to 
monopolization as a result of licensing practices under § 2 of the Sherman Act and § 5 of the 
FTC Act, prohibiting unfair or deceptive competition practices. For instance, the FTC alleged 
that Dell was concealing its rights for technologies to be included in the VL-bus standard, 
prepared by the Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA), during the process of 
standards development, and subsequently claiming its patented rights from standards 
implementers.656 The FTC established that since VESA favored standards that do not embed 
any proprietary technology, it would have implemented a different non-proprietary design if 
Dell had timely disclosed its patents.657 The case ended up with a settlement prohibiting Dell 
to enforce its SEP for the VL-bus standard and restricting it from claiming its patented rights 
for any patents included in a standard if it intentionally failed to disclose those.658 Similarly, 
the FTC accused RE Union Oil Company of California (Unocal) of not disclosing its pending 
applications for patents that could be essential for the implementation of the emission standards 
adopted by the California Air Resources Board (CARB), and by this means monopolizing the 
production and supply of gasoline under the given standard.659  
 
The next one in line of patent ambush case law was the Rambus case, where the FTC, similarly 
to the Commission, accused Rambus Incorporated of not disclosing its essential technologies 
in standard-setting processes of JEDEC and even evading questions concerning its patent 
portfolio or patents that might be relevant for the proposed standard.660 The FTC found that 
 
 
654 An LoA is a document stating the submitter’s position with respect to ownership, enforcement or 
licensing of a (potential) SEP; see Section 6.1 of IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws. 
655 Business Review Letter to the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (2 February 2015) available at 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/response-institute-electrical-and-electronics-engineers-incorporated. 
656 Dell Computer Corp., 121 FTC 616, 618 (1996).  
657 Press Release, ‘Dell Computer settles FTC Charges’ (2 November 1995) available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/1995/11/dell-computer-settles-ftc-charges. 
658 Ibid.  
659 See the documents available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/0110214/unionoil-
company-california-matter. Remarkably, the FTC did not agree with the claim that since CARB was a state 
agency, its actions could be immunized under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, and suggested that false petitioning 
involving misrepresentation in governmental communications loses this protection when “petitioning occurs 
outside the political area, the misrepresentation is deliberate, factually verifiable and central to the outcome of the 
proceedings of case, and it is possible to demonstrate and remedy this effect without undermining the integrity of 
the deceived governmental entity”; see Press Release, ‘FTC reinstates complaint of unfair methods of competition 
against Unocal’ (7 July 2004) available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2004/07/ftc-reinstates-
complaint-unfair-methods-competition-against. 
660 FTC, ‘FTC Issues complaint against Rambus, Inc. Deception of standard-setting organization violated 




Rambus’ actions were deceptive in the context of a duty of good faith arising from JEDEC’s 
policies, and constrained Rambus’ royalties.661 Equivalent allegations have been made against 
Qualcomm’s failure to disclose its allegedly “reasonably necessary”662 patents in JVT: 
Qualcomm’s conduct was found inconsistent with the expectations of disclosure among the 
JVT’s members and with an affirmative duty of the SDO’s policy to disclose relevant patents, 
with a consequence that its patents were declared non-enforceable.663 Remarkably, both 
Rambus and Qualcomm claimed the IPR Policies of the SDOs to be unclear regarding the 
disclosure obligation. Subsequent investigations against Google/MMI ended up in settlement, 
preventing these companies from seeking injunctions against licensees willing to enter FRAND 
licensing agreement,664 unless the licensees refuse to engage in negotiation process, 
introducing the specific procedures purposed at protecting the interests of potential licensees 
willing to negotiate on FRAND terms.665 
 
A landmark decision on injunctive relief was issued by the US Supreme Court in eBay.666 Prior 
to this judgement, liability-rule protection for patented technologies was subject to FRAND 
commitments undertaken in SDOs.667 In eBay, the Court held that injunctive relief cannot be 
awarded to the patent-holder merely as a consequence of a patent infringement, unless the 
patent-holder demonstrates that he has: (1) suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that the available 
legal remedies are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that injunctions are necessary 
to balance the hardships between the patent-holders and the infringer; (4) and that the public 
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction: in other words, the Court the Court 
used a traditional four-factor test which is used to determine whether an injunction should be 
issued. On this occasion, some have argued that patent-holders should not be awarded 




661 See FTC Docket No. 9302 Opinion of the Commission in the Matter of Rambus Inc., (Aug. 2, 2006). 
However, the DC Circuit found that there was not enough evidence to prove that a different technology had been 
selected had Rambus disclosed its patents and, interestingly, that the actions of Rambus invited competitors to 
enter the market and compete; see US Court of Appeals of DC Circuit, No. 07-1086, Rambus Incorporated v. 
Federal Trade Commission (22 April 2008).  
662 United States Courts of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., (Mar. 21, 
2007). 
663 Ibid. 
664 Press Release, ‘Google agrees to change its business practices to resolve FTC competition concerns in 
the markets for devices like smart phones, games and tablets, and in online search landmark agreements will give 
competitors access to standard-essential patents; advertisers will get more flexibility to use rival search engines’ 
(3 January 2013) available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/01/google-agrees-change-its-
business-practices-resolve-ftc. 
665 See Geradin, ‘The European Commission policy’. 
666 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 US 388 (2006).  
667 For a discussion of the legal background to generate such a liability rule, see D. H. Ginsburg, T. M. 
Owings and J. D. Wright, ‘Enjoining injunctions: the case against antitrust liability for standard essential patent 
holders who seek injunctions’ (2014) 14 The Antitrust Source 1-7. 
668 See, for instance, R. Hesse, Remarks as Prepared for the Global Competition Review GCR Live IP & 
Antitrust USA Conference, ‘A year in the life of the joint DOJ-PTO Policy Statement on Remedies for F/RAND 
Encumbered Standards-Essential Patents’ (25 March 2014) available at 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/517771/download; who refers to the decision in Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC 




The US Courts have also ruled on calculation of FRAND royalties: in the dispute between 
Microsoft and Motorola on royalties for WLAN and video compression technology standard, 
the District Court for the Western District of Washington stated that FRAND royalties should 
reflect SDO’s goal of promoting the widespread adoption of a standard and address the risks 
of patent-holdup ad royalty-stacking, while ensuring that that the patent-holder is remunerated 
not based on the economic value of patented technology, but for the value associated with the 
incorporation of that technology into a standard.669 In TCL v Ericsson, a long-standing 
licensing dispute on SEPs related to 2G, 3G and 4G specifications, the District Court for the 
Central District of California calculated FRAND-based royalties by using both the “top-down” 
approach and comparing licenses of “similarly situated” companies. The Court also noted that 
difference in royalty rates offered to potential licensees are not justified by differences in sale 
volumes alone, giving its interpretation to the “non-discriminatory” element of FRAND 
commitment.670  
 
While this section did not intend to provide a comparative analysis of the EU and US decisions 
regarding abuse of dominance and SEPs, it illustrated the importance of this issue for global 
ICT standardization. The FRAND commitment, despite of its inherent vagueness, appears to 
be well-accepted in the industry and by the Courts: yet, as it also appeared from the interviews 
conducted for this study, companies’ and SDO’s interpretation of FRAND differ, causing 
disagreement among the industry. Crucially, the Courts and competition authorities in both 
States take into account whether patent-holders adhere to their commitments under SDOs’ IPR 
policies. Many decisions on abusive practices have been issued very recently, or are still 
pending, on both side of the Atlantic; arguably, the deployment of 5G networks will only 
increase the number of SEPs-related cases due to the augmented number of patents in 5G.671  
 
6. Procedural principles for standardization 
 
6.1 Background to due process principles in standardization   
 
Each regulatory framework discussed in the previous sections appears to maintain a similar set 
of procedural requirements for SDOs to adhere to. At the same time, the frameworks sometimes 
differ in their definition of the principles, the precision of procedural requirements they impose 
as well as the extent to which they reference other frameworks: the SDOAA (2004), for 
instance, resorts to the principles of the OMB Circular,672 and Regulation 1025/2011 cites the 




still issue exclusion order, there is potential divergence between how federal courts and the ITC remedy 
infringements of FRAND.  
669 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Inc., 2:10-cv-01823-JLR, 871 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (WD Wash. 2012). 
670 TCL Comm’n v. Ericsson, C.A. No. 14-CV-341 (C.D. Cal. December 21, 2017). 
671 IPlytics Report ‘Who is leading in the 5G patent race? Analysis on declared standard essential patents, 
3GPP contributions and attendance data’ (February 2019) (on file with the author). 
672 Interestingly, unlike the US instruments, two EU instruments do not refer to each other.  
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Technical standard-setting processes had to follow certain procedural principles from the outset 
of Western standardization as an effort of private actors in the XIXth century. In Europe, 
technical committees where standards were originally developed, were designed to balance the 
membership of producers, users, consumers, and non-affiliate participants, and to reach 
consensus on the technical documents.673 Standardization process in these committees aimed 
to consider all voices before taking the decision, and in a way resembled “deliberative 
democracy;” from outside, however, the process remained rather technocratic, with expert 
knowledge being a prerequisite to be included onto the committees.674 One of the first 
mentioning of a comprehensive set of standardization principles in Europe was reported in 
1917 and pertained to the work of the Engineering Standards Committee (ESC), the 
predecessor of the British Standards Institute (BSI): these principles included representation of 
all interested parties; voluntary adoption of standards and voluntary service on technical 
committees; clear demand for standardization; practical, engineering and commercial 
orientation; and regular standards revision.675 DIN added the principles of consistency and 
scientific integrity of standardization process, which also meant that all interested stakeholders 
should be involved.676  
 
In turn, the US embraced the principles of voluntary consensus standardization as a response 
to industry’s reluctance to otherwise adopt non-governmental standards: to address this 
weakness, technical committees and societies emerged from a mixture of technical, 
institutional and cultural forces.677 Since support of a strong network of manufacturers and 
buyers was crucial for such voluntary standards to survive, technical committees accepted 
engineers and managers form all interested parties.678 In the beginning of the XXth century, 
procedural principles for standards development have been codified by a number of 
organizations: International Association for Testing Materials (IATM), the predecessor of 
ASTM, was governed by the principle of balance, including balancing technical and economic 
consideration;679 the American Standards Association (ASA), emphasized the principle of 
consensus.680 Subsequently, the US evolution of private standardization seemed to shift SDOs 
towards “open standards” movement, while the concept of openness remained ambiguous.681  
 
On both sides of the Atlantic, the requirements of due process and consideration of all views 
mainly aimed to prevent dominance in standardization process as well as to ensure that a 
standard is not adopted over the objections of stakeholders.682 These procedural principles were 
 
 
673 J. Yates and C. N. Murphy, Engineering Rules: Global Standard Setting Since 1880 (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Pres, 2019), p. 9.  
674 Ibid. 
675 Yates and Murphy, Engineering Rules, pp. 60-62.  
676 Ibid. 
677 A. L. Russel, Open Standards and the Digital Age: History, Ideology, and Networks (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 43.  
678 Ibid. 
679 Yates and Murphy, Engineering Rules, pp. 60-62. 
680 Russel, Open Standards and the Digital Age, p. 279.  
681 Ibid. 
682 Yates and Murphy, Engineering Rules, pp. 60-62; Russel, Open Standards and the Digital Age, p. 56. 
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taken up by other national SDOs, and were institutionalized with the further evolvement of 
NSOs and increased globalization of standards development. Actors establishing the initial 
principles of due process were a rather small community of Western engineers:683 modern 
standardization, however, involves a broader range of actors, and the rules governing 
standardization are also prescribed by lawyers and politicians.  
 
Against this backdrop, this section examines the procedural principles introduced in the 
regulatory frameworks, to which it will collectively refer as “due process” principles. While 
previous studies of standardization processes analysed each procedural framework separately, 
this research follows a different approach, and aims to review the principles holistically and in 
the context of ICT standardization. As a starting point, this section takes the principles of the 
WTO framework, referenced in both the US and EU, and considers how these principles are 
implemented in the national and competition law frameworks. It further discusses the 
principles that were not mentioned by the TBT Committee and the Code of Good Practice but 
were put forward by other regulatory frameworks.   
 
6.2 Analysing due process principles for standards development  
 
6.2.1 Transparency  
 
In multilateral trading system, transparency facilitates harmonization and coherence of 
technical requirements across the WTO Members. The general provision on transparency in 
standardization activities, Article 2.9 of the TBT Agreement, is implemented by the TBT 
Committee Decision (2000), which in turn specifies steps to be taken by International 
Standards Bodies (ISBs) to achieve greater transparency, such as publishing of work 
programs,684 notifying standardization activities, allowing access to the relevant information at 
least to the interested parties and providing opportunities to comment on standards’ drafts (note 
that no clarification as to which parties are to be considered as “interested” is provided).685 
When publishing their working programs or (draft) standards, ISBs should also consider 
technical means available in different countries.686 ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019) further specifies 
that when national bodies develop standards or contribute to international standardization 
work, they should provide sufficient and updated information and maintain appropriately 
documented procedures.687 Together with the draft standards, these documents should be freely 
available for any stakeholder (meaning, according to the Guide 59 (2019), all those that can 
affect, be affected or perceive to be affected by the particular standardization activity); all other 
 
 
683 See historical overview of the main actors in Yates and Murphy, Engineering Rules.   
684 The 7th Triennial Review elaborates on this requirement; see Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
Seventh Triennial Review of the Operation and Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
Under Article 15.4 (6 November 2015) WTO Doc. G/TBT/37, para. 4. See also the parallel requirement in the 
Code of Good Practice Annex 3(J) of TBT Agreement and Article 4.2.6 of ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019). 
685 Annex 4, para. B(4) of TBT Committee Decision (2000). 
686 Annex 4, para. B(3) of TBT Committee Decision (2000). 
687 Articles 4.2.1, 4.2.2 and 4.2.5 of ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019). 
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draft documents should be received by participants, meaning those involved in standards 
development.688  
 
The Code of Good Practice clarifies that a copy of a draft standard should be provided in a 
non-discriminatory manner to any interested party requesting it (and not only to “all Members 
of an ISB” as it is the case with international bodies),689 and that an “adequate period of time” 
for submitting comments amounts to at least 60 days.690 A notice of the period for commenting 
should ideally state whether a standard deviates from the relevant international standard;691 the 
necessity of this deviation shall be explained in responses to the comments of those SDOs that 
accepted the Code of Good Practice.692 Furthermore, the working program of an SDO should 
be published on SDOs’ website (and, for ISBs, the websites of ISO/IEC Information Center) 
at least every six months.693 and a standard should be promptly published upon its adoption.694 
In recent years, a number of steps have been taken by the TBT Committee to facilitate 
Members’ implementation of the principle of transparency: examples include strengthening of 
the TBT Notification Submission System (TBT NSS), exchanging regional experiences and 
improving the functioning of TBT enquiry points.695  
 
Transparency also sits at the center of procedural requirements stipulated by the EU. 
Regulation 1025/2012 requires ESOs and NSOs to ensure transparency of their standards and 
standards development processes by using publicly available working programs that contain 
information on preparation and amendment of standards; exchanging draft documents; and 
providing interested parties with opportunities for commenting on prospective deliverables.696 
In this regard, ESOs and NSOs are encouraged to provide online user-friendly mechanisms to 
submit comments, as well as to enhance the access to their activities by supporting virtual 
meetings or web-conferencing.697 ESOs should also annually report to the Commission on a 
number of issues, including representation of stakeholders and cooperation among NSOs and 
ESOs.698 Annex II of the Regulation (2012) fine-tunes the principle of transparency for ICT 
standards and provides that SDOs should document all information on technical discussions; 
announce new standardization activity through suitable and accessible means; seek 
participation of all relevant stakeholders699 and ensure that comments of interested parties are 
 
 
688 Articles 3.5, 3.7 and 4.2.4 of ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019).  
689 Annex 3(M) and (P) of TBT Agreement. 
690 Annex 3(L) of TBT Agreement. 
691 Annex 3(L) of TBT Agreement. 
692 Annex 3(N) of TBT Agreement. 
693 Annex 3(J) of TBT Agreement. See further 7th Triennial Review (2015) para. 4.  
694 Annex 3(O) of TBT Agreement. 
695 Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Eighth Triennial Review of the Operation and 
Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade Under Article 15.4 (9 November 2018) WTO 
Doc. G/TBT/41, paras. 6.1 and 7. 
696 Articles 3 and 4 of EU Regulation 1025/2012. 
697 Rec. 18 of EU Regulation 1025/2012. 
698 Article 24 of EU Regulation 1025/2012. 
699 It has been suggested that “stakeholders” can be business or professional associations, consumer, States, 
and NGOs; Van Leeuwen, European Standardization, p. 19. 
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considered and addressed.700 Horizontal Guidelines (2011) further mention that standardization 
platforms should implement procedures informing stakeholders in “good time” of on-going, 
finalized, and future standardization work at each stage of standards development.701 
 
Similarly to the TBT framework, where the role of “notifications hub” is entrusted to the ISO 
and the WTO TBT facility, Regulation 1025/2012 provides that notifications of NSOs and 
informal SDOs whose standards may be used by the Commission for procurement purposes 
should be submitted to the ESOs.702 Yet, where Regulation 1025/2012 obliges SDOs to make 
their work programs publicly available,703 TBT Committee Decision does not speak in terms 
of “public availability”, but rather, “easy accessibility” of information regarding SDOs’ current 
work programs.  
 
In the US regulatory framework, transparency applies both to federal agencies, which should 
announce their participation in standardization activities related to the issues of national 
priority or (international) regulation,704 and to SDOs, which should notify their work on current 
and new standards and make written procedures available to all stakeholders.705 In a similar 
vein, requirements to notify all parties affected by the particular standardization activity and to 
allow access to information are laid down in the SDOAA (2004).706 Other elements of 
transparency are encapsulated in the ANSI’s principle of “openness” and include providing 
information on parties’ affiliation and notifying stakeholders of particular  development 
activities.707   
 
6.2.2 Openness and Participation 
  
Related to transparency is the principle of participation or openness, as it is referred to by some 
regulatory frameworks. The TBT Committee Decision (2000) provides that open and 
unrestricted participation in international standardization should be guaranteed at all levels of 
standard-setting (namely, proposals of new work items, technical discussions, submission of 
comments, standards review, voting, standards adoption and dissemination)708 and policy 
development (emphasis added).709 However, pursuant to the wording of the Decision, the 
 
 
700 Annex II. 3(c) of EU Regulation 1025/2012. 
701 Horizontal Guidelines (2011), para. 282. 
702 In practice, that implies that NSOs would need to notify the WTO TBT facility, ISO and ESOs.  
703 Article 3.3 of EU Regulation 1025/2012. 
704 Section 6(e) of OMB Circular (2016). 
705 Sections 1.5, 1.9 and 2.5 of ANSI Essential Requirements (2019). Note that ANSI refers directly to 
notification requirements and not to the notion of transparency. Specific procedures apply to project initiation 
notifications, including notifying ANSI and providing public review.  
706 Section 102 of SDOAA (2004). 
707 Section 2.1 of ANSI Essential Requirements (2019). 
708 Note that these stages are defined differently by ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019): proposal and acceptance of 
new work items; technical discussion on proposal; submission of comments on drafts; review of existing 
standards; resolution of comments and approval of standards’ and availability of approved standards (although 
the author thinks availability should not be a stage of standards development). Article 4.3.1 ISO/IEC Guide 59 
(2019). 
709 Annex 4, para. C(6) of TBT Committee Decision (2000). 
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requirement to ensure that participation is also meaningful (emphasis added) applies only to 
standards development.710 In turn, ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019) limits the scope of openness to 
“all stages of the standards development process,” noting that such participation should be on 
a non-discriminatory basis to all stakeholders.711 It is then up to national bodies to facilitate 
inclusive participation of all stakeholders, also those who are potentially under-represented, 
without imposing undue membership barriers, as well as to ensure availability of documents 
and procedures necessary for participation.712 The Code of Good Practice further specified that 
participation of SDOs that have signed the Code in international standardization efforts should 
preferably occur through one delegation per WTO Member.713 
 
In the EU standardization ecosystem, participation is built on openness, equality and 
meaningful opportunities to express one’s position and have it considered. Regulation 
1025/2012 stipulates that ESOs should ensure effective participation of all affected 
stakeholders, particularly those representing social interests or a particular group,714 public 
authorities and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs),715 both at the policy development level and 
at various stages of standards development (i.e. standardization proposal, technical 
deliberations, submission of comments and revision processes).716 The word “effective” may 
suggest that the degree of participation sought by the Regulation implies actual involvement in 
decision making; at the same time, the Regulation (2012) clarifies that “effective participation” 
does not entail that stakeholders should be granted voting rights for (all) standardization 
activities/ standardization phases, unless those rights are provided by the procedural framework 
of ESOs717 (to compare, ANSI states that unreasonable restriction of voting rights precludes 
participation.)718 In case of ICT standards, Annex II of the Regulation (2012) highlights with 
regard to participation that technical specifications should be developed based on open 
decision-making which is accessible to all interested parties in the market affected by those 
specifications.719 Naturally, where ESOs operate on the basis of national delegation, the duty 
to involve all relevant actors lies upon NSOs.720 Horizontal Guidelines (2011) add to the EU 
regulatory framework that SDOs should implement the principle of participation via objective 
and non-discriminatory distribution of voting rights, in particular as regards to the processes of 
technology selection.721 Opportunities to take part in standards development should be grated 
to all competitors in the relevant market(s) and – where the work of SDO concerns de facto 
industry standard – also to third parties. 
 
 
710 Annex 4, para. C(7) of TBT Committee Decision (2000). 
711 Article 4.3.1 of ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019). 
712 Articles 4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.3.4 and 4.3.5 of ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019). 
713 Annex 3(G) of TBT Agreement. 
714 Rec. 17 and 24 of EU Regulation 1025/2012. 
715 Article 5, 6 and 7 of EU Regulation 1025/2012. Participation of underrepresented stakeholders is also 
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Pursuant to the OMB Circular (2016), standards development processes should be open to 
interested parties and provide them with meaningful opportunities to participate on a non-
discriminatory basis.722 Similarly to Regulation 1025/2012, the Circular (2016) addresses 
participation of governmental actors, noting that the engagement of agencies in activities of 
SDOs does not imply their endorsement of SDOs’ decisions.723 At the same time, agency 
representatives should be able to participate in all relevant discussions of SDOs on an equal 
basis with other members, including voting and serving in official capacities, unless precluded 
by law or the agency itself.724 In the earlier version of the Circular, the principle of openness 
was explained as “providing meaningful opportunities to participate at all stages of standards 
development.”725 During the revision of the OMB Circular, however, many commenters voiced 
concerns that the providing participation “at all stages” may burden the work of SDOs while, 
as a practical matter, this requirement was already implemented by the principle of 
transparency. Accordingly, the sentence was replaced by “providing meaningful opportunities 
to participate on a non-discriminatory basis”726  (note that the language of the EU suggests 
“effective participation” of “all affected stakeholders,” and does not as such mention non-
discrimination).  
 
In turn, ANSI’s explanation of participation encapsulates the principle of transparency, while 
clarifying that participation in standards development and approval processes should be open 
for all directly and materially affected stakeholders (which is closer to the wording of the EU 
Regulation), without undue financial barriers or unreasonably restricted voting membership.727 
SDOAA (2004) is limited to the requirement that all procedural principles, including openness, 
should be applied also to all SDOs’ standardization activities and “actions relating to the IPR 
policies.”728  
 
It comes as no surprise that both US and EU frameworks address governmental agencies’ 
participation in (national) SDOs: after all, standards may be used for regulatory and policy 
purposes at both sides of the Atlantic, so keeping governments informed of and engaged in 
industry activity is advantageous both for the public and private sector. Neither do the 
restrictions imposed on voting rights seem unreasonable: in a narrow-specialized technical 
field, increased participation may dissipate the effectiveness of technical processes, cause 
breakdowns in experts’ negotiations729 or unnecessary prolong technical deliberations, which 
in turn threatens the effectiveness of a standard. What is astonishing, is that none of the 
 
 
722 Section 2(e)(j) of OMB Circular (2016). 
723 Section 6(d) of OMB Circular (2016). 
724 Ibid. 
725 Which mirrors the principle of “openness” of the TBT Committee Decision. Note also similarities with 
the wording of Article 4.3.1 of ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019). 
726 OMB Circular, at 9. Note that the “all stages” requirement is still present in ISO/IEC Guide 59, 
alongside with the requirement to participate on a non-discriminatory basis; Article 4.3.1 of ISO/IEC Guide 59 
(2019). 
727 Sections 1.1 and 2.1 of ANSI Essential Requirements (2019). 
728 Section 103(1)(7) SDOAA. 
729 D. Stasavage, ‘Open-door or closed-door?’, p. 668. 
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frameworks explain what should be understood under the term “policy development” – even 
though the TBT Committee Decision and Regulation 1025/2012 accurately define standards 
development stages. And while SDOAA (2004) seems to limit its scope to SDOs’ IPR policies, 
it is unclear whether those are covered by the TBT Committee Decision, especially given the 
fact that the TBT Agreement is silent on the intellectual property issues related to standards. 
 
6.2.3 Consensus, Impartiality and Balance  
 
Consensus is the cornerstone of private voluntary standardization. As stipulated in the ISO/IEC 
Guide 2 (2004), a standard is by definition established by consensus,730 which the Guide 
defines as a “general agreement characterized by the absence of sustained opposition to 
substantial issues by any important part of the concerned interests and by a process that 
involves seeking to take into account the views of all parties concerned and to reconcile any 
conflicting arguments,” but that “does not imply unanimity.”731 Some regulatory frameworks, 
however, employ consensus together with the requirements of impartiality or even balance, 
purposed at avoiding dominance of particular (group of) interests.732  
 
The principle of consensus has often been crucial for defining a standard and establishing the 
coverage of the TBT Agreement.733 When referring to consensus-based standards, the TBT 
Committee Decision (2000) further develops the requirement of meaningful opportunities, 
emphasizing that standards development processes should not privilege or favor particular 
interests, and that consensus-procedures should seek to consider the views of all parties 
concerned and reconcile any conflicting arguments.734 In this context, all standard development 
processes should guarantee impartiality.735 The fact that impartiality and consensuses are 
merged into one principle invites an assumption that for international standardization, 
consensus only serves as a safeguard of equality during the preparation of standards. In 
addition, due attention has to be paid to the difference in the wording: whereas impartiality 
“should be accorded”, consensus process “should seek to take into account the views of all 
parties.”736  
 
ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019) stipulates that impartiality should be accorded with respect to the 
access to participation in work, submission of comments on drafts, considerations of views and 
 
 
730 Article 3.2 of ISO/IEC Guide 2 (2004). 
731 Article 1.7 of ISO/IEC Guide 2 (2004).  
732 The author is aware that there are different views with regard to the concept of balance and dominance 
in SDOs: for instance, JRC Report suggests that consensus can impede balance. In its recent intervention, the DoJ 
stated that consensus decision of an SDO with unbalanced membership may fail to produce a balance of interests. 
See NSS Labs, Inc. v. Crowdstrike, Inc., Case No. 3:18-cv-05711, Statement of Interest of the United States (ND 
Cal., filed Jun. 26, 2019). See also J. L. Contreras, ‘Understanding “balance” requirement for standards 
development organizations’ (2019) 2 CPI Antitrust Chronicle. 
733 See section 3 of this chapter. 
734 Annex 4, para. D(8) of TBT Committee Decision (2000). 
735 Annex 4, para. D(9) of TBT Committee Decision (2000). 
736 Compare Annex 4, paras. D(8) and (9) of TBT Committee Decision (2000). Perhaps this suggests an 
implicit awareness of the Committee, that the consensus-based process is not always attainable. 
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comments, decision-making through consensus, obtaining information and documents, 
availability of drafts and approved standards, adopting ISO/IEC standards as regional or 
national standard and standards’ revision.737 It further elaborates that national bodies should 
conduct their work in a consensual and impartial manner, meaning that no party is favored over 
another and no stakeholder (category) dominate the processes,738 and should prefer consensus 
over voting and document its standpoints and decisions.739 To contribute to the requirement of 
balance of interests, Guide 59 (2019) suggests categorization of stakeholders and participants 
according to the broad area of interests, and assessing the relevance of these categories in the 
context of standards development project.740 The governance structure of national bodies 
should support neutrality, independency and impartiality regarding specific interests of the 
participants, and should invite its participants to build consensus: to that end, the Guide offers 
some suggestions on how NSO leadership, while acting impartially in the discussion and the 
normative work on standards,741 should deal with objections or “sustained opposition” which, 
the Guide notes, cannot be interpreted as a right to veto; interestingly, Guide 59 (2019) 
specifically notes the effort-best character of this requirement: “the obligation to address the 
sustained opposition does not imply an obligation to successfully resolve it.”742 With regard to 
behavioral independency, national bodies should, among other things, allow their governing 
bodies and staff to behave independently from those financing standardization project:743 these 
requirements render the updated ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019) the only procedural instrument so 
far that addresses the independence and impartiality of leadership positions.  
 
The Code of Good Practice only refers to consensus in the context of “coherence,” suggesting 
SDOs within the territory of a Member to make every effort to achieve a national consensus on 
standards they develop.744 As in the Committee Decision, the principle of consensus is 
formulated as a best “best effort” requirement, rather than an obligation.  
 
Regulation 1025/2012 highlights the importance to have collaborative and consensus-driven 
decision-making processes which do not favor any particular stakeholder. It further specifies 
that in the context of ICT standards, consensus does not imply unanimity, but an achievement 
of the general agreement by seeking to take into account the views of all parties concerned and 
to reconcile conflicting arguments; consensus is typically reached when there is an absence of 
sustained opposition to substantial issues by affected stakeholders.745 In this regard, 
impartiality for ICT standards should be viewed in the light of scientific technological 
development: standards should be neutral and stable and should not distort the market or 
 
 
737 Article 4.4.1 of ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019). 
738 Ibid., Article 4.4.2  
739 Ibid., Article 4.4.4(c)(d). Note that the latter also concerns the requirement of transparency. 
740 Since not all categories are relevant to all standards projects, Article 4.4.5 of ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019). 
741 Ibid.  
742 Articles 4.4.3 and 4.4.4(b) of ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019). 
743 Ibid., Article 4.4.6. 
744 Annex 3(H) of the TBT Agreement. 




impede competition and innovation.746 The principle of balance is mentioned as a goal of 
participation of all relevant categories of interested parties, rather than a separate principle.747 
 
As noted earlier, the US framework endorses standards that are based on consensus, which 
already appears from NTTAA’s and Circular’s references to “voluntary consensus standards” 
and “voluntary consensus standards bodies.” The OMB Circular (2016) defines consensus as 
a general agreement, but not necessarily unanimity, and notes that consensus-building implies 
consideration of comments and objections in a fair, impartial, open, and transparent 
processes.748 ANSI adds that in order to comply with the essential requirement of consensus, 
an effort should be made to resolve all expressed disagreements and that the evidence of 
consensus should be documented,749 and clarifies that procedures on how consensus should be 
determined is a matter of SDOs’ governance. The Circular further requires SDOs to preserve 
standards development processes that are balanced, provide a meaningful engagement from a 
broad range of parties and ensure that no single interest should dominate the decision-
making.750 This terminology is rather simplified as opposed to “balance of interests” or 
“balance of representation” in the earlier versions of the Circular, as well as in the ANSI 
Essential Requirements (2019) or the SDOAA (2004), and probably aims to avoid confusion 
and allow certain flexibility to determine balance during standard development procedures.751  
  
ANSI also concurs that standards development processes should (strive to) have a balance 
between different interest categories. The criteria for balance provide that for SDOs 
establishing safety–related standards, no single interest category may constitute more than 1/3 
of the membership, whereas for SDOs dealing with other types of standards, no single interest 
category may constitute a majority of the membership.752 Moreover, interest categories should 
be discretely defined by SDOs and cover all materially affected parties.753 ANSI also 
emphasizes lack of dominance by any single interest category, individual or organization, 
meaning exclusion of other considerations due to the leverage, strength or representation of a 
dominant stakeholder (group).754 In general, no test for dominance is required, except when the 
dominance is claimed in writing by a directly and materially affected party.755   
 
6.2.4 Effectiveness and Relevance  
 
Under the TBT Committee Decision, the principles of effectiveness and relevance provide 
positive and negative obligations for ISBs. Positive obligations imply that standards should 
respond to regulatory and market needs, be paced to scientific and technological development, 
 
 
746 Annex II (4)(e) of EU Regulation 1025/2012. 
747 Annex II (3)(c)(iii) of EU Regulation 1025/2012. 
748 Section 2(e)(v) of OMB Circular (2016). 
749 Sections 1.7, 2.6 and 2.7 of ANSI Essential Requirements (2019). 
750 Section 2(e)(ii) of OMB Circular (2016). 
751 See OMB Circular (2016), at 9. 
752 Sections 1.3 and 2.3 of ANSI Essential Requirements (2019). 
753 Section 2.3 of ANSI Essential Requirements (2019). 
754 Section 1.1 of ANSI Essential Requirements (2019). 
755 Section 2.2 of ANSI Essential Requirements (2019). 
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and, ideally, be performance based; the latter is echoed in the Code of Good Practice and thus 
also applies for SDOs.756 The ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019) adds that standards developed by 
national bodies should also contribute to advancing trade in the broadest geographical and 
economic contexts, and focus on user-friendliness.757 As to negative obligations, standards 
should not distort the global market, affect fair competition, give preference to certain 
countries’ technical requirements or impede innovation and technological development, the 
latter also required from SDOs.758 Hence, in order for their standards to be effective and 
relevant, ISBs should take into account the requirements of the market, the state of scientific 
development, and implement procedures for identifying and reviewing standards which are no 
longer necessary.759 The fact that these two principles are merged together again opens avenues 
for assumptions: for instance, the wording of the TBT Committee Decision may suggest that 
ineffective international standards should be also considered per se irrelevant, or that all 
relevant standards are effective. Interestingly, the Appellate Body in EC-Sardines held that an 
international standard should be regarded as ineffective and inappropriate for application when 
it does not accomplish the legitimate objective pursued (“ineffective”) and is not specifically 
suitable for the fulfilment of those legitimate objectives (“inappropriate”).760 
 
Regulation 1025/2012 addresses the principle of relevance in the context of ICT 
standardization: ICT specification should respond to the needs of the markets as well as to the 
regulatory requirements,761 and in this matter are also linked to the principle of coherence. They 
should further ensure neutrality and stability by being scientifically-driven and performance-
oriented, but also allowing competition and innovation.762 Moreover, ICT standards should be 
of sufficient quality to enable the development of competing implementations and not to be 
“hidden or controlled” by anyone other than the SDO which established them.763 Once adopted, 
ICT standards should remain subject to ongoing support and maintenance, and be publicly 
available for implementation and use against a reasonable fee, if necessary.764 Proprietary 
components essential for implementation of these standards should be licensed on FRAND-
basis: this also includes licensing without compensation.  
 
To ensure that standards maintain their relevance, the OMB Circular (2016) requires agencies 
to utilize the retrospective periodic review mechanism,765 and urges them to collaborate with 
SDOs in order to consider updates and alternatives to existing standards.766 As such, ANSI 
 
 
756 Annex 4, para D(11) of TBT Committee Decision (2000) and Annex 3(I) of TBT Agreement. 
757 Articles 4.5.6 and 4.5.7 of ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019). 
758 Annex 4, para D(10) of TBT Committee Decision (2000) and Annex 3(E) of TBT Agreement. 
759 Similar requirement is echoed in Articles 4.5.1 and 4.5.5 of ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019).  
760 EC-Sardines, paras. 259-29. It has also been argued that the difference between effectiveness and 
appropriateness lies in the fact that the former bears upon the results of the means employed, whereas the latter 
relates to the nature of the means employed. See Partiti, ‘What use of an unloaded gun?’, p. 853. 
761 Annex II, 4(d) of EU Regulation 1025/2012. 
762 Annex II, 4(e) of EU Regulation 1025/2012. 
763 Annex II, 4(f) of EU Regulation 1025/2012. 
764 Annex II, 4(b) of EU Regulation 1025/2012. 
765 Those mechanisms are defined in Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011) and Exec. 
Order No. 13610, 81 Fed. Reg. 4213 (May 2, 2010).  
766 See OMB Circular (2016), p. 8.  
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does not address standards’ relevance, but mentions coordination and harmonization as tools 
to resolve potential conflicts between and among existing and future ANSs.767  
 
The striking absence of any further elaboration on efficiency and relevance by US and EU 
frameworks may be explained by the assumption that standards which do not respond to the 
needs of the market and the society are most likely not to be used by the industry or to be 
endorsed by governmental agencies as policy tools. In fact, deviation from ineffective and 
irrelevant standards is not prohibited, although may occur at some costs. 
  
 6.2.5 Coherence and coordination 
 
Another principle that facilitates development of effective standards is coherence. Coherence 
ensures optimal allocation of SDOs’ resources, avoids duplications in SDOs’ activities and 
prevents possible contradiction among standards. To eliminate the existence of conflicting 
international standards, the TBT Committee Decision (2000) emphasizes the importance of 
coordination and cooperation between relevant international bodies.768 In a similar vein, SDOs 
within the territory of one Member shall strive to achieve a “national consensus” on standards 
they produce and to avoid duplication and overlap between their work and the work of relevant 
ISBs.769 ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019) introduces the requirement of voluntary coordination to 
comply with within each national body, as well as among national bodies within each country 
or region.770 With regard to national standards, Guide 59 (2019) encourages NSOs to adopt 
flexible policies and procedures to support effective coordination and cooperation with regard 
to development of national standards,771 and notes that involvement of public bodies and 
officials is essential in case when standards are adopted to support legislation.772 
 
Coherence is especially crucial in the EU regulatory framework, since EU standardization does 
not only influence harmonization of technical requirements, but also consistency in EU policy-
making. Coherence in European standardization system is ensured by the so-called “stand still” 
obligation, which prohibits NSOs to adopt or maintain national standards that contradict their 
European equivalents.773 In view of standards relevance to the market, Regulation 1025/2012 
also supports regular information exchange between NSOs, ESOs, European stakeholder 
organizations and the Commission when designing annual standardization programs.774 In a 
similar vein, ICT technical specifications should cover domains that are not (yet) subject to 
 
 
767 Sections 1.4 and 2.4 of ANSI Essential Requirements (2019). 
768 Annex 4(D) of TBT Committee Decision (2000). Although it might be suggested that the principle of 
coherence does not refer to standard and standard-setting processes within a single ISB (i.e. Delimatsis, ‘Global 
standard-setting 2.0’, p. 317), it nevertheless guides the policies and communication of that ISB and might affect 
its decisions in relationship with other organizations.  
769 Annex 3(H) of TBT Agreement. For national bodies developing international standards, see also 
Articles 4.6.2 and 4.6.4 of ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019).  
770 Ibid., Article 4.6.1.  
771 Ibid., Article 4.6.6. 
772 Ibid., Article 4.6.7. 
773 Articles 3.5 and 3.6 of EU Regulation 1025/2012. 
774 Rec. 27 of EU Regulation 1025/2012. 
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European technical harmonization,775 while remaining “relevant enough” to be implemented 
by different vendors. 
 
ANSI mentions coordination and harmonization as tools to resolve potential conflicts between 
and among existing and future ANSs (and thus not within SDOs’ areas and scope of work),776  
defining a  “conflict” as a situation where the terms of one standard are incompatible with the 
terms of the other standard and preclude proper implementation of the latter.777 Such situations 
should be resolved in “good faith”, requiring substantial, thorough and comprehensive efforts 
(emphasis added) to harmonize the prospective and existing ANSs, and the evidence of 
compliance with this requirement should be documented.778 To avoid duplication of technical 
requirements and maintain coherence in US standardization environment, Federal State and 
local bodies should coordinate with standardization activities of the private sector.779  
 
6.2.6 Concerns of developing countries or “weaker parties”   
 
The fact that effective participation of developing countries is encapsulated in a separate 
principle in the TBT Committee Decision (2000),780 and not dealt with under the principle of 
openness akin to US and EU frameworks addressing the involvement of weaker parties,781 is 
no accident, given the mandate of the WTO. Under the TBT Committee Decision (2000), this 
principle consists of both passive and active elements: it prohibits de facto exclusion of 
developing countries,782 and calls upon providing technical assistance for improving their 
participation – which is echoed in the relevant provisions of the TBT Agreement.783 
Involvement of potentially under-represented stakeholders and providing access to the relevant 
information, as well as ensuring that standards contribute to broad geographical context, is also 
promoted among national bodies by ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019).784  
 
It should be noted, however, that even when set forth by a specific provision, increased 
involvement of developing countries may have similar flaws as broad participation in general: 
Western companies often admit fearing the “race to the bottom” and decrease in quality of 
international standards as a consequence of active involvement of developing countries in 
SDOs’ decision-making. On a positive side of the ledger, participation in global standardization 
fora provides developing industry with a steep learning curve and in the long run, may 
 
 
775 Annex II, 2 of EU Regulation 1025/2012. 
776 Sections 1.4 and 2.4 of ANSI Essential Requirements (2019). This conflict is also mentioned in Article 
4.6.5 of ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019). 
777 Section 2.4.1 of ANSI Essential Requirements (2019). 
778 Section 2.4.2 of ANSI Essential Requirements (2019). 
779 Section 12(b) of NTTAA 1995. 
780 Annex 4, para. E(13) of TBT Committee Decision. 
781 In this regard, the JRC Report concluded that the interests of under-represented groups are best served 
when public authorities look out for the public interest within the current regulatory scheme, following and 
deepening the previously mentioned procedural and safe-harbor approaches; see JRC Report, p. 17. 
782 It is suggested that this requirement is defined in a negative manner; Delimatsis, ‘Global standard-
setting 2.0’, p. 318. 
783 Article 12 of the TBT Agreement. 
784 Articles 4.3, 4.5.6 and 4.7 of ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019). 
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eventually facilitate expansion of multilateral trade.  
 
6.2.7 Appeal and review  
 
Under Regulation 1025/2012, technical review is only mentioned in the context of ICT 
specifications,785 which leaves the door ajar for SDOs to decide whether they should provide 
appeal and review procedures for the decision-making processes leading to the adoption of a 
standard. In turn, the OMB Circular (2016) provides that SDOs should incorporate processes 
for handling procedural appeals.786 ANSI elaborates that such processes should offer 
“identifiable, realistic, and readily available appeals mechanism for the impartial handling of 
procedural appeals regarding any action or inaction,”787and shall be available to all parties 
concerned without imposing an undue burden on them, and consideration of appeals shall be 
fair and unbiased and fully address the expressed concerns.788 SDOAA (2004) further stipulates 
that SDOs should ensure that appeals can be filled by those parties who oppose SDOs’ 
decisions.789 
 
The fact that neither the EU or WTO framework require SDOs to maintain appeal or review 
processes is quite astonishing. Indeed, appeal procedures are present in EU standardization 
through the procedural mechanisms of the three ESOs;790 yet, the fact that ANSI obliges all 
SDOs to comply with its Essential Requirements for accreditation purposes encourages a large 
part of US-based SDOs to introduce appeal and review processes into their operational 
framework, which arguably is not the case for SDOs based in the EU. In turn, the updated 
version of ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019) suggests that national bodies should implement 
procedures for responding to enquiries, hearing complaints and handling appeals that arise 
from their standardization processes and implementation of the Code of Good Practice;791 yet, 
since the Guide does not replace or interpret the TBT framework, this requirement is of little 
use for SDOs implementing the TBT Code of Good Practice. 
 
6.2.8 Access to standards on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms 
 
Availability of standards documents was discussed under the principle of transparency; 
nevertheless, some standardization frameworks explicitly address access to proprietary 
elements incorporated into a standard or technical specification. More often than not, the 
applicable instruments require SDOs to implement a patent policy that is based on F/RAND 
licensing commitments.792 Regulation 1025/2012 explains that the FRAND principle also 
 
 
785 Annex II(4)(a) of EU Regulation 1025/2012. 
786 Section 2(e)(iv) of OMB Circular (2016). 
787 Section 1.8 of ANSI Essential Requirements (2019). 
788 Section 2.8 of ANSI Essential Requirements (2019). 
789 Section 102(5)(F) SDOAA (2004). 
790 See, for instance, the appeal procedure of the ETSI, in Chapter IV.4. 
791 Presumably from the terminology, it means the TBT Code of Good Practice. But the document provides 
as example the Procedures for the technical work in ISO/IEC Directives Part 1. See Article 5.12 of ISO/IEC Guide 
59 (2019). 
792 See Contreras, ‘An empirical study’. 
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cover royalty-free licensing requirement.793 OMB Circular (2016) clarifies that RAND 
licensing obligations794  extend to “implementers of the standard” and not to the “all interested 
parties,” unlike it was stipulated in its earlier versions. The SDOAA (2004) itself does not 
contain a specific F/RAND provision (this requirement is introduced in the Circular to which 
the SDOAA refers), but states that its principles apply to actions related to the IPR policies of 
SDOs.  
 
The Horizontal Guidelines (2011) suggests that SDOs should have a clear and balanced IPR 
policy, which would be adjusted for the needs of particular industry and organization in 
question,795 and which requires a commitment from patent-holders to disclose their essential 
intellectual property and license their technology on FRAND terms.796 In addition, the IPR 
policy should oblige the owners of technologies (potentially) essential for standards 
implementation, to disclose their patents in good faith, by this means allowing standards 
development group to make an informed choice.797 This disclosure obligation is based on 
“reasonable endeavors” of standards development participants to identify the essential IPR 
reading on the prospect standard, and as such, does not require firms to conduct an onerous 
research. The assessment whether the licensing terms are indeed “fair and reasonable” should 
be based on considerations whether those fees bear a reasonable relationship to the economic 
value of the intellectual property.798 While the Guidelines suggest that the FRAND 
commitment aims to ensure the accessibility of the essential technology to the standard users 
on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory conditions,799 many have claimed that the actual 
purpose of the FRAND commitment was to prevent a “holdup” situation, or even to preclude 
a patent-holder from seeking injunctions in case of infringement. 800  
 
While the ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019) provides that patent solutions may be included in a 
standard if justifiable for technical reasons and licenses are negotiated under FRAND, 
whenever the patent-holder is located,801 inclusion and licensing of proprietary technologies 
into standards is not addressed by the TBT Agreement, although concerns related to intellectual 
property sometimes arise at TBT Committee meetings. One of such concerns related to 
intellectual property implemented in China’s guidelines for secure IT risk control mechanism 
 
 
793 Annex II, 4(c) of EU Regulation 1025/2012. 
794 Which the Circular explains as “a term of art in the rulemaking context”; OMB Circular (2016), at 9. 
795 Horizontal Guidelines (2011), para. 284. 
796 Horizontal Guidelines (2011), para. 285. This commitment, which is of a contractual nature, should 
be given prior to the adoption of the standard, and shall bind undertakings to which essential patents might 
later be transferred. 
797 Horizontal Guidelines (2011), para. 286. Needless to say, these conditions do not apply for SDOs with 
royalty-free standards policy.  
798 Horizontal Guidelines (2011), para. 289. 
799 Horizontal Guidelines (2011), para. 287. 
800 P. Chappatte, ‘FRAND commitments: the case for antitrust intervention’ (2009) 5 European 
Competition Journal 319-46 at 331; such reasoning links to the investigations of the Commission in Rambus and 
Qualcomm.  
801 Article 4.5.8 ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019). Note that Guide 59 is the only document so far that describes 
the commitment globally. 
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in banking sector.802 Another, and perhaps the most famous example, is the discussion on 
WLAN Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure (WAPI), a China’s homegrown encryption 
standard for WLAN developed as a counterpart of IEEE’s 802.11 standard: as discussed above, 
one of the many issues that caused the discontent of Western WTO Member was the lack of 
FRAND obligations for proprietary algorithms on which WAPI specifications were running.  
 
6.3. Relevance of the procedural principles to ICT standardization  
 
6.3.1 Application of the regulatory frameworks to SDOs  
 
6.3.2.1 The WTO regulatory framework 
 
The six principles of the TBT Committee Decision apply to international standards developed 
by recognized bodies; this implies that cover standardization activities of the ISO and the IEC, 
which TBT implicitly recognizes by referring to the definitions of the ISO/IEC Guide in its 
Annex 1,803 as well as standards produced by the ISBs listed in Annex A of the SPS Agreement, 
namely Codex Alimentarius Commission, International Office of Epizootics and International 
Plant Protection Convention.804 The TBT Committee Decision will most likely also apply to 
ITU, a specialized agency of the UN whose Standardization Sector is well established in the 
ICT industry.805  In turn, the Code of Good Practice, while in theory covering a very broad 
range of SDOs,806 would only apply inasmuch as the SDOs explicitly accept it which, in the 
absence of any TBT obligation towards these SDOs, can only be ensured by the Member where 
the SDO is established.807 While a similar rationale should in principle apply to ISO/IEC Guide 
59 (2019), its updated scope is limited to national bodies, also when it implements the 
provisions of the TBT Code of Good Practice:808 at the same time, the requirements of Guide 
59 (2019) go beyond the applicable TBT instruments, addressing such aspects as FRAND 
licensing conditions and availability of appeals.  
 
It appears that, despite their evident role in multilateral trade, most of the ICT standards, being 
industry-driven initiatives outside the recognized ISBs, are not covered either by the TBT 
Agreement or by the Code of Good Practice, and are only covered by ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019) 
when they are developed by the national bodies (which, in case of global standards, is rather 
rare) that have accepted that Guide. Indeed, ICT standards may still fall under the coverage of 
other WTO Agreements, such as GATS and TRIPS but, unlike TBT, these agreements do not 
 
 
802 Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Minutes of the Meeting of 18-19 March 2015, WTO Doc. 
G/TBT/M/65 (May 28, 2015), para. 2.2.2.2. 
803 Note that unlike the SPS Agreement, TBT does provide an indicative list of standards bodies covered 
by the Agreement.  
804 Annex A(3) of SPS Agreement. Following the reasoning of the Appellate Body in US-Tuna II, the fact 
that those bodies were listed by the SPS Committee which consists of whole WTO membership serves as proof 
as they have “recognized activities” in standardization; US-Tuna II, paras. 360–63. 
805 See Chapter II.2. 
806 See Partiti, ‘What use of an unloaded gun?’. 
807 Ibid.  
808 Article 5 of ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019) applies to national bodies.   
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offer mechanisms for procedural scrutiny of (private) SDOs; such scrutiny, however, is 
desirable to ensure that private standards are developed in transparent and open manner with 
due respect to procedural guarantees.809  
 
That said, compliance with the TBT requirements can still be ensured, albeit indirectly, through 
the mechanisms available outside the WTO framework. Standards created by industry 
consortia may be submitted to the TBT procedural principles once they are endorsed by a 
recognized SDO. Moreover, adherence to the WTO principles is expected from US-based 
SDOs that are accredited by ANSI. These, in turn, may be both formal and informal bodies 
dealing with interoperability of telecommunications networks, standards consumer electronic 
equipment and design of software: examples of informal SDOs accredited by ANSI include 
the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (ATIS), Consumer Electronics 
Association (CEA), Dimensional Metrology Standards Consortium (DMSC), and 
MedBiquitous.810 Hence, by accrediting private SDOs, ANSI does not only recognize their 
standards as “American National Standards,” but indirectly submits these bodies to the scrutiny 
of the TBT principles.   
 
6.3.2.2 The EU and US national regulatory frameworks  
 
The procedural principles of Regulation 1025/2012 largely apply to the development of 
harmonized standards by the ESOs and NSOs and to a lesser extent, to informal ICT platforms, 
whose standards can be used for the EU procurement purposes.811 Since the US regulatory 
framework does not provide for the establishment of “designated bodies,” it is assumed to 
cover a wider range of SDOs. As it is the case with the WTO framework, industry consortia 
will only fall under the procedural principles of OMB Circular (2016) and ANSI once they are 
accredited by the ANSI and/or their standards are used as policy-tools.   
 
It should also be observed that the role of the US governmental agencies and the European 
Commission in private standardization activities cannot be compared to the one of the WTO 
Secretariat: as such, the WTO Secretariat does not partake in the meetings of technical experts 
(what US agencies are encouraged to do) or enjoy a Counsellor or observer status in private 
SDOs, and nor can it propose standardization projects (which is the Commission’s prerogative 
in the ESOs). Hence, already by participating in private standardization activity, regulators can 
be the watchdog of due process in SDOs, albeit they contribute to standards development on 
an equal footing with other stakeholders.812   
 




809 Mavroidis and Wolfe, ‘Private standards and the WTO’, p. 21 (on the perils of poor standards 
development processes).  
810 See list of ANSI-accredited standard developers (2019) available at https://share.ansi.org/. 
811 See Annex II of EU Regulation 1025/2012. 
812 This was confirmed in a number of conversations with standardization experts; see Chapter V.  
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In the US and EU, antitrust provisions governing standardization are not confined to 
international standards or technical regulations, and hence also apply to industry consortia and 
informal standard-setting groups. For this reason, SDOAA(2004) and Horizontal Guidelines 
(2011) may be assumed to cover a broader range of standards and standardization platforms 
than the TBT Agreement or the applicable US and EU legislation, especially considering that 
the competition and antitrust provisions can be subject to extraterritorial application and curb 
anti-competitive conducts outside their jurisdictions.813 It should be noted, however, that both 
SDOAA and Horizontal Guidelines limit the liability of SDOs, but not of their Members. 
Accordingly, individual parties participating in standards development may still be prosecuted 
for anticompetitive conduct occurred in standards development. 
 
It should be recalled that not all legal instruments discussed in this chapter are binding: for 
instance, the TBT Committee Decision is a “subsequent agreement” between the WTO 
Members,814 which should be taken into account when interpreting the TBT Agreement,815 and 
Horizontal Guidelines are considered soft law of the European Commission. This, in turn, also 
affect the applicability of the procedural principles put forward by these frameworks to 
standardization activities.816  
 
6.3.2 Due process principles  
 
The procedural principles for standardization analysed in this chapter may differ in their 
definition, but to some extent, they are also intertwined. Transparency underpins openness, 
since effective participation is impossible without access to the relevant information; 
transparency also underpins coherence, allowing SDOs to coordinate their work programs and 
ensuring efficient allocation of standards development projects; consensus and balanced 
procedures that allow for the resolution of objections facilitate consent within the industry and 
thus ensure that standards are relevant, effective and widely accepted.  
 
The question arises whether and to which extent can these principles be adhered to by all SDOs 
operating in the ICT sector. Compliance with the principles is especially questionable for 
industry consortia: these informal SDOs can be expected to lack transparency, as it is defined 
by the applicable procedural principles,817 and openness, since most of them can be assumed 
to prefer being closed group of technical experts and not to publish information relevant to 
their ongoing and future standards development.818 Moreover, increased openness of standards 
development committees is generally presumed to cause delays, which in turn are significant 
 
 
813 See section 5 of this chapter. 
814 Article 31(3)(a) of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 23 May 1969, in force 27 January 
1980, 1155 UNTS 331; (1969) 8 ILM 679; UKTS (1980) 58. 
815 US-Tuna II, paras. 371-72. 
816 For instance, compliance with the procedural requirements of Horizontal Guidelines do not always 
guarantee antitrust immunity. 
817 For instance, SDOs as VXI bus and the Open Geospatial Consortium, while providing information on 
their recent products or sometimes even putting their standards into public domain, do not publish their work 
program, which is required under the notion of transparency.  
818 This assumption was in part confirmed by the interviews with experts; see Chapter V.3. 
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indirect costs of standardization of technologies;819 at the same time, it is also believed to 
improve the outcomes of standardization processes.820 
 
Likewise, consortia may fall short on impartiality and balance: W3C is infamously considered 
a “benevolent dictatorship” where the Director has the ultimate decision-making power.821 
Whether consensus is always beneficial, let alone feasible, is likely to depend on SDOs’ 
operational field and scope of activities: development of web standards, for instance, is mostly 
driven by technical excellence, rather than consensus.822 Coherence is almost an oxymoron in 
R&D intensive SDOs: most widely accepted ICT standards were subject to fierce competition 
from other standardization initiatives in the early stages of their development and were selected 
by the market due to their technical features, costs or compatibility with other technologies.823 
Finally, appeal and review are strikingly absent from a number of regulatory frameworks, most 
notably from the TBT instruments, with ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019) limiting the requirements 
of maintaining appeal procedures to NSOs. 
 
By employing vague and ambiguous terms, the procedural frameworks provide SDOs with 
room for maneuver to adjust their governance to specialized technical activities in their 
operational field. The procedural principles discussed in this chapter thus should be considered 
holistically and in the context of the industry field and regulatory environment in which an 
SDO operate. In the light of this “convenient vagueness,”824  these principles should be viewed 
as “best effort” practices for SDOs to escape antitrust liability, develop standards to be 
referenced in national regulations, or to benefit from increased legitimacy: these practices are 
further implemented by SDOs governance frameworks.825 
 
6.4 Relation to other procedural principles 
 
6.4.1 OpenStand principles of the Internet Society  
 
One of the main contested principles of standardization is the one of “openness.”  In the context 
of the examined regulatory frameworks, openness mostly implies ensuring participation, equal 
 
 
819 In this regard, see R. Mazzoleni and R. R. Nelson, ‘The benefits and costs of strong patent protection: 
a contribution to the current debate’ (1998) 27 Research Policy 273-84.  
820 Simcoe, ‘Standard setting committees’. Note, however, that this study examined the processes of IETF 
which has a more comprehensive operational framework and, arguably, stronger procedural guarantees than many 
informal SDOs. For the examination of IETF governance and procedure, see Chapter V.4. 
821 See J. L. Contreras, ‘A tale of two layers: patents, standardization and the internet’ (2016) 93 Denver 
Law Review 853-95 at 874-5, n. 102.  
822 In other words, “The Web is, and should be, driven by technical merit, not consensus”; J. Way, ‘A brief 
history of HTML5’ (6 December 2011), quoting Ian Hickson, available at https://code.tutsplus.com/articles/a-
brief-history-of-html5--net-23064. 
823 See Chapter V.3. 
824 The author is grateful to Professor Pierre Larouche for the suggested terminology.  
825 Procedural principles for standardization as “best effort” have been discussed in the context of the WTO; 
see M. Du and F. Deng, ‘International standards as global public goods in the world trading system’ (2016) 43 
Legal Issues of Economic Integration 113-44 at 134-5; and by Mataija, who views them as “quasi-administrative 
law”  for SDOs; see Mataija, ‘Leveraging trade law’, p. 311. 
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opportunities and providing necessary information; however, a different interpretation is 
suggested for Internet and Web standardization, where “open standards” typically refer either 
to the process of standards’ creation or to the royalty-free IPR policies.826 Such “open” non-
proprietary specifications underpin Internet infrastructure and allow devices, services and 
applications to operate across a wide system of networks, ensuring their interoperability and 
consistency.827  
 
Principles that should be adhered to by bodies and communities establishing this type of “open 
standards” were laid down by the OpenStand movement – an alliance between number of 
SDOs.828 According to the OpenStand principles, due process in Internet standardization is 
achieved through appeals opportunities, clear procedures for review and fairness - the latter 
requirement being rather absent from almost all regulatory frameworks except when it concerns 
FRAND principles or resolution by comments and appeals as prescribed by the ANSI. Absence 
of dominance also plays a crucial role, perhaps resulting from the earlier threat of IBM 
domination in standardization of computer networks and existence of telecom monopolies.829 
To ensure that the processes are not dominated by vested interests, OpenStand refers to broad 
consensus, transparency in terms of public consultation, availability of documents, and 
balance.830 With regard to participation requirements, OpenStand mentions that processes 
should be open to all parties that are interested and informed (emphasis added); this wording 
allows for an assumption that even open standards processes can exclude certain stakeholders, 
in this case those who are “uninformed.”831 Remarkably, while there may be some tension 
between FRAND and OpenStand’s preference for royalty-free licensing of essential 
technologies, it is also the practice of copyrighted standards that is tolerated under all 





826 C. B. Biddle, ‘No standards for standards: understanding the ICT standards-development ecosystem’, 
in J. L. Contreras (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Technical Standardization Law: Competition, Antitrust and 
Patents (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2018), p. 21.  
827 See ‘Open internet standards chapter toolkit’, available at   
https://www.internetsociety.org/chapters/resources/open-internet-standards-chapter-toolkit; and Internet Society, 
‘Policy brief: open internet standards’, available at https://www.internetsociety.org/policybriefs/openstandards/. 
ISOC is generally guided by fundamental beliefs that the Internet should be open and global, Internet 
standardization should be transparent and consensus-based, and that participation in the Internet standardization 
should be inclusive and based on transparency, equality and fairness. See ‘Policy brief: open internet standards’, 
available at https://www.internetsociety.org/policybriefs/openstandards/. 
828 See https://open-stand.org/. 
829 Russel, Open Standards and the Digital Age, p. 13. 
830 See ‘Policy brief: open internet standards’. 
831 The relevant sources do not provide any further explanations with regard to when are stakeholders 
sufficiently “informed” to participate in standardization processes.  
832 Open Source Initiative, ‘Open standards requirements for software’, available at 
https://opensource.org/osr, explains that a standard must be freely and publicly available under royalty-free terms 
at reasonable and non-discriminatory cost (although it is unclear how the requirement of “free availability” fits 
together with availability “under non-discriminatory costs). This requirement would be very hard to comply with 
by such formal SDOs as ISO and CEN/CENELEC, which offer their standards against a fee. In this regard, see 
also ISO/IEC definition of international, regional and national standards, which suggests their publicly 
availability; Article 3.2.1 ISO/Guide 2 (2004). 
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It should be noted that the scope of OpenStand principles remains rather limited (Internet and 
software standardization), and lacks legal basis or enforcement mechanisms.833 But despite the 
challenges “open standards,” such as inclusion of proprietary solutions into Internet 
specifications and lack of sufficient governmental recognition,834 this concept, as well as the 
OpenStand principles, cannot be ignored in the context of modern standardization. Similarly 
to the wireless telecom industry, the Internet is characterized by new stakeholders and tensions 
between governments and private sector:835 the emergence of the IoT systems and 5G standards 
for cellular networks, together with increased reliance on open source is likely to reshape the 
current landscape of technical standardization in general, and ICT standardization in particular.  
 
In this regard, some scholars have argued that since Internet is evolving in a constant and rapid 
pace, the “open standards” concept should be flexible and adjust to the society.836 Others 
suggested that the concept of openness has been fundamentally changed throughout the years: 
by the time the importance of open systems was realized by Internet engineers, openness was 
attributed with political, economic, technical and cultural meaning.837 Moreover, the reality of 
industrial development allows stakeholders with vested interests to pursue their own agenda 
even when the systems are open,838 questioning whether the concept of “open standards,” as 
introduced by the OpenStand movement, is achievable.  
 
6.4.2 Good Governance  
 
Whereas from public law perspective, the discussed principles constrain SDOs governance, 
from the viewpoint of private law, they represent procedural rights granted to SDOs’ 
participants and which they can claim against other participants or against SDOs.839 At the 
same time, in the context of global governance, briefly discussed in Chapter II, the regulatory 
frameworks are expected to fine-tune the broader “good governance” principles to the field of 
standardization and, where applicable, to ICT standards development. While this is marginally 
the case (for instance, with regard to transparency, some frameworks indeed state which 
information should be provided), some theoretical concepts of global regulation, i.e. “all 
affected principle,” do not seem to materialize through standardization frameworks: even when 
 
 
833 For instance, it is unclear which consequences would be borne by SDOs and its participants in case 
their standards development activities fail to comply with the procedural principles of Open Stand movement. It 
is for this reason that the OpenStand principles are not considered as a regulatory framework for the purpose of 
this study. 
834 See ‘Policy brief: open internet standards’. 
835 For an elaborative research on this topic, see Global Commission on Internet Governance, ‘Who runs 
the internet? The global multi-stakeholder model of internet governance’ (2016) Research Volume 2, available at 
https://www.cigionline.org/. 
836 See K. Krechmer, ‘Open standards requirements’ (2006) 4 The International Journal of IT Standards 
and Standardization Research 43-61, who advocated, inter alia, for open access, open meetings, open interfaces 
and open use.  
837 See Russel, Open Standards and the Digital Age, p. 6, who links the openness in standardization with 
the concept of “openness” in US politics. 
838 Ibid., p. 16. 
839 This is also suggested in the JRC Report.  
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referring to “affected stakeholders,”840 the frameworks do not clarify what is the threshold to 
determine when a stakeholder is “affected” (the exception would be the updated ISO/IEC 
Guide 59 (2019), which defines such terms as “stakeholder” and “participant”).841 Moreover, 
availability of review and appeal mechanisms, while being the leading principle in global 
governance scholarship, is not implemented in most regulatory frameworks.  
 
It should be noted that procedural safeguards of global governance provide mechanisms to hold 
non-State regulators accountably and by this means, to compensate for democratic deficit of 
global regulation. In this context, it remains questionable whether standardization is, and 
should be considered, a democratic process: arguably, the principles were designed to prevent 
dominance and ensure technical excellence, rather than provide SDOs’ committees with 
democratic scrutiny, and have evolved into procedural requirements that SDOs have follow to 
escape certain liability. At the same time, while current standardization is evolving from purely 
technical exercise to a modus of global governance,842 the question arises whether the 
democratic deficit of standardization should still be ignored.  
 
6.5 Shortcomings of the regulatory frameworks   
 
When analysed in the context of current standardization, certain aspects appear strikingly 
absent from the regulatory frameworks. First are foremost is the lack of consideration  
regarding the copyright of private standards. While some clarity could have been offered by 
the principle of transparency and the requirement of “reasonable availability” of standards, 
implemented in the WTO and US frameworks, the threshold for reasonable availability remains 
opaque. ISO/IEC Guide 2 (2004) provides that standards’ public (emphasis added) availability 
is “…presumed to constitute acknowledged rules of technology…”843 which may suggest that 
standards that are not publicly available should not, in principle, be endorsed as industry rules. 
This does not seem to be the case in the US standardization system, which allows incorporation 
of standards that are not placed into the public domain. The OMB Circular (2016) explicitly 
refused to provide any concrete definition of the “reasonably available” requirement, referring 
to the OFR, but offered some guidance by mentioning which aspects should be viewed as 
facilitating such availability, including access to standards’ summary and read-only versions. 
 
Furthermore, the considerations regarding SDO’s governance processes are also absent: the 
frameworks do not clarify whether the principles apply to all activities of SDOs, or only to 
technical development of standards. Such clarification has so far only been provided by the 
ANSI, whose due process requirement apply only to the development ANSs;844 yet, the 
questions of governance and design of SDOs’ rules become increasingly important in 
 
 
840 I.e. EU Regulation 1025/2012. 
841 Article 3.5 of ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019). 
842 See chapter II for explanations. 
843 Article 3.2.1 of ISO/IEC Guide 2 (2004).   
844 “These requirements apply to activities related to the development of consensus for approval, revision, 
reaffirmation, and withdrawal of American National Standards (ANS)” (emphasis added), Section 1.0 ANSI 
Essential Requirements (2019). 
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standardization ecology. In the absence of a clear regulatory framework, SDOs arguably have 
a wider discretion when designing their governance rules rather than when developing their 
standards: in theory, a standard can then be drafted following procedures that were developed 
in opaque and closed processes that did not represent industry consensus.   
 
It should be noted that some of these concerns may have indeed been taken on board by the 
recently updated ISO/IEC Guide 59 (2019(. For instance, the document addressed the FRAND 
requirement and role of the SDO leadership which, as it will appear from the case studies of 
Chapter V, becomes increasingly important. But despite these positive evolvement of the 
procedural frameworks, the Guide’s scope is rather limited, since it applies only standards 
development processes, and only to only national bodies. Moreover, some issues, such as the 




The regulatory frameworks examined in this study offer a similar set of procedural principles, 
including transparency, openness/participation, consensus, impartiality, balance of interests, 
coherence and coordination, relevance, and appeal. By and large, there is certain tension 
between some of the principles: for instance, openness can undermine the principle of 
balance,845 and consensus is by definition associated with exclusion, which in turn is necessary 
to define the scope of inclusion.846 At the same time, the principles appear to complement each 
other and, for this reason, and to understand the dynamics of ICT standardization, they should 
be viewed holistically, despite that their interpretation may somehow differ per regulatory 
framework.  
 
In this context, rather than imposing stringent requirements on SDOs, the procedural principles 
represent a set of institutional norms that are “best effort” practices and that ultimately aim to 
ensure that SDOs’ processes are balanced and are not dominated by a single group of actors.  
The challenge, however, lies within the applicability of the regulatory frameworks, and thus 
the “best effort” practices they suggest, to different types of SDOs. While in theory, it is 
possible for an SDO processes to be curbed under multiple legal regimes (for instance, the 
WTO framework and the EU regulatory framework for ESOs), many SDOs in the ICT sector 
are likely to fall outside the scope of all frameworks but those on US and EU competition law, 
which do not require any formal acceptance by SDOs or any reference to their standards by 
governmental authorities. The application of these frameworks to global SDOs would 
ultimately depend on whether the standards they produce modify trade conditions in the EU 
and US.  
 
The question remains whether the procedural principles, given their broad interpretation, are 
adequate to ensure the balance of interests in ICT standardization. While courts in EU and US 
 
 
845 JRC Report, p. 14. 
846 Russel, Open Standards and the Digital Age, p. 19. 
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tend to refer to good governance principles only as auxiliary arguments,847 it should be further 
examined how the principles are implemented into the governance frameworks of SDOs. To 
that end, the next chapter reviews to what extent do the governance and operational rules of 




847 P. Verbruggen, ‘Good governance of private standardization and the role of tort law’ (2019) 2 European 
Review of Private Law 319-52 at 349.  
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As self-regulatory institutions, SDOs enjoy great freedom in designing their operational rules 
and pacing them to the current industry needs and technological progress. Nevertheless, their 
procedures should still be compliant with the applicable legal requirements, which also entails 
that SDO should implement the established procedural principles into their operational 
frameworks and provide sufficient enforcement mechanisms to ensure that these rules are 
complied with. With SDOs’ processes gaining more attention from governmental authorities 
and the Courts on both sides of the Atlantic, there have been so far very few studies that have 
systematically analysed the institutional rules of various SDOs, let alone scrutinized them 
under the applicable regulatory frameworks. However, institutional architecture of an SDO by 
all means affects coordination between its participants and their compliance with due process 
principles, and hence deserves particular attention.  
 
This chapter provides a detailed systematic overview of the operational rules of five prominent 
SDOs, each having different institutional background and developing different types of ICT 
standards. In particular, it examines these SDOs’ governance, policy-making processes, 
including mechanisms for appeal and review of the decisions of SDOs’ bodies, and standards 
development procedures, and explores which procedural and substantive guarantees they offer. 
Where applicable, this chapter draws parallels with the findings of previous studies on SDOs’ 
governance. Ultimately, it explores the extent to which the rules and procedures of the five 
SDOs comply with due process requirements set forth by the applicable regulatory 
frameworks. Since such scrutiny may lack robustness due to the institutional differences of 
SDOs, it is performed in a rather holistic approach, without suggesting whether SDOs comply 
or violate particular regulatory requirements by virtue of procedural guarantees.  
 
While this study is rather limited due to a small number of SDOs, its findings facilitate broader 
understanding of the institutional context in which ICT standards are developed and invite to 
view SDOs’ governance from a broader perspective of ICT standards as suppliers of private 
governance.  
 
2. Background to SDOs’ institutional architecture 
 
There is a rich body of scholarship discussing governance, procedural rules and decision-
making of professional member-driven associations.848 Informal regulatory systems have their 
own substantive rules that their members should follow, establish their own procedures to solve 
 
 
848 See Chapter II. 2 and 6. For instance, Mueller suggests that unanimous decision-making achieves better 
outcomes, while Alchian and Demsetz attach significant weight to the frequency in voting for important 
organizational decisions; see D. Mueller, Public Choice III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) and 
A. A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, ‘Production, information costs and economic organizations’ (1972) 62 American 
Economic Review 777-95. 
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potential conflicts and maintain their own enforcement mechanisms, often relying on contract 
law, organizational law or reputation (e.g. “blaming and shaming.”).849 Incentives to comply 
with the set of rules are provided by the organizations’ membership requirements as well as 
their ability to exclude non-compliant parties. To be resilient, specialized organizations do not 
only have to serve their membership, but also satisfy external requirements of their institutional 
environment, which implies that they should develop goals and actions which may not be part 
of their internal technical mission.850 Often, their self-monitoring and self-enforcement 
arrangements are somehow facilitated by national legislation;851 however, organizations that 
supply weak due process, and where the demand for an institutional change is weak, are likely 
to favor sustained regulatory capture.852  
 
Against this backdrop, there are only a few studies that have addressed institutional governance 
and procedural rules of standardization institutions.853 As such, SDOs decision-making follows 
the rules determined in their operational frameworks, which in turn may depend on many 
factors: for instance, the State of SDOs’ incorporation,854 technical nature of its activities (e.g. 
the degree and intensity of testing needed prior to standards adoption), and the industry 
preferences.855 In this regard, this study understands under “decision-making” not only those 
decisions that are technical and reflect the main functions of SDOs, i.e. inclusion of technology 
or approval of a standard, but also those which are of administrative or governance nature and 
which support the functioning of SDOs, i.e. admission to membership, resolution of disputes 
or modifications of operational rules.856 The argument of this chapter is that both “levels” of 
decision-making, namely governance and standards development, are equally important: while 
 
 
849 See, among many others, E. Stringham, ‘The extralegal development of securities trading in 
seventeenth-century Amsterdam’ (2003) 43 The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 321-44; L. 
Bernstein, ‘Opting out of the legal system: extralegal contractual relations in the diamond industry’ (1992)  21 
Journal of Legal Studies (1992) 115-47, suggesting that stakeholders that have been long involved in the diamond 
business would not dispute basic concepts of acceptable business practices. In this regard, see also L. Bernstein, 
‘Private commercial law in the cotton industry: creating cooperation through rules, norms and institutions’ (2001) 
99 Michigan Law Review 1724-90. Similar suggestions appear from the literature on transnational private 
regulation: e-commerce, for instance, does not only use legal sanctions such as termination of account to “punish” 
those not compliant with the platform’s rules, but also reputational sanctions imposed by  peers and that based on 
platform regulation; F. Cafaggi, ‘The many features of transnational private rule-making: unexplored relationships 
between custom, jura mercatorum and global private regulation’ (2015) 36 University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
International Law 875-938 at 906. Unlike Bernstein, Cafaggi warns that in transnational private regulation, 
conflicts do not only concern application but also validity of the rules. 
850 See J. W. Meyer and B. Rowan, ‘Institutional organizations: formal structure as myth and ceremony’ 
(1977) 83 American Journal of Sociology 340-63, who explain decoupling of organizations’ external tasks from 
internal activities.  
851 Ostrom provides an example of fishers in Alanya employing a “rotation system,” which was accepted 
by governmental officials; Ostrom, Governing the Commons, p. 20.  
852 Mattli and Woods, ‘In whose benefit?’, p. 5. 
853 See, for instance, JRC Report; R. Werle, ‘Institutional aspects’.  
854 For instance, SDOs established in the US are likely to follow Roberts’ Rules of Order; H. M. Robert 
and S. C. Robert, Robert’s Rules of Order Newly Revised, 11th ed. (Boston: Da Capo Press, 2011). 
855 See also Abbott and Snidal, ‘International “standards”’, p. 346. 
856 The JRC Report, which also analyses governance and standards development processes of SDOs, 
suggests that SDOs’ governance can be analysed as an “interaction between relatively autonomous organizations 
and its stakeholder base” or as a “form of decision-making by heterogeneous groups of actors participating in 
organizations with specific rules and procedures for making decisions as a group”; see JRC Report, p. 84.  
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SDOs are indeed technical organizations, their technical work would not be possible without 
non-technical decisions taken at the governance level.  
 
Members and participants of SDOs take decisions collectively during the interactions in 
technical committees and governance bodies. In prominent private SDOs whose standards are 
globally adopted, these decisions create their own ecosystem and ultimately have an impact on 
society.857 By affecting the interplay between various actors, SDOs’ decision-making 
mechanisms influence standardization costs, which is likely to affect advancement of new 
technologies and their future acceptance by the market;858 for SDOs operating in ICT sector, 
Intellectual Property (IPR) policies are of a particular importance and may affect stakeholder 
participation and membership of these SDOs and consequently, the R&D embedded in their 
standards.859  
 
As member-driven organizations, SDOs should ensure that their operational rules first and 
foremost satisfy their stakeholders, which, in case of ICT sector, are predominantly commercial 
industry players. As a supplier of private governance, however, SDOs should also ensure, as a 
minimum, that their rules provide sufficient opportunities for those stakeholders that are not 
included in their decision-making to indirectly participate in - and challenge the outcomes of - 
their processes.860 Arguably, whether the balance between epistemic decision-making and 
addressing democratic deficit can be achieved depends on the extent to which SDOs implement 
the established procedural principles for standardization in their operational frameworks.861 
 
Earlier scholarship suggested that SDOs have a similar institutional pattern and largely mimic 
each other’s processes.862 The resemblance of operational rules and institutional structures 
arguably explains the rarity of “jurisdictional” conflicts between formal (“traditional”) and 
private SDOs,863 despite the considerable overlap of their work. Recent research, however, 
observed that membership and operational rules of technological SDOs are determined 
endogenously as a result of institutional competition;864 a more recent study concluded that 
there is a considerable heterogeneity in SDOs governance.865  
 
Despite their voluntary nature, standards developed in SDOs are accompanied by various forms 
of sanctions. Naturally, when a standard is made mandatory through regulatory endorsement, 
companies that do not comply with it may be boycotted or denied certification.866 By the same 
 
 
857 See Chapter II.3. 
858 Werle, ‘Institutional aspects’, p. 406, discusses the process of data networking standard by Xerox in 
CCITT. 
859 Chiao, Lerner and Tirole, ‘The rules’.  
860 See Chapter II.5. 
861 See Chapter III.   
862 Werle, ‘Standards’, p. 17. 
863 Werle, ‘Institutional aspects’, p. 400. This lack of “jurisdictional” disputes may however as well be the 
consequence of SDOs’ common “weaknesses,” such as limited resources and small administration; ibid., p. 401. 
864 Spulber, ‘Innovation economics’. 
865 JRC Report, p. 43. 
866 See Brunsson, Rasche and Seidl, ‘Dynamics of standardization’, p. 625.  
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token, companies that choose not to comply with a standard that is made mandatory through 
market forces, risk being excluded from this market.867 These sanctions, however, are not 
imposed by the SDOs themselves, but rather by the third parties, such as auditors, certifiers or 
market players. It may be assumed, however, that SDOs have some kind of sanctioning 
mechanisms in place to penalize their members and participants when those do not comply 
with the SDOs operational rules, such as requirements of IPR policies or working procedures 
of technical committees.  
 
Whether SDOs operational frameworks indeed reflect the established procedural principles, 
provide affected stakeholders with sufficient opportunities to participate in SDOs’ decision-
making, and self-enforce compliance with the operational rules, should be verified by a 
thorough examination of SDOs’ institutional architecture. This chapter thus offers a systematic, 
detailed analysis of the governance and standards development processes of five prominent 
SDOs developing ICT standards: the European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
(ETSI), the Standards Association of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
(IEEE-SA), the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the World Wide Web Consortium 
(W3C), and the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (Bluetooth SIG).  
 
3. Methodology for the descriptive research 
 
The SDOs examined in this study were selected based on their overall relevance in ICT 
standardization, significance of their technologies and awareness of their standards among non-
technical actors. The five SDOs all have different institutional setting: ETSI is a semi-public 
European Standards Organization (ESO) whose standards have regulatory impact; IEEE-SA is 
a private professional association accredited by the ANSI; IETF is a loosely organized body 
without formal membership; W3C is a consortia-type of organization where membership is 
involved in decision-making, but where the decisions are ultimately taken by the Director; and 
Bluetooth SIG is a consortium where decision-making is left for a relatively closed group of 
members. Naturally, SDOs with others institutional models are likewise relevant for the ICT 
standardization ecosystem; yet, the current analysis is limited to the sample of these five 
organizations.  
 
The operational frameworks of the five SDOs were analysed in a desk study by reviewing the 
SDOs’ documentation that is publicly available on their websites, including their statutes, 
bylaws, rules of procedure and other governance documents, as well as additional information 
made available on their website, such as mission statements, organizational history or 
description of standardization processes. The SDOs’ governance features that were examined 
in this study are the membership, governance bodies, funding models, dispute resolution, 
decision-making processes and IPR policies. In case of IEEE-SA, governance of both IEEE 
and its Standards Association has been discussed in order to gain a better understanding of  the 
functioning of the organization. For the purpose of this analysis, SDOs’ standards development 
 
 
867 See Chapter II.3. 
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procedures were divided into three stages: proposal of standardization projects, technical 
deliberations in SDOs’ committees, and approval of standards868 (For ETSI, the emphasize of 
this analysis lies on the development of European Harmonized Standards (“ENs”) due their 
regulatory impact). Hence, this study distinguishes between two decision-making processes: 
drafting of governance rules and policies and developing of technical standards.869  
 
While addressing of similarities and differences between the governance and procedural 
elements if the five organizations is inevitable in such institutional analysis, the ultimate aim 
of this study is not to compare the five SDOs: such comparison would not be meaningful given 
the differences in SDOs’ institutional setting, historical background, and operational field. Nor 
does this study aim to suggest whether a certain SDO should be held liable under the applicable 
regulatory frameworks. Rather, evaluation of SDOs governance and processes in the context 
of due process principles points to the diversity of the ecosystem and, having a rather 
explorative purpose, aims to facilitate understanding of institutional aspects of current ICT 
standardization by explaining SDOs governance and decision-making. 
 
There are, however, a number of caveats which concern this descriptive analysis of SDOs’ 
governance and procedures. Firstly, the descriptive study is somewhat asymmetric due to the 
difference in the amount of information that SDOs make publicly available; moreover, 
operational rules of some SDOs may be more thorough and complex than those of others. 
Secondly, SDOs’ procedures are often amended:870 while most of these changes are editorial 
and non-substantial, some appear important for the SDOs’ functioning.871 This study thus 
describes the state of affairs at the moment of writing.  
 
4. Descriptive analysis of SDOs governance and procedures 
 
4.1 European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) 
 
4.1.1 Scope and purpose  
 
The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) was established in 1988 by the 
European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT)872 as a non-
 
 
868 Some regulatory frameworks (i.e. WTO and EU law), as well as the operational frameworks of SDOs 
maintain their own standards development stages; yet, the division in three stages, which are present in every 
SDO, was used for the sake of coherence.   
869 This distinction was introduced by David and Shurmer, who argued that such conceptualization reflects 
a “technological idealism,” meaning that the decisions of engineers should be based on merit rather than strategic 
considerations. P. A. David and M. Shurmer, ‘Formal standard-setting for global telecommunications and 
information services: towards an institutional regime transformation?’ (1996) 20 Telecommunications Policy 789-
815.  
870 Likewise, the membership may be fluctuating in the course of this research, which spans over three 
years, more than 100 members have joined ETSI, and more than 1000 have joined IEEE.  
871 Examples are IEEE SASB bylaws changes with regard to IPR policies, and update of Bluetooth SIG 
Bylaws.  
872 CEPT was formed in 1959 as a coordinating body for European postal and telecommunication services. 
For further information, see https://cept.org/cept/. 
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for-profit association in accordance with applicable French Law.873 ETSI’s creation was 
initiated by a Green Paper of the EC, proposing to establish a body operating in ICT and 
telecommunications sector.874 At the moment of writing, ETSI counts more than  900 members 
from over 60 counties.875 
 
ETSI’s serves as a platform for gathering actors to develop global standards for ICT systems 
and services in such fields as Internet technologies, mobile telecommunication and cellular 
networks.876 Some prominent ETSI standards are Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA),877 
General Packet Radio Service (GPRS),878 and Global System for Mobile Telecommunication 
(GSM).879 Being one of the three ESOs within the meaning of the Regulation 1025/2012,880 
ETSI performs an important normative function within the EU, while also having a wide-
reaching influence on international telecommunications market.881  
 
Together with six other SSO,882 ETSI is a founding partner and sponsor of the 3rd Generation 
Partnership Project (3GPP), a consortium of telecommunications standard development bodies 
responsible for the creation of technical specifications for 3G, 4G and 5G wireless mobile 
telecommunications technology.883 ETSI’s partnership with other SDOs can be established 
through a Letter of Intent, enabling exchange of technical information; a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU), allowing meeting participation; and Cooperation Agreement,  




873 Article 1 of ETSI Statutes. ETSI’s operational framework is codified in ETSI directives, available at 
https://portal.etsi.org/Resources/ETSIDirectives.aspx. 
874 ‘The convergence of the telecommunications, media and information technology sectors, and the 
implications for regulation’, (1999) COM (97)623,  available at 
http://aei.pitt.edu/983/1/telecom_convergence_gp_follow_COM_99_108.pdf.  
875 For the current list of ETSI members, see http://www.etsi.org/membership/current-members. 
876 ‘Vision, mission and long term strategy’, available at http://www.etsi.org/about/what-we-do/vision-
mission-strategy. According to its website, ETSI published between 2.000 and 2.500 standards each year; see 
http://www.etsi.org/standards. 
877 A digital standard for mobile radio which allows i.e. “back to back” communication between radio 
terminals and high level voice encryption, and is often used by public safety services or military; see 
http://www.etsi.org/technologies-clusters/technologies/tetra. 
878 This standard enables data connection for 2G and 3G cellular services; see 
http://www.etsi.org/technologies-clusters/technologies/mobile/gprs.  
879 Enables cellular communication networks; see http://www.etsi.org/technologies-
clusters/technologies/mobile/gsm. 
880 Annex I of EU Regulation 1025/2012. 
881 Article 3 of ETSI Statutes. In this regard, ETSI members should also support the promotion of ETSI 
documents as the basis of worldwide recommendations standards within ITU and JTC1, Article 13.8 of ETSI 
Rules of Procedure. See also ‘ETSI long-term strategy 2016-2021’, available at 
http://www.etsi.org/images/files/Brochures/ETSI_LTS%20Brochure_WEB.pdf  stating that ETSI’s aims is to be 
an enabler of global standards.  
882 ATIS, ARIB, TTC, TTA, CCSA, TSDSI.  
883 For further information regarding the 3GPP, see the website of the SDO, http://www.3gpp.org/. Another 
example of a partnership oneM2M, a joint SDO developing standards for M2M Service layers, see  
http://www.onem2m.org/.  
884 Article 1.8.1.1 of ETSI Technical Working Procedures. Note that the relationship between ETSI and 
ITU is different than the one of CEN/ISO and CENELEC/IEC. While being members of ETSI, NSOs may not 
acquire the membership of ITU, unless they are a part of a governmental body. 
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Next to its standards, ETSI delivers technical specifications, guides and reports, for which the 
SSO maintains different procedures. Technical Specifications (TS) are desirable when the 
market requires a fast solution.885 ETSI Technical Report (TR) contains only informative 
elements;886 ETSI Special Report (SR) covers information of a general ETSI member or public 
interest;887 ETSI Guide (EG) directs handling of technical standardization activities.888 ETSI’s 





ETSI’s membership is divided into categories and statuses. The categories of membership 
cover a wide range of participants, namely administrations, governmental bodies and National 
Standardization Organizations (NSOs), network operators and service provides, 
manufacturers, users and, finally, research bodies.890 National organizations that combine the 
functions of administrations and operators are represented separately in both membership 
categories.891 Companies can also join ETSI with multiple entities (i.e. from different 
countries).892 Demonstrated interest in ETSI’s activities and acceptance of ETSI Directives is 
required to obtain SDO’s membership.893 
 
NSOs should be recognized by the government as national standard-setting bodies.894 The 
Rules of Procedure define “administration” as a part of public administration responsible for 
electronics communications and refer to the bodies not covered by administration as to the 
“other governmental bodies.”895 The term “user” is further described as an organization making 
use of services in the field of electronics communications and related areas, and having main 
interest in standards in capacity of users.896 According to the recent data, manufacturers claim 
to have the largest share of ETSI membership (nearly 42%), in contrast to the users and 




885 Annex E.1.1 of ETSI Technical Working Procedures. TS may be used to publish the contents of a draft 
European standard being submitted to a vote or a draft EN being submitted to an ENAP. 
886 Annex E.2.1 of ETSI Technical Working Procedures. 
887 Ibid., Annex E2.3  
888 Ibid., Annex E.2.2. This study will not further elaborate on the differences between ETSI deliverables. 
889 Annex 6 and 11; Annex 6 of ETSI Rules of Procedure. However, the copyright of the standards belongs 
to the ETSI; Article 3.2.1 of IPR Guide.  
890 Article 6.1 and 6.3 of ETSI Statutes; Annex 1, Article 1 of ETSI Rules of Procedure. Those members 
can participate individually or grouped in National or European Organizations (i.e. group of manufacturers). 
891 Article 1.2.2 of ETSI Rules of Procedure. 
892 This is evidence from the list of current members; see ‘ETSI members around the world’, available at 
https://www.etsi.org/membership/members. 
893 Article 6.3 of ETSI Statutes. 
894 NSOs are thus the ‘public’ element of the hybrid ETSI-structure. 
895 See Annex 1.1 of ETSI Rules of Procedure. 
896 Ibid. 




When becoming a member, an organization is offered a selection of three membership statuses: 
full member, associate member or observer. Only those affiliates located within the 
geographical area of the CEPT898 can acquire the full membership of the ETSI; other can join 
as associate members;899 the fees for full and associate memberships are identical. 
Observership can be obtained by those who fulfil the conditions of full or associate members 
but opt for limited participation in the activities of the Institute.900 Full Members are entitled to 
participate in the meetings of the General Assembly and Technical Bodies and have a right to 
vote in all matters, except for the cases in which the weighted national majority applies;901 
associate Members generally have the same rights as full Members, but with stricter voting 
limitations;902 observers are neither entitled to vote in the governance-related matters, nor can 
they attend standards development meetings,903 and their membership fees are relatively lower 
than those of  full and associate members.904  
 
To join ETSI, organizations are required to submit a written application containing sufficient 
details of its status and business and a statement of GDP/annual electronics communications –
related turnover to the Director-General (DG). However, it is for the General Assembly to 
examine the provided information and to determine the status of the future member and its 
class of contribution – the DG mainly performs an advisory function in this process.905 An 
application is approved by consensus among members of the General Assembly.906 
Membership can be terminated by dissolution, abolition, resignation of the organization, or its 
expulsion by the General Assembly for non-payment of contributions or substantial breach of 
other membership obligations - the latter is unspecified by the applicable provisions.907 
 
4.1.2.2 Principle bodies 
Already in its early years, ETSI maintained a structure that was formalized and based on 
coordination between different committees: to illustrate, working programs of various Sub-
Technical Committees for GSM specifications were defined by the Special Mobile Group, 
which also approved standards or standards’ amendments and drafted ETSI’s policies.908  
Currently, the main bodies of ETSI are the General Assembly, the Board, the Technical 
 
 
898 At the moment of writing, CEPT counts 48 Members. See ‘CEPT members, units and admission year’, 
available at https://cept.org/cept/cept-members-units-and-admission-year. 
899 Articles 6.4 and 6.5 of ETSI Statutes; Articles 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 of ETSI Rules of Procedure. 
900 ETSI Statutes, Article 6.6; ETSI Rule of Procedure, Article 1.2.4. Companies or NSOs may opt for 
observership when located outside CEPT countries and want to maintain a formal relationship in ETSI but have 
no capacity or mandate to participate in ETSI’s technical work.  
901 Article 1.2.2 of ETSI Rules of Procedure. 
902 Article 1.2.3 of ETSI Rules of Procedure; Article 1.4 of ETSI Technical Working Procedures. 
903 Unless exceptions are made and justified by legitimate interests, ETSI Technical Working Procedures, 
Article 1.4. 
904 Article 1.2.4 of ETSI Rules of Procedure. Interestingly, ETSI Statutes require to refer to observers as 
to “members”, unless the context indicates otherwise; see Article 6.2 of ETSI Statutes. 
905 Article 1.3.2 of ETSI Rules of Procedure. 
906 Article 7.4.2 of ETSI Statutes; Article 1.4.3 of ETSI Rules of Procedure. 
907 Article 8 of ETSI Statutes. 
908 P. Depuis, ‘Consolidating GSM Phase 1 and evolving the services and systems features to GSM Phase 
2 in ETSI SMG (199201995)’, in F. Hillebrand (ed.), GSM and UMTS: The Creation of Global Mobile 
Communication (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2006), p. 65. 
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Organization, Special Committees, Industry Specification Groups, and a Secretariat headed by 
a Director-General.909 The General Assembly is the highest authority of the Institute, 
empowered with the adoption of procedural rules and binding resolutions.910 It is comprised of 
representatives of all Members, and Counsellors of EC and EFTA.911 The General Assembly 
is preceded by a Chairman and is assisted by Vice Chairmen, all of them elected from the full 
Members.  
 
Being the main governing body, the General Assembly appoints the Board, which consists of 
full Members and acts on behalf of the General Assembly.912 The Members of the Board act in 
their individual capacity, and do not represent Members of their affiliation.913 The Board also 
selects the Director-General, the legal representative of the Institute who is charged with 
managing and administrative affairs, such as the budget, and serves for a five-year period.914 
The Director-General is assisted by the Secretariat, which is also entrusted with logistical and 
operational tasks.915  
 
Technical work on standard-setting takes place in ETSI’s Technical Organization, which in 
turn encompasses three types of Technical Bodies created either by the Board or the General 
Assembly and responsible for the drafting of its deliverables, namely an ETSI Project, 
Technical Committee and ETSI Partnership Project.916  ETSI Project is established on the basis 
of a market sector requirement and aims to achieve a definite result within a limited time-
frame; Technical Committee performs technology-oriented work; and Partnership Project 
enables cooperation with external bodies.917  Each Technical Body may establish their Working 
Groups and decide on the rules governing their activities. In case any coordination issues occur 
between the Technical Bodies, the Operational Coordination Group is entitled to resolve them. 
The General Assembly may intervene in the work of the Technical Organization by modifying 





909 Article 10 of ETSI Statutes; Article 8 of ETSI Rules of Procedure. 
910 Article 11 of ETSI Statutes; see Article 3 of ETSI Rules of Procedure for the full list of the General 
assembly’s functions.  
911 Article 11 of ETSI Statutes; Article 3 of ETSI Rules of Procedure. 
912 Article 13 of ETSI Statutes; Article 5 of ETSI Rules of Procedure. Although both full and associate 
members may nominate the candidates, only those affiliated with full members can get elected. 
913 Annex 7.2 of ETSI Rules of Procedure. 
914 Article 15 of ETSI Statutes; Article 8 of ETSI Rules of Procedure. 
915 Article 16 of ETSI Statutes; Article 9 of ETSI Rules of Procedure. 
916 Article 14 of ETSI Statutes and Article 6 of ETSI Rules of Procedure. 
917 Article 1 of ETSI Technical Working Procedures. Technical Bodies are established by the General 
Assembly or the Board. 
918 Article 3.4 of ETSI Rules of Procedure. 
919 Article 6 of ETSI Statutes. Special Task Forces are established to fulfil specific tasks in support of the 
standardization activities, and in general follow the same rules as Technical Committees. A proposal for the 
establishment of Special Task Forces should provide for justification for their creation and should be supported 
at least by four ETSI Members and approved by the relevant Technical Body. After approval and adoption of the 
deliverables by the Technical Body, the Special Task Force cease to exist, unless decided otherwise.  
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4.1.2.3 Policy Drafting 
ETSI Directives are drafted by the General Assembly and are subject to frequent 
modifications.920 When amending the Statutes and the Rules of Procedure, the General 
Assembly should take decisions by qualified majority voting;921 the quorum for Statutes’ 
modification is at least 75% of the total weighted votes casted in favor, and for the Rules of 
Procedure - at least 71%.922  
 
4.1.2.4 Decision-making and voting 
The General Assembly should ideally be consensus-based;923 yet, many decisions are taken 
through a voting procedure. Although both full and associate Members have a right to vote in 
the General Assembly, only the ballots of full Members are considered when determining the 
quorum.924 Depending on the issue submitted before it, the General Assembly uses one of the 
three voting procedures. The Weighted National Voting is typically used for elaboration, 
approval and implementation of European Standards, amendments of legal framework and 
disputes arising from the application of the Rules of Procedure.925 During this procedure, the 
heads of each NSO delegation give a vote based on the views of all members of their National 
Delegation.926 Membership issues and matters related to policy or regulatory documents 
intended to be used in the EU, are handled by the Weighted Individual Voting by full ETSI 
Members. In other situations, the Weighted Individual Voting by both full and associate 
Members is used.927 The European Commission and the EFTA enjoy Counsellor status and 
participate in the meetings without the right to vote.928 
 
Under the mentioned procedures, a decision is approved by 71% of positive ballots. The voting 
quorum for the General Assembly is at least 50% of the total number of weighted votes of full 
members; abstentions of or submitting failures to not count as a vote.929 Minority rights should 
be protected during the voting procedures:930 however, the regulatory provisions of the ETSI 
leave obscure the concept of “minority,” and do not specify which rights should be protected 




920 For instance, current version is modified in April 2019, while the previous version dated February 2019. 
921 Article 18 of ETSI Statutes; Article 19 of Rules of Procedure. 
922 Ibid.  
923 Article 11.1.1 of ETSI Rules of Procedure. 
924 Article 11.1 of ETSI Rules of Procedure. 
925 Ibid., Article 11.2.1. 
926 The allocation of weighted national votes is introduced in Annex 3 of ETSI Rules of Procedure; 
Members having most votes are Germany, UK, France and Italy, while Montenegro is a member with the least 
votes.  
927 Annex 4 of ETSI Rules of Procedure. 
928 Article 11.3 of ETSI Directives. The same applies when they participate in the meetings of the Board, 
Special Committees or Technical Organization; Article 1.5 of ETSI Rules of Procedure. 
929 Article 12.1 of ETSI Rules of Procedure; for voting for standards approval by correspondence, this 
minimum should be reached by a specific date.  
930 Article 11.1.4 of ETSI Rules of Procedure. 
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4.1.2.5 Financing  
Around 15% to 20% of ETSI’s operational budget is paid by the Commission.931 Other listed 
sources of ETSI’s income include grants, assets’ revenues, remuneration for services and 
membership contributions.932 Membership fees are proportional to the number of class units of 
contribution applicable to every membership category:933 for administrations, the contributions 
are based on the last available GDP, and for other members their Electronics Related 
Communications Turnover (ECRT) is considered. Microenterprises, Small & Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs),934 universities, public research bodies and user associations are subject to 
reduced annual membership fees.935 Members may be required to pay additional minimum 
contribution in case they participate in a Partnership Project.936  
 
4.1.2.6 Dispute Settlement  
Any disagreements between ETSI Members should be resolved bilaterally: if this fails, the 
Members concerned can ask the General Assembly to offer a friendly mediation, for instance 
by other Members and/or the Secretariat. Decisions of the Technical Organization can be 
directly appealed to the Board and the General Assembly.937 Escalated disputes are litigated 
under French law, unless the parties concerned agree differently;938 IPR disputes where a patent 
has been granted and there is no agreement between the parties involved are dealt with by the 
national courts of law.939  
 
In case of disputes between (a) Member(s) and ETSI, parties should exhaust all appeals 
procedures available under the Institute’s legal framework prior to initiating legal proceedings 
under French law.940 Members commencing proceedings against the ETSI are also obliged to 
reimburse the SDO’s expenses in connection with the dispute (i.e. attorneys, investigation costs 
and expert fees) .941 
 
4.1.3 Standards Development Processes  
 
4.1.3.1 Proposal to Standardize 
The ETSI legislation divides its standard-setting processes into six milestones, namely the 
adoption of the working item by a Technical Body; designing the early standard draft; 
designing the stable draft; submitting draft for approval; approval by a Working Group and, at 
 
 
931 ‘Funding ETSI’, available at http://www.etsi.org/about/what-we-
are/funding?highlight=YToxOntpOjA7czo2OiJidWRnZXQiO30=.  
932 Article 9 of ETSI Statutes and Article 10 ETSI Rules of Procedure. 
933 See Annex 2 of ETSI Rules of Procedure for the determination of contributions.   
934 Interestingly, trade associations are “effectively” considered SMEs; see Clause 2 of the Guidelines for 
the implementation of Annex 2 of the Rules of Procedure. 
935 See ‘2017 contributions to ETSI’, available at 
http://www.etsi.org/images/files/membership/ContriForm.pdf.  
936 Article 1.2.2 of ETSI Rules of Procedure. 
937 Article 14 of ETSI Statutes. 
938 Article 18 of ETSI Rules of Procedure. 
939 Article 4.3 of ETSI IPR Guide. 
940 Article 18.1 of ETSI Rules of Procedure. 
941 Article 18.2 ETSI Rules of Procedure. This rather discouraging factor for litigation was implemented 
into ETSI framework after the TruePosition v. Ericsson case, discussed in Chapter V.4. 
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last, approval by the Technical Body/ETSI membership.942 For the sake of coherence, however, 
the examination of ETSI’s standard-setting procedures will follow the three-stages approach 
introduced in the beginning of this chapter.  
 
ETSI endues its Members, the EC and EFTA with the right to propose standardization 
projects.943 Such new item proposal should be supported by at least four ETSI full and/or 
associate members, who are also expected to actively participate in standard development. 
Every ETSI work item is provided with a Rapporteur, a person serving as a prime contact point 
for technical matters and work progress,944 who also bears management and coordination 
tasks.945 Once prepared, the ETSI work item is subject to approval by the relevant Technical 
Body. A standardization proposal is adopted if 71% of the votes are in favor. If that quorum is 
not achieved, the proposal can still be approved if the percentage supporting votes of full 
members reaches 71.946  
 
4.1.3.2 Technical Work  
The actual work on standards and specifications occurs in the Technical Bodies of the 
Technical Organizations. Technical documents are drafted in Technical or Special Committee 
by individual experts who represent the ETSI Members of their affiliation. Each Member can 
nominate only one expert to take part in the meetings.947 In every matter of decision-making, 
a Technical Body and its Committees are obliged to endeavor consensus;948 in case consensus 
cannot be achieved, the chairman may require voting, possibly in a secret balloting.949 To 
support standardization work, ETSI may open a call for expertise.950 Every meeting of a 
technical body or a Working Group should start with a call for IPRs by the Chairman. The call 
can be issued either in written or in oral form,951 and should remind participants to disclose 








942 Article 1.6.4.1 of ETSI Technical Working Procedures. 
943 ‘How does ETSI make standards’, available at https://www.etsi.org/standards/standards-making. 
944 Article 1.6.2 of ETSI Technical Working Procedures. 
945 Ibid., Article 1.6.4. One of the tasks of the Rapporteur is to investigate whether any relevant use 
requirement documents exist. 
946 Article 1.7.1 of ETSI Technical Working Procedures. 
947 Ibid., Article 1.4. 
948 ETSI Directives define consensus as a “general agreement, characterized by the absence of sustained 
opposition to substantial issues by any important part of the concerned interest and by a process that involves 
seeking to take into account the views of all parties concerned and to reconcile any conflicting arguments”; Annex 
A1 of ETSI Technical Working Procedures.  
949 Article 1.7.1 of ETSI Technical Working Procedures. 
950 See, for instance, call for proposal for Specialist Task Forces, available at https://portal.etsi.org/stf/ 
OpenCallForExperts. 
951 Article 2.3.2 of ETSI IPR Guide. 
132 
 
The approval processes within the ETSI vary according to the type of the standard and the 
scope of its application. As a common rule, every document, disregarding its ultimate status, 
should be primarily approved by the Working Group in charge of its creation. EGs and ESs are 
subsequently submitted to the Director-General for the Membership Approval Process by the 
Weighted Individual Voting of all full and associate Members.952 Approval of ESs also requires 
consensus of the relevant Committee of the Technical Body and the successful balloting of all 
members;953 ETSI reports and technical specifications are approved by the relevant Technical 
Committee or Industry Specification Group.954 ES is approved for the use within Europe if at 




Figure 1: overview of EG and ES process, from https://www.etsi.org/standards/standards-making 
 
When drafted in cooperation with other (standard-setting) organizations, a document is subject 
to the Two-step Approval Procedure, whereby a Public Enquiry and Weighted National Vote 
are conducted separately.956 This process can be interrupted if the Technical Body raises 
substantial objections. Specifications approved in 3GPP are directly endorsed as ETSI 
Technical Specifications, without ETSI internal approval. 
 
(b) EN Approval Process (ENAP) 
 
ENs are approved by correspondence following the Weighted National Voting Procedure.957 
Within 14 days upon its approval by the relevant Technical Body, the draft standard is 
submitted to the ETSI Secretariat, which in the next 30 days prepares the draft for the Public 
Enquiry by the NSOs. In the following 90 days,958 NSOs undertake national consultations and 
deliver their comments and national position. The rules and management of this process is left 
entirely to the NSOs, which can vote in favor or against the adoption of the draft or opt for an 
abstention. Once the balloting on the EN has been conducted, the votes of the EU and the EFTA 
countries are counted separately: the results of this exercise determine whether the standard 
will be adopted in those countries.959 If outcomes are positive, they should be followed by the 
 
 
952 Article 14 of ETSI Rules of Procedure. 
953 Ibid.  
954 Ibid.  
955 Ibid. It is remarkable that the Rules of Procedure mention “Europe” and not “CEPT countries” or 
“NSOs”.  
956 Article 2.2.1 of ETSI Technical Working Procedures. 
957 Articles 13.4 and 13.5 ETSI Rules of Procedure. 
958 This was modified in 2017, when this used to be 120 days.  
959 Article 13.5.3 of ETSI Rules of Procedure.  
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endorsement of the standard in other States whose NSOs voted in its favor.960 A negative vote 
should be accompanied by an explanation, which should be delivered and reviewed by the 
Technical Body. Technical comments submitted during this period are resolved in a processed 
organized by the Chairman of the Technical Body within 60 days.  
 
When the draft has been significantly modified during one of the approval stages, it might be 
subject to another Public Enquiry or even balloting on national position in the General 
Assembly.961 In case no technical comments have been received by the closing date of Public 
Enquiry, the process continues with the weighted national voting.962 Prior to its publication, 
the document undergoes an extensive editing process according to ETSI’s Drafting Rules, 
which introduce the principles for preparation of the ETSI deliverables such as homogeneity, 
consistency, equivalence of other language version. The adopted EN is published by the 
Secretariat within 10 days after the final approval.  
 
NSOs have a crucial role in implementation of the ENs and should take measures for ensuring 
the visibility of EN at national level, either by a publication of a text identical to the standard 
or an endorsement sheet, either by an announcement.963 Likewise, since  NSOs should comply 
with the “standstill obligation;”964 the rules on voting and implementing of a Standstill are set 
by each NSO and handled over to the Director-General, who can provide them for inspection 
of any ETSI member or Counsellor.965 The general rules is that a Standstill obligation applies 
to an individual working standard or an EN draft accepted by General Assembly, whereof the 
precise scope is defined and the target finalizing date is set. It commences either 60 days after 
the working item on the EN has been adopted, either at the beginning of the actual technical 
work on that working item, depending on whichever date comes later.966  
 
ENs can be withdrawn by the weighted national voting.967 ENs are reviewed at least every 5 
years, resulting either in standards’ confirmation, update, withdrawal or its designation as 





960 Ibid., Article 13.5.3. 
961 Ibid., Articles 13.4 and 13.5.   
962 In case the vote actually fails, but it would not fail when only EU countries are voting, standard will 
still be adopted but not enforced in other CEPT countries.  
963 Article 13.7 of ETSI Rules of Procedure. 
964 Ibid., Article 13.3. 
965 Requirements regarding Standstill should be further specified in the MoU signed by ETSI and each 
NSO, Article 13.2 of ETSI Rules of Procedure. 
966 Ibid., Article 1.6.7. 
967 Ibid., Article 13.6. 2.2.1.3 Technical Working Procedure further specifies the withdrawal procedure. 




Figure 2: overview of EN process, from https://www.etsi.org/standards/standards-making 
 
 
4.1.4 IPR Policy   
 
ETSI’s IPR Policy was established by the General Assembly in 1993 as a response to increasing 
concerns of patent hold-ups,969 and was subsequently adopted by the 21st General Assembly 
on 23 November 1994 and incorporated in the ETSI Directive as Annex 6 to the ETSI Rules 
of Procedure.970 Initially based on FRAND-licensing commitment, the IPR Policy has been 
investigated by the Commission in 1994 and 2005, which led to its modifications.971 In 2007, 
the policy was revised to permit, however not require, ex ante disclose the maximum royalty 
rates.972  
 
The ETSI IPR Policy is commitment-based, requiring each Member to make reasonable 
endeavors to notify the ETSI on the essential IPRs.973 The term “reasonable endeavours” is 
rather ambiguous and raises questions regarding its interpretation. Pursuant the EC DG 
Competition, reasonable endeavours refer to the disclosure obligation, as it cannot be 
reasonably expected from an ETSI Member to identify potential IPR holders in standardization 
process that Member is not a part of.974 Indeed, neither the Institute, not its Members are 
obliged to conduct IPR searches.975 “Reasonable Endeavours” thus focuses on the steps taken 
to reveal the SEP and the IPRs by its holders, their activities and the knowledge of Members’ 
representatives. For instance, each meeting of a Working Group must commence with a call 
for the IPRs.976 The disclosure requirement is particularly applicable to a Member submitting 
a technical proposal on working item, who should inform about any of his IPRs that might be 
 
 
969 R. Bekkers and J. West, ‘IPR standardization policies and strategic patenting in UMTS’ (2008) 25th 
DRUID Celebration Conference, Copenhagen June 17-20, pp. 5-6; M. Dolmans, ‘Standards for standards’ (2002) 
26 Fordham International Law Journal 163 208 at 181. 
970 See also ETSI IPR Guide on Intellectual Property Rights, version adopted by Board #94 on 19 
September 2013 (hereinafter: ETSI Guide on IPRs). An overview of landmark events, including modifications of 
IPR policy, is available at http://www.etsi.org/about/what-we-are/landmarks. 
971 The first revision resulted in the fact that the adopted policy also required patent disclosure and broad 
FRAND licensing, while the second revision addressed Commission’s concerns that disclosure obligation is too 
weak; see Dolmans, ‘Standards for standards’. 
972 See the JRC Report. 
973 Article 4 of ETSI IPR Policy. 
974 Article 4.3.1 of ETSI Guide on IPRs. 
975 Article 4.2 of ETSI IPR Policy. 
976 Article 2.1.1 of ETSI Guide on IPRs. 
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essential if proposal is adopted. The obligation is deemed to be fulfilled if a Member belongs 
to a Patent Family of ETSI.  
 
ETSI IPR Policy is based on the FRAND principle, which implies that the SEP owners should 
provide licenses on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. In this regard, any 
discussion within Working Groups on the meaning of “fair” and “reasonable”, or which address 
the essentiality and validity of patents, constitute anti-competitive conduct and is prohibited.977 
These rules are further explained in the Guidelines for Antitrust Compliance.978 Any denial of 
licensing should be explained in written and send for considerations of the Director-General. 
When the licenses are not available, the General Assembly should explore whether there is a 
viable alternative, which would satisfy the ETSI requirement and would not be blocked by the 
IPRs. In case such technology does not exist, it is up to the Director-General to take appropriate 
measures, what commonly will result in asking the SEP holder to reconsider his position.979 
The denial to license is not explicitly named as a breach of the IPR Policy, and thus Members 
not complying with the FRAND commitment cannot be subject to expulsion from the Institute. 
In contrast, a situation when it can be demonstrated that an ETSI Member has deliberately 
withheld the disclosure significantly beyond what could be expected from normal 
consideration of “timeless” (“intentional delay”) is considered as a breach of IPR policy and 
can be sanctioned by the General Assembly.980  
 
4.2 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards Association (IEEE-SA) 
 
4.2.1 Scope and purpose 
 
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) was established in 1963 as a 
private, non-profit organization,981 following the merging between the American Institute of 
Electric Engineers (AIEE), operating in the areas of telegraph and telephone industry, and its 
slightly younger twin-organization, the Institute for Radio Engineers (IRE).982 IEEE’s 
activities range from organizing and sponsoring conferences and publishing of technical 
literature in the field of electrical engineering and ICT, to launching development projects and 
issuing technical specifications. IEEE’s mission is “fostering technological innovation and 
excellence for the benefit of humanity,”983 and scientific and educational work of the 
organization aims to advance, inter alia, computer engineering and computer science.984 IEEE 
 
 
977 Even when such discussion concerns availability of IPR on royalty free bases since, technically, it still 
refers to the price.  
978 ETSI Guidelines for Antitrust Compliance, version adopted by Board on 29 January 2011. 
979 Article 8 of ETSI IPR Policy. 
980 Article 2 of ETSI Guide on IPRs. 
981 See IEEE Certificate of Incorporation, available at https://www.ieee.org/documents/01-05-
1993_Certificate_of_Incorporation.pdf. 
982 See ‘IEEE history’, available at http://ethw.org/IEEE_History. 
983 ‘About IEEE’, available at www. Ieee.org/about.  




is headquartered in New York985 and at the moment of writing, counts over 422.000 members 
in nearly 160 countries.986 
 
The Institute serves as an overarching organization for a large number of voluntary associated 
groups of members dedicated to the various fields of IEEE’s activities. These organizational 
units represent specific scientific interests or geographical areas987 and, despite being integral 
parts of the IEEE, often have their own administrative and management settings.988 
Standardization activities are undertaken in the IEEE Standards Association (hereinafter: 
IEEE-SA);989 although hierarchically linked to the Institute’s governing bodies, this specialized 
Major Board of the Institute enjoys a high degree of authority and independency in its technical 
work.990 
 
Some of the prominent examples of IEEE standards are Standard Digital Interface for 
Programmable Instrumentation,991 802.3 Ethernet standard992 and the set of specifications for 
Wi-Fi chipsets, which enabled interconnection of electronic technologies via wireless 
telecommunications. The types of IEEE-SA deliverables vary from list of terms, definitions 
and terminology to describing testing methods, performance or safety requirements. IEEE’s 
standards can be implemented by other organizations with which IEEE has signed a reciprocal 
agreement or Memorandum of Understanding.993 
 






The IEEE legal framework allows only individuals to become a member. The memberships’ 
grades and categories differ on the basis of i.e. applicant’s income, educational background 
and contributions to the IEEE designated fields (engineering, ICT, biological, medical and 
 
 
985 See IEEE Certificate of Incorporation.  
986 See ‘About IEEE’. 
987 This means that IEEE operate according to a so-called “dual complementary regional and technical 
structure”, see ‘IEEE history’. Next to the Standards Association (IEEE-SA), the IEEE coordinates the work of 
Educational Activities Board (EAB), Publication Services and Products Board (PSPB), Member and Geographic 
Activities Board (MGAB) and Technical Activities Board (TAB). 
988 Section I-107 of IEEE Bylaws. The Major Boards are the Committees of IEEE within the meaning of 
the New York Not-for-Profit Corporation Law. 
989 Section I-303.6 of IEEE Bylaws. 
990 Article 7 of IEEE-SA Operations Manual. IEEE-SA operational framework is available at 
https://standards.ieee.org/about/policies/index.html. 
991 Standard used within interface systems to interconnect both programmable and non-programmable 
electronic measuring apparatus with other apparatus and accessories necessary to assemble instrumentation 
systems; see 488.1-1987 - IEEE Standard Digital Interface for Programmable Instrumentation, available at 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/29042/.  
992 Standard Local Area Network Technology (LAN) with Wide Area Network (WAN) applications. 
993 Article 7 of IEEE-SA Operations Manual. 
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physical sciences, mathematics and other technical-related areas).994 Membership fees vary 
accordingly.995 To fall within a membership category, applicants should meet certain 
conditions.996 Those who do not satisfy the requirements of any of the categories can participate 
as Society Affiliates,997 or Associate Members with a limited voting power.998 Requests for 
admission to the membership or for an advancement of a membership grade are reviewed by 
the specialized Admission and Advancement Committee, whose decisions can be subsequently 




Being a separate organization within the Institute, the IEEE-SA maintains its own governance 
system, including the rules and conditions to obtain its membership.1000 The Standards 
Association accepts a great variety of players, including governmental agencies on different 
state-organizational levels, trade associations, commercial entities and individuals.1001 
Although the latter do not necessarily have to be affiliated with the IEEE, their prior 
membership of the Institute is encouraged by the lower participation fees.1002 All members are 
empowered to vote in unlimited number of standardization processes.1003 To obtain the 
membership of Standards Association, an individual or an entity has to demonstrate an interest 
in standards activities and to commit paying the membership fees. Members can be suspended 
or expelled from the IEEE-SA by the Board of Governors (BoG) upon approval of two-thirds 
of the BoG’s voting members:1004 the ground for suspension or expulsion include failure to 
confirm with IEEE Bylaws or IEEE-SA Operations Manual, unethical or unlawful conduct, or 
failure to fulfil the membership requirements.1005 Working Groups may establish their own 




994 Section I-100 of IEEE Bylaws. IEEE has following Membership grades: Honorary Member, Fellow, 
Senior Member, Member, Associate Member, Graduate Student and Student; and following membership 
categories: Electronic Membership, Life Members, Minimum Income, Permanently Disabled, Retired or 
Unemployed. IEEE Bylaws further specify the requirements for each category.  
995 See 2020 IEEE Membership and Society Membership Dues, available at 
https://www.ieee.org/membership_services/membership/join/join_dues.html.  
996 The Bylaws refer to the IEEE Policies for qualification for categories. Every category has its own 
condition and own rights and privileges  
997 Section I-103 of IEEE Bylaws. 
998 Ibid., Section I-104. 
999 Ibid., Section I-104.6. The Appeal Committee is comprised of the Vice President-member of 
Geographic Activities Board, the Vice President-member of Technical Activities Board, and the Vice President-
member of the Educational Activities Board.  
1000 Section I-303.6 IEEE Bylaws. 
1001 Ibid., Section I-403; in general, they are divided into three categories: individuals, not-for-profit 
enterprises and for-profit enterprises. 
1002 56 US $ against 252 US $ for external parties; see Article 6.2 of IEEE-SA Operations Manual. 
1003 Article 6.3.1 of IEEE-SA Operations Manual. Naturally, individual members vote in individual-based 
processes, while entities vote in in entity-based processes. 
1004 Article 6.4.1 of IEEE-SA Operations Manual.  
1005 Ibid., Article 6.4. 
1006 In 802.11, for instance, participants were for a long time able to lose all voting rights “in one go,” as it 
appears from the minutes of 802.11 Working Group’s meetings. 
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The governing bodies of IEEE are the Board of Directors and the Assembly. The latter elects 
the Officers of the Institute,1007 and consists of twenty-three delegates - the IEEE President, the 
IEEE President-Elect, the IEEE Past President, the ten Region Delegates, and the ten Division 
Delegates, - elected by IEEE voting members for the term of two years.1008 Division Delegates 
are elected by the Division of their association, and must be members of and maintain 
membership in at least one of the Societies within that Division;1009 Region Delegates are 
elected by Regions of which they are members and residents.1010 All delegates shall possess a 
Fellow or Senior Member grade.1011  
 
The Board of Directors counts thirty-one directors who represent various interests, for instance 
Directors-at-large, of which some are elected by all voting members and other by the 
Assembly,1012 and Directors elected by the voting members.1013 The Board of Directors is the 
highest authority of the institution and deals with the matter of fundamental importance: for 
instance, it may propose amendments for IEEE Constitution,1014 approve assessments of IEEE 
members1015 and sanction those members whose conducts violate the IEEE legislation or are 
seriously prejudicial to the SDO,1016 by means of their expulsion, suspension or censure. The 
Board of Directors further appoints committees of IEEE Major Boards. The formal head of the 
Institute – IEEE President – is elected by constitutional voting members and holds the office 
 
 
1007 Namely, the Vice President - Educational Activities (who shall serve as Chair of the Educational 
Activities Board), the Vice President - Publication Services and Products (who shall serve as Chair of the 
Publication Services and Products Board), the Secretary, and the Treasurer. 
1008 Article VIII of IEEE Constitution and Section I-201 of IEEE Bylaws. At least one of the Directors is 
obliged to have US citizenship; see Article IX Section 4 of IEEE Constitution. 
1009 Section 1-201.2 IEEE Bylaws. 
1010 Ibid., Section 1-201.3. 
1011 Ibid., Section 1-201.5. 
1012 The total number of elected Directors should be between 9 and 15, and the number of Directors elected 
by the voting members shall be not less than sixty percent of the total number of Directors; Article IX Section 2 
of IEEE Constitution.  
1013 Article IX Section 1 of IEEE Constitution. The Board of Directors is comprised of: the President, the 
President-Elect, the Past President, all of whom shall be elected by the eligible voting members of IEEE; the Vice 
President - Technical Activities, who shall be elected by the eligible voting members of IEEE who are also 
members of at least one Society; the IEEE-USA President, who shall be elected by the eligible voting members 
of certain IEEE Regions; the President IEEE-SA, who shall be elected by the eligible voting members of IEEE 
who are also members of the Standards Association; ten Region Directors, who shall be elected by the eligible 
voting members of each respective Region; ten Division Directors, who shall be elected by the eligible voting 
members belonging to one or more society within each respective Division; the Vice Presidents for Educational 
Activities, Member and Geographic Activities and Publication Services and Products, the Secretary and the 
Treasurer, all of whom shall be elected by the Assembly. Article I-301 (1) IEEE Bylaws. 
1014 Article XIX Section 4 of IEEE Constitution. 
1015 Section I-108 of IEEE Bylaws. For that decision to be taken, 2/3 favourable votes of the Board of 
Directors is required. 




in different capacities for three years.1017 Administrative tasks, including the record keeping, 





Although IEEE-SA has a separate organizational scheme, its governance should not be seen in 
complete isolation from IEEE, since Standards Association is responsible to the Board of 
Directors.1019 IEEE-SA is chaired by a President, elected for the term of two years, whose tasks 
include the establishing and keeping of contacts with external stakeholders.1020 The main 
governing body is the BoG, responsible for the constituency of industry interests in standard-
setting,1021 and empowered to adopt policies governing standardization activities and to make 
recommendation on matters related to standard-setting to the Board of Directors.1022 The BoG 
is comprised of fifteen members elected every two years by IEEE voting members who also 
hold the membership of IEEE-SA:1023 its composition should reflect technical and global 
standards interests of the IEEE, and should also be balanced with regard to the interests 
involved in IEEE-SA activities.1024  Between the BoG meetings, an action on behalf of the BoG 
can be taken by ad hoc council.1025  
 
The BoG annually appoints the Standards Board (SASB), which consists of minimum 18 and 
maximum 26 individuals possessing the membership of both IEEE and the IEEE-SA.1026 The 
 
 
1017 The first year of the duty the incumbent serves as president –elect, second year as president and third 
year as past president; Articles VII and XIII Section 1 of IEEE Constitution. 
1018 Article XIII of IEEE Constitution; Section I-203 of IEE Bylaws.  
1019 Section I-300 of IEEE Bylaws. Matters delegated to organizations units by means of IEEE Bylaws 
require approval of the governing body of that unit and subsequent review and approval of the Board of Directors 
prior to their implementation.  
1020 Article 4.2.2 of IEEE-SA Operations Manual. The three-year rotation scheme is similar to the one of 
the IEEE President.   
1021 Article 4.2.1 of IEEE-SA Operations Manual. 
1022 Section I-300.6 of IEEE Bylaws; Article 1 of IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws. 
1023 Those members are the IEEE-SA President, who shall be elected for a two-year term by the eligible 
voting members of IEEE who are also members of the IEEE-SA; the IEEE-SA President-Elect or the most recent 
IEEE-SA Past President willing to serve; the Chair of the Standards Board, who shall be appointed by the IEEE-
SA BoG; the most recent Past Chair of the Standards Board willing to serve; the Chair of the IEEE-SA Corporate 
Advisory Group, who shall be appointed for a two-year term by the IEEE-SA BoG; the IEEE-SA Treasurer, who 
shall be appointed for a two-year term by the IEEE-SA President; eight Members-at-large, four of whom shall be 
elected by the eligible voting members of the IEEE-SA and four of whom shall be appointed by the IEEE-SA 
BoG, as specified in the IEEE-SA Operations Manual; and the Staff Secretary, who shall serve without vote. The 
IEEE-SA Past President shall serve as a voting member of the IEEE-SA BoG in which years there is no IEEE-SA 
President-Elect. 
1024 No individual IEEE Society or council, or government, or industry should be over-represented in the 
structure of the IEEE-SA BoG; see Article 4.2.1 of IEEE-SA Operations Manual. 
1025 Article 4.3.4 of IEEE-SA Operations Manual. The council is comprised of IEEE-SA President; the 
IEEE-SA President Elect or the most recent IEEE-SA Past President willing to serve; the Chair of the IEEE-SA 
Standards Board; the Managing Director, IEEE Standards Activities; and one member-at-large. 
1026 Article 5.1.2 of IEEE-SA Operations Manual; Article 4.1 of IEEE-SA Standard Board Bylaws. Next 
to that, SASB may also include non-voting participants, like liaison representatives or members emeriti. Members 




SASB coordinates standards development work, approves new projects and reviews them 
against the requirements of consensus, due process, openness and balance.1027 The activities of 
the SASB are divided between several committees: the Patent Committee (PatCom) reviews 
standard-setting processes with regard to the use of patented technologies,1028 provides the 
overview for the use of patents and patent information in the IEEE standards1029 and delivers 
non-binding recommendations for defining of IPR Policy; Procedures Committee (ProCom) 
recommends modifications to the IEEE-SA governing documents;1030 New Standards 
Committee (NesCom) reviews whether proposed standardization projects comply with the 
IEEE requirements;1031 Standards Review Committee (RevCom) evaluates and recommends 
(dis) approval of new or amended standards;1032 and Audit Committee (AudCom) provides 
oversight of Sponsors’ activities in standards-development procedures.1033  
 
As it is the case for every organizational unit of the IEEE, elected or appointed members of the 
IEEE-SA committees and groups should not entail any real or perceived conflict of 
interests.1034  Members of all mentioned standing committees are appointed for one-year term 
by the Chair of the Standards Board; as an overarching requirement, individuals in standing 
committees should possess the membership of the IEEE-SA and act in accordance with the 
IEEE and the IEEE-SA legal framework,1035 including the fiduciary duty to the Institute. With 
that in mind, the composition of standing committees may differ. The following table indicates 




1027 Article 5.1 of IEEE-SA Operations Manual. Further explanation as regards these principles is not 
provided.  
1028 Article 4.2.5 of IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws. This Committee is composed of at least four but 
not more than six persons, who must be voting members of the SASB or the BoG. 
1029 Article 4.2.5 of IEEE-SA Standards Board Manual. 
1030 Ibid., Article 4.2.1. 
1031 I.e. if the project falls within the scope of the IEEE, is assigned to a proper sponsor, and whether all 
stakeholders are represented; Article 4.2.2 of IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws. 
1032 Ibid., Article 4.2.3.  
1033 Ibid., Article 4.2.4. Other committees, less relevant for the purpose of this chapter, are the 
Administrative Committee (AdCom) and Industry Connections Committee (ICCom), Standards Coordinating 
Committees (SCCs).  
1034 A conflict of interest is defined as any situation in which a member’s decisions or votes could 
substantially and directly affect the member’s professional, personal, financial or business interests. Section I-
300.2 IEEE Bylaws. 
1035 Article 4.2 of IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws. 
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Name Committee Number of Members  Years holding post Appointing Body  
ProCom Minimum 6, no ex 
officio 
1 year Chair IEEE-SA SASB 
NesCom 10-15 members of 
various technical 
divisions, of which at 
least 4 voting members 
of IEEE-SA SASB; 6 ex 
officio  
1 year Chair IEEE-SA SASB 
RevCom 12 – 15, at least 3 voting 
members of IEEE-SA 
SASB; no ex officio 
1 year Chair IEEE-SA SASB 
AudCom At least 5, 5 current or 
former members of 
IEEE-SA SASB; no ex 
officio  
1 year Chair IEEE-SA SASB 
PatCom 4 – 6 voting members of 
IEEE-SA SASB or 
IEEE-SA BoG; 1 IEEE 
Standards staff 
designated by the 
Managing Director of 
Standards Activities ex 
officio. 
1 year Chair IEEE-SA SASB 
Table 1: Structure of IEEE-SA Committees  
 




IEEE Constitution is amended in the balloting process of IEEE all voting members.1036 Prior 
the petition for amendment reaches the voting members, at least two-thirds of those Directors 
present at the meeting of the Board of Directors should adopt a resolution for the amendment. 
The petition is then signed by at least 100 members who constitute one-third of the total voting 
members. After the review of IEEE legal counsel and at least 60 days before the balloting is 
conducted, the proposed amendments are submitted to the voting members. IEEE Bylaws is 
amended and approved by the Board of Directors. Proposed modifications and their motivation 
should be transmitted to all Directors at least 20 days before the balloting takes place. The 
changes to both Constitution and Bylaws are approved with the favorable votes of two-thirds 




1036 Article III Section 3 of IEEE Constitution. 





The work of IEEE-SA and its bodies is regulated in various legal documents, each serving their 
own purpose. IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws provides policies for management and 
creation of IEEE standards. This document is drafted and amended by IEEE-SA SASB or its 
standing committees,1038 and requires two levels of approval: firstly, a positive 
recommendation of the SASB should be sought, which is the case when two-thirds of the voting 
IEEE-SASB members present at the meeting vote in favor of proposed modifications;1039 
secondly, the proposed amendment should be  approved by the BoG.1040 The interpretation of 
the IEEE-SA Bylaws can be provided by the ProCom Chair upon the agreement of at least 75% 
of the PatCom members.1041 
 
The orchestration and working procedures of the Standards Board are governed by the IEEE-
SA SASB Operations Manual. Members of the Standards Board and any of its’ standing 
committees may propose modifications to this document to the Standards Board Secretary: 
however, only ProCom is entitled to review the SASB Operations Manual, and the final 
approval of any modifications should be sought by the IEEE-SA Standards Board.1042 
Ultimately, the objectives and policies of IEEE standardization are specified in the IEEE-SA 
Operations Manual. This document is created and modified by the IEEE-SA BOG. 
 
4.2.2.4 Decision-making and voting 
The voting quorum differ per body and committee of IEEE and its Standards Association. 
Within the Assembly, the BoD and any other IEEE Major Board or its committees (including 
IEEE-SA SASB), the majority of the voting members constitute a quorum.1043 In contrast, 
approval or status modification of IEEE standards1044 and the formulation of a new Sponsor 
requires favorable votes of at least 75% of the SASB voting members present at the time of the 
vote.1045 To approve an action without a meeting within the Board of Directives, a unanimous 
consent is required;1046 for other organization units, majority consent of those participating 
(provided a majority of the voting members on the committee respond to the action) is 
sufficient, unless the governing documents provide otherwise.1047  
 
In principle, Study and Working Groups take decisions based on consensus. In case majority 
voting is required, IEEE-SA Study Group Guidelines recommend a minimum of five persons 
 
 
1038 For instance, PatCom is consulted for modifications of IPR policy. 
1039 Article 8 of IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws. 
1040 Article 4.1.1 of IEEE-SA Operations Manual. 
1041 Article 8.1 of IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws. SASB does not contribute to interpretation, but 
should nevertheless be notified.  
1042 Article 9.2 of IEEE Standards Board Operations Manual. 
1043 Section I-202.5 of IEEE Bylaws.  However, to be considered as an act of the body, achievement of the 
quorum is not enough: the majority of the voting members present during voting have to cast a positive vote.  
1044 Ex. from “active” to “inactive” status.  
1045 Article 5.1 of IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws. 
1046 Section I-300.3.9 of IEEE Bylaws. 
1047 This also applies to the IEEE-SA; see Section I-300.2 of IEEE Bylaws. 
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for individual-based groups, and a minimum of three entities for entity-based groups, but the 
ultimate determination of the voting quorum is left to the Sponsor.1048  
 
4.2.2.5 Financing  
The Board of Directors holds stewardship and fiduciary responsibility for IEEE assets.1049 The 
IEEE-SA financing mechanism is separate from the one of IEEE: since the former intended to 
be operated on an expense-neutral basis to IEEE, it is financed by the revenue from the sale of 
documents, royalties from intellectual property, contracts, fundraising, and participatory fees 
for standards-related products and services. Financial oversight is provided by the Finance 
Committee that in turn reports to the BoG.1050  
 
4.2.2.6 Dispute Settlement 
Those who are directly and materially affected by standards may, upon the exhaustion of the 
appeals procedures of any relevant subordinate committee or body, appeal procedural actions 
or inactions to the IEEE-SA SASB, The appeals pool consists of six to nine members of the 
SASB appointed by the SASB’s Chair who, together with SASB Vice Chair for Appeals, is an 
Appeal Officer of the Standards Board. A SASB Appeal Panel is comprised of a chair and two 
other members not involved in the dispute or affected by the decision at issue.1051 Final 
decisions of the IEEE-SA SASB Appeal Panel can be appealed to the BoG, which is also 
entitled to handle appeals against its own actions and inactions.1052 Similar to the structure in 
the SASB, the BoG Appeal Officers are the IEEE-SA President and the appointed by him/her 
IEEE-SA BOG Vice Chair for Appeals. The latter forms the BOG Appeal Panel comprised of 
three voting members of the IEEE-SA BOG not involved in the dispute or affected by the 





1048 ‘IEEE-SA study group guidelines’, available at 
https://standards.ieee.org/develop/corpchan/studygrp.pdf. 
1049 Article XIII Section 6 of IEEE Constitution. 
1050 The Finance Committee consists of the IEEE-SA President; the IEEE-SA President-Elect or the most 
recent IEEE-SA Past President willing to serve; the IEEE-SA Treasurer, who shall be appointed by the IEEE-SA 
President; and the Managing Director, IEEE Standards Activities, who shall serve as an ex-officio member 
without vote; Article 5.5 of IEEE-SA Operations Manual. 
1051 See Article 5.8 of IEEE-SA Standards Board Operations Manual. 
1052 Ibid., Article 5.8.9. 




Figure 3: IEEE-SA Appeal Process, from IEEE website  
 
Both Standards Board and the BoG deal exclusively with procedural appeals. Disputes around 
technical decisions, including making a technical comment during balloting period, are 
resolved at or below the Sponsor level following the procedures of the relevant committee and 
the Sponsor.1054 Ethical claims are handled by the IEEE Ethics and Member Conduct 
Committee or the IEEE-SA Standards Conduct Committee.1055 
 
4.2.3 Standards Development Processes  
 
4.2.3.1 Proposal of standardization project 
Once the need for standardization is established, interested parties join their forces in 
(potential) Study Groups.1056 During this phase, they draft a Project Authorization Request 
(PAR), a highly detailed legal document stating the reasons and intentions of the related 
standardization project. Each Study Group operates under the supervision of a Sponsor 
organization, which determines the technical content of standardization project and bears 
responsibility for a standardization project dedicated to it.1057 Traditionally, the Sponsors for 
IEEE standards are IEEE Societies and Committees, Standards Coordinating Committees 
 
 
1054 Article 5.2 of IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws. 
1055 Ibid., Article 5.4. 
1056 Although the Working Groups are formed after the proposal is approved, parties can already start 
working in so-called Study Groups, which form the potential basis of the future Working Groups. ‘The standards 
development lifecycle’, available at https://standards.ieee.org/develop/index.html. 
1057 Article 5.2.2 of IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws; Article 5.1 of IEEE-SA Standards Board 
Operations Manual. 
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(SCCs), the Corporate Advisory Group1058 or Standards Board.1059 Upon its completion, the 
PAR is examined by the NesCom, RevCom and AudCom, each reviewing the proposed project 
against certain requirements of the IEEE-SA. Technical work on standards development starts 
directly after the formal approval of the PAR by the IEEE-SA Standards Board, and should 
take no longer than four years.1060 
 
4.2.3.2 Technical work on standards  
With the approval of PAR by the Standards Board, the final structure and composition of the 
Working Group is established, which in many cases mimics the composition of the Study 
Group drafting the PAR. Each Working-Group is tailor-made for a specific standardization 
project, and is comprised either of individuals or representatives from entities – accordingly, 
IEEE-SA differentiates between “individual” and “entity” methods of standard-setting.1061 
Participation in Working Groups is open to anyone with the relevant technical expertise, 
knowledge and dedicated interest in the project.1062 Individuals nominated to participate in the 
Working Group meetings on behalf of an entity are obliged to declare to be the sole experts 
representing the interests of their organization prior to the balloting.1063 
 
The Working Groups should ensure broad and balanced representation of all parties interested 
in standardization projects, and to encourage global engagement by, i.e. approaching the 
members of the IEEE for their interest and expertise and issuing a call for participation.1064 The 
Working Group chairs are appointed by the Sponsor or selected by the Working Group. The 
main task of the chairs is preventing any conflict situations, in which they  may be assisted by 
officers.1065 Disputes within Working Group are resolved by consensus, meaning that the 
majority should be in favor of a certain decision. However, it is up to the Working Group to 
define “majority” and to decide by which procedures to operate, as long as they respect the 
requirements of due process and openness and do not contradict the rules of the IEEE-SA.1066 
The Policies and Procedures (P&P) of all Working Groups should be approved by their 
Sponsor, who can also establish a single procedure for all the Working Groups that it manages.  
 
The IEEE-SA seeks to encourage the disclosure of (potentially) essential patented technologies 
at the earliest stage of standard development. In principle, each Working Group meeting 
 
 
1058 The IEEE-SA Corporate Advisory Group may only act as a Sponsor for entity-based Study/Working 
Groups together with another IEEE Sponsor or when another Sponsor cannot immediately be determined; see 
IEEE-SA Study Group Guidelines, n 1048. 
1059 For the current list of Sponsors, see https://development.standards.ieee.org/pub/view-sponsor-pnps. 
1060 Article 5.2 of IEEE-SA Standards Board Operations Manual An extension is possible upon the 
Sponsor’s request and the subsequent authorization from the NesCom. 
1061 When developed according to the entity-method, individuals are nominated by the entities of their 
affiliation.  
1062 Standards Development Lifecycle, n 1056. 
1063 Article 5.4.4.1 of IEEE-SA Standards Board Operations Manual. 
1064 Usually through the IEEE-SA Media Contact. 
1065 In case the standard is developed byvirtue of individual-based method, the Chair and Vice-Chair 
persons should be affiliated with both IEEE and the IEEE-SA. 




commences by the statement concerning the IEEE-SA patent policy and a call to identify or 
disclose the holders of patents which the meeting participants believe to be essential for the 
functioning and implementation of the standard at issue. Those (potential) patent-holders may 
subsequently be asked to submit a Letter of Assurance (LoA) to the IEEE, a document stating 
the submitter’s position with respect to ownership, enforcement or licensing of a (potential) 
SEP.1067 Such assurance, provided in good faith, is irrevocable and applies, at minimum, from 
the date of the standard’s approval by the SASB. There are no mechanisms to force the SEP-
holders for disclosure and submission of the LoAs; the refusal to issue licenses according to 
the patent policy is typically followed by the dialogue between the patent owner and the 
Working Group chair/members, intending to reveal the reasons behind the SEP-holder’s denial 
to license its technology according following the IPR rules of IEEE-SA. The absence of LoA 
is carefully considered during the standard’s approval process. 
 
4.2.3.3 Approval  
Once consensus in the technical stage of standardization is achieved, and the Sponsor has 
decided that the draft standard is sufficiently mature and stable, the working document moves 
to the phase of the Sponsor balloting. The Sponsor balloting group is formed by the Sponsor 
and, similarly to Working Groups, can be individual or entity-based.1068 Once established, the 
composition of Sponsor balloting group cannot be modified. Participation in Sponsor balloting 
is not conditional about the membership of the relevant Working Group: however, non-
members of the IEEE-SA are required to pay a per-ballot fee to be eligible for balloting. Each 
group member has one vote and can give his or her comments when approving or disapproving 
a draft, or abstain from voting at all. Specific reasons should be provided in case of casting a 
negative vote.1069 Sponsor balloting may not be dominated by any companies or individuals, 
and no interest category can comprise over one-third of the balloting group.1070 Such 
requirements do not apply for Working Groups in charge of technical work on standards: 
despite their endeavor to provide a balanced representation of interest, the legal framework of 
IEEE-SA does not provide for explicit rules concerning the actual representation of interest 
groups. 1071 
 
A standard is approved in Sponsor balloting if the voting results in consensus, meaning that 
75% of the group has to cast the vote and the 75% of those votes have to be in favor, and that 
all technical or editorial comments submitted with the votes are responded.1072 If applicable, a 
draft can be modified considering the comments, what might turn negative votes into positive. 




1067 See the definition in Article 6.1 of IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws. 
1068 Article 5.4 of IEEE-SA Standards Board Operations Manual. 
1069 Ibid., Article 5.4.3.2.  
1070 Ibid., Article 5.4.1.  
1071 See Article 5.2.1.2.1 of IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws, which speaks about standards development 
process as a whole, not specifically the actions within the Working Groups at the stage of technical development. 
1072 Articles 5.4.3.3 and 5.4.3.5 of IEEE-SA Standards Board Operations Manual. 
147 
 
Together with the initiation of consensus ballot, a draft standard opens for the 60-days IEEE-
SA Public Review Process, providing an opportunity for any interested party to comment on 
the draft that is being reviewed in consensus process and obtain responses from the Working 
Group.1073 Any person can purchase a ballot draft and submit the comments online via the 
IEEE website.  
 
Upon achieving consensus in Sponsor balloting, a draft standard is submitted to the IEEE-SA 
Standards Board for its final approval.1074 The Standards Board reviews the document and 
supporting material and establishes, based on decision of the RevCom, whether the final draft 
still falls under the scope of the PAR and whether the applicable procedural rules have been 
respected throughout the process of standards development.1075 The final draft undergoes 




Figure 4: IEEE-SA standards development process, from https://standards.ieee.org/develop/develop-
standards/process.html 
 
Standards are subject to review by the Sponsor of their preparation as often as new information 
is available, but at least every ten years.1076 The procedure for revising a standard is the same 
as for developing a new standard, and encompasses the cumulative scope of the project, 
including all approved amendments and corrigenda. Standards that are significantly obsolete 
should be recommended for withdrawal from active status by the Sponsor. Such 
recommendation should be approved in a process of Sponsor ballot with 50% of total votes 
returned and at least 75% of those votes in favor of the recommendation. A standard is 




1073 Ibid., Article 5.4.5.  
1074 Article 4.5.2.4 of IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws. 
1075 Article 4.2.3 of IEEE-SA Standards Board Operations Manual. See also ‘How is final approval 
obtained’, available at http://standards.ieee.org/develop/finalapp.html.  
1076 Articles 2.2 and 5.3 of IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws. 




4.2.4 IPR Policy  
 
The first IEEE IPR policy introduced FRAND requirement and permitted SEP holders to ex 
ante disclose their licensing terms.1078 A SEP-holder disclosing a potentially essential patent 
should submit to the IEEE an LoA stating his/her intentions and (a) assures that he/she will 
license its SEP to implementers of the standard (i.e. for a reasonable royalty, at the holder’s 
election, royalty-free); (b) assures that he/she will not enforce its SEP against implementers, c) 
states that he/she does not have SEPs, or d) declines to provide assurance.1079  
 
The vagueness of FRAND-commitment and inability to take cost-benefit comparison when 
deciding on the inclusion of patented technologies in a standard lead to the policy revision in 
2007. The proposed modifications established the requirement of ex ante disclosure of 
maximum royalty rates and licensing terms, stipulated the irrevocability of patent-holders’ 
assurance and clarified the binding effect of the assurance on the submitter’s affiliates.1080 After 
obtaining a favorable Business Review Letter from the Antitrust Division of the US 
Department of Justice,1081 the new policy was approved by the IEEE governing bodies and 
became enforceable in May 2007. In practice, however, the policy proved to be unsuccessful 
in achievement of its goals: not only did it fuel the discussion on the meaning of “reasonable 
rate” and “unfair discrimination”, which is suggested to provoke diverse interpretation of the 
Policy,1082 but it also proved to be ineffective as only two LoAs accepting to disclose maximum 
rates were received by the IEEE-SA.1083  
 
Following the “Six Proposals” speech of Renate Hesse,1084 and driven by concerns of patent 
hold-up and royalty stacking, IEEE IPR Policy was subject to another revision in 2015. This 
time, amendments of the Patent Policy were more extensive and preliminarily sought to 
mitigate the alleged concerns of patent hold-up and royalty stacking. In its request to the DoJ 
to provide a Business Review Letter, the IEEE SA submitted four modifications1085 it intended 
to implement in the new Patent Policy. While two of the proposed modifications – prohibition 
 
 
1078 See Contreras, ‘An empirical study’, p. 13. 
1079 Article 6.1 of IEEE-SA Standard Board Bylaws. 
1080 IEEE-SA Request for Business Review Letter to the US Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 29 
November 2006, available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2014/01/28/302148.pdf. 
1081 US Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Business Review Letter, 30 April 2007, available at 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/response-institute-electrical-and-electronics-engineers-incs-request-business-review-
letter. 
1082 The Policy was considered as “overly ambitious”; see K. Karachalios, ‘Fundamental uncertainty at the 
intersection between patents and standards’ (November/December 2015) The Patent Lawyer. 
1083 See Petit, ‘The IEEE-SA revised patent policy’, p. 216. 
1084 Renata Hesse, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, ‘Six “small” 
proposals for SDOs before lunch’, Remarks as Prepared for the ITU-T Patent Roundtable 13 on 10 October 201, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/287855pdf.  
1085 Those are sometimes termed by IEEE as “clarifications” highlighting that no major changes were made 
and suggesting that the more specific obligations of the version after 2015 also apply to commitments made before 
2015; some, however, refer to “changes” or “revisions” to highlight the departure of the new Policy from practice. 
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for Submitters of LoAs1086 that have been determined complete and posted on the IEEE-SA 
web site (“Accepted LoAs”) to seek, or seek to enforce, injunctions (or “Prohibitive Order”) 
against implementers unless those fail to participate in, or to comply with the outcome of an 
adjudication by the appropriate authorities;1087 and permission for patent holders to require 
reciprocity in licensing only with regard to the patents that are essential to a single standard, 
and only when the reciprocity relates to (a) SEP(s) – introduce explicit changes to the Policy, 
two other points are rather believed to take form of clarifications:1088 the option to determine 
the “reasonable rate” based on the value of the relevant functionality of the smallest saleable 
patent practicing unit (SSPPU)1089 compliant implementations of the SEP; and clarification  
that IPRs shall be licensed for “any Compliant Implementation”, meaning any product or 
service that conforms to any mandatory or optional portion of a normative clause of an IEEE 
Standard.1090 
 
IEEE-SA Working Groups are explicitly prohibited to discuss the status or substance of on-
going or threatened litigation on the matters of IPRs, essentiality or validity of patent claims or 
specific license terms or IPRs other than mentioned in the accepted LoAs.1091 Next to this 
requirement, the IEEE maintains an Antitrust and Competition Policy, which provides non-
binding guidelines to prevent its activities from becoming anti-competitive arrangements.1092  
 
4.3 Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 
 
4.3.1 Scope and purpose of IETF 
 
The organizational structure of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has been described 
as a “loosely self-organized group of people who contribute to the engineering and evolution 
of Internet technologies.”1093 IETF has no membership and is not incorporated in any 
jurisdiction, and its work is supported by a small Secretariat is located in the US. In its earlier 
years, IETF was described as “kind of direct, populist democracy that most of us have never 
experienced.”1094 The work of IETF is driven by the beliefs of its participants and volunteers, 
 
 
1086 Note that according to the language of IEEE Patent Policy, “Submitter” is an individual or an 
organization providing an LoA, who may not necessarily be the SEP holder.  
1087 The reason that policy provides is that there is sufficient compensation for Accepted LOAs. 
1088 Although this is disputed by many SEPs-holders. 
1089 See D. Kappos and (The Honorable) P. R. Michel, ‘The smallest salable patent-practicing unit: 
observations on its origins, development, and future’ (2018) 32 Berkley Technology Law Journal 1433-56, 
explaining the Court’s rulings on SSPPU. 
1090 M. A. Lindsay, Business Review Letter Request to Assistant Attorney General, W. J. Baer (30 
September 2014) available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2015/02/17/311483.pdf. The 
2015 IPR Policy Update was subjected to numerous appeals within the IEEE and ANSI; see Chapter V.4.  
1091 Article 6.2 IEEE- SA Standards Board Bylaws. 
1092 IEEE SA Antitrust and Competition Policy, available at 
http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/antitrust.pdf. 
1093 See ‘The Tao of IETF: a novice’s guide to the internet engineering task force’ (2019) P. Hoffman (ed.), 
available at https://www.ietf.org/tao.html. 
1094 P. Borsook, ‘How anarchy works’ (10 January 1995) Wired, available at  
https://www.wired.com/1995/10/ietf/. In other words, IETF was functioning as a new type of government, rather 
than merely a body building internet infrastructure. 
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who are guided by the IETF’s key principle “We reject kings, presidents and voting. We believe 
in rough consensus and running code."1095  
 
For decades, IETF has been the principal SDO developing and maintaining voluntary Internet 
standards and specifications, having an important role in defining Internet governance. 
Currently, IETF standardization activities are divided between more than one hundred IETF 
Working Groups, each of them focusing on certain set of specifications,1096 and the IETF 
preserves the aspiring objective of benefiting the Internet community and public at large by 
“making the Internet work better by producing high quality, relevant technical documents that 
influence the way people design, use, and manage the Internet”1097 IETF standardization is 
generally based on engineering excellence rather than policy and business considerations,1098 
aiming to ensure a simple and efficient standards development process and fair and open 
representation of all affected interests.  
 
Standardization efforts within IETF typically result in a document termed a Request for 
Comments (RFC), which is available free of charge.1099 Yet, only RFCs which are normative 
documents approved by the IETF enjoy a status of “standards”;1100 other RFCs are 
“Informational” in nature (an example is RFC 5218 defining what makes an internet protocol 
successful)1101 and may be labelled as “Experimental” or “Historic.”1102 Likewise, RFCs are 
not considered standards when issued by a body outside IETF, such as the IAB or the Internet 
Research Task Force (IRTF).1103 The IETF further distinguishes between widely deployed 
Internet Standards and Best Current Practices (BCP) offering operational specifications: the 
latter specify the governance rules and policies of IETF. 
 
To ensure the smooth functioning of Internet standardization, IETF maintains informal liaisons 
with other SDOs, such as W3C and IEEE.1104 Additionally, Contributors to IETF work grant 
 
 
1095 See ‘The Tao of IET’, referring to the quote of David Clark.  
1096 See ‘IETF Working Group Guidelines and Procedures’, S. Bradner (ed.) (September 1998) available 
at http://ietf.org/rfc/rfc2418.txt.  
1097 ‘Mission Statement’, available at https://www.ietf.org/about/mission.html. 
1098 ‘IETF Standards Process’, available at https://www.ietf.org/about/standards-process.html.  
1099 The rationale behind the term “Request for Comments” is the constantly changing technical system of 
the Internet, and the need to constantly update technical documents managing it.  
1100 Section 6 of ‘The Tao of IETF’. Typically, these documents start with such sentences as "This 
document specifies an Internet standards track protocol" or "This memo documents an Internet Best Current 
Practice," or have a header stating "Category: Standards Track" or "Category: Best Current Practice". 
1101 Ex. D. Thaler, ‘What makes for a successful protocol’ (July 2008) available at 
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5218. 
1102 For further information, see the IESG Guidelines on Informational and Experimental status of RFCs, 
available at http://www.ietf.org/iesg/informational-vs-experimental.html. 
1103 Section 6 of ‘The Tao of IETF’. 
1104 The nature of these liaisons is rather informal, since they are not established by an agreement between 
SDOs but take place in Working Groups, see Section 8 of ‘The Tao of IETF’. As suggested by an expert, “If there 
is somebody who participates in both organizations, it is a sign that both organizations have overlapping activities; 
if not it is a good sign that they do not.” Interview with an expert from an SDO, 12 January 2018, on file with the 
author.  For more information, see ‘Liaisons’, available at http://www.ietf.org/liaison. 
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copyrights on RFCs to the IETF Trust, which in turn gives the necessary rights to IETF. This 





IETF has no formal membership, and its work relies on volunteers joining the Working Groups. 
Participation in IETF standard-setting is based on technical contributions of individuals who, 
even when affiliated with an organization, participate as individuals.1106 Most of contributors 
are software engineers, individuals affiliated with network operators and networking hard-and 
software vendors and academics with specialized knowledge of internet and networking 
protocols, but also representatives of computer and trade press may take part in the process.1107  
IETF Working Groups typically take form of a mailing list, to which everybody can sign up 
and by this means become a “participant.”1108 By joining one of the Working Groups, a person 
automatically accepts IETF rules, including its IPR policy. Meetings of the Working Groups 
may also be held in person and thus require a payment of a meeting fee.1109  
 
4.3.2.2 Principle Bodies 
Although fairly informal, IETF activities nevertheless need at least a minimum of coordination. 
The structure followed by the IETF participants is offered by other organizations, which may 
take an active part in standards development processes or merely provide administrative 
support. One of the main bodies dealing with the technical work of the IETF is the Internet 
Engineering Steering Group (IESG), which serves as a “management group” of IETF and bears 
direct responsibility for the progress of standardization project, including final approval of 
specifications as Internet Standards and ensuring that the documents are of a sufficient quality. 
IESG comprised of the IETF Chair and the Area Directors (AD), randomly selected by the 
Nominating Committee (NomCom) from a pool of volunteers and approved by the Internet 
Architecture Board (IAB) for a term of two years, each of them responsible for an area of a 
specific focus of IETF work.1110 To facilitate the management of their area, ADs may create 
directorates that are comprised of experienced members of the IETF community; yet, the IESG 
is the only body, which is entitled to add or close down the areas, redefine their scope or change 
their structure.1111 Since these decisions may significantly affect the work of the IETF, a prior 
consultation with the IETF community is preferred.1112 The IETF Executive Director, the IAB 
Chair and a designated IAB liaison are ex-officio participants of the IESG; ADs may assume 
 
 
1105 ‘Rights contributors provide to the IETF trust’, S. Bradner and J.L. Contreras (eds) (November 2008) 
available at https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5378. 
1106 See ‘Getting started in the IETF’, available at http://ietf.org/newcomers.html. 
1107 Section 3.12 of ‘The Tao of IETF’. 
1108 The mailing lists of Working Groups are available at http://datatracker.ietf.org/list/wg/. 
1109 However, what was mentioned during the meetings also has to be mentioned on the mailing lists. 
Interview with an expert from a cyber security authority, 11 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1110 Section 3.12 of ‘The Tao of IETF’. It is also possible that multiple ADs are responsible for one area. 
1111 ‘The TAO of IETF’, Section 2.2.2. 
1112 Ibid.  
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a liaison role within other organizations when it comes to the matter of technical 
cooperation.1113  
 
At the moment of writing, the IETF counts seven areas dealing with the issues of, inter alia, 
Internet applications, IETF process, operational aspects, security and transport.1114 Each area 
of IETF activities is comprised of multiple Working Groups, whose coordination also falls 
under the responsibility of the ADs. In turn, each Working Group is chaired by one or more 
volunteer who manages its work an ensures that the necessary deadlines are met.1115 A draft 
cannot move forward if at least two members of the IESG express concerns as regards the 
contents of a document.1116 Despite its advisory role in technical processes, the IESG may 
decide whether an output of Working Groups represents consensus of IETF community.  
  
Long-range coordination of IETF activities is entrusted to the IAB.1117 In general, IAB is 
concerned with the design of Internet and its protocols; it acts as a sponsor for the Internet 
Research Task Force (IRTF) and performs a rather advisory role in the activities of the Internet 
Society (ISOC).1118 Yet, within the IETF, IAB is also entrusted with specific tasks as the 
reviewing of new IETF Working Groups as regards their architectural consistency and 
integrity, overseeing the IETF liaisons, appointing the IETF chair and approving IESG 
candidates.1119 Additionally, IAB approves IESG nominations and IANA appointments, and 
serves as an appeal board for complaints of improper standard-setting process and for appeals 
against IESG and IAOC.1120 
 
Members of the IAB shall not represent organizations of their affiliation, and neither do they 
owe fiduciary duty of loyalty or care to the IAB, IESG, IRTF or IETF.1121 The IAB is 
comprised of twelve full members selected for two-year term by the NomCom and approved 




1114 For the full description of areas, see http://ietf.org/iesg/area.html. 
1115 See ‘Working groups’, available at http://www.ietf.org/wg/. A full list of active IETF Working Groups 
can be found at http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/.  
1116 These procedures are aimed to prevent the prospect standard from negatively affecting the rest of IETF 
protocols, but also to ensure that the project is not constantly blocked by one party.  
1117 ‘Charter of the Internet Architecture Board’ (IAB), B. Carpenter (ed) (May 2000) RCF28050, available 
at https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2850; ‘Internet Architecture Board: overview’, available at 
https://www.iab.org/about/iab-overview/. The partnership between IAB and IETF was however tested by the 
tensions between OSI and TCP/IP, where the different approaches to architecture and organizational structure 
resulted in “constitutional crisis” that forced IETF participants to revisit their procedural believes. See A. Russel, 
‘“Rough consensus and running code”’ and the internet-OSI standard wars’ (2006) 28 IEEE Annals of the History 
of Computing, 48-61. 
1118 Section 2 of the Charter of the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) (2000). ISOC is a separate 
organization, which became a sort of organizational home of IETF in 1996 as the Internet has grown in popularity 
and usage and commercial users outnumbered academic and government users. See Contreras, ‘A tale of two 
layers’, pp. 868-9, referring to the Memorandum from E. Huizer, on IETF-ISOC Relationship (October 1996), 
available at https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2031.  
1119 Section 2 of the Charter of the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) (2000). 
1120 Ibid.  
1121 Ibid., Section 1. 
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any voting power.1122 However, he/she may participate in all IAB meetings except those where 
the IESG members are approved or appeals against IESG decisions are handled, since the IETF 
chair is also the chair of the IESG. Together with another full IAB member, he also serves as 
a liaison to the IESG.1123 Liaison members from ISOC, RFC Editor, IANA and IESG do not 
have any voting rights in the IAB but may attend their meetings and contribute to the 
discussions. 
 
IAB members further select one full member to act as a chair for one-year term. A chair can 
be removed if this decision is supported by the vote of two-third of IAB members, or in case 
chair’s action demonstrate a significant departure from the IAB.1124 In turn, the chair of the 
IAB appoints and removes an honorary Executive Director who administers the internal 
operation of the IAB. The number of terms that a member may serve in the IAB or as one of 
its officials is unlimited.1125  
 
It appears that the NomCom, although not being directly involved in IETF standardization, 
plays a key role in the IETF governance by selecting candidates for the IESG, IAB and IAOC. 
The NomCom is composed of a non-voting chair, appointed by the President of the ISOC, two 
or three liaisons from IESG, IAB and ISOC and an advisor, which is typically a previous 
NomCom chair and ten members randomly selected from eligible IETF volunteers who have 
attended minimum three of last five IETF meetings.1126 
 
Administrative structure of the IETF Working Groups, IESG, IAB and IRTF is provided by 
the IETF Administrative Support Activity (IASA), which also manages financial matters 
related to IETF meetings. IASA is considered as a body ensuring accountability and 
transparency of the IETF administrative and fiscal activities to the IETF community;1127 yet 
this accountability is achieved through a different body, the IETF Administrative Oversight 
Committee (IAOC), which establishes the scope of IASA’s administrative functions.1128 The 
IAOC is composed of volunteers selected directly or indirectly by the IETF community and ex 
officio members from ISOC and IETF leadership.1129 The work of the IASA is overseen by the 
Administrative Director (IAD), likewise accountable to the IAOC. The roles of the IOAC, 






1123 Ibid., Section 3.4. 
1124 Ibid., Section 3. 
1125 Ibid. 
1126 See ‘IAB, IESG, and IAOC selection, confirmation, and recall process: operation of the nominating 
and recall committees’, M. Kucherawy (ed), (January 2015) RFC 7437, available at 
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7437/?include_text=1. 
1127 ‘Structure of the IETF Administrative Support Activity (IASA),’ R. Austein (ed) (April 2005), BCP 
101 available at https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4071. 
1128 Section 2.2.1 of ‘The Tao of IETF’. 
1129 See ‘IAB, IESG, and IAOC selection, confirmation, and recall process’. 
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The process of editing, formatting and publishing of RFCs is entrusted to the RFC Editor, a 
body that performs various tasks throughout the drafting process and works in collaboration 
with the IESG.1130 The IAB plays an important role in this process since it approves the body 
acting as an RFC Editor and the policy that will govern its work; however, the funding for RFC 
activities is provided by the IASA.  
 
4.3.2.3 Policy Drafting 
The IETF framework does not contain any procedures for drafting of standardization policies. 
Rules that the SDO is expected to follow are decided by consensus in dedicated Working 
Groups and are subsequently published as BCP RFCs. Accordingly, the process of IETF policy 
development is fairly similar to the one of standards development. IPR Policies are typically 
expected to represent the consensus of the IETF community, and therefore are subject to public 
review and approval by the IESG.1131  
 
4.3.2.4 Decision-making and voting  
Each of the bodies governing IETF activities establish their own decision-making mechanisms, 
including the rules on quorum and conflict of interests. For instance, while within the IAOC 
decision are preferably taken by consensus, voting may be used as alternative where consensus 
cannot be achieved.1132 For the decision-making within the IAB and the IESG, unanimity is 
desirable; if the decision cannot be reached unanimously, the chair may conduct informal polls 
to determine consensus, seeking the agreement of at least full seven members while maximum 
of two full members may dissent for the IAB, and the agreement of the chair and ADs for the 
IESG.1133 A voting mechanisms of the NomCom is established by its chair, and the criteria for 
determining the quorum for decisions making are communicated to all NomCom members.1134 
Working Groups do not maintain “hard rules” for decision-making, and entrusted the decision 
on whether consensus has been reached, to the Working Group’s chair.  
 
4.3.2.5 Financing 
In principle, the IETF is not provided with any funding and does not generate any income. This 
is partly due to the absence of membership and the loose organization structure. However, the 
functioning of the IETF would not be possibly without any financial support. In this regard, 
each of the bodies and committees engaged in the work of the IETF maintains its own funding 
system. The work of the IETF Secretariat is financially supported by the IASA, which derives 
its revenues from IETF meetings and the ISOC funding.1135  
 
 
1130 Section 2.2.5 of ‘The Tao of IETF’. 
1131 See, for instance, the 2017 IPR Policy, stating, “This document is a product of the Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has 
been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). ‘Intellectual property rights in 
IETF technology’, S. Bradner and L. Contreras (eds.) (May 2017) BCP 79, available at https://www.rfc-
editor.org/rfc/rfc8179.txt (hereinafter: IETF IPR Policy). 
1132 Section 4.2 of IOC Administrative Procedures (15 February 2016) available at 
https://iaoc.ietf.org/policy-procedures.html. 
1133 See Charter of the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) (2000). 
1134 ‘Update to RFC 3777 to clarify nominating committee eligibility of IETF leadership’, B. Leiba (ed.) 
(January 2013) RCP 6859, available at https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6859. 




4.3.2.6 Dispute settlement 
Until November 2018, decisions of the IAB and the IAOC questioned by a member of the IETF 
community in relation to their compliance with IETF BCPs or the relevant operational 
guidelines can be formally reviewed by the IAOC.1136 The decision or inaction of the IAOC or 
IESG may be appealed to the IAB by any member of the IETF community, and subsequently, 
to the ISOC Board of Trustees.1137  
 
Disputes within the NomCom are preferably resolved within the committee for the reason of 
confidentiality. When seem does not seem to be possible, a written request to the Internet 
Society President to resolve the issue should be submitted by a party.1138 The Internet Society 
President appoints an arbiter who investigates the issue, consults with the two principle parties 
of the dispute and decides on the resolution, which he or she discussed with the Internet Society 
President prior to preparing a report.  
 
Decisions of Working Group chair can be appealed to the AD, and subsequently to the IESG. 
If the Working Group disagrees with the resolution provided by the IESG, an appeal can be 
filed by the IAB.1139 
 
4.3.3 Standards Development Processes 
 
4.3.3.1 Proposal to standardize 
Since there is no membership, an RFC may be proposed by anyone wishing to join the work 
of IETF, regardless whether the document is intended to be informative or normative, and 
whether the RFC takes form of an individual submission to the IETF, or a project that should 
be considered within a Working Group.1140 In case of the latter, a Working Group is initiated 
either by an AD or by a (group of) individual(s) after obtaining consent of the AD(s). To 
facilitate the formation process by engaging in more research, any individual may request the 
IETF a permission to hold a Bird of a Feather (BoF) session, which may serve also as a forum 
for a discussion without any intent to establish a Working Group.1141 
 
The establishment of a Working Group follows formal steps: creation of Charter, a document 
defining the course of activities of the Working Group which serves as preliminary contract 
the prospective Working Group Chair, the relevant AD(s) and the IETF Secretariat; formation 
of a general Internet mailing list; description of the focus and intent of the Working Group and 
 
 
1136 The IOAC is no longer operational, leaving the IAB the main “dispute settlement body” of IETF. 
Section 6.5 of S. Bradner (ed.) ‘Internet Standards Process – Revision 3’ (March 2013) RFC 2026, available at 
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc2026/?include_text=1. 
1137  Section 2.2.3 of ‘The TAO of IETF’. 
1138 See ‘IAB, IESG, and IAOC selection, confirmation, and recall process’. 
1139 For this reason, the IAB chair and the liaison from the IAB do not participate in the IESG appeals; see 
‘An IESG Charter’, H. Alvestrand (ed.) (February 2004) RFC 3710, available at http://ietf.org/rfc/rfc3710.txt. 
1140 Section 4.2 of ‘The Tao of IETF’. 
1141 Such request should be filed with the AD; Section 2.4 of S. Bradner (ed.), IETF Working Group 
Guidelines and Procedures (September 1998) RFC 2418. 
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the milestones for its progress and the final approval of the Working Group by the AD and 
subsequently, the IESG with the advice from the IAB.1142 At this stage, the IESG may request 
to make changes in the charter. Substantive modifications of a charter have to undergo the same 
process as the charter drafting. Upon approval, the Working Group is announced by the IETF 
Secretariat.1143 
 
In general, Working Groups are short-lived in nature and are terminated upon the completion 
of its goals, or when the responsible AD concludes that its work is no longer relevant for the 
IETF community.1144 In both cases, the decision should be taken by the AD and should be 
supported by the reasons for termination.1145 Upon agreement with the IESG, the AD, the Chair 
and participants, the objectives of a Working Group may also be modified through re-
chartering processes.1146  
 
4.3.3.2 Technical work 
Most of the IETF’s detailed technical work is carried out via the Working Groups’ mailing 
lists. Although the lists and the discussions are not moderated, messages sent to the 
announcement lists should be approved by the IETF Secretariat and a small number of IETF 
leaders.1147 A (group of) designated individual(s) may serve as Editor(s) for a particular 
Working Group’s document. Occasionally, Working Groups may meet face-to-face, for 
instance on a one-week IETF event; in such case, the costs associated with conducting the 
meetings are borne by the attendees or the corporate hosts of the meeting, complemented with 
additional funding from the IASA.1148  
 
Each Working Group may determine their operational rules, as long as those are compliant 
with the requirements for fair and open participation and consideration of technical alternative. 
However, certain vast rules are considered best practices and should be followed throughout 
the activities of the Working Groups. These rules include publishing the draft agenda before 
the actual session, making the minutes available and encouraging broader participation. The 
key obligation is the decisions of the Working Groups must be taken by a “rough 
consensus,”1149 meaning that a large majority of Working Group participants must agree with 
the decision and that strongly held objections are debated until proved wrong. The method of 
determining consensus varies per Working Group: for instance, consensus may be established 
by “humming” or when there is a general sense of agreement. Decisions reached during a face-
 
 
1142 Section 5 of IETF Working Group Guidelines and Procedures (1998). 
1143 Section 2 of IETF Working Group Guidelines and Procedures (1998). 
1144 Ibid. 
1145 Ibid., Section 4. 
1146 Ibid., Section 5. 
1147 Section 2.3 of ‘The Tao of IETF’. 
1148 The meetings of IETF take place in North America, Europe and Asia, approximately once a year in 
each region. So far, IETF conducted about 80 face-to-face meetings.  
1149 The rationale behind it is that, in the absence of formal membership, decisions, in principle, cannot be 
taken by formal voting. 
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to-face meeting must also gain consensus on a mailing list.1150 The responsibility to determine 
whether consensus has been achieved lies on the Working Group Chair, who also resolves any 
procedural issues arising during standardization processes. Once the technical discussions are 
finalized and upon the decision of the Working Group Chair, it is submitted to the Working 
Group Last Call (WGLC).  
 
4.3.3.3 Approval 
Upon achieving consensus within the Working Group, the document is submitted for 
considered of the IESG. The IESG announces an IETF-wide Last Call, which takes at least two 
weeks for drafts coming from Working Groups, and four weeks for individual submissions.1151 
The IESG subsequently determines whether the document satisfies the applicable criteria and 
its technical quality and clarity is consistent with that expected for the maturity level. 
Procedures for this stage are defined by the IESG, and typically involve a prior review by the 
responsible AD. After the approval of the IESG, the draft becomes a standards-track RFC, and 
is published upon necessary editing/revision. The adoption process of the Best Current Practice 
(BCP) is similar to the one of the RFC, with a difference that once the document is approved 
by the IESG, it is immediately published without editing.1152 
 
An RFC may be updated by the Working Group or by individual actors. Updated RFCs  get a 
new number, which practically means that the text of an RFC is never subject to modification. 
Technical and editorial mistakes are handled by the RFC Editor.  
 
4.3.4 IPR Policy 
 
In general, IETF encourages to use non-patented technology, and Working Groups prefer 
technologies without IPR claims, or those, which can be licensed on royalty-free basis.1153 That 
said, IETF acknowledges that superior technology may outweigh technologies accompanied 
by free licensing or fewer IPR claims, and, as other SDOs, introduces the rules governing IPRs 
inclusion in IETF standards.  
 
Provisions regarding the IPRs were mentioned for the first time in 1992 in IETF’s first IPR 
formal IPR Policy, adopted as RFC 1310 and largely mirroring the language if ANSI’s IPR 
Policy.1154 The policy was instigated by the changing landscape of standardization and growing 
commercialization of the Internet.1155 In 1994, the policy was strengthened with the 
requirements for patent-holders to grant an RF license to ISOC, as well as to license their 
 
 
1150 This ensures that those who were not able to attend the meeting can still share their viewpoint; Section 
3.2 of IETF Working Group Guidelines and Procedures (1998). 
1151 ‘The TAO of IETF’, Section 6.4. 
1152 See Section 3.2 of IETF Working Group Guidelines and Procedures (1998).  
1153 Section 6.4.5 of ‘The Tao of IETF’. The Tao introduces the IBM license for RFC 1822 as an example 
of successful royalty-free licensing.  




technologies to those implementing IETF standards on RAND or royalty-free basis.1156 Yet, 
the IPR policy became relevant only in 1995, when Motorola refused to commit to license its 
patents for PPP Compression Control Protocol, which lead to disagreement in the Working 
Group; Motorola eventually agreed to license its technology on RAND terms, but only after 
the standard containing patent claims was already published.1157  
 
IETF IPR Policy was revised the following year and this time, it only contained a disclosure 
obligation.1158 The Policy  established the three basic principles of IPR claims, namely that 
IETF a) does not have an obligation to determine the validity of IPR claims; b) can decide to 
use technologies for which IPR disclosures have been made and that c) all contributors and 
participants must disclosure the existence of any IPR which they believe (may) cover the 
technology under discussions, without requiring prior patent search. The disclosure should be 
made as soon as it is reasonably possible after the document is published as an Internet Draft 
or an RFC.1159  
 
This approach was maintained in the subsequent modifications of March 20051160 which 
brought clarity into the ambiguities regarding the disclosure obligation, and in April 2007, the 
latter adding a clarification of third party disclosure.1161 Under this Policy, participants were 
free to choose their own format for disclosure and may include any additional information 
regarding their licensing intentions, such as ex ante disclosure of licensing terms.1162 In May 
2017, IETF adopted a new IPR Policy which, inter alia, modified some definitions, changed 
the focus to “participants” rather than “contributors,” explained that IETF disclosures can be 
made by anyone, also outside IETF community, and added procedures for adopting the IPR 
rules to non-IETF stream documents.1163 
 
4.4 World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) 
 
4.4.1 Scope and purpose 
 
The creation of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) is closely linked to the invention of 
the World Wide Web in 1989, its first web server (the “httpd”) and the document formatting 
language (“HTML”) in early 1990th. Although first Web protocols were published by within 
IETF by Tim Berners-Lee from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), he soon 
 
 
1156  Section 5.6 of ‘The internet standards process – revision 2’, C. Huitema and P. Gross (eds.) (March 
1994) RFC 1602, available at https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc1602.txt.pdf. 
1157 Contreras, ‘A tale of two layers’, p. 870.  
1158 Section 10.3 of ‘The internet standards process – revision 3’, S. Bradner, (ed.) (October 1996) RFC 
2026, available at https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2026. 
1159 Ibid. 
1160 ‘Intellectual property rights in IETF technology’, S. Bradner (ed.) (March 2005) RFC 3979, available 
at https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3979. 
1161 ‘Clarification of the third-party disclosure procedure in RFC 3979’, T. Narten (ed.) (April 2007) RFC 
4879, available at https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4879. 
1162 Contreras calls this policy an “informal” ex ante approach; Contreras, ‘An empirical study’, p. 18. 
1163 See Section 13 of IETF IPR Policy (2017).  
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enough became frustrated with slow and inflexible IETF processes.1164 As a consequence, the 
new standardization body was founded in 1994, which also marked the emergence of a “web 
community,” developing various protocols and standards associated with the Web. In June 
2019, W3C counted 445 Members.1165 
 
W3C represents a non-hierarchical cooperation between universities and research facilities and 
does not have a typical organizational structure.1166 The consortium is managed by a joint 
agreement among four “host” institutions, namely MIT, European Research Consortium for 
Informatics and Mathematics (ERCIM), Keio University (KEIO) and Beihang University 
(BEIHANG),1167 and has regional offices to facilitate administration. The ultimate decision-
making authority belongs to the W3C Director and the inventor of the web.  
 
Standardization of W3C is guided by the idea that the web should be accessible and beneficial 
to all people, regardless the devices or network infrastructure they are using and that any 
interaction by means of web should build up upon trust and confidence within both social and 
technological sense. 1168 Some of its prominent specifications are XML, HTML5, Web design 
protocols and Web applications, which ensure functionality and accessibility of the web on a 
global scale.1169 In its process, W3C adheres to a set of Open Standards Principles of the 
modern paradigm for standards,1170 including the principle of cooperation, due process, broad 
consensus, transparency, balance and openness.  
 
W3C standards are defined in the Working Groups of the W3C community and published in 
the form of Recommendations.1171 The work of W3C groups is governed by the Code of Ethics 
and Professional Conduct, which clarifies which behavior is acceptable during standard-setting 
meeting.1172 Next to web standards, W3C produces other documents that might serve as input 
to the standard-setting process, such as Member submission, team/staff submission and reports. 
Similarly to other institutions discussed in this chapter, W3C cooperates and coordinates with 




1164 See A. L. Russel, ‘Constructing legitimacy: the W3C’s patent policy’, in L. DeNardis (ed.), Opening 
Standards: The Global Politics of Interoperability (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011), pp. 159-76.  
1165 ‘Current members’, available at https://www.w3.org/Consortium/Member/List#xW. Remarkably, in 
June 2017, this number was 474.  
1166 Clause 9 of the Draft International World Wide Web Consortium Member Agreement (2013), available 
at https://www.w3.org/2009/12/Member-Agreement. The Membership Agreement is interpreted and governed by 
the laws of The Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the United States of America. 
1167 ‘Facts about W3C’, available at https://www.w3.org/Consortium/facts.html. 
1168 ‘W3C Mission’, available at https://www.w3.org/Consortium/mission.  
1169 See ‘W3C Standards’, available at https://www.w3.org/standards/. 
1170 The Agreement between W3C and Open Standard was signed on 29 August 2012. See Chapter III.6 
for OpenStand principles. 
1171 For all W3C standards, see ‘All standards and drafts’, available at https://www.w3.org/TR/tr-date-
stds.html. For all W3C Working Groups, see ‘Groups’, available at https://www.w3.org/Consortium/activities. 







Membership of W3C is open to organizations, which in turn nominate their employees to 
represent entities in Working Groups and Interest Groups. To participate on behalf of their 
Member-organization, experts are expected to demonstrate technical and social competences, 
and must be able to act fairly.1173 Whether or not the experts possess these qualities is assessed 
by the Members’ representatives in the Advisory Committee, who subsequently nominate 
individuals from their organization to take part in standard-setting activities.1174 To prevent the 
conflict of interest, experts participating in W3C activities are obliged to disclose their 
significant relationship and affiliation changes.1175 Any association of individuals, companies 
or governments (or a combination of those) participating in a W3C activity with a common 
purpose is considered a “member consortium,” and may designate individuals to exercise the 
rights of Member representatives.1176    
 
To become a member, an organization should complete a membership application, which then 
should be approved by the W3C, and sign customized Membership Agreement.1177 All 
members enjoy equal benefits, irrespective of their nature, orchestration or incorporation; those 
benefit include a seat in the Advisory Committee, access to restricted information, 
opportunities to initiate a Member Submission process, and the possibility for their 
representatives to take part in W3C Working Groups and Interest Group, or to join the team of 
W3C Fellows.1178 Being non-Members of the W3C, the four hosts organizations enjoy different 
rights and obligations, and are expected to provide vendor-neutral technical and administrative 
leadership and take an active role in the establishment the Advisory Committee. Participation 
of civil society in W3C activities is possible through  Community and Business Groups, which 
unlike Working Groups, are open to non-members, but also via specifications reviews, 
contributions of use cases, tests and implementation feedback. Individuals may join W3C 
forum either as Affiliate Members or as “invited experts” upon the approval by the Working 
Group Chair and the Team.1179 
 
 
1173 Clause 3.1 of World Wide Web Consortium Process Document, C.M. Nevile (ed.) (March 2017) 
available online at https://www.w3.org/2017/Process-20170301/ (hereinafter: W3C Process Document). 
1174 See Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct (2015) and the disclosure requirements as defined in 
Clause 6 of the W3C Patent Policy, D. J. Weitzner (ed.) (February 2004) available online at 
https://www.w3.org/Consortium/Patent-Policy-20040205/#sec-Disclosure (hereinafter: W3C Patent Policy). 
1175 Clause 3.1 of W3C Process Document (2017). 
1175 Notably, experts’ relationship with other W3C Members, and the evolvement of W3C membership as 
such, may affect the composition and the assignment of the roles within a Working Group; such type of 
reappointment is arranged by the Director, for instance, when the Working Group Chair changes affiliation. See 
also ‘Conflict of Interest Policy’, D.J. Weitzner, (ed.) (September 2004) available at 
https://www.w3.org/2000/09/06-conflictpolicy. 
1176 This implies that IPR commitments are made on behalf of the consortium, unless a further IPR 
commitment is made by the individuals’ employers. 
1177 ‘Join W3C’, available at https://www.w3.org/Consortium/join. Until the Membership Agreement is 
signed by both parties and the W3C has received a payment of membership fee, an applicant organization is 
considered an Interim Member.  
1178 Clause 5 of Draft International World Wide Web Consortium Member Agreement (2013). 




4.4.2.2 Principle Bodies 
The W3C Team composed of the Director, the CEO, W3C paid staff and fellows (employed 
by W3C Members) plays a crucial role in the organization’s management. The Director has an 
ultimate authority for the W3C activities and acts as a chief architect for all specifications 
created by the W3C.1180 Depending on the document, Director’s tasks include assessing 
whether consensus has been reached within the W3C community, appointing group chairs and 
adjudicating as “tie-breaker” for Group decision appeals. The Director may also take a 
disciplinary action in case of serious violations by one of the W3C participants and the failure 
to resolve the situation.1181 In turn, each of the other three hosts appoints a Deputy Director, 
responsible before the Director for the activities within the ERCIM, KEIO and BEIHANG.1182 
Next to providing architectural leadership, the Team may also publish Team Submissions 
indicating the level of Team consensus about the published material; these documents do not 
constitute a part of the technical report development process.  
 
W3C members are represented in Advisory Committee,1183  which reviews charter proposals, 
recommendations and process documents, and elected the Advisory Board and Technical 
Architecture Group members. It meets twice a year to discuss the W3C activities, assign the 
liaisons with other organizations and allocate the resources, and is chaired by a person 
appointed by the Team, typically the CEO.1184 The Team is obliged to update the Advisory 
Committee as regards the membership modifications and the overview of the W3C finances.   
 
The Advisory Board assists the W3C Team on issues of strategy, management, process, legal 
matters and conflict resolution, manages the evolution of the Process Document and provides 
support in the disagreements between the Members by hearing a Submission Appeal.1185 The 
Advisory Board is comprised of nine participants elected by the Advisory Committee for the 
term of two years, and the Chair, appointed by the Team.1186 Similarly to the Team, the 
Advisory Board reports to the Advisory Committee; however, since the former does not have 
any decision-making power, its role is indeed strictly advisory.  
 
Technical issues around Web architecture are managed by the Technical Architecture Group 
(TAG), whose tasks include interpretation and clarification of Web architecture principles and 
coordinating cross-technology developments within and outside W3C.1187 The TAG consists 
of eight participants, of which three are appointed by the Director, and five elected by the 
Advisory Committee, for the term of two years; each of the TAG members has one vote.1188 
 
 
1180 Clause 2.2 of W3C Process Document (2017).  
1181 Clause 2.1.1 of W3C Process Document (2017).  
1182 Clause 4 of Draft International World Wide Web Consortium Member Agreement (2013). 
1183 Clause 2.3.1 of W3C Process Document (2017). 
1184 Clause 2.2 of W3C Process Document (2017). 
1185 The later occurs in cases unrelated to Web architecture; Clause 2.3 of W3C Process Document (2017). 
1186 Ibid. 




The Director is also the Chair of the TAG, appointed by the Team. Importantly, the TAG is not 
involved in any administrative, procedural or organizational policies of the W3C; this does not 
take away the fact that the TAG has to report its activities to the Advisory Committee. Only 
one representative per Member Organization can have a seat in the TAG and the Advisory 
Board, except when participants change affiliation. Individuals cannot participate in either of 
these bodies.  
 
4.4.2.3 Policy drafting 
Activities of the W3C are governed by several documents and, similarly to the IEEE, 
procedures for their amendments are also different. The Member Agreement, which explains 
the rights and obligations of those willing to contribute to W3C standardization processes may 
only be amended by four host institutions and the Member signing it.1189 While the W3C does 
not offer clear-cut rules regarding its policy-drafting, the relevant document to examine is the 
W3C Process Document providing and the rules for Working Groups and W3C bodies. The 
document was developed by the Advisory Board’ Process Task Force in the Revising W3C 
Process Community Group and was subsequently reviewed by the W3C Membership.1190  
 
4.4.2.4 Decision-making and voting 
Although web standardization is in principle not consensus-based, W3C Working Groups 
should strive to achieve consensus during the meetings. To that end, the chairs should ensure 
that all legitimate views and objections, whether or not expressed by active participants of the 
Working Group, are considered, and endeavor to resolve the disagreements.1191 Consensus 
within the meaning of the W3C is achieved when a substantial number of group participants 
support the decision and nobody dissents by registering a Formal Objection, with a possibility 
to have a few abstentions. Formal objections should be addressed by the Working Group in a 
public, substantive response that include rationale for decisions, that is sent to the reviewer 
raising the objections within a time limit set by the Chair and the reviewer.  
 
The W3C Process Document does not require a quorum for decisions but mentions that a 
Working Group charter may include a quorum for consensus. The Working Groups, however, 
should set minimum threshold of support to avoid that decisions are taken with many 
abstentions.1192 In exceptional circumstances, a Chair may invite individual experts to 
participate in a meeting: those would typically have no voting rights, unless decided otherwise. 
The voting may be conducted to resolve a substantive issue or a to take a process decision, and 
after the Chair has determined that all other available means for achieving consensus have 
failed. In this case, the explanation on the issue being voted on, the decision to conduct the 




1189 Clause 17 of Draft International World Wide Web Consortium Member Agreement (2013). 
1190 For the evolution of the document, see the marked comparison available at 
https://www.w3.org/2017/Process-20170301/diff-20150901.html. 
1191 Clause 3.3. of W3C Process Document (2017). 
1192 Clause 3.3 of W3C Process Document (2017). 
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Each organization represented in the Working Group or the bodies of the W3C has one vote.1193 
Participants unable to attend the vote may authorize other group members to act as a proxy. 
The formal voting procedures, including the quorum requirements, should be included in the 
Working Group charter.  
 
4.4.2.5 Finance and income 
W3C is a not-for-profit organization. Its revenue model is based on membership dues, research 
grants, private/public funding, sponsorship and donations.1194 The membership fees depend on 
organization’s revenues, type and location of its headquarters, and may be subject to 
modifications.1195  
 
4.4.2.6 Dispute Settlement 
Any issues arising in the Working Groups should be resolved through a dialogue. Members 
disagreeing with the decisions (including those which were taken by voting), should file a 
formal objection with the Working Group’s Chair.1196 All objections raised within the Working 
Groups must be reported to the Director and publicly documented.1197 In case an individual 
believes that the latter has been omitted, he or she may raise concerns with the relevant Domain 
Leader.1198 When a group of participants believe that their concerns, either technical or 
procedural, are not being taken into account by the Working Group, they may initiate a Group 
Decision Appeal to the Director asking him to confirm or deny the decision.1199 Such requests 
should be made known to the W3C Team.  
 
The Advisory Committee may also file an appeal for certain decisions of the Director.1200 
Representatives of Advisory Committee may also initiate an appeal for W3C decisions taken 
following Advisory Committee review, for instance those relating to group creation and 
modification and maturity levels of Recommendation track documents and the Process 
document by (Advisory Committee Appeal). The appeal request should be filed within three 
weeks of the decision by sending a request to the Team and should be supported by at least 5% 
of the Advisory Committee participants.1201 Once this quorum is reached, the Team organizes 
an appeal vote to approve or reject the contested decision.  
 
 
1193 The vote of the W3C is also regarded as a vote of an organization. 
1194 ‘Facts about W3C’, available at https://www.w3.org/Consortium/facts. Apparently, W3C does not 
have an own bank account and its finances are managed through the host organizations; to compare IETF bank 
accounts are ran through ISOC, see H. Halpin, ‘The crisis of standardizing DRM: the case of W3C encrypted 
media extensions’ (2017) Proceedings of the 7th International Conference, SPACE 2017, Goa, India, December 
13-17. 
1195 Clause 2 of Draft International World Wide Web Consortium Member Agreement (2013). For the 
history of fees, see ‘History’, https://www.w3.org/Consortium/fee-history.  
1196 Clause 3.5 of W3C Process Document (2017).  
1197 Clause 3.3.2 of W3C Process Document (2017). When the Chair believes that the Group has duly 
considered the legitimate concerns of dissenters as far as is possible and reasonable, the group should continue its 
work despite the existence of such objections.  
1198 For the list of domains, see ‘Groups’, available at https://www.w3.org/Consortium/activities.  
1199 Clause 3.5 of W3C Process Document (2017). 
1200 Clause 7.2 of W3C Process Document (2017); although this rarely happens in practice, see Halpin, 
‘The crisis of standardizing DRM’. 




Matters that cannot be resolved through the dialogue or internal appeals procedure are settled 
by the Commercial Rules of Arbitration of the American Arbitration Association (for members 
incorporated in the US), or by the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International 
Chamber of Commerce (for members incorporated outside the US). In both cases, the place of 
arbitration is Cambridge, Massachusetts, and the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
apply. The outcomes of such arbitration can be entered and enforced in any court of competent 
jurisdiction.1202 
 
4.4.3 Standards development processes 
 
4.4.3.1 Proposal to standardize 
Standardization work is initiated by (a) representative(s) of one or more Member Organizations 
filing a submission request to the Director.1203 To evolve into a comprehensive standardization 
item, the topic should generate enough interest among the W3C Members, the Team and the 
general public; the latter are invited to participate in Workshops related to the issues that are 
of interest to the W3C community.1204 Once the suggested topic gains enough interest, the 
Director proposes the development of one or more new Interest/Working Group charters. It 
may thus be suggested that it is the Director and the W3C Team that determine standardization 
activities, as members cannot vote on the creation of new charters.1205 A charter is a document 
that describes i.e. the group’s mission, procedural rules and expectations and deadlines as 
regards the group’s deliverables and should be brought for approval  of the Advisory 
Committee.1206 
 
With the support of W3C members, who review the proposed charter for at least four weeks, 
the Director approves the establishment of (a) group(s) and therewith authorizes the technical 
work on a particular standardization project: from that moment onwards, every W3C member 
may join the Working Group, provided that it commits her patents to the Working Group’s 
charter.1207 Each substantial modification of a group’s charter, or it’s extension, should be 
subject to evaluation by the Advisory Committee. Subject to appeal by Advisory Committee, 
a group may be closed  by the Director in case of insufficient resource to maintain its activities, 
or when the outcomes are delivered ahead of the chartered schedule.1208  
 
4.4.3.2 Technical work 
Technical deliverables, including Recommendation Track technical reports, software, test 
suites and reviews, are produced by the W3C Working Groups; Interest Groups aim to gather 
stakeholders willing to exchange their ideas and to evaluate potential Web technologies and 
 
 
1202 Clause 19 of Draft International World Wide Web Consortium Member Agreement (2013). 
1203 Clause 10 of W3C Process Document (2017). 
1204 Workshops are run with open invitations to determine whether there is a right momentum for 
standardization; see Halpin, ‘The crisis of standardizing DRM’, p. 4. 
1205 Ibid.  
1206 Clause 5.2.6 of W3C Process Document (2017). 
1207 Because the standard does not exist yet, commitments can only be made to the charter.  
1208 Clause 5.2.7 of W3C Process Document (2017). 
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policies.1209 Despite the differences in their purposes, both types of groups share similar 
characteristics and have to comply with the same set of requirements: each group must have a 
publicly available charter, a Chair appointed by the Director, a Team Contact and an archived 
mailing list for formal group communications.1210 Member’s representatives may join the 
groups at any time of their existence, but each organization may be represented only by one 
participant. 
 
The Working Groups of W3C are open to three types of participants, namely the 
representatives of Members, Invited Experts and representatives of the Team, who also aid to 
the group’s proper integration within the SDO. In contrast, Interest Groups where the only 
participation requirement is subscription to the mailing list, may also include public 
participants.1211 While Working Groups typically count fewer than 15 participants,1212 Interest 
Groups generally do not have participation limits. To join a Working Group or an Interest 
Group, an individual Member representative must be nominated by the Advisory Committee 
representative of his/her organization, disclosure his/her affiliation(s) and accept the terms of 
the Group’s charter.1213 Resignation from group occurs through the Advisory Board 
representatives. A Team representative may join the groups when designated by W3C 
management.  
 
Activities of the Working Group initially result in the First Public Working Draft, which should 
be made available to other W3C groups and to the general public.1214 Upon the publication of 
this document, Working Groups’ participants may exclude identified and disclosed essential 
IP claims from Royalty-Free requirements.1215 The document may be  reviewed by other 
Working Groups for the period of six month. Subsequently, the Working Group is expected to 
publish a revised Working draft, implementing the suggested modifications or indicating the 
reasons for the lack of any substantial changes.1216 After the necessary changes have been 
implemented, the proposed specification gains the status of Candidate Recommendation.1217  
 
4.4.3.3 Approval  
Once the document evolves into a Candidate Recommendation, the Director announces its 
publication to other W3C groups and to the public and commences an Advisory Committee 
review of the suggested specification.1218 This phase can be categorized as a “Last Call 
 
 
1209 Ibid., Clause 5. 
1210 Ibid., Clause 5.1. 
1211 Ibid., Clause 5.2.1. 
1212 This is in the interest of swift progress; for the same reason, participants are usually experts in the areas 
defined in the charter. A Working Group which is too large may be split in smaller working groups and interest 
groups. 
1213 Clauses 5.2.1.1. and 5.2.1.2 of W3C Process Document (2017). 
1214  Clauses 6.1.2. and 6.3.1 of W3C Process Document (2017). 
1215 Conditions for exclusion are further specified in Clause 4 of W3C Patent Policy (2004). 
1216 The latest Working Draft published within 90 days of the First Public Working Draft is termed the 
“Reference Draft”; see Clauses 5.2.6 and 6.1.2 of W3C Process Document (2017). 
1217 Ibid., Clauses 6.1.2. and 6.4. 
1218 The latest Working Draft published within 90 days of the First Public Working Draft is termed the 
“Reference Draft”; see Clause 6.4. W3C Process Document (2017). 
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Working Draft”, and may also be subject to the call for exclusion as provide in the W3C Patent 
Policy.1219 Hence, the ultimate decision is taken by the Director, and are subsequently ratified 
and voted on by the W3C Advisory Committee.1220 In case of any substantial changes, a 
Working Group must seek the Director’s approval to publish a revised Candidate 
Recommendation:1221 this process however proves to be smoother than the transition from the 
Public Working Draft to the Candidate Recommendation.  
 
In the following step, specification becomes a Proposed Recommendation, which should be 
reviewed by the Advisory Committee within at least 28 days after its publication and at least 
10 days after the end of the last Exclusion Opportunity.1222 If any substantive changes are made 
to Proposed Recommendation, the specification returns to the Working Group as a Candidate 
Recommendation or a Working Draft. In case of no significant modifications, the W3C should 
take a decision whether the document can evolve into a W3C Recommendation.1223  
 
To facilitate implementation of its Recommendations, W3C offers a number of tools for 
building sites using its Recommendations,1224 and provides translations of W3C deliverables 
in different languages. The Working Groups may already demonstrate interoperable 
implementations early in the development process, for instance by means of testing.1225 
Recommendation that no longer serve their purpose may be declared obsolete or rescinded by 
the decision of the W3C Community.1226  
 
4.4.4 IPR Policy 
 
The first version of the W3C IPR Policy was drafted in 1999 and included both disclosure and 
licensing commitments, which required W3C members to license their SEPs to all 
implementers on royalty-free and RAND terms. This policy was not applauded by the group 
of open source software developers, who feared that the W3C process will be “hijacked” my 
companies wishing to monetize their patents.1227 The new policy was proposed in 2002 and 
was merely built on RF licensing commitment; the final version of 2004 included an exception 
that allowed incorporation of proprietary technologies in W3C standards after a positive 
assessment of a “Patent Advisory Group” (PAG), comprised of all working group members 
 
 
1219 Ibid., Clause 6.1.2; Clause 4 of W3C Patent Policy (2004).  
1220 Halpin, ‘The crisis of standardizing DRM’, p. 4. 
1221 Since substantive changes will generally require a new Exclusion Opportunity as stipulated in clause 
4 of the W3C Patent Policy.  
1222 Clauses 6.1.2 and 6.5 of W3C Process Document (2017). 
1223 Clause 6.6 of W3C Process Document (2017). 
1224 The W3C tools are available at https://w3c.github.io/developers/tools/.  
1225 Clause 6.2.4 of W3C Process Document (2017). 
1226 Clause 6.9 of W3C Process Document (2017). 
1227 Contreras, ‘A tale of two layers’, p. 877. W3C received nearly 2,500 public comments on the draft 
policy, most of which opposed it. 
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and the W3C Chair.1228 The general principle is however that the W3C does not approve 
Recommendations based on essential claims that are not available on royalty-free terms.1229 
 
In course of standards development, W3C may issue disclosure request to any party that is 
deemed to have knowledge of essential claims.1230 When receiving a disclosure request, and 
individual in a Member organization has to make a disclosure statement, if it actually has a 
knowledge of a patent. The disclosure obligation is satisfied if the patent holder commits to 
royalty-free licensing and is hence very limited and only necessary when a member does not 
wish to license on RF-terms. Although the policy is incorporated as a part of the Process 
Document and hence binds all W3C members, the royalty-free commitment is only compulsory 
when their representatives join for a Working Group, meaning that the W3C membership alone 
does not give rise to the royalty-free licensing obligations under the IPR policy.1231  
 
When resigning from a Working Group within 90 days after the polishing of the first public 
draft, a member is exempted from all licensing commitments that arose from participation in 
that group; in case of a later resignation, the licensing commitment remains binding.  Members 
may exclude essential claims within 60 days after leaving a Working Group, which however 
does not affect their disclosure obligations.1232 Specific essential claims may also be excluded 
from royalty-free licensing requirement if the participant refuse to license specific claims no 
later than 150 days after the publication of the first public working draft and specifically 
discloses the claims subject to this exclusion.1233 
 
4.5 Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG) 
 
4.5.1 Scope and purpose 
 
Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG) is an industry consortium dedicated to the development 
of specifications for wireless connectivity solutions and low-power wireless connectivity 
technologies.1234 Bluetooth SIG has a formal structure and is incorporated in Kirkland, 
Washington, where its main office is located.1235 Pursuant to its Bylaws, Bluetooth SIG is a 
trade and technical association that aims to promote the interests of developers and users of 
Bluetooth products and technology.1236 The consortium was formed by five companies in 1998 
 
 
1228 This process, however, has not been often invoked. See Contreras, ‘A tale of two layers’, p. 878, 
discussing the cases of Voice XML and Eolas. 
1229 Clause 2 of W3C Patent Policy (2004). 
1230 Clause 6 of W3C Patent Policy (2004). 
1231 Clause 3.2 of W3C Patent Policy (2004). 
1232 Clause 4 of W3C Patent Policy (2004). 
1233 Ibid. 
1234 Allegedly, one of the reasons why Bluetooth SIG was created as a new organization as a response to 
dissatisfactions in ETSI, Interview with an industry expert, 18 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1235 See ‘Fourth Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of  Bluetooth SIG, Inc’; and Section 
2.1 of Bylaws of Bluetooth SIG, Inc. (May 17, 2019) (hereinafter: Bluetooth SIG Bylaws); the Bluetooth SIG 
operational rules are available at https://www.bluetooth.com/membership-working-groups/membership-types-
levels/membership-agreements. 
1236  Section 2.1 of Bluetooth SIG Bylaws.  
168 
 
and had about 400 members already by the end of the same year. Its first specification 
(Bluetooth 1.0) was realized in 1999. Since that time, Bluetooth products are widely used by 
the global community.1237  
 
Bluetooth develops two types of technologies: Basic Rate/Enhanced Data Rate enable 
uninterrupted wireless connections between devices, and is used in audio-handsets, hands-free 
systems and wireless speakers; and Bluetooth Low Energy enables short-burst wireless 
connections and is used in fitness trackers, beacon solutions and sensor networks.1238 There are 
three types of Bluetooth SIG specifications: the Core Specification Supplement (CSS) defines 
data types, formats, common profile and service codes used by all Bluetooth specifications; the 
GATT Specification Supplement specifications (GSS) define characteristic and descriptor 
formats used by Profiles and Services; and the Mesh Device Properties specifications (MDP) 
define mesh properties used by the Mesh Profile and Mesh Model.1239 Next to drafting these 
normative documents, Bluetooth SIG establishes testing tools programs and qualification rules 






Membership of the Bluetooth SIG can be acquired by firms, corporations, or other legal entities 
with a demonstrated interest in the activities of the consortium.1241 Each Member has the right 
to access Bluetooth specifications, to participate in the Bluetooth Qualification Program and 
Testing Tools Program, and to license trademarks. Furthermore, Members are entitled to 
license certain claims of copyright, patent and patent applications owned by other Members, 
and obtain licenses for certain testing materials on terms and royalty rates provided by the 
Board of Directors; such testing should serve to prove that the products are in compliance with 
the Bluetooth Testing Tools Program.1242 Any entity directly or indirectly controlled by a 
Bluetooth SIG Member is considered its Affiliate and is entitled to the same rights and 
restrictions as the Member;1243 this also entails that such Member and its Affiliate is permitted 
 
 
1237 According to the Bluetooth SIG website, there are currently more than 8.2. billion users of Bluetooth 
specifications, and that Bluetooth is recognized by 92% of consumers.  
1238 See ‘How it works’, available at https://www.bluetooth.com/what-is-bluetooth-technology/how-it-
works.  
1239 Section 1.6 of Specification Management Process Document/Bluetooth Process Document (May 2019) 
available at https://www.bluetooth.com/specifications/archived-specifications/ (hereinafter: SMPD). 
1240 Sections 2.2 and 2.3. of Bluetooth SIG Bylaws (2019). 
1241 Section 4.1 of Bluetooth SIG Bylaws (2019).  
1242 Ibid., Section 4.2(b). 
1243 For purposes of this definition control means direct or indirect ownership of or the right to exercise (a) 
greater than fifty (50%) percent of the outstanding shares or securities entitled to vote for the election of directors 
or similar managing authority of the subject entity; or (b) greater than fifty (50%) percent of the ownership interest 
representing the right to make decisions for the subject entity. A Member-organization may be requested to prove 




to only one vote, disregarding whether the Affiliate has a separate membership. The transfer 
of membership requires a prior written consent of the Board of Directors. 
 
Bluetooth SIG distinguished between three membership classes: Promoters, who are the only 
voting members,1244 Associate Members and Adopter Members. To facilitate the allocation of 
dues and participation in the Working Groups and committees of the consortium, the Board of 
Directors reserves the right to introduce subclasses of Members. Next to the voting power, 
Promoters are entitled to appoint a representative to the Board of Directors.1245 Adopter 
Members may implement the specifications and may participate in certain committees of the 
Bluetooth SIG.1246 When promoted to Associate Membership, companies enjoy the right to 
access the information from the Working Groups and committees; moreover, certain subclasses 
of Associate Members may take part in the technical activities of the SIG, having voting power 
on committees or Working Groups.1247 Associate Membership may only be acquired by an 
Adopter Members.1248  
 
All Members should sign the Membership Commitment Agreement, accept the SIG’s 
Incorporation Agreement, Bylaws and Patent/Copyright License Agreement, and should 
submit their applications to the Board of Directors, which may modify membership 
requirements and benefits. While initially, only seven founding companies were granted the 
status of Promoters - namely Ericsson AB, Intel Corporation, Lenovo (Singapore) Pte. Ltd., 
Microsoft Corporation, Apple Inc., Nokia Corporation and Toshiba Corporation, - the Bylaws 
stipulate that other companies may be granted Promoter Membership upon the unanimous 
consent of then-current Promoters.1249 Next to signing the Membership agreement and 
accepting the Bluetooth Incorporation Agreement and its Bylaws, Associate and Adopter 
Members should also pay initial membership fee in order to be admitted to the consortium.1250 
Omission to pay membership dues does not automatically lead to the termination of the 
membership, but demotes a Member to a membership category which does not require the 
payment of annual fees and, accordingly, grants less rights to the Member.1251 
 
A suspension or termination of the membership follows in case a Member has committed a 
material and serious violation of consortium’s legal documents or has engaged in a conduct 
harmful for the purposes and the interest of the SIG, and should be agreed by the unanimous 
consent of the Promoter Members of the Board of Directors.1252 A company whose membership 
is terminated by the Board of Directors has no right to reapply for the membership, unless 
 
 
1244 Ibid., Section 4.1. 
1245 Ibid., Section 4.3(a). 
1246 Ibid., Section 4.3(c). 
1247 Ibid., Section 4.3(b). 
1248 For the list of all membership benefits, see https://www.bluetooth.com/membership-working-
groups/membership-benefits.   
1249 Section 4.4(a) of Bluetooth SIG Bylaws (2019). 
1250 Ibid., Section 4.4.  
1251 Unless the 4/5 of the Board of Directors agrees differently. In any case, when subject to downgrade in 
category, a Member at granted 10 days’ notice. See Section 4.6 of Bluetooth SIG Bylaws (2019). 
1252 Ibid., Section 4.6. 
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otherwise is decided by the consent of 4/5 of the Board Directors. A Member may also 
withdraw from the consortium at any time after giving a written notice to the Executive 
Director or the Secretary.1253 Any licenses for the use of patents granted to or by a Member 
pursuant to the Membership Agreement continue existing upon the Member’s termination or 
withdrawal.  
 
4.5.2.2 Principal Bodies and officers 
The governing body of the Bluetooth SIG is the Board of Directors,1254 responsible for the final 
adoption of all Bluetooth specifications, the oversight and the final approval of Qualification 
Program and Testing Tool Program, and the establishment of all committees and Working 
Groups.1255 Next to these tasks, the Board of Directors is also responsible for the issues related 
to the SIG’s annual budget and for the supervision of all officers and employees of the 
consortium.1256 The Board of Directors is composed of one representative appointed by each 
Promoter for unlimited time,1257 and up to four Associate Member Directors (AMD) serving a 
two-year term.1258 The application to serve at the Board of Directors may be submitted by any 
Associate Member, but AMDs are appointed by the unanimous approval of the Promoter 
Members.1259  
 
A Director may be removed and replaced at any time by the Member of its affiliation, or by 
the other Directors upon approval of 4/5 of the Promoter Members in case of his/her absence 
from the meetings or failure to substantially perform the Director’s duties.1260 Directors 
typically are not remunerated for their services to the consortium,1261 however financial 
compensation may be provided by the Members who appointed the Directors.1262 Each 
Member can appoint individuals to observe the meetings of the Board of Directors, without 
having any voting power: in this case, only one individual can attend only one meeting, unless 
otherwise is permitted by the Board of Directors.1263 
 
The Board of Directors appoints the officers of the Bluetooth SIG, including Chairperson, Vice 
Chairperson of the Board, and a Secretary; if deemed necessary, the Board may also appoint 
an Executive Director, Assistant Executive Directors, Assistant Secretaries and other 
officers.1264 Chairperson and Vice Chairperson must hold a seat in the Board of Directors; for 
 
 
1253 Ibid., Section 4.7. 
1254 Ibid., Section 6.1. 
1255 Ibid., Section 6.6. 
1256 Ibid. 
1257 Representatives are typically employees of Member-entities. 
1258 The access to the minutes of board meetings is restricted.  
1259 Section 6.3 of Bluetooth SIG Bylaws (2019). As it is the case for the Promoter-members, such 
individual should be an employee of the Associate Members.  
1260 Section 6.4 of Bluetooth SIG Bylaws (2019). 
1261 However, a reasonable fee may be paid to Directors for attending regular and special meetings of the 
Board of Directors and performing their duties.   
1262 Section 6.7 of Bluetooth SIG Bylaws (2019). 
1263 Ibid., Section 6.18. 
1264 Ibid., Sections 7.1 and 7.1. 
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the appointment to other officers, no affiliation requirements apply.1265 All officers of the 
consortium are appointed at annual meeting of the Board of Directors by the majority vote of 
a 2/3 of a quorum, and serve in their capacity for the term of one year; the Executive Director 
who is affiliated with a Member can only be appointed upon the unanimous consent of the 
entire Board.1266 
 
Apart from appointing the officers and defining their tasks, the Board of Directors may also 
create permanent and temporary committees to assist the Board.1267 The resolution for the 
establishment of such committees should gain support of the majority of the Directors. Each 
Promoter is entitled to appoint its representative to every committee, unless otherwise is 
provided by the Bylaws or by the consent of 4/5 Promoter Members. Officers of the committee 
are elected or appointed by the Board of Directors, whereas the membership of each committee 
should be determined by its charter, a document tailored for a specific committee which sets 
forth the procedures and rules and is subject to approval of 4/5 of the Board of Directors. The 
Board of Directors may also establish temporary Working Groups, whose scope, membership 
requirements and operating procedures should be defined and amended by the unanimous 
approval of the Promoter Members.1268 In case these are not established in the charter, a 
Committee or Working Group will be regulated by the rules of procedure for the Board of 
Directors.1269 
 
There are three types of groups entrusted with technical activities of the SIG: Working Groups 
are responsible for the development and modification of Bluetooth specifications and are open 
to Associate Members and Promoters; Expert Groups provide expertise and guidance to the 
Working Groups, and are open to all members; Study Groups develop guidelines to enable new 
usage models, and are open to all members.1270 To contribute to the Working Group, an eligible 
Member has to apply online for the group’s membership and to comply with the requirements 
of the Working Group’s Charter.  
 
The meetings of the Board of Directors are managed by the Chairperson, who also keeps an 
oversight on the implementation of its orders and resolutions.1271 The duties of the Chairperson 
may be taken over by the Vice Chairperson.1272 It is not obligatory for Bluetooth SIG to have 
an Executive Director, however in an event the Board decided to appoint one, the selected 
individual will perform the tasks of the CEO in supervising and controlling the affairs of the 
consortium and the activities of its officers.1273 Similarly to the Vice Chairperson, the tasks of 
 
 
1265 Ibid., Section 7.2 and 7.3. 
1266 Ibid., Section 7.4. 
1267 Ibid., Section 8.1.  
1268 Ibid., Section 8.10. Working Groups may be terminated only upon unanimous approval of the Board 
of Directors. 
1269 Sections 8.3 and 8.4 of Bluetooth SIG Bylaws (2019). 
1270 For the list of current Working Groups and Committees, see https://www.bluetooth.com/membership-
working-groups/working-groups/working-groups-committees.  
1271 Section 7.7 of Bluetooth SIG Bylaws (2019). 
1272 Ibid., Section 7.8. 
1273 Ibid., Section 7.10. 
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the Executive Director might be performed by the Assistant Executive Director(s) in the 
absence, inability or refusal to act by the former.1274 Finally, the Secretary provides 
administrative and logistic support to the activities of the SIG,1275 and may be assisted or 
substituted by the Assistant Secretaries.1276 Unlike the Board of Directors, the officers receive 
a financial compensation for their services to the Bluetooth SIG.  
 
Both Chairperson and the Executive Director have the power to sign the legal documents of 
the Bluetooth SIG, unless a signature of the latter is required by law. Except when explicitly 
authorized by the Board of Directors, no officer, agent or employee of the Bluetooth SIG may 
enter any contractual obligation or execute and deliver any instrument on behalf of the 
consortium.1277 The Legal Forum, comprised of one legal representative of each Promoter, 
provides interface between the General Counsel of the SIG and the Promoters, but does not 
provide the consortium with any legal advice.1278  
 
Other bodies that support the work of t Bluetooth SIG are the Bluetooth Qualification Review 
Board (BQRB),1279 Bluetooth Test and Interoperability Group (BTI),1280 responsible for the 
qualification and testing programs, and the Bluetooth Architectural Review Board (BARB). 
The latter provides the architectural oversight of the specifications and supporting the Working 
Groups and consisting of one member appointed by each Promoter.1281 The Chairmen these 
bodies are selected by the 4/5 votes of the Board of Directors, to whom these bodies are also 
accountable.  
 
4.5.2.3 Policy drafting 
By Bylaws of Bluetooth SIG may only be amended by unanimous approval of the 
Promoters.1282 The rules of procedure are usually described in the committees’ or Working 
Groups’ charters, subject to approval by four-fifth of the entire Board of Directors.1283 Unless 
otherwise specified in the charters, Working Groups operate according to the Working Group 
Process Document, which is approved with four-fifth votes of the entire Board of Directors. In 
turn, the Specification Management Process Document (SMPD) defines the processes that 
should be followed for developing new specifications or updating the existing ones.1284 
Although it is unclear from the document which committee is in charge of its’ amendments, it 
appears the BARB appears a contact point for any questions regarding SMPD.1285 
 
 
1274 Ibid., Section 7.11. 
1275 Ibid., Section 7.9. 
1276 Ibid., Section 7.12. 
1277 Ibid., Section 11.1 
1278 Ibid., Section 8.11. 
1279 Ibid., Section 8.6. 
1280 Ibid., Section 8.8. 
1281 Ibid., Section 8.7. 
1282 Article XVI of Bluetooth SIG Bylaws (2019). 
1283 Ibid., Section. 8.3. 
1284 Note that Bylaws and Membership Agreements take precedence over conflicting elements in these 
documents and the SMPD. Section 1.1 of Bluetooth SIG Bylaws (2019). 





4.5.2.4 Decision-making and voting 
Promoters are the only members having voting rights as Members of the SIG; each Promoter 
is entitled to one vote at the meetings.1286 Unless the applicable legal documents provide 
differently, 4/5 or more of the Promoter Members present in person or represented by proxy, 
constitutes a quorum for any meeting of the Members.1287 A list of Promoters entitled to vote 
should be prepared at least 10 days before every meeting, and shall be open to the examination 
of any Promoter Member.1288 Members can also take actions without a meeting, provided the 
written consents delivered electronically meet the quorum necessary for such action to be 
approved if it was a subject to the voting.1289  
 
The Board of Directors should decide by majority voting, unless the legal framework of the 
SIG provides otherwise.1290 However, the approval of certain actions, including the 
appointment of the AMDs, the approval of new membership subclass or adoption of a 
document establishing substantive or procedural rights governing more than one Committee or 
a Working Group, requires unanimous consent of the Promoter Members of the Board of 
Directors.1291 The 4/5 votes of the Promoter Members is required when approving of the annual 
membership fees.1292 Approval of any changes to the Working Groups’ processes and of the 
annual budget required 4/5 votes of the entire Board of Directors.1293 An action of a committee 
or a Working Group may be vetoed by the vote of the 4/5 of the entire Board of Directors.1294  
 
4.5.2.5 Finance 
Bluetooth SIG is a non-for profit and non-stock corporation: its members do not derive any 
financial benefit from its activities. The levied membership fees are used to support the SDO’s 
activities such as testing, promotion and operational expense.1295 
 
4.5.2.6 Dispute Settlement 
The consortium does not maintain an appeal mechanism. Disputes arising from the Bluetooth 
SIG Membership Agreement are decided exclusively by the state and federal courts of New 
York.1296  
 




1286 Section 5.6 of Bluetooth SIG Bylaws (2019). 
1287 Ibid., Section 5.7. 
1288 Ibid., Section 5.8. 
1289 Ibid., Section 5.9. 
1290 Ibid., Section 6.14.  
1291 Ibid., Section 6.19. 
1292 Ibid., Section 6.19. 
1293 Ibid., Section 6.19. 
1294 Unless other statutory provisions are applicable; Section 6.19 of Bluetooth SIG Bylaws (2019). 
1295 Ibid., Section 4.5. 
1296 Section 10(c) of Bluetooth SIG Membership Agreement Version 3.0 (May 2017). 
1297 The SMPD differentiates 6 phases of specification development: requirement, development, validation, 
adoption, maintenance, end -of-life. This study will however adhere to the three-phases approach for the purpose 
of coherence. Note that the SMPD was updated in May 2019, with the main changes being: removal of IP/Voting 
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4.5.3.1 Proposal to standardize 
Any SIG member can suggest development of a specification by submitting a New Work 
Proposal (NWP) for the approval of the Board of Directors.1298 Upon its approval, the Board 
assigns the NWP to a Study/Working Group, which drafts the Functional Requirements 
Document (FRD).1299 The BARB reviews the functional requirements, problem statement, 
Working Group’s charter and its scope of work.1300 Once the FRD and the charter are approved 
by the BARB, the core technical work on standardization project commences.  
 
 
Figure 5:Bluetooth SIG Requirement Phase, from SMPD (2019) 
 
 
4.5.3.2 Technical work on standards 
Once the technical work is commenced, the coverage of the FRD is defined in the Draft 
Improvement Proposal Document (DIPD), which is submitted to the Associates and Promoters 
upon the review and the approval of the BARB.1301 When the document evolves into the Final 
Improvement Proposal Document (FIPD) and locks down all mandatory/optional features per 
the functional requirement, it is subject to the review and approval of the Bluetooth Test & 
Interoperability Committee (BTI) and the BARB.1302 When this stage is completed, the 
document gains the status of Prototyping Specification and undergoes the Specification 
Validation (IOP): during this stage, the Working Groups develop test plans that are 
subsequently reviewed by the BARB and the BTI.1303 Upon their approval, the Formal IOP 




Draft Review; adding Member Review; removal of Specification Adoption Committee and reducing adoption 
meeting notice from 21 days to 14 days. 
1298 See ‘Submit and idea for specification’, available at https://www.bluetooth.com/specifications/submit-
an-idea-for-a-specification. 
1299 Section 3.2 of SMPD (2019). 
1300 Section 8.5(b) of Bluetooth SIG Bylaws (2019); Section 3.4 of SMPD (20190). 
1301 See Section 4 SMPD (2019). 
1302 Section 8.8 of Bluetooth SIG Bylaws (2019).  








The results of Formal IOP Testing are successful when three independent passes are achieved 
per test case in the approved IOP test plan for the core feature/Generic Attributes-based 
service,1304 and two independent passes achieved per test case in the approved IOP test plan 
for profiles.1305 Upon the completion of the testing, and the approval of the Board of Directors,  
the Working Group generates a Draft Bluetooth Specification for Member review,  which is 
subject to the 60-days review by all Members, unless the board of Directors unanimously 
approve to shorten this period to 45 days (“Member Review”).1306 A final version (“Voting 
Draft”) is presented to the Board of Directors after the Member Review is completed; all 
Members should be notified of the Voting Draft at least 14 days before the Board of Directors 
approves the Final Draft (“Adoption Date”), apart from corrections of typographical errors that 
were unanimously approved by the Board of Directors.1307  
 
 




1304 The Generic Attributes defines a hierarchical data structure that is exposed to connected Bluetooth 
with low energy devices. 
1305 Section 4.3.1 of SMPD (2019).    
1306 Section 9.3(a) of Bluetooth SIG Bylaws (2019). This was different before 2019, when the review. 
Period amounted to 45 days (Section 9.2 of Bluetooth SIG Bylaws (2012), on file with the author).  
1307 Section 9.3(b) of Bluetooth SIG Bylaws (2019). 
176 
 
To be adopted, a specification document needs to gain 4/5 approval of the Board of 
Directors;1308 Members are notified of the New Bluetooth Specifications within one week after 
the adoption of a Voting Draft or Errata Correction.1309Any modifications or updates for an 
adopted specification are considered proposal to develop a new specification and should follow 
the applicable procedure.1310 To implement Bluetooth technologies, Members should 
demonstrate compliance of their products with Bluetooth SIG specifications via Bluetooth 
Qualification Program.1311 Testing materials used in this program should be subject to prior 
certification according to the Bluetooth Testing Tools Program.1312 
 
4.5.4 IPR policy 
 
Once becoming a member of Bluetooth SIG, companies also sign the Bluetooth 
Patent/Copyright License Agreement,1313 by which all members and their affiliates grant each 
other a “nonexclusive, royalty-free, perpetual, irrevocable, non-transferable, non-
sublicensable, worldwide license under its Necessary Claims” for the use, distribution and sale 
of Compliant Portions.1314 The term “necessary claims” refers to claims of a patent or patent 
application owned by a member, that will be necessarily infringed by implementing Bluetooth 
Specifications and such infringement cannot be avoided in the absence of any technically 
reasonable alternatives.1315 In case of disputes arising from patent infringement by a member 
of the SIG, and when such dispute is not defensive based on a patent infringement claim or suit 
by such member, the latter is entitled to change the license grant from a royalty-free license to 
a reasonable royalty license and to collect such royalty retroactively.1316 
 




1308 Before 2019, approval needed to be gained by the Adoption Board, which consisted of the Directors 
and chairpersons appointed by each Associate Member of the Working Group responsible for the specification at 
issue (Section 8.9 of Bluetooth SIG Bylaws (2012), on file with the author). During the balloting, all members of 
the Adoption Committee who were not the members of the Board of Directors collectively had one vote. Such 
vote should also have been ratified by a vote of a majority of the entire Board of Directors, which took place 
within one week of the Adoption Meeting. Each Adoption Committee was tailored to specific specification and 
ceased to exist upon the conclusion of the voting. (Section 9.2 of Bluetooth SIG Bylaws (2012), on file with the 
author). 
1309 Section 9.3(e). Before that this requirement added that the copy of the new specification is posted on 
the website of the SIG. 
1310 Section 9.4 of Bluetooth SIG Bylaws (2019). 
1311 Ibid., Section 2.2. 
1312 Ibid., Section 2.3. 
1313 Bluetooth Patent/Copyright License Agreement (July 2016).  
1314 Section 5(b) of Bluetooth Patent/Copyright License Agreement (2016). Within the meaning of the 
Licensing Agreement, ‘Compliant Portion’ implies those specific portions of products (hardware, software or 
combinations thereof) that: (i) implement and are compliant with the actual Bluetooth Specification and/or 
Foundation Specification, whichever the case may be, (ii) are qualified pursuant to the Bluetooth Qualification 
Process, (iii) are within the bounds of the Scope and (iv) meet the requirements set forth in the Compliance 
Requirements, see Section 1(j) of Bluetooth Patent/Copyright License Agreement (2016). 
1315 Ibid., Section 1(o). 
1316 Ibid., Section 5(b). 
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Institutional settings and orchestration of each of the five SDOs examined in this study indeed 
demonstrate some similarities; at the same time, each of the operational frameworks discussed 
above is unique in the sense that is fits the specific setting in which each SDO operate. Current 
governance architecture of these SDOs is a result of their historical purpose, complex 
interactions among their members and institutional changes introduced to their processes and 
operational scope as a consequence of market and technology development. 
 
Although standards crafted within these SDOs are crucial for the functioning of many ICT 
systems, their regulatory impact may differ. ETSI, being an ESOs, champions the list of SDOs 
exerting normative pull at least when it comes to the implementation of ENs. Standardization 
activities of IEEE-SA derive their regulatory impact from the specifics of the US legal 
environment for standardization,1317 as well as the endorsement of some IEEE standards by 
ISO/IEC/JTC1.1318 At first glance, the regulatory importance of standards developed in IETF, 
W3C and Bluetooth SIG is less obvious: yet, many of their standards have also been adopted 
by ISO.1319 Hence, all five SDOs contribute to the governance regime of ICT standardization 
by providing written rules that should be followed to ensure interoperability between products 
and services: routine Internet use requires such standards as Wi-Fi (IEEE-SA), cellular 
networks (ETSI/3GPP), Bluetooth connectivity (Bluetooth SIG), HTTP for information 
exchange among web browsers and servers (W3C), Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), and 
the fundamental TCP/IP protocols (IETF). 
 
In this context, a rigid comparison between the five SDOs will not be appropriate due to the 
differences in their scope and operational setting. Some comparative remarks, however, are 
necessary to apprehend the distinction between the studied SDOs, and to suggest some take-
aways from this exercise.  
 
4.6.1 Membership  
 
The fact that all SDOs are driven by industry representatives, mostly commercial companies 
or research facilities, comes as no surprise. In all organizations, technical knowledge and 
interest in the operation field of a particular SDO is a necessary requirement to be eligible for 
participation in standardization activities. Once signing a membership agreement or joining the 
work of an SDO without formal membership (IETF), stakeholders also accept the rules of this 
SDO, such as the IPR policy. The SDOs categorize their membership by dividing it into classes, 
ranks, statutes or similar; allocation to a particular type of membership may affects membership 
fees as well as the rights and duties of the members, especially in consortia. In all SDOs, 
companies appear to be able to join with multiple entities, with each entity maintaining its 
 
 
1317 See Chapter III.4. 
1318 Arguably, accreditation by ANSI also provides these standards with certain legitimacy and may 
encourage their incorporation into the US legislation; yet, as it appears from the analysis of chapter III.4, 
incorporation by reference of US private voluntary standards is not conditional upon ANSI’s accreditation.  
1319 Some authors suggest that many consortia members therefore serve a “double duty,” working in 
consortia’s technical committees as well as in the committees of formal SDOs ratifying standards of these 
consortia. Schneiderman, Modern Standardization, p. 10. 
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membership rights . While each SDO introduces procedures for expulsion or suspension of its 
members, the author is not aware of any cases where this procedure has indeed been employed. 
 
In most SDOs, governmental agencies appear to participate in standards development 
processes on an equal footing with other members; an exception would be the ENs’ approval 
process in ETSI. Although not prevented by the membership requirements, regulatory actors 
are not often witnessed to be members of W3C or Bluetooth SIG.1320 In turn, civil society is 
not strongly (if at all) represented in all examined SDOs. Yet, some organizations provide 
opportunities for non-technical stakeholders to join standardization or governance discussions, 
commonly as observers without voting rights; the threshold to participate appears especially 
low in IETF, where everyone can subscribe to the mailing list. The views of civil society may 
also be sought in the processes of stakeholder consultation or public review (i.e. IEEE, ETSI 
through NSOs), or through testing procedures (Bluetooth SIG).  
 
Membership of ETSI, W3C and Bluetooth SIG is only open to entities and corporations: 
experts participate in working groups on behalf of their employers or affiliated associations. In 
turn, IEEE-SA also accommodates individual-based working groups where experts act in 
private capacity, and IETF only allows individual to join their standardization work. Regardless 
whether the membership is corporate or individual, experts participating in the working groups 
of the five SDOs are required to disclose their affiliation. Members of some SDOs’ governance 
bodies are required to act in private capacity and have fiduciary duty to the SDOs (i.e. IEEE-
SA).1321  
 
SDOs Members  Membership types 






users, research bodies, 
administrations, 
governmental bodies 
full (CEPT countries); 
associates and 
observers (non-voting) 







governmental agencies  
individual or corporate  
individuals and entities (via 
representatives), no prior 
membership required 
IETF 
no formal membership, 
individuals wishing to 
contribute join the 
mailing lists of working 
groups 
N.A. 
software engineers, individuals 
affiliated with network operators and 
networking hard-and software 
vendors, academics, representatives 
of computer and trade press  
 
 
1320 See members list on W3C, ‘Current Members’, available at 
https://www.w3.org/Consortium/Member/List; and of Bluetooth SIG, ‘Member Directory’ available at 
https://www.bluetooth.com/develop-with-bluetooth/join/member-directory/.  




organizations, in some 
cases also individual 
experts 






organizations via representatives; 
individuals 
Bluetooth SIG 
firms, corporations, or 
other legal entities with a 
demonstrated interest in 




Members and Adopter 
Members 
Associate Members and Promoters in 
Working Groups, and all 
membership in Expert or Study 
Groups. 
Table 2: Comparison among members and membership types 
 
 
4.6.2 Principle bodies 
 
Another distinction between the SDOs can be observed when examining composition of their 
governing bodies. SDOs governance functions as a complex network of bodies that provide 
ecosystem for technical activities and support the functioning of their technical committees and 
working groups. In this regard, the highest authorities of some SDOs may be composed of the 
entire membership of that SDO, as in case of the General Assembly in ETSI. The Advisory 
Committee of W3C is as well comprised of all members, but the crucial role in W3C 
governance is played by the W3C Team and ultimately, the Director. IEEE-SA and Bluetooth 
SIG do not maintain a governance body where their whole membership is represented: rather, 
the members of the IEEE-SA’s BoG are elected by IEEE voting members, and companies’ 
representatives become members the Board of Directors of Bluetooth SIG by virtue of their 
affiliation with the Promotors. The IETF is different due to the fact that it does not operate 
according to any membership model.  
 
SDOs may also distinguish between bodies responsible for SDOs’ management, and those 
dealing with technical activities. The latter are the Technical Organization in ETSI, SASB in 
IEEE, IESG in IETF, and TAG in W3C. IAB in IETF is entitled to take decisions that related 
both to management and technical issues. 
 
4.6.3 Policy drafting 
 
It can be observed that the operational frameworks of ETSI and IEEE(-SA) are more thorough 
than those of IETF, W3C and Bluetooth SIG, which grant considerable discretion to the 
Working Groups.1322 In any event, the processes of policy drafting and modification of 
governance rules differs significantly per SDO.1323 In ETSI, amendment of governance 
 
 
1322 However, the Working Group’s Charters often require approval of a governance body.  
1323 The JRC Report, having studied a larger example of SDOs, notes that the processes differ with respect 
of individuals participating in policy development: some SDOs are membership-driven, while others expect 
individuals to have fiduciary duty to the SDO, and are more leadership-driven. In this regard, it observes that 
SDOs where decisions are taken by the General Assembly are membership-driven, while SDOs where decisions 
are taken by the Board, or non-elected leadership, are leadership-driven. It further classified IEEE-SA and W3C 
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documents should be approved by the General Assembly, representing the entire membership. 
In IEEE and W3C, the process of drafting and amending the rules depends on the governance 
document at issue: in this regard, while the W3C in principle provides possibility for the entire 
membership to review the process document, there are no provisions in IEEE-SA governance 
document that require membership consultation. That said, some impactful amendments to 
IEEE-SA operational frameworks were available for review and comments.1324 In Bluetooth 
SIG, policy is developed and approved by the Promotor-members, and membership 
consultation or review is not foreseen in the SIG’s operational framework. IETF governance 
processes are analogous to the technical processes, and thus all interested and/or affected 
stakeholders may review and comment on modifications via the mailing lists.  
 
Counterintuitively to that fact that operational frameworks of rather “formalized” SDOs, such 
as ETSI and IEEE-SA, may be more challenging to amend due to their complexity as well as 
a large group of stakeholders whose approval needs to be sought (as it is the case with ETSI). 
The history of modifications of SDOs rules demonstrates that the rules of these organizations 
are updated more frequently than those of consortia, even though the updates are generally 
marginal. While in the past decade, the governing documents of W3C and IETF have not been 
subject to many adjustments,1325 rules and procedures of ETSI and IEEE are amended at least 
once a year. Bluetooth SIG has recently implemented important changes to its Bylaws and 
Process Document, modifying the Bluetooth specifications approval process.  
 
4.6.4 Decision-making and voting  
 
Member’s type and classification also affects the votes’ allocation within the institution: in 
ETSI, the balloting power appears to be assigned according to the “He who pays the piper calls 
the tune” principle: the higher the membership fees, the more voting units will the entity have. 
A similar mechanism applies to the Weighted National Voting process, with a difference that 
the votes are allocated per NSOs. In turn, the concept of “voting membership” differs within 
the IEEE and its Standards Association as regards its purpose: while IEEE members are 
empowered to elect the officials of the Institute and hence determine the composition of its 
governing bodies, IEEE-SA members vote only in the standardization activities of the Institute, 
which at first glance, questions their representation at the higher hierarchical levels. The 
Bluetooth SIG grants voting rights only to the permanent group of Promoters, who also 
nominate the Board of Directors and approve the accession of new Promoters to the SDO.  
 
Most of the SDOs indeed seem to promote consensus-based standardization, but define 
consensus differently, sometimes even leaving it to determination of the Working Groups (i.e. 
IETF). Following their operational frameworks, however, consensus does not appear to bear 
 
 
as leadership-driven (IEEE-SA: decisions taken by elected board, W3C – by non-elected leadership); in contrast, 
ETSI and to some extent, IETF, are membership-driven. JRC Report, p. 13. 
1324 I.e. the Update of IPR Policy; see Chapter V.5 
1325 For a long time, standardization activities within IETF were governed by the IPR Policy that dates 
back to 2005; the policy has been amended only in 2017; in turn, the W3C IPR Policy was established in 2004.  
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much significance, but rather serves as a “shield mechanism” or “best practice requirement,” 
since the majority voting is often invoked in SDOs, and especially in their governance bodies 
(i.e. IEEE-SA, IETF, with each body having its own decision-making mechanism).1326 In this 
regard, due account should also be taken of the role of chair persons of SDOs’ committees and 
working groups, who may sometimes facilitate the achievement of consensus or decide where 
it is appropriate to resort to voting (IETF, W3C). The only non-consensus SDO, Bluetooth 
SIG, established a quorum of 4/5 of Board of Directors, and allows decisions to be taken either 
by majority voting or unanimity;1327 one may however suggest that industry consensus is 
achieved through testing prior to the adoption of specifications.   
 
It appears thus that consensus is not the main decision-making mechanism in SDOs, unlike it 
was claimed by regulatory frameworks: rather, SDOs with global membership and a large 
number of stakeholders tend to prioritize balance and absence of dominance in their standards 
development processes.  
 
4.6.5 Finance  
 
All five SDOs have a non-for-profit status and their work is ideally driven by technological, 
and not commercial, aspirations. Although sales of standards documents may constitute a 
source of revenues for some SDOs (such as IEEE in this study),1328 income generation is not 
the purpose of SDOs that follow this governance model.1329 Activities and meetings of SDOs 
are largely sponsored by their members; in some cases, SDOs’ staff and officers may also 
receive remuneration for their services in the governing bodies. Among the analysed 
organizations, only ETSI obtains financial support from “governmental” budget of the 
European Commission,1330 which in turn is entitled to mandate standardization projects (US-
government financing of IETF activities has ceased upon the increased commercialization of 
the Internet); in other bodies, regulators’ financial contributions are provided by membership 
fees.1331 Some governance bodies within a single SDO maintain separate funding mechanisms 




1326 In this regard, the JRC Report noted that governance bodies of most SDOs operate following majority 
voting while in practice, as suggested in the empirical part of the report, governance decisions are still taken by 
consensus rather than voting.  
1327 It should be observed that the group of decision-makers in the SIG is fairly limited in comparison to 
other SDOs (12 members of the Board of Directors) which in theory, renders the unanimity requirement more 
realistic (again, in comparison to other SDOs examined in this study). 
1328 Note that is generally the case for those SDOs that offer their standards for sale, including 
CEN/CENELEC, IEC and ISO.  
1329 At the same time, increased income, at least in theory, can ensure sustainability of an institution, 
involvement of all stakeholders and better-quality standards. See also the ASTM argument in American Society 
for Testing & Materials v. Public.Resource.org, Inc. (ASTM v. PRO), No. 1:13-cv-01215 (TSC), 2017 WL 
473822, (DDC Feb. 2, 2017), amended by No. 17-7035 (DC Cir. 2018). 
1330 Pursuant to the ETSI website, the funding from the EC and EFTA amounts to 15-20% of the ETSI 
budget; see ‘Funding ETSI’, available at http://www.etsi.org/about/what-we-are/funding.  
1331 Other means for governmental financing are grants, joint programs and research support; see Bremer, 
‘American and European perspectives’, pp. 342-3. 
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4.6.6 Dispute Settlement 
 
All five SDOs favor that the disputes between their members/participants are resolved 
bilaterally or within SDOs’ working groups; formal appeals function as a “last resort facility,” 
and appeal bodies and mechanisms differ significantly per SDO.1332 In ETSI, dispute resolution 
is ultimately handled by the General Assembly, while members are strongly discouraged from 
initiating any legal procedures outside ETSI. In IEEE-SA, procedural appeals are filed with the 
SASB and subsequently, with the BoG. The IETF dedicates the dispute resolution to the IAOC, 
which is an administrative body, but the final appeals can also be heard by the IAB and 
ultimately, the ISOC. Members of the W3C can file appeals with the Advisory Board and the 
TAG, but the ultimate decisions are taken by the Director and the Advisory Committee voting. 
Each SDO also maintains separate rules for appointing appeal officers, handling of appeals and 
providing the relevant information to the parties. Bluetooth SIG does not provide for any 
internal dispute resolution mechanisms and refers to state litigation for settling disputes. 
 
4.6.7. Standards Development Processes 
 
Unlike their governance processes, SDOs’ technical processes follow a somewhat similar 
pattern. Standards’ proposals have to be supported by multiple stakeholders and accepted by a 
designated body, sometimes following a voting procedure (IEEE-SA and ETSI). Hence, even 
before a standards project is formally launched, there should be a pool of relevant actors willing 
to work on it. For this reason, the first stage of standards development is already characterized 
by significant amount of lobbying, financial research and technical work, and often sets the 
course of standardization project.  
 
Experts’ discussions are carried out in tailored working or study groups. IETF and W3C tend 
to prefer mailing lists’ discussions, while technical work of ETSI, IEEE-SA and Bluetooth SIG 
rather takes place during personal meetings.1333 Given that the main technical decisions on 
standards’ design and functioning, including incorporation of proprietary technologies, are 
taken during this second phase of standards development, the work of experts might be allied 
with conflicts of interests and strategic conduct of actors to the detriment of stakeholders’ 
interests. For this reason, it is crucial for the working and study groups to prevent, or balance 
the arising conflict situations: in this context, the roles of chairmen and vice-chairmen are 
crucial in all SDOs.   
 
Standards appear to be approved by a different group of actors than those involved in their 
drafting. Final approval may be sought by SDOs’ governing bodies (most obvious cases being 
IEEE-SA, W3C, Bluetooth SIG). Some SDOs may open the draft standards for public review 
(IEEE-SA, W3C and, to some extent, IETF), or for members/community-wide review (IETF, 
 
 
1332 The JRC Report notes that most SDOs they examined offer procedures for interpretation of policies 
and allow appeals of policy-related decisions; see JRC Report, p. 110. 
1333 This does not mean that IETF and W3C have no meetings and ETSI, IEEE-SA and Bluetooth-SIG 
cannot engage in email exchange.  
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ETSI for ENs). Recently, Member Review process was implemented in Bluetooth SIG, 
replacing the approval by Adoption Committee. While this changes in operational framework 
are welcomed from the perspective of stakeholder-participation, Member Review process does 
not appear to require that Members comments should be per se addressed or resolved, leaving 
the Board of Directors as the only body entitled to modify the standard.   
 
It is important to note that SDOs may introduce procedural principles or best practices for 
standards development in their operational rules: an example is the requirement to explain 
negative votes for standards approval (ETSI). SDOs may also refer to other procedural 
frameworks, such as OpenStand (W3C). Ultimately, SDOs standardization work does not end 
with the adoption of a standard: many organizations provide assistance with standards’ 
implementation and ensure  that their standards still respond to the market needs by maintaining 
review and withdrawal processes.  
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SDO ETSI IEEE-SA IETF W3C Bluetooth SIG 
Body/ies responsible for 
standards approval 
General Assembly  
SASB (advised by Standing 
Committees), after sponsor 
balloting and public review 
IESG, after an IETF-wide Last 
Call (for RFCs) 
Advisory Committee; ultimate 
approval by Director 
Board of Directors with 4/5 
quorum, upon completion of 
Member Review 
Members of standards 
approving body/ies 
all full and associate members by 
weighted individual voting 
For EN: the votes of National 
Delegations count (weighted 
national voting procedure) 
SASB members appointed by the 
BoG; 
 IETF Chair, the Area Directors 
(AD) randomly selected by the 
Nominating Committee and 
approved by the IAB 
W3C Member organizations, 
Director elected by 5 host 
members 
All Promoters and max 4 Associate 
Member Directors 
Body/ies responsible to 
develop and update rules, 
procedures and policies 
General Assembly  
SASB, Standing Committees 
and BoG (depending on the 
document) 
IESG, after an IETF-wide Last 
Call (for BCPs) 
The Advisory Board’s Process 
Task Force in the Revising W3C 
Process Community Group; 
approved by the W3C 
Membership; ultimate approval 
by Director 
Board of Directors by unanimous 
consent  
Members of the policy-
making body/ies 
all full and associate members; 
voting  by qualified majority  
*BoG - members elected s by 
IEEE voting members; *SASB- 
appointed by the BoG;  
*Standing Committees - 
members appointed by SASB 
chair 
(voting by majority) 
 IETF Chair, the Area Directors 
(AD) randomly selected by the 
Nominating Committee and 
approved by the IAB 
Advisory Board: elected by 
Advisory Committee (all W3C 
Members); ultimate approval by 
Director 
All Promoters and  max Associate 
Member Directors 
Dispute settlement and 
appeal body/ies 
General Assembly assists in 
finding mediators (typically other 
ETSI Members or the Secretariat)  
Decisions of Technical 
Organization appealed to the 
Board & General Assembly  
SASB; final appeals handled by 
BoG 
 IAB 
Advisory Board, after Working 
Group Chair and Domain 
Leader were unsuccessful 
N.A. 
Members of the dispute 
settlement and appeal 
body/ies 
Mediators: appointed by the 
General Assembly/selected by 
parties in conflict 
*SASB appeal - SASB members 
appointed by the SASB Chair;  
 * BoG appeal - three voting 
members of the IEEE-SA BoG  
12  full members randomly 
selected by NomCom and 
approved by the ISOC Board; 
IETF chair serves as ex-officio 
elected by Advisory 
Committee (all W3C 
Members) 
N.A. 




4.6.8 IPR Policies  
 
SDOs’ rules on disclosure and licensing of SEPs has been addressed in a number of previous 
studies, some of which are quite recent.1334 It is thus not the intention of this study to conduct 
a thorough examination of the SDOs IPR policies. At the same time, it should be admitted that 
these policies also provide important procedural guarantees, and their existence in SDOs is a 
requirement of the applicable regulatory frameworks. Hence, some general observations 
regarding the IPR policies of the five SDOs should be made.  
 
Almost all IPR policies provide a definition of the concept of “essentiality” that revolves 
around technical features (ETSI) and lack of suitable commercial or technical alternatives  
(IEEE, W3C, Bluetooth SIG).1335 None of the policies obliges patent holders to license their 
technologies on FRAND/royalty-free terms in the sense that refusal to license does not 
formally lead to a “sanction” in the form of a fine or expulsion from membership: yet, a patent-
holder that does not comply with licensing rules may face other consequences, such as 
exclusion of its technology from a standard or a reputational damage.1336 In this regard, ETSI’s 
IPR Policy provides that in case a FRAND-based license is not available, the General 
Assembly should seek a feasible alternative, which may even lead to designing around the 
patent. Within the IEEE-SA, a negative LoA can bear consequences for technology’s inclusion 
into a standard: yet, no actions are required from the SASB or its committees.1337 A failure to 
disclose the relevant IPR in standards development of IETF may prevent a stakeholder from 
any further participation in IETF’s standards development with respect to the technologies 
whose disclosure was omitted.  
 
The recent study on SDOs governance revealed that SDOs IPR policies are based on a so-
called “Baseline Policy,” which serves as a “safe harbor” approach. Such Baseline Policy is 
based on the general requirement of patent disclosure and licensing and is deemed compatible 
with the legal rules.1338 Some SDOs implement this Baseline Policy with committal choices, 
such as royalty-free licensing requirements (W3C, Bluetooth SIG) or interpretation of 
FRAND-terms and restriction to seeking injunctions (IEEE-SA). Others include non-
committal choices, where IPR policies offer different modes or optional choices and allow 
divergent interpretation, for instance regarding the meaning of FRAND or the extent of 
 
 
1334 See the JRC Report and the project on Intellectual Property Management in standard-setting processes, 
carried out by Bekkers and Updegrove and which offered a comparative overview of SDOs’ policy on patents’ 
essentiality, disclosure and licensing commitments; Bekkers and Updegrove, A Study of IPR Policies and 
Practices. 
1335 Note that essentiality is not mentioned in IETF which defines IPRs as a patent, utility model, or similar 
right that may cover a technology implementing and IETF specification, Section. 1(j) and (k) of IETF IPR Policy.  
1336 See also P. Larouche and. F. Schuett, 28 ‘Repeated interactions in standard setting’ (2018) 28 Journal 
of Economics and Management Strategy 488-509.  
1337 PatCom only requests LoAs when those are not provided. 
1338 JRC Report, p. 129. Some SDOs, like ISO/IEC/ITU, limit their IPR Rules to that Baseline Policy. 
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licensing obligations at company level (ETSI, IETF).1339 At the same time, IETF, W3C and 
Bluetooth SIG express a strong preference for non-patented contributions and royalty-free 
licensing schemes, while such preferences is not expressed in ETSI and IEEE-SA policies, 
despite the significant differences between the two. While in theory, IPR Policies should serve 
to balance the rights of patent holders and patent users, whether such balance is indeed present 
in the current IPR Policies of the five SDOs remains a topic for further discussion.1340   
 
5. Compliance with procedural principles for standardization 
 
5.1 Coverage by the regulatory frameworks  
 
As explained in Chapter III, scrutiny of all types of SDOs under the relevant regulatory 
frameworks and their procedural requirements would not be accurate nor desirable: in fact, the 
author argues that such systematic analysis would even be impossible due to the divergent 
nature of ICT standards. While such standards may indeed be developed by a single SDO with 
one set of rules, these standards, or their parts, are often referenced, adopted or endorsed by 
other SDOs, which in turn may operate according to a different set of rules or enjoy different 
level of acceptance among industry stakeholders and governments. Likewise, ICT standards 
should adapt to the requirement of the markets, technology and society, which renders them 
subject to rapid modifications. Procedures used during the endorsement or amendments of 
these standards are endogenous to SDOs governance and, as demonstrated in this chapter, are 
different; similarly, the regulatory effect the standard may have after its endorsement or 
modification may vary. Given this rather “unstable” environment in which ICT standards 
function, SDOs developing them may in principle be curbed by multiple regulatory 
frameworks, or none of them at all. For this reason, the governance and processes of the five 
SDOs will be reviewed in the context of the due process principles for standardization in a 
holistic manner. Pondering the question of applicability of each of the regulatory frameworks 
to the analysed SDOs is nevertheless a useful exercise for this research, since these frameworks 
ultimately grant certain level of legitimacy to standards or even exempt SDOs from antitrust 
liability.  
 
It appears from the ISO/TBT database on standardizing bodies that ETSI is the only body that 
has formally accepted the WTO TBT Code of Good Practice.1341 Although the database 
contains to entries of Code’s acceptance from IETF or W3C, these SDOs have previously 
indicated to comply with the criteria of the Code.1342 Furthermore, while it may be argued that 
 
 
1339 JRC Report, p. 151. Consent of members is important for committal choices, while non-committal 
choices are rather subject to market discipline. Committal choices are also made by leadership-driven SDOs, and 
non-committal – by membership-driven.  
1340 In this regard, see Chapter V.4.  
1341 See list of SDOs that have accepted the Code of Good Practice; see https://tbtcode.iso.org/sites/wto-
tbt/list-of-standardizing-bodies.html. Also, since ETSI is the national body, it is covered/should accept ISO/IEC 
Guide 59 (2019). 
1342 See the IAB reply to the European ICT questionnaire, ‘Impact assessment study on the “standardization 
package.” Request for information from forums and consortiums’ available at https://www.iab.org/wp-
content/IAB-uploads/2011/03/2010-02-05-IAB-Response-Euro-ICT-Questionnaire.pdf; ‘WTO TBT Standards 
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IEEE-SA should comply with the provisions of the Code by virtue of its accreditation by the 
ANSI,1343 this assumption is not confirmed in the Code itself: rather, IEEE-SA pledges its 
compliance with “WTO criteria for international SDOs” in its various documents.1344 SDOs’ 
coverage by the provisions of the WTO TBT Committee Decision depends on whether they 
can be considered ISBs which, following the rather convoluted narrative of the WTO 
jurisprudence, implies that that the SDOs should offer their membership to at least all WTO 
Members who should also recognize standardization activities of these SDOs. This study 
observes that although being driven by enterprises and private actors, the five SDOs in 
principle do not pose any restrictions on the governmental authorities of all WTO Members to 
join their standardization activities either as decision-makers or as observers.1345 Moreover, the 
fact that standards developed in the five SDOs are globally used by both private and 
governmental actors in their routine activities suggest their wider recognition: apart from the 
broad market adoption, the “recognition” of these standards is also exemplified by their 
endorsement by the ISO. Hence, this study argues that ETSI, IEEE-SA, IETF, W3C and 
Bluetooth SIG can in principle be considered ISBs in the context of the WTO to the extent that 
they comply with the six procedural principles TBT Committee Decisions, and especially 
openness to all WTO Members.1346  
 
With regard to the national regulatory frameworks, Regulation 1025/2012 evidently applies to 
ETSI, as one of the ESOs. Being the developers of ICT standards that are “not national, 
European or international,” the other SDOs may fall under the scope of Annex II of the 
Regulation as long as their standards are identified by the Commission for procurement 
purposes: while this is the case for IETF and W3C, standards and specifications developed by 
IEEE-SA and Bluetooth SIG have so far not been referenced in the Commission’s 
Decisions.1347 By the same token, OMB Circular (2016) will apply to standards referenced in 
US law, and ANSI Essential Requirements to those SDOs that have obtained or seek to obtain 
ANSI’s accreditation (from the current sample of SDOs, this concerns only IEEE). 
Accordingly, each of the five SDOs may in principle fall under the scope of the national 




Code criteria applied to W3C’, DanielID (ed.) (12 July 2009) available at https://www.w3.org/2009/07wto-std-
crit.html, which notes, however, that it is unclear if “W3C, or any other international non-governmental body” 
fits the criteria of the TBT Agreement, Annex 3 (B), since it is located within the territory of not one but many 
Members. Indeed, while for the purpose of the Annex, the place of an SDOs’ incorporation, or its secretariat 
location, would presumably facilitate identifying the WTO Member responsible for this SDO’s acceptance of the 
Code, this would be challenging for an SDO that functions through cooperation of a number of universities. 
1343 As it was claimed in the dispute on IEEE 2015 IPR Policy Update. 
1344 See, for instance, the e-mail of S. Tatiner of 21 May 2012, available at 
https://standards.ieee.org/content/dam/ieee-standards/standards/web/documents/other/reldoc_NARA.pdf. 
1345 In principle, nothing in the Bluetooth SIGs’ operational framework precludes governmental agencies 
from joining the SIG (“Any firm, corporation, or other legal entity …”); Section 4.1 Bluetooth SIG Bylaws (2019). 
1346 This, of course does not mean that this procedural framework is enforceable.  
1347 See ‘ICT technical specifications’, available at https://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/policy/ict-
standardisation/ict-technical-specifications_en. At the same time, the EC most certainly uses Wi-Fi and Bluetooth 
standards in its daily work. 
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Lastly, given the extraterritorial application of EU and US national competition law provisions, 
and the fact that all five SDOs are largely private and produce standards that are globally 
adopted, it may be assumed that these SDOs fall within the scope of the applicable EU and US 
competition rules, namely the Horizontal Guidelines (2011) and the SDOAA (2004). This is 
evidenced by many past and pending cases against the analysed SDOs in the domain of 
competition and antitrust on both sides of the Atlantic.1348  
 
This study, however, emphasizes that whether or not the SDOs are covered by one of the 
regulatory frameworks does not imply that they do not have to comply with the set of 
procedural principles. Indeed, adherence to these principles grants SDOs with certain 
legitimacy, for instance under trade law or competition law; yet, this study argues that the role 
of due process principles in technical standardization is broader than demonstrating compliance 
with legal rules. The procedural principles serve as good governance mechanisms to ensure 
that SDOs take decisions that are balanced by considering the views of those affected these 
decisions, and prevent dominant and exclusion in standards development, as well as offer 
accountability towards stakeholders.  
 
5.2 Procedural Principles for Standardization  
 
5.2.1 Transparency  
 
Transparency in SDOs revolves around providing information and access. Requirements of 
transparency include publishing work programs; notifying standardization activities to certain 
bodies as well as informing interested stakeholders; allowing interested parties to access 
information about standardization processes and to comment on standards’ drafts; distributing 
the final version of a standard; and providing an adequate period of time for submitting 
comments.  
 
All five SDOs provide access to their governing documents via their websites; likewise, 
standards and specifications of most of the SDOs – apart from IEEE-SA – can also be retrieved 
from their websites or from the website of their working groups.1349 IEEE-SA is the only SDO 
that publishes extensive information about the meetings of its working groups (the agenda, 
reports and minutes),1350 while W3C and IETF provide access to the discussions on the mailing 
lists.1351 Furthermore, only ETSI publishes its work program;1352 the other four SDOs inform 
about their on-going and future standardization activities through newsletters, updates and 
 
 
1348 See Chapter III.5. See also the overview of cases by Contreras, ‘A tale of two layers’, pp. 882-95. 
1349 See, for instance, ‘Active IETF working groups’, available at  https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/. ‘Web 
platform WG specifications’, available at 
https://www.w3.org/WebPlatform/WG/PubStatus#HTML_specifications.   
1350 See, for example, ‘Summary Reports and Minutes of 802.11 WG Sessions’, available at  
http://www.ieee802.org/11/Reports/index.html. 
1351 However, access to the minutes of the meetings of W3C Advisory Committee is restricted to members 
only; in a similar vein, ETSI and Bluetooth SIG make the minutes available only for members.   




work plans published on their websites (Bluetooth is an exception since its annual report is 
available only for Members). Furthermore, while all SDOs maintain tools to inform interested 
members or stakeholders about standardization activities (for example, through liaisons or call 
for expertise), ETSI is obliged to notify its ENs development projects. Technical bodies of 
some SDOs are sometimes required to notify other governance bodies of a planned or 
completed standardization activity (i.e. IEEE-SA, Bluetooth SIG). Finally, all SDOs allow for 
a possibility to comment on the draft standards through various mechanisms, i.e. public enquiry 
(ETSI), public or community-wide review (IEEE-SA, IETF), members-consultation (W3C), or 
testing (Bluetooth SIG).  
 
Each SDO further maintains its own mechanisms that contribute to transparency. Those include 
disclosure of affiliation and/or knowledge of essential technologies at the beginning of the 
working groups meetings (all five SDOs); public availability of voting result (ETSI, IEEE-SA, 
IETF and W3C), availability of working group Charters (IETF and W3C) and public working 
drafts (IETF, W3C).1353 In this regard, some SDOs are more transparent with regard to the 
decision-making processes in their standards development meeting rather than governance 
meetings (i.e. IEEE-SA; IETF; W3C).1354  
 
5.2.2 Openness and Participation 
 
Openness and participation imply opportunities to contribute to standardization work, either 
by participating in technical committees or by commenting on standards drafts. In particular, 
such opportunities should enable interested stakeholders to voice their disagreements with 
decisions taken during the meetings and by this means, prevent exclusion from the processes, 
but they may as well relate to objective distribution of voting rights.1355  
 
Restrictions on membership in the five SDOs examined in this study, or on participation in 
their technical processes, do not appear unreasonable given the operational field and 
institutional setting of these organizations. The SDOs are open to a large spectrum of 
stakeholders, but some may be claimed to be more open by accepting also individual 
participants (IEEE-SA), or even only individuals, irrespective of their affiliation (IETF); 
especially the later seems to offer high degree of openness since its standardization activities 
are easy to join. W3C and Bluetooth SIG assign some members more rights than others, which 
 
 
1353 In some of SDOs, a draft standard can be obtained against a fee (IEEE-SA). The JRC Report noted 
two reasons why some SDOs may refuse to provide a public draft of their standards: preventing non-members 
from using the draft to obtain patents that would be asserted against SDO members and avoiding sending 
inaccurate signals to the marketplace regarding the content of final standards (this applied to DVB, VITA and 
JEDEC). JRC Report, p. 118.  
1354 Ibid.; the fact that individual votes in the governing bodies of these SDOs are not disclosed 
counterbalances potential conflict of interests.  
1355 The JRC report suggests that openness takes two forms: openness to membership and ability to 
participate in standardization work. It notes that all SDOs it examined permit all interested parties to participate, 
while their membership appears more limited; and that participation in governance processes is limited to 
members. JRC Report, p. 117.  
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is also typical for specialized consortia.1356 ETSI has voting rights limitations when it comes 
the approval of ENs, which may be explained by the fact that, despite its global role, ETSI 
remains an SDO producing European Harmonized Standards; ETSI also distribute its voting 
rights according to the size and turnover of its members. While SDOs generally have a one-
vote-per-member rule, in Bluetooth SIG, affiliates of a company have only one vote, despite 
having separate membership. In IEEE-SA, a company can join with only one affiliation, 
although participants of the Working Groups’ meetings often provide various affiliations.1357 
Although in IETF, affiliation of experts formally does not matter, the Chair of the working 
group should ultimately ensure that the process is balanced and based on consensus. 
 
Only ETSI’s highest authority is open to all members;1358 in other SDOs, the officials on 
governance bodies are either appointed or elected.1359 While this limits openness of other 
SDOs, it can be justified by an assumption that organizations should be governed by those with 
significant expertise in their operational field. Some SDOs contribute to openness by issuing a 
call for participation among their members (i.e. IEEE-SA), or offer guidelines  and trainings 
on how to participate  in their technical discussions (i.e. IETF, W3C). In principle, standards 
development meetings, and sometimes even meetings of governing bodies of all SDOs, are 
open for observers, although occasionally upon a payment of a fee (ETSI), but permission of 
the Chair to attend the meeting is usually required.  
 
5.2.3 Consensus, Impartiality and Balance  
 
The requirement of balanced, impartial and consensus-based standards development, at least 
in author’s view, aims to avoid bias in SDOs’ technical committees and prevent a situation 
when a standard is adopted over a strong opposition.1360 Similarly to openness, consensus 
prevents exclusion from the process, which arguably, leads to better results.1361 The meaning 
 
 
1356 Delcamp and Leiponen, ‘Innovating standards’, p. 38. 
1357 See minutes of the meetings, of IEEE 802.11 Working Group, available at 
http://www.ieee802.org/11/Reports/index.html. 
1358 In principle, Advisory Committee in W3C also represents the whole membership, but it does not hold 
the ultimate decision-making power. 
1359 This is crucial since sometimes these governance bodies can ultimately block standards’ adoption (i.e. 
IESG). Another observation that can be made is that often, individuals are rotating between SDOs’ committees 
and governance bodies (i.e. IEEE-SA). From one side, this ensure that only those with sufficient knowledge and 
experience are entitled to take governance decisions; from the other side, this create a close group of individuals 
who are in charge of SDOs’ governance.  
1360 Although the US Supreme Court held in a case on software copyright (see MGM Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., 545 US 913 (2005)) that “time and market forces often provide equilibrium in balancing interests,” 
this balance should not be taken for granted in SDOs’ technical committees.  
1361 In this regard, the JRC report differentiate between geographic and commercial balance. Some studies 
have noted that in ITU, IPR policy consensus was important for resolving IP disputes and did better than voting, 
since it gave leverage to firms to include their IPR is a standard and helped excluding unimportant technologies 
and open debate, so superior technologies emerge; see S.M. Greenstein and M. Rysman, ‘‘Coordination costs and 
standard setting’. Another study suggests that, in certain institutional settings, i.e. organizations with adequate 
continuity and enough long-time members to take a decision, “rough consensus” can be a more powerful 
mechanism than majority voting; J. F. Nickerson and M. zur Muelen, ‘The ecology of standards processes: 




of consensus differs per SDO, but always implies an absence of opposition and resolution of 
comments. In IEEE-SA, consensus is achieved when those concerned with the scope of the 
standard have reached a substantial agreement, which means more than a simple majority, but 
not necessarily unanimity, and that all views and objections have been considered and efforts 
have been made toward their resolution;1362 in W3C, consensus implies lack of formal 
objections;1363 in IETF Working Groups, consensus means that “very large majority” agrees 
with the decisions, and may be achieved through “humming” (although some of its governing 
bodies, i.e. IAB and IESG, may decide by unanimity).1364 Bluetooth SIG does not support 
consensus, but rather operates according to 4/5 voting quorum.  
 
Next to consensus, SDOs employ different mechanisms to ensure that their processes are 
balanced. Some set certain participation or composition quorum for technical committees or 
voting groups (i.e. ETSI, IEEE-SA), others have rules that ensure balance in their governance 
bodies (ETSI, IETF, W3C). It remains unclear whether the rules of Bluetooth SIG actually aim 
to achieve a balance, since requirements of impartiality, consensus or balance are not  
mentioned in its operational framework. However, all SDOs in a way maintain an obligation 
to provide reasons for stakeholders’ comments or objections, which ultimately ensures that the 
processes do not get stalled and proposals are not blocked without valid justifications. (Note 
that reason-giving is as such not mentioned in the regulatory frameworks governing SDOs, 
while it is an important requirement in the context of private governance).1365 
 
It remains questionable whether SDOs that allow companies to join with multiple affiliates are 
truly balanced. By the same token, it is unclear whether the requirement for individual 
participants to represent their own views, rather those of the entity of their affiliation, really 
works in the real-life setting.1366 Moreover, SDOs’ mechanisms to ensure balance relate to 
representation of interests of market players: indeed, participation rules of SDOs require 
technical knowledge as a precondition to membership or participation in their activities – and 
rightly so. However, the increased societal and legal impact of ICT standards implies that the 
notion of “affected” stakeholders should be broader than those active on the market. To 
illustrate, Internet protocols, while being extremely technical, have a large impact on society 
and human life, and arguably should take into account human rights.1367 But even when limited 
to commercial interests, stakeholders with greater expertise and financial means, typically large 
IPR holders and users, will tend to invest more in the process and have more weight in 
 
 
1362 Article 2.1 of IEEE-SA Standard Board Bylaws. 
1363 See Clause 3.3 W3C Process Document (2017). 
1364 See Section 4.2 ‘The Tao of IETF’. 
1365 See Chapter II.5. 
1366 This would depend on many variables that are difficult, if not impossible, to measure, such as 
employees’ loyalty to the company, personalities of individuals, etc.  
1367 Arguably, engineers define human rights more narrowly than lawyers: for instance, engineers see 
privacy breach as a technical attack undermining trust in networks. See C. Cath and L. Floridi, ‘The design of 
internet architecture by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and human rights’ (2017) 23 Science and 






5.2.4 Effectiveness and Relevance 
 
The requirement for standards to be effective and relevant to market’s demands relates to the 
(maintenance of) standards’ quality, and is achieved through such processes as updating 
technical documents, conducting market research and pacing standardization activities to 
current technical and societal needs. Procedures for reviewing, amending and withdrawing of 
standards are present in all five SDOs, although with some differences.1369 All SDOs also 
require that their work is based on engineering and technical decisions, rather than political 
and commercial considerations;1370 yet, technical standardization remains a political exercise 
with a lot of tensions between conflicting interests, some of which may be dealt with in a hidden 
way.1371 In this context, some SDOs have a clear division among technical and management 
bodies, arguably avoiding that experts will be destructed from technical work by administrative 
issues. 
 
Before launching a new standardization project, most SDOs require that there is sufficient 
support from their members and the industry, which spares technical and human efforts from 
being devoted to an activity that is not relevant for the industry.1372 Effectiveness and relevance 
are also ensured by the requirement to produce standards that are clear and complete for 
implementation.  
 
5.2.5 Coherence and coordination 
 
To ensure coherence in their processes, all SDOs typically have liaison agreements, MoU or 
partnerships with other SDOs. Especially in  ICT standardization, SDOs have to cooperate and 
coordinate their work to ensure consistency of networks and systems: standardization of IoT 
technologies is a clear example of this collaboration. Sometimes coordination is almost 
inevitable due to the endorsement of standards by another SDO. Members and participants are 
generally allowed to attend the meetings of their partner organizations, in most cases, again, 
with prior approval of the chairs.  
 
5.2.6 Concerns developing countries or “weaker parties” 
 
Although this does not appear from their operational frameworks, IETF and W3C address the  
needs of developing countries to access global networks, as well as participate in the creation 
of Internet and web standards, by conducting trainings and workshops to educate experts as 
 
 
1368 See N. Gandal and R. Régibeau, ‘Standard-setting organizations’, pp. 394-433. 
1369 For instance, ETSI standards are reviewed at least once in 5 years, while IEEE standards – in 10 years. 
1370 For instance, IETF governance bodies were established as non-commercial organization that valued 
technical capability over economic returns; see Nickerson and zur Muelen, ‘The ecology of standards processes’. 
1371 See Cafaggi, ‘The many features’ on accounting standard-setting. 
1372 This is different for IETF where, in principle, nothing precludes an individual to submit his/her own 
proposal for consideration. 
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well as to learn about potential challenges.1373 Meetings of these SDOs take place all over the 
world, which enables participation of experts from developing countries. However, without a 
strong mandate from an SDO or related procedural requirements, it is unclear whether these 
initiatives are sufficient in the context of the relevant WTO requirement. Indeed, companies or 
governmental agencies from developing countries are not precluded from joining all SDOs on 
an equal basis with those from the developed world (perhaps with the exception of ETSI for 
certain voting quorum); in practice, however, technical committees of SDOs are presumable 
led by the developed countries.  
 
5.2.7 Appeal and Review 
 
While this principle concerns availability of mechanisms for challenging or reviewing 
decisions taken SDOs’ technical or governance bodies, it also encompasses the processes 
around dispute resolution, such as availability of appeal procedures, establishment of appeal 
bodies and availability of appeal decisions.1374 In SDOs, disputes can arise either between 
members of a working group, or between members of working groups and governance 
bodies.1375 Earlier studies have observed that market participants thoroughly assess how SDOs 
resolve disputes, including to whom it assign authority in dispute resolution and whether these 
assignments result in biases.1376 
 
All SDOs but Bluetooth SIG have appeal bodies and maintain procedures on how appeals are 
conducted, including the timeline to issue the decision or confirm the receipt of an appeal brief. 
Some SDOs publish appeals documents and decisions (IEEE-SA; IETF; W3C). Appeals in 
most SDOs are handled by the appointed members of governing bodies; however, in W3C, the 
ultimate decision in appeal procedures lies with the Director, while in ETSI aims to involve 
the whole membership in the General Assembly. IETF has different dispute resolution systems 
for different governance bodies. Furthermore, governance bodies of some SDOs are also 
entitled to verify whether all procedural guarantees have been satisfied during the decision-
making processes in other bodies (IEEE-SA; IETF).  
 
Yet, availability of internal appeal may not be enough to ensure procedural guarantees. While 
private expertise is needed for adequate decisions on complex technical issues, such method of 
dispute resolution often lacks legal expertise and risks that essential due process rights are 
 
 
1373 See  S. Boyera, ‘The mobile web in developing countries: the next step’, available at  
https://www.w3.org/2006/12/digital_divide/public.html; https://www.w3.org/2006/07/MWI-EC/cfp.html; 
https://www.ietf.org/live/previous-ietf-live-sessions/live101/ietf101-techplenary/; J. Arkko, ‘Diversity’  (April 
2013) available at https://www.ietf.org/blog/diversity/. In this regard, ETSI also attempts to include developing 
countries on its agenda; see “IoT, 5G, security and privacy focus on the 20th Global Standards Collaboration 
Meeting’, available at https://www.etsi.org/newsroom/news/1087-2016-04-news-iot-5g-security-and-privacy-
focus-of-the-20th-global-standards-collaboration-
meeting?highlight=WyJkZXZlbG9waW5nIiwiY291bnRyaWVzIiwiZGV2ZWxvcGluZyBjb3VudHJpZXMiXQ. 
1374 In this sense, it also contributes to transparency.  
1375 It may be hypothesized that both are connected because governance bodies may be sued for inaction. 
1376 Greenstein and Rysman, ‘Coordination costs and standard setting’. 
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ignored;1377 moreover, SDOs dispute settlement bodies cannot impose adequate corrective or 
reparative remedies,1378 and are usually limited to SDOs’ members. These shortcomings may 
be compensated by a recourse to litigation, which will also allow external parties to challenge 
SDOs decisions that affect them. SDOs, however, appear reluctant to support litigation:1379 the 
reasons for it may be high litigation costs and time constraints, as well as the jeopardy of legal 
intervention into technical decisions.  
 
5.2.8 Access on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms 
 
While some SDOs favour licensing policies that are based on royalty-free requirements, all 
SDOs seem support the minimum requirements of the “Baseline Policy” from the applicable 
regulatory provisions.  
 
5.2.9 SDOs’ internal procedural principles  
 
It should be noted that each of the SDOs maintains certain procedural principles on which they 
build their standardization activities. ETSI emphasizes the principles of openness, meaning that 
its decision-making should be accessible to all interested parties; consensus, meaning that 
decision-making processes do not favor any particular stakeholder; transparency, requiring 
archiving all information on technical discussions, public announcement of new 
standardization activities, seeking of participation of interested parties to achieve balance and 
considerations and response to comments. Furthermore, ETSI standards should meet the 
requirements of maintenance, illustrated by an ongoing support of published standards; public 
availability of standards;1380 FRAND-based IPR policy, possibly without monetary 
compensation; effectiveness and relevance for the market needs; neutrality and stability; and 
quality.1381 These principles echo the requirements of Annex II of Regulation 1025/2012, 
which is not surprising due to the ETSI’s role as an ESO. 
 
To ensure fairness and good standards practice, as well as to protect itself from liability, IEEE-
SA follows the following five principles: due process, meaning having visible standards 
developing procedures and following them; openness, ensuring that all interested parties can 
 
 
1377 Delimatsis, ‘The Future of transnational self-regulation’, p. 66. In a similar vein, eBay realized that its 
own alternative enforcement system is not reliable without treat of law enforcement behind its community system 
and the coercive power of government. See J. Goldsmith and T. Wu, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a 
Borderless World (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006), p. 136. 
1378 In this regard, see P. Cane, ‘Administrative law as regulation’, in C. Parker et al. (eds.), Regulation 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004), p. 221.  
1379 While one SDO that falls outside the scope of this study makes recourse to mandatory arbitration 
(DVB), this process has never been used in practice (remarks on a SDOs’ governance workshop, Brussels, March 
2018). Litigation on IPR issues occurs outside the SDOs and is between the stakeholders. In this regard, Contreras 
demonstrated that interoperability standards’ litigations are often revolve around similar standards and similar 
actors, while it is not the case for Internet standards; and that standards policies that de-emphasize patent 
monetization have led to fewer litigations; see Contreras, ‘A tale of two layers’.  
1380 Note that the requirement is worded that public availability also means use on reasonable terms 
(including for a reasonable fee). 
1381 See ‘Standards making’, available at https://www.etsi.org/standards/standards-making. 
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participate actively in the standards development process; consensus, which defines percentage 
of balloting group vote to approve a draft of a standard; balance, ensuring that balloting group 
include all interested parties and avoid dominance; and right of appeal, allowing anyone to 
appeal a standards development decision at any point.1382 These principles are closely related 
to the Essential Requirements of ANSI which, again, may be expected due to IEEE’s 
accreditation by ANSI. 
 
While its governance bodies endorse the OpenStand principles,1383 IETF emphasizes that the 
goal of its standardization processes is technical excellence; prior implementation and testing; 
clear, concise and easy understood documentation; openness and fairness; and timeliness.1384 
The OpenStand principles are likewise adhered to by W3C,1385 which also highlights  
cooperation; due process; broad consensus; transparency; balance; and openness.1386 Bluetooth 
SIG, while introducing requirement for quality, relevance and effectiveness of its standards, 
does not refer to procedural principles in its operational framework. 
 
To some extent, the rules of SDOs indeed address the shortcomings of the regulatory 
frameworks, at least for their specific standardization activity. SDOs devote close attention to 
balance, although it does not always entail a balance of interests, but rather a balance to prevent 
dominance. Some SDOs also address procedural guarantees in governance bodies, although 
the differences between standards development and “policy development” processes are 
notable, in some organizations less than in the others. The rules on copyright are in most cases 
linked to SDOs financial mechanisms and, as it may reasonably be expected from private 
organizations, their copyright policies do not address copyright of standards as a possible 
barrier to access regulation. 
 
5.3 ICT SDOs as private rule-makers 
 
SDOs’ processes have to adhere to both internal (imposed by their operational frameworks) 
and external (imposed by the applicable regulatory frameworks) procedural principles. While 
compliance with internal principles is verified by the governance bodies of each SDOs, this 
section aimed to shed some light onto procedural guarantees offered by the five examined 
SDOs in the context of the regulatory frameworks of the WTO, US and EU. Due process 
principles provided by these frameworks serve as a meta-regulation, introducing best practices 
for good standardization governance and providing SDOs with accountability mechanisms; in 
turn, SDOs enjoy a high degree of self-regulation by setting and managing their own rules and 
 
 
1382 See ‘Develop standards’, https://standards.ieee.org/develop/develop-standards/govern.html. 
1383 See ‘Leading global standards organizations endorse “OpenStand” principles that drive innovation and 
borderless commerce’ (August 2012) available at https://www.ietf.org/blog/leading-global-standards-
organizations-endorse-openstand-principles-drive-innovation-and-borderless-commerce/. 
1384 See ‘Standards process’, available at https://www.ietf.org/standards/process/. 
1385 The Agreement between W3C and Open Standard was signed on 29 August 2012.  
1386 See ‘W3C self-evaluation of OpenStand principles’, available at https://www.w3.org/2012/08/open-
stand-w3c.html. Earlier studies concluded in this regard that IETF and W3C are becoming increasingly similar in 
the sense that they are open and provide support with implementation; see C. Vincent and J. Camp, ‘Looking to 
the internet for models of governance’ (2004) 6 Ethics and Information Technology 161-73. 
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processes, and ensuring that these rules are enforced through procedural mechanisms that they 
provide. These internal safeguards of SDOs arguably intend to contribute to effective and 
unbiased standardization outcomes.  
 
However, when designing their rules, SDOs have to strike a balance between processes that 
are self-disciplinary and ensure sufficient procedural guarantees, and processes that are 
attractive for the majority of stakeholders and provide for sufficient quality and smooth 
implementation of their standards.1387 It may be expected that strictly defined processes, while 
aiming at balanced and inclusive decision-making, could be viewed by many industry actors 
as burdensome or unnecessarily bureaucratic.1388 In this context, and given the evolving 
standardization ecosystem, due process mechanisms of SDOs may not be sufficient to ensure 
good governance and representation of all interests in their decision-making.1389 Moreover, the 
effectiveness of each rule will be obsolete without its effective enforcement. For these reasons, 
while governmental agencies should in principle trust SDOs internal rules, an external review 
of their decisions may sometimes be necessary to ensure procedural safeguards of 
standardization processes.1390  
 
In epistemic rule-making, such external review may be provided by the proclamation of a 
“special expertise topping other expertise” which also has coordinative function.1391 In 
practice, this would imply introducing a “meta SDO” that would serve as a guardian of due 
process in standardization. It is however unlikely that such body would be effective, and its 
decisions enforceable. Firstly it would not be possible to render compliance with its principles 
mandatory: to the contrary, as observed from the history of SDOs, such stricter approach will 
fuel the emergence of new SDOs with even looser procedural norms, which will only 
exacerbate the issue. Even such “meta” bodies as ISO and ANSI are still considered voluntary 
within standardization ecosystems. Legally, acceptance of the rules of a hypothetical 
standardization body can be ensured through a governmental regulation adopted in every 
national law (this due to the global impact of ICT standards), or through private law (i.e. 
contracts between companies or between companies and SDOs). 
 
Secondly, such body would should still be comprised of industry experts, and arguably would 
not compensate for democratic deficit in SDOs’ governance regime. At the same time, having 
a “meta” SDOs composed out non-technical experts, while contributing to democratic 




1387 See Wiegmann, Blind and de Vries, ‘Multi-mode standardization’. 
1388 After all, this was one of the main reasons behind the creation of W3C and Bluetooth SIG. See also 
Simcoe, ‘Standard setting committees’, observing that consensus-driven decision in standardization committees 
take longer, although they do guarantee better quality of the decisions.  
1389 See also Mattli and Woods, ‘In whose benefit?’, p. 15. 
1390 Schepel observes that while US private system implies self-discipline of private bodies, questions 
related to due process, i.e. consensus, would be posed by Courts to governmental agencies referencing the 
standards, and not the SDO. See Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance, p. 284. 
1391 See, in this regard, Shapiro, ‘“Deliberative” “independent” technocracy’, p. 343, who mentions this as 
a past British civil service tradition of the “administrative class.”  
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Another option may be a review by regulatory agencies. Arguably, governments already 
possess sufficient mechanisms to control ICT standardization,1392 especially when such 
standards are incorporated in US regulation or identified by the European Commission for 
public procurement. To ensure due process, regulatory agencies may intervene in private 
standardization through hierarchical means, for instance by imposing stricter rules in their 
national laws, encouraging stakeholders to conduct their technical work in particular 
organizations, or sponsoring certain technical solution.1393 Yet, while intervention by political 
bodies may in principle promote democracy and balance, in technical decision-making at 
transnational level, governmental interference will likely be viewed as attempts of nation-states 
“to gain national advantage at the expense of the members of transnational regime,”1394 as is 
thus not recommendable.  
 
Ultimately, procedural safeguards may be ensured by increased judicial review of SDOs’ 
processes. While providing accountability to private regulatory regimes,1395 judicial review 
may also minimize the risk that standards developers are unduly influenced by regulators when 
the latter serve as controllers.1396 However, increased juridification is not only likely to traverse 
the technical nature of SDOs processes, which is the common jeopardy of any options for 
external review of SDOs’ processes, but may also discourage SDOs’ work due to the increased 
chance of its liability;1397 this is particularly evident from SDOs reluctance to discuss its 
decision-making in courts.1398 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
The analysis of this chapter demonstrates the heterogeneity of SDOs’ rules. Indeed, while there 
is a certain pattern in how SDOs are organized (i.e. stages in standards development processes, 
roles of governance bodies), each SDO has a complex network of rules and procedures. These 
rules, while designed in self-regulatory processes, should however be considered within the 
legal constraints of the applicable regulatory frameworks. In this context, SDOs indeed enjoy 
 
 
1392 Goldsmith and Wu (Who Controls the Internet?) explain how governments can exercise control over 
free speech on the Internet by providing example of the famous Yahoo! Case, Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le 
Racisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (ND Cal. 2001). Lessig suggested that governments may be more successful than 
private parties in designing Internet codes that serve to as interest of users; see Lessig, Codes and Other Laws.   
1393 For instance, a Code of Good Practice/Trust for Cloud standardization has allegedly failed to the refusal 
of private parties to standardize through the formal processes, and with the support of the Commission.  
 1394 Shapiro, ‘“Deliberative,” “independent” technocracy’, p. 349. In this regard, Russel also observes that 
aggressive regulators and policymakers involved in standardization may have an agenda to promote national 
industrial or innovation policies; see A. Russel, ‘Standardization history: a review essay with an eye to the future’, 
in S. Bolin (ed.), The Standards Edge: Future Generations (Ann Arbor, MI: Sheridan Press, 2005) 247-260. 
1395 Cafaggi, ‘A comparative analysis’. 
1396 See Cane, ‘Administrative law as regulation’, who also notes that public functionalities, like private 
actors, are motivated by self-interest.  
1397 These fears have been expressed as an aftermath of the Courts’ decisions in Trueposition v. Ericsson 
and James Elliot cases; see Chapter V.5.    
1398 Schepel doubts whether judicial review, public authority voices and other mechanisms of public 
decision-making can promote socially responsive institutions of deliberation in private bodies, rather that such 
mechanisms would disrupt social structure of communication and perverse effects of litigation; Schepel, The 
Constitution of Private Governance, p. 257.  
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a wide discretion not only to implement the due process requirements, but also to determine 
what these requirements mean, defining such terms as “consensus” “openness” and “balance” 
in their procedural rules. Each SDO thus implements procedural requirements in a unique way 
that suits its operational scope and, most importantly, its membership.1399 This implies that if 
SDOs’ frameworks are to fall short on procedural guarantees, there is little chance that their 
governance bodies will address the issue, which may result in lack of due process. For that 
reason, “external” review of SDOs processes, either by industry experts or by public law 
bodies, is in principle advantageous to ensure the balance, openness and transparency of their 
decision-making.  
 
The question arises whether increased due process in SDOs’ can improve the quality of ICT 
standards they produce and, ultimately, substitute for the lack of democratic input. As 
suggested in the scholarship on global and private governance, safeguarding participation and 
transparency of non-State regulation, and offering review opportunities for private decision-
makers, leads to increased legitimacy and positively affects the uptake of regulation. In other 
words, increased “input” legitimacy of SDOs, meaning compliance of their rules with due 
process requirements, should also increase SDOs’ “output” legitimacy, meaning compliance 
with their standards. Establishing whether or not such formula applies to ICT standardization 
requires technical knowledge and understanding of the functioning of ICT standards and is a 
matter of case-by-case analysis. However, some insights on implementation of due process 
principles and legitimacy of ICT standards can be provided by technical experts involved in 
the activities of SDOs. In this regard, the next chapter discusses how procedural guarantees are 
experienced in practice by offering testimonies from experienced participants of SDOs’ 




1399 As noted by Ostrom, a set of rules used in one physical environment may have different consequences 
when used in a different environment; Ostrom, Governing the Commons, p. 23. Hence, rules that work for one 
SDO may not have the same effect in a different SDO. 
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Building on the theoretical analysis of the previous chapters, this chapter aims to shed light 
onto practical consideration regarding due process in ICT standardization by means of 
qualitative empirical research, namely semi-structured interviews and case studies. The 
findings of this chapter, despite sometimes taking a form of anecdotal evidence, contribute to 
the overall understanding of current practices in ICT standardization, and offer food for thought 
for both public and private regulators with respect to the design and scrutiny of SDOs’ 
processes. 
 
In particular, this chapter discusses the view of industry experts on some contested issues in 
standards development, including the divide between governance and standards development 
processes, barriers for participation and importance of such principles as openness, consensus 
and balance. In this regard, it attempts to understand whether increased compliance with due 
process principles within SDOs indeed positively affects legitimacy and effectiveness of ICT 
standards. Furthermore, due to the importance of the effective appeal mechanisms that ensure 
SDOs’ accountability and enforceability of its procedural principles, and the alleged 
shortcomings of dispute resolution processes of some SDOs, this chapter briefly reviews three 
case studies on procedural disputes in SDOs examined in chapter IV. Ultimately, the last 
section of this chapter sketches tendencies and best practices with regard to due process, 
legitimacy and effectiveness of ICT standards.  
 
2.  Methodology for qualitative empirical research 
 
2.1 Semi-structured interviews 
 
The qualitative empirical study of this chapter was mainly performed through conducting semi-
structured interviews with experts who had considerable experience in ICT standardization. 
This part of the research aimed preliminary to reveal how are due process principles for ICT 
standardization implemented in practice. The choice to conduct open-ended interviews, as 
opposed to focused or structured interviews, was deliberately made at the beginning of this 
study in 2015. Open-ended interview format enables to ask respondents both about the facts of 
a particular matter and about their opinion, allowing them to propose their own insights and 
suggest other sources of evidence:1400 this format thus fitted the purpose of the study, namely 
to shed practical insights on due process in ICT standardization. To the contrary, focused 
interviews merely allow to verify certain facts, without placing them in a broader context, while 
structured survey questions are typically used to produce quantitative data: using these two 
methods would have provided less comprehensive results and would not fit the explorative 
 
 
1400 R. K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 
2003), p. 89. 
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nature of this study.1401 This section further elaborates on the methodology used for the semi-
structured interviews.  
 
2.1.1 Interview questions  
 
A standardized interview script was developed based on the findings of the descriptive study 
on SDOs’ operational frameworks. The script was later adapted for each expert to be 
interviewed, depending on his/her affiliation, experience, or involvement in the disputes 
relevant for the case studies discussed in section 5 of this chapter. 
 
2.1.2 Selection of interview subjects  
 
The potential interviewees were identified based on their affiliation – predominantly, leading 
multinational tech companies which are large stakeholders in ICT standardization, and which 
were categorized either as “patent-intensive companies,” whose business models were largely 
built on innovation and patent monetization, or as “user companies,” (i.e. media companies, 
device manufacturers, etc.) Although this division is admittedly extremely simplistic and as 
such, has its flaws, it corresponds to one of the main topics discussed in this study and in the 
interview questions, namely procedural guarantees in drafting and updating IPR policies. 
Further division of companies into, for instance, network operators, service providers and 
manufacturers, although more precise, would have been less suitable: since each SDO 
maintains different membership and participants categories, a coherent categorization of 
interviewed stakeholders is problematic; one company may fall into multiple categories, 
risking misinterpretation of the responses and rendering a comprehensive approach to the 
interview observations less feasible. 
 
Other subjects approached with an invitation for an interview were affiliated with  
consultancies, governmental organizations with expertise in the field of ICT standardization, 
and staff or governance bodies’ members of leading global ICT SDOs (which were not limited 
to the 5 SDOs analysed in this study), and national SDOs active in regional and global ICT 
standardization. In this regard, some affiliates of private companies approached were also 
appointed, or have been appointed in past, as members of SDOs’ governance bodies.  
 
Furthermore, potential interviewees were identified based on their experience with and 
knowledge of governance and technical processes in different SDOs: for instance, individuals 
who held, or have held leadership positions in SDOs’ governance bodies; individuals who 
were, or have been involved in (on-going) standardization activities; or individuals who were, 
or have been involved with standardization management, strategy or policy of the company of 
their affiliation. In this regard, the selection criteria were not as such constrained to the 
individuals’ experience with the five SDOs examined in this study, although many experts have 
indicated to have been involved in the processes in least three of these SDOs.  
 
 




In total, 52 individuals have been contacted with an invitation for an interview. From them, 4 
individuals have been first informally approached at the conferences and events that the author 
attended, and have later received an e-mail with an invitation for the interview (see below 
section 2.1.4). 11 Individuals have been first approached via LinkedIn Messaging and InMails 
with a short explanation of the study and an invitation for an interview: 5 individuals have 
responded positively to this invitation and have then received an e-mail with a detailed 
explanation of the study, as well as the interview questions. 3 individuals have been suggested 
by other experts during the interviews and have also received an invitation for an interview by 
e-mail. 34 interview subjects have been approached directly by e-mail.  
 
From 52 individuals, interviews have been conducted with 26 experts. 25 of these interviews 
were used in this study (1 interview dealt with a topic that later on was decided not to be 
included in the scope of this research). From 26 experts with whom the interviews have not 
been conducted, 6 initially indicated to have interest in the study and agreed to be interviewed, 
but could not participate due to time constraints, referred to another expert, or did not reply to 
follow-up e-mails; 5 disagreed to be interviewed, noting lack of time, expertise in the subject 
matter or interest in the study as their reasons; and 15 provided no response at all.  
 
Total individuals contacted  52 
Total interviewed  26 
Agreed to participate, but no follow-up (experts did not say "no") 6 
Disagreed to participate (experts said "no") 5 
No response  15 
Table 4: Number of respondents and non-respondents for the interviews 
 
 
Experts contacted 52 
Private companies 26 
Consultancies/small research bodies  5 
Governmental Bodies  3 
Global SDOs 12 
National SDOs  6 
Table 5:Demographics of interview subjects approached   
 
A substantial majority of contacted experts were affiliated with Western companies, SDOs and 
(non-) governmental actors based either in the US or EU. This is not surprising given the fact 
ICT standardization is largely carried out by Western stakeholders in SDOs based in the US 
and the EU.1402 To provide a more comprehensive view, participation of non-Western 
companies was sought: affiliates of 6 leading Asian tech companies involved in the different 
 
 
1402 See also Chapter III, which uses the same reasons to explain the choice behind US and EU regulatory 
frameworks, and Chapter IV, explaining the choice of US and EU-based SDOs.  
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layers of ICT standardization have been approached with an invitation to participate in the 
study, of which 2 have been interviewed, 2 agreed to participate but did not follow up on further 
e-mails, 1 declined, and 1 did not respond. All individuals approached were based in Western 
branches of the companies.  
 
2.1.3 Demographics of respondents  
 
The respondents had experience in multiple industries: for instance, many were involved in 
standardization at different abstraction layers; had large experience with IPR strategy and 
licensing policies of their company; or contributed to the development of Internet and web 
protocols. The respondents were also of a mixed professional background, including policy 
advisors, managements strategists, (ICT) engineers and lawyers. Most of the respondents had 
an extensive experience with working for multiple private companies, SDOs’ secretariats or 
(non-)governmental bodies, where they held different leadership positions. All individuals 
have been involved – either directly or as observers – in multiple standards development and 
governance processes. Despite the fact that the respondents have been approached as affiliates 
of certain companies, SDOs or governmental bodies, they were interviewed in private capacity, 
which was agreed with them prior to the interview: hence, the respondents did not only reflect 
on the practices of their current employers, but also shared their own experiences and 
observations.  
 
The following table illustrates the demographics of the 25 respondents whose interviews were 




Total subjects interviewed 25 
Patent-intensive company 8 
User company 4 
SDO staff member  6 
Consultancy/research body 4 
Governmental Body 1 
Table 6: Demographic respondents  
 
 
Since the interviews were carried out through open-ended questions and aimed to reveal 
practical aspects of ICT standardization, rather than analyse the responses per category of 
stakeholders, no account of respondents characteristics and responses to interview questions 
was provided. Moreover, since some respondents were selected based on their employers’ 
positions in the disputes discussed in the case studies of this chapter, conflicting views were 
reasonably expected.  
 




Potential interviewees were approached from December 2017 to April 2018. The interviews 
were conducted in a time period between January 2018 and July 2018, depending on the 
availability of the experts.  
 
As explained above, potential interviewees were approached by e-mail explaining the nature 
of purpose the study, introducing the researcher and asking for their participation; the e-mail 
also provided assurance that no references will be made no the interviewee’s affiliation.1403 In 
case of positive responses, the potential interviewees were sent the list of questions to be asked 
during the interviews.1404  
 
Some of the questions on the list were asked to all interviewees (“general questions”): for 
instance, what were the advantages of SDOs in which the companies of their affiliation 
participated; which were the barriers for (effective) participation in standardization work; 
which were the differences between SDOs’ standards development processes and governance 
processes, and were these differences justified; whether interviewees were aware of any 
ongoing disputes in SDOs, and whether they are satisfied with the dispute resolution processes; 
whether in the interviewee’s views, SDOs in which the company of his/her affiliation is 
involved offers sufficient procedural guarantees; and whether SDOs with which the 
interviewee is/was affiliated, or in which the company of interviewee’s affiliation 
participates/participated, produce standards that achieve the goals they pursue. Other questions 
were tailored to a specific SDO, standard or a case study, depending on the interviewee’s 
affiliation and experience (“specific questions”).1405 
 
The interviews were conducted either in person or through various means of 
telecommunication (i.e. skype, WebEx, phone calls). For those interviews where the experts 
granted an explicit permission to make recordings, transcripts of the conversations were made 
and sent to the experts for their approval; for other interviews, the interviewer was taking notes 
during the interviewing process.1406 Some experts, noting lack of time, preferred to answer 
interview questions per e-mail, but also offered insights and suggestions that went beyond the 
questions, and were available to provide further comments and clarifications. All interviews 
were conducted in English.  
 
Total interviews 25 
Interviewed in person 5 
Interviewed via skype/phone 18 
Provided written answers to interview questions 2 
Table 7: Interview methods   
 
 
1403 As interviews were scheduled before GDPR came into effect, no consent form was distributed at this 
stage of the empirical research. See sample email see Annex IIA. 
1404 See example of interview questions, Annex IIB.   
1405 Some interviewees provided feedback to rephrase the questions, or indicated that they preferred not to 
answer some questions.  





Since the interviews took form of “guided conversations,” experts’ responses were sometimes 
open-ended. Based on their answers, the experts have also been asked follow-up questions; for 
instance, experts were asked to list “success” factors behind certain standards or SDOs; or to 
provide their opinion on the following statement: “a standard can be effective even when it was 
developed according to ill-defined procedures,” whereby it was explained that “ill-defined 
procedures” imply the absence of openness, transparency, consensus and review mechanisms 
during standards development processes.  
 
The answers to the questions were subsequently grouped under separate topics (i.e. “barriers 
to participation” and “difference between governance and standards development processes”), 
and analysed in a coherent text that follows the narrative of this research.1407 Answers that 
related to the three case studies on procedural dispute were analysed in the context of the desk 
study and other relevant evidence. Before finalizing this manuscript (January 2020), the 
excerpts from the interviews used in this study have been shared with the experts in order to 
confirm that their statements have not been misinterpreted.  
 
2.2 Qualitative case studies on disputes in SDOs 
 
The second type of empirical research was the study of three disputes that involved, or occurred 
in, three SDOs analysed in chapter IV, namely ETSI, IEEE-SA and W3C. This part of the 
research aimed preliminary to reveal what can be learned from disputes on SDOs’ procedures 
with regard to implementation of due process principles for standardization?  
 
The case studies were mostly performed by a desk research using the following sources: 
relevant case law, organizational documents placed in public domains, archival records 
available on SDOs’ websites or shared with the author by participants (i.e. minutes of the 
meetings; text of proceedings; e-mail correspondence); official statements of companies 
involved in the disputes and previous (academic) case studies. Where possible, the desk study 
was supplemented by the answers of semi-structured interview questions provided by 
individuals who have been involved in the disputes or have profound knowledge of the events 
(see above for the methodology). These questions formed a part of “specific questions” 
discussed above and were sometimes asked as follow-up questions during the interviews.  
 
It should be noted that not all relevant documents were made equally available for all three 
case studies, which may result in an unbalanced representation of views.1408 This shortcoming 
was attempted to be mitigated by reaching out to different stakeholders and formulating 
 
 
1407 See Section 3 of this chapter.  
1408 As noted by Yin, case studies in general may lack rigor and, as any type of qualitative research, do not 
allow to make any generalizations (Yin, Case Study Research, p. 9). 
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questions in an objective manner, without taking any position based on the desk study research 
or previous studies in the field, or favoring any parties. 
 
2.3 Survey among SDOs members   
 
The empirical study of this research initially included a survey among members and 
participants of the five SDOs. Survey questions related to members’ experiences and 
satisfaction with these SDOs’ technical and governance processes. The purpose of the survey 
was to empirically test the hypotheses derived from theoretical findings of the descriptive and 
anecdotal evidence of this research. Five surveys were developed, each tailored to the specific 
SDO analysed in Chapter IV or, as it was case of IEEE, a specific working group: yet, the 
surveys could only be distributed among 3 SDOs/working groups, namely the members of 
ETSI, 802.11 Working Group of IEEE-SA and participants of IETF general mailing list .1409 
The total number of survey responses received amounts to 93, of which 79 were completed. 
Note that due to the absence of formal membership in IETF, it is impossible to calculate the 
exact number of respondents approached. 
 
Due to these limitations, the survey results do not present meaningful contributions to the 
conclusion of this empirical part of the study, or of the whole study, and rather serve as 
anecdotal evidence. Yet, although not entirely representative, these findings also allow for 
some interesting observations: for instance, the results demonstrated no correlation between 
stakeholders’ affiliation with their satisfaction of SDOs’ processes, and neither did the 
extensiveness of stakeholders’ experience in an SDO appeared to affect their knowledge of this 
SDO’s governance processes. Furthermore, the respondents indicated that there was no need 
to modify SDOs’ processes, and neither to subject them to increased governmental scrutiny.  
 
Because of the relatively small number of responses, it was decided not to include the survey 
findings into the main empirical study. It was also decided not to remove the survey completely, 
since even its limited findings offer some interesting, although anecdotal, observations, but 
also because this survey could potentially serve as a useful reference for future empirical work. 
Hence, the  methodology and results of the survey are discussed in Annex III of this manuscript.  
 
2.4 Limitations and caveats 
 
The qualitative empirical study of this research has a number of caveats and limitations that 
should be addressed. 
First and foremost, the great majority of experts interviewed in the context of this study are 
affiliated with leading ICT commercial enterprises; only a few contributors are linked to 
smaller-scaled companies, governmental agencies or SDOs’ secretariats.1410 Hence, it should 
 
 
1409 See Annex III for explanations, methodology and results. 
1410 It should be recalled that some experts who have been approached in the capacity of SDOs leadership 
are also affiliated with private companies.  
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be admitted that the results of this study are rather limited and do not necessarily represent an 
equal share of all standardization interests. This limitation can be explained by the following: 
firstly, most stakeholders in ICT standardization are indeed large private companies, which 
also explains the choice of stakeholders approached for the interviews; secondly, due to the 
time constraints and the limitations imposed by the research design of the study,1411 it was 
practically impossible to identify and approach all relevant stakeholders in ICT 
standardization. Hence, the conclusions derived from these interviews, even if taking a form 
of anecdotal evidence, should be viewed in the light of this limitation.  
The second limitation relates to the demographic homogeneity of the interview subjects: all 
interviewed individuals were affiliated Western-based companies, or Western branches of 
Asian companies, SDOs or governments. This limitation can be explained by the fact that the 
ICT sector is still largely driven by Western companies from the US and EU, and Western-
based SDOs. It should be noted that the research questions that guided qualitative empirical 
studies took no account of nationality, country of residence or gender of interviewed experts: 
while not directly relevant for the purpose of this research, this material constitutes an 
interesting topic for future empirical studies.  
 
Third, although the interviews sought the insights of various parties, not all approached 
stakeholders agreed to participate: for this reason, the case studies do not represent the views 
of all parties, and there is an inequality between the number of companies termed as “patent-
intensive” and “user.”  
 
Fourth, open-ended interview questions, while having a benefits of not restricting the interview 
subjects to the scripted list of questions and allowing them to choose the conservation format 
(i.e. strictly following the questions; skipping some questions; sending written answers if 
personal interview is not possible) may have also resulted in somewhat unbalanced findings. 
This especially concerns responses submitted per e-mail, since it limited the opportunities to 
ask follow up questions during the interviews.1412  Moreover, some experts preferred to cover 
multiple questions in one response, or not to follow the questions’ script at all; in a similar 
vein, the majority of interviewed experts preferred not to be recorded, which eliminated the 
possibility of sending transcripts for verification.  
 
Last, due account should be taken of the fact that experts participated in the study in their 
private capacity. Their contributions were based on their particular experience and may also 
include their own opinion, which may not always correspond to the position prevailing in the 
industry or even the company of their affiliation. At the same time, account should be taken of 
certain preference in experts’ views resulting from their affiliation. It is also important to note 
that depending on experts’ background or the industry in which they are involved, their 
interpretation of such concepts as transparency, openness and consensus may differ.  
 
 
1411 See Chapter I.  





Despite the mentioned caveats, the findings of the empirical research contribute to the study 
on procedural guarantees in SDOs by offering a different, practical perspective on complex 
legal issues that sit at the center of this study.  
 
3. Experts’ views on SDOs’ governance and standards development processes 
 
3.1 Experience with SDOs’ governance and procedures 
 
3.1.1 Differences between SDOs  
 
In their answers to the interview questions, the experts have frequently addressed the 
differences between various institutional models of SDOs. Such differences may arise, among 
others, from the specifics of the dimension in which SDOs operate, as well as the varieties of 
standards that SDOs create.  
 
For instance, in the healthcare sector, a large share of standards is concerned with safety and 
essential performance of medical devices, which is not the case with the ICT, where 
interoperability plays a crucial role.1413 Due to the high safety risks and increased regulation, 
healthcare standardization is rather conservative and moves slower than ICT standardization. 
Innovations in healthcare are often not standardized and companies prefer to use their 
inventions as a competitive differentiator, which renders the issue of Intellectual Property 
rights (IPRs) embedded in a healthcare standards less essential than it is in the domain of 
ICT.1414 That said, standardization activities of the two sectors are closely linked: to illustrate, 
medical body area networks require base specifications for technological interoperability, such 
as protocols and formats, to enable transfer of the medical data via ICT vehicles.1415 Moreover, 
healthcare standardization involves a wide range of expertise, since the syntax and semantics 
should be modeled after the reality of clinical concepts: hence, both ICT engineers and 
clinicians who share their experience with interaction patterns are involved in standardization 
work.1416 Healthcare standards thus evolve as they adopt the latest ICT technologies. 
 
 
1413 Interview with an industry expert, 25 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1414 The expert clarified that the healthcare specific data exchange, i.e. essentially work flow, interaction 
patterns -related or semantics-related, are not suitable for capitalizing the value of patents. Moreover, due to fact 
that the regulatory requirements tend to focus on “what” and not on “how,” there are hardly in any patents in 
standardization of Medical Devices and Healthcare IT. Interview with an industry expert, 25 January 2018, on 
file with the author.  
1415 Such base specifications create reference architecture and are typically used in combination to cover 
the needs for user-cases: examples include IEEE 802.15.16, but also Digital Imaging Communication (DICOM), 
used for imaging by X-ray and ultrasound. Other leading ICT standards in healthcare sector are the Integrating 
the Healthcare Enterprise (IHE) and the IEEE 11073 series for patient monitoring domain. At the same time, 
regulatory domain in healthcare sector is larger than in ICT due to such legal requirements as privacy, data 
localisation and security, while most of the standards concern safety and essential performance of medical devices. 
Interview with an industry expert, 25 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1416 The dynamics and interactions between different parts of these systems is crucial and must closely fit 




Experts also highlighted the difference between international and European SDOs: since there 
is no obligation to adopt ISO standards as national standards, NSOs supposedly enjoy more 
freedom in international fora.1417 IEC and CEN/CENELEC were experienced as being more 
prone to seeking industry advise, whereas ISO was claimed to show more tendency to rely on 
the judgement of NSOs’ leaders; this may be explained by ISO’s extremely broad, multi-
sectoral scope, which sometimes hinders communication with stakeholders, as well by 
historical differences between these bodies.1418 With regard to the ESOs, it appears that 
although companies cannot participate in ETSI through NSOs,1419 a great number of innovative 
companies still prefer ETSI’s participation model over CEN/CENELEC delegation 
principle.1420 The advantages of ETSI mentioned by the experts were  ETSI’s openness, free 
availability and global use of ETSI standards, and a well-functioning IPR policy:1421 in this 
context, ETSI’s IPR policy was suggested not be the best one but, the certainly one “that 
works.”1422 From the perspective of smaller companies, however, ETSI was found to have 
slower, and more political, processes due to the large amount of members who are willing to 
drive a standard.1423 
 
When discussing the difference between formal and informal SDOs, it was noted that consortia 
are not common in other sectors than ICT which, in turn, also questions the relevance of formal 
organizations in the ICT standardization.1424 Consortia were suggested to prefer governance 
rules that are decided by consensus or voting,1425 as opposed to a political and top-down rules 
of ISO.1426 In this context, the differences in SDOs’ decision-making were explained by the 
purpose of their activities: in GSM Association, for instance, decisions are preliminary driven 
by mobile operators, whose interests the SDO was established to serve, while manufacturers 
typically have less rights.1427  
 
Some sectors rely on both formal and informal standards. In the area of forensic cyber 
standardization, all forensic laboratories support processes that follow the relevant ISO 
 
 
clinicians who have a good comprehension of technology.” Interview with an industry expert, 25 January 2018, 
on file with the author.  
1417 Interview with an expert from an NSO, 19 January 2018, on file with the author.  
1418 Interview with an industry expert, 25 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1419 This due to the different membership requirement. Interview with an expert from an NSO, 19 January 
2018, on file with the author.  
1420 Interview with an industry expert, 23 January 2018, on file with the author.   
1421 Interview with an expert from an SDO, 4 April 2018, on file with the author; in relation to IPR policy: 
Interview with an industry expert, 16 January 2018, on file with the author; Interview with an industry expert, 17 
January 2018, on file with the author.  
1422 Interview with an industry expert, 7 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1423 Interview with an industry expert, 21 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1424 Interview with an expert from an NSO, 19 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1425 Interview an industry expert, 4 April 2018, on file with the author. Note that this experience of the 
expert is striking with the common understanding of consortia as being led by a handful of firms, and formal 
SDOs consensus-driven.  
1426 Interview an industry expert, 4 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1427 Interview with an industry expert, 15 January 2018, on file with the author. However, challenges may 
arise once operators impose their decisions on manufacturers.  
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standards, and also rely on the implementation guidelines of the European Agency for 
Cybersecurity (ENISA).1428 However, the standard language used to ensure that forensic tools 
export data in harmonized way, the Cyber-investigation Analysis Standard Expression 
(CASE), is developed by the forensic community and is largely led by companies and 
practitioners, who take their decisions by voting.1429 CASE is administered by governmental 
agencies (Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3), Netherlands Forensic Institute 
(NFI)); non-regulatory bodies (NIST) and  private companies (FireEye), and is coordinated by 
the University of Lausanne.1430 
 
By and large, it was acknowledged that “one size fits all” approach for SDOs’ governance 
models and procedures does not exist, even for organizations operating in the same industry 
subset.1431 Every SDO follows a unique set of rules, tailored for its specific purposes and 
membership, and none of the existing governance models should be considered “better” or 
“worse.”1432 For example, not all SDOs rely on the wide-accepted definition of an open 
standard,1433 and business models for IPR licensing often differ per company.1434 Stakeholders’ 
experience with SDOs largely depends on technology and market context, but also on the 
business goals of corporate stakeholders and even on the conduct of individuals participating 
in standardization work.1435 Standardization of telecommunications, for instance, generally 
requires a broad approach (i.e. large group of people as opposed to a smaller group of like-
minded individuals), but some specifications, such as the USB, were claimed to be better 
developed in narrower groups.1436 Likewise, while FRAND licensing often form the crux of 
telecoms standardization, a similar IPR model in upper-layer standardization1437 was believed 
to disturb the technical work of committees, since it prevented stakeholders from focusing on 
performance benefits.1438  
 
3.1.2  Switching between existing standardization platforms and creating new ones 
 
Due to the abundance of SDOs, their institutional variety and voluntary membership, a scenario 
where participants that are not satisfied with the governance or technical activity in one SDO 
 
 
1428 Interview with experts from cyber police authority, 11 January 2018, on file with the author. While 
the guidelines are voluntary, they work similarly to the Harmonized European Standards. Interview with 
cyber police authority, 11 January 2018. 
1429 Interview with experts from cyber police authority, 11 January 2018. 
1430 Interview with experts from cyber police authority, 11 January 2018. 
1431 Most clearly it was suggested in interview with an expert from an NSO, 19 January 2018, on file with 
the author, with regard to ICT standards.  
1432 Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 27 April 2018, on file with the author.  
1433 Interview with an industry expert, 13 June 2018, on file with the author. 
1434 Interview with an expert from an NSO, 19 January 2018, on file with the author.  
1435 Interview with an industry expert, 25 January 2018, on file with the author.  
1436 Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 27 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1437 I.e. application protocols and language formats. 
1438 Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author; Interview an industry 
expert, 4 April 2018, on file with the author.  
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(for instance, due to its IPR Policy rules) switch to another forum seems plausible.1439 Such 
practice, however, was not observed in the recent study on SDOs’ governance; rather, it was 
suggested that stakeholders are more likely to “step out of the room” and carry out particular 
standardization activities elsewhere, without terminating their SDO membership.1440 Often, 
such “externally” developed standards will be re-introduced in the SDO, for instance via a fast-
track process, to further resume standardization activities. 
 
For example, in mid-2000, W3C members decided to abandon the development HTML mark-
up specifications and focus on its XML-based equivalent with a stricter mark-up syntax rules, 
the XHTML, instead. 1441 The work on HTML5 specifications continued in the Web Hypertext 
Application Technology Working Group (WHATWG), a consortia created by Apple, Mozilla 
and Opera in 2004.1442 Unlike it was the case for W3C, WHATWG processes were not based 
on consensus;1443 moreover, where W3C required companies to provide royalty-free licenses 
for patent claims covering its specifications, WHATWG offered less strict patent protection. 
 
Once it became clear that the XHTML standard could not replace HTML due to technical 
reasons,1444 W3C decided to resume the work on HTML:1445 WHATWG specification were 
put through W3C process, and HTML5 was adopted by W3C in 2009.1446 Yet, since browser-
vendors were concerned that the W3C process was too slow for HTML5,  two new procedures 
were adopted to accelerate standardization processes: firstly, a system for creating W3C 
Community Groups for standardization activities became fully automized; secondly, HTML 
Extensions could not be defined without re-chartering the Working Groups.1447  
 
 
1439 In this regard, next to the “vertical” relationship, there is also “horizontal” relationship between SDOs 
who compete in standards development; see JRC Report, p. 61. Note that such type of “competition” would 
typically be for bottom-up SDOs, since regional and international and national should ideally not compete because 
of coherence requirements.  
1440 JRC Report, p. 68. 
1441 See ‘HTML5: a vocabulary and associated APIs for HTML and XHTML’ (2014) W3C  
Recommendation of 28 October 2014, available at https://www.w3.org/TR/2014/REC-html5-
20141028/introduction.html#history-0. 
1442 These companies did not share the position of W3C membership; a proposal by Mozilla and Opera at 
a W3C workshop in 2004 where the companies suggested to continue the work on HTML did not gain sufficient 
votes. R. Tabarés-Gutiérrez, ‘Taking a glance at the history of HTML5’, in K. Jacobs and K. Blind (eds.), EURAS 
Proceedings 2017. Digitalization: Challenge and Opportunity for Standardisation (2017). 
1443 Allegedly, the formation of W3C was also a reaction on the “slow progress without concrete results” 
of W3C, and not only on its decision to switch to the XML.  
1444 XHTML only allowed the employment of entirely new technologies and lacked backwards 
compatibility with the older versions of HTML, while the HTML5 specifications supported both code syntaxes 
and allowed multimedia elements. Most importantly, the standard did not work well on Explorer, which was a 
major browser at that time, and was causing inconvenience for web developers. See also S. E. Madnick, ‘The 
misguided silver bullet: what XML will and will NOT do to help information integration’ (2001) Sloan Working 
Paper 4185-01, available at http://ebusiness.mit.edu/research/papers.html.  
1445 Tabarés-Gutiérrez, ‘Taking a glance’. 
1446  Halpin, ‘The crisis of standardizing DRM’, p. 5.  
1447 Halpin, ‘The crisis of standardizing DRM’, p. 14. However, in 2011, the groups separated once again, 
this time because the differences in the objectives pursued: while the WHATWG viewed HTML5 as a “Living 
Standard” subject to constant amendment, the W3C favored a more stable design and focused on standardization 




Indeed, experts mentioned the option to “vote with the feet” when disagreeing with SDOs’ 
processes, as well as the possibility that participants may be driven away by market forces.1448 
In this context, procedural principles may come into play due to the existence of competing 
alternative platforms where stakeholders’ positions, otherwise ignored, will be heard.1449 An 
example provided by an expert described a situation when many IEEE members were skeptical 
about the potential for adoption of the Apple-driven FireWire IEEE 1394 because of royalty 
demands of one of the contributors; consequently, an alternative set of specifications based on 
reciprocal royalty-free licensing,  driven by Intel and others, was developed as a USB standard 
in a much narrower group, and subsequently widely adopted by the industry.1450 According to 
experts’ opinion, competition in 3GPP currently takes place between proposal made by 
companies participating in the working groups of SDOs, rather than between parallel standards 
developed by different SDOs,1451 and standards’ evolution is moved to the new releases of 
technical specifications,1452 and not to the rival initiatives. 
 
Some experts suggested that parallel standardization activity in other organizations is 
complementary rather than alternative.1453 For example, a group of 3GPP members established 
MulteFire Alliance to speed up standardization of LTE specifications for unlicensed spectrum, 
since the work within 3GPP was affected by the hesitation of the operators who often lacked 
interest in specifying LTE.1454 (Operators’ uncertainties revolved around such questions as: to 
what extent should Wi-Fi be integrated into cellular solutions, and to what extent can 3GPP 
develop solutions for unlicensed spectrum).1455 In a longer run, however, MulteFire aims to 
bring standardization work back to 3GPP,1456 which indicates that this strategy should be 
considered as “stepping out of the room” rather than “voting with the feet.”  
 
 
new specification was transferred to the W3C, but Apple, Mozilla and Opera kept a version with less restrictive 
license.    
1448 Interview with an industry expert, 23 January 2018, on file with the author; Interview with an industry 
expert, 25 January 2018, on file with the author; Interview with an industry expert, 13 February 2018, on file with 
the author; Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 27 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1449 Interview with an industry expert, 13 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1450 Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 27 April 2018, on file with the author. The 
experts noted that next to the royalty-free policy, other factors such as capability of the technology and its 
longevity also came into play; moreover, there were other standards such as HTTP that would never have gained 
such rapid and wide spread adoption if engineers were faced with questionable costs. 
1451 Interview with an industry expert, 1 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1452 Interview with an industry expert, 1 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1453 Interview with an industry expert, 16 January 2018, on file with the author.    
1454 Interview with an industry expert, 15 January 2018, on file with the author; Interview with an industry 
expert, 7 February 2018, on file with the author. The experts explained that in such a consensus-based organization 
like 3GPP, unlicensed spectrum is not the primary focus of the mobile operators, because they pay for the 
spectrum. Therefore, using unlicensed spectrum with that technology is not supported by all operators. However, 
the interest may increase once unlicensed LTE technology is ready and deployed.  
1455 Interview with an industry expert, 1 February 2018, on file with the author. Other examples included 
the Unlicensed Mobile Access (UMA), specifications developed outside the formal SDO framework but then 
brought to ETSI, from the interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1456 The operational framework of MulteFire, and especially its IPR Policy, demonstrates similarities with 
the one of ETSI, and contains elements of relationship between IEEE and Wi-Fi Alliance. Interview with an 




It appears that standards drivers are more likely to create a new SDO for a particular 
standardization activity, rather than to bring a standardization project to another institution. As 
such, new organizations are created when envisaged technical work does not fit within any of 
the existent SDOs, or as a reaction to their mis-performance.1457 Establishment of a new SDO 
requires a lot of effort to be put in designing their processes and ensuring that the organization 
has clear terms of reference, follows the broader WTO principles and, most importantly, does 
not run into antitrust problems;1458 moreover, organization’s operational rules should be 
designed in a way that, from the outset, does not allow the work of this organization to be 
hijacked by a particular interest group.1459 Although the rules of such new organizations are 
initially written by a few founding companies1460 and members joining after the establishment 
have to accept the operational framework defined by founders, the by-laws and charters always 
allow for changing the rules when required by the SDOs membership.1461 
 
Examples of such recently erected consortia are Zhaga Consortium and DiiA/DALI 
Alliance:1462 established only by a few companies, both consortia grew into organizations of 
about 150 members. Although they remain driven by large stakeholders, every company whose 
activities fall within the scope of the consortia are allowed to join and choose between the 
different levels of membership.1463  
 
Yet, it was also suggested that creation of new SDOs may have negative consequences, 
especially when a new piece of work can be accommodated in an existent organization.1464 
Proliferation of SDOs requires companies to spread their scarce resources and expertise over 
different entities, and increase their investment uncertainties, which may even create confusion 
in the market.1465 As an example, when the GSM Association initiated technical work on audio 
codec for smartphones, some companies preferred the project to be carried out in 3GPP, where 
this type of activities traditionally took place: the rationale behind it was that related 
specifications should have followed one approval path for staying consistent and being 
 
 
1457 Interview with an industry expert, 18 April 2018, on file with the author. For instance, ISO provided 
certain period of time after for declaring essential patents, which resulted in a situation with 3 patent pools for a 
standard; as a response to this licensing situation, the industry created the Alliance for Open Media. Interview 
with an industry expert, 4 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1458 Interview with an industry expert, 15 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1459 Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 15 February 2018, on file with the author. 
Interview with  an industry expert, 18 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1460 Interview with an industry expert, 15 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1461 Interview with an industry expert, 18 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1462 Those were established by members of large consortia, such as Bluetooth SIG. Interview with an 
industry expert, 18 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1463 Interview with an industry expert, 18 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1464 A recent example provided by the expert is when a body was erected by few market players to 
standardization in security and tele monitoring domain for consumer health, and a company was trying to convince 
them to bring the activity back in an already established SDO. Interview with an industry expert, 25 January 2018, 
on file with the author. 
1465 Interview with an industry expert, 25 January 2018, on file with the author. An example is a cloud trust 




correctly implemented into products, rather than being balkanized over different technical 
bodies.1466 It is perhaps also for this reason (although it was not mentioned as such by the 
interviewee) that recent years have witnessed a number of mergers between different SDOs:1467 
for instance, some smaller consortia ended up being integrated in the Open Mobile Alliance, 
which was initially established by only a few entities.1468 
 
3.1.3 Barriers for participation  
 
Barriers for participation in standardization activities have been previously addressed in the 
relevant scholarship, which discussed, among other things, participation of developing 
countries, civil society and SMEs in global SDOs.1469 The regulatory frameworks for 
standardization address barriers for participation through the principle of openness, but also 
through transparency, since meaningful participation is impossible without access to 
information.  
 
While participation in SDOs was believed to bring enormous benefits to the industry and public 
sector due to their effectiveness, global outreach and industry reputation,1470 many experts have 
discussed factors that may prevent stakeholder participation in certain types of SDOs, or even 
affect their decision to join the SDOs’ membership.1471 In general, IPR policies were named as 
one of the main blocking factors for effective participation in standards development. 
Companies that follow open source or royalty-free business model (typically new players on 
the market), may be discouraged by ETSI’s FRAND policy from joining the SDO;1472 to the 
contrary, companies with FRAND business model are discouraged from participation in SDOs 
where IPR policies have adverse effects on their business.1473 Smaller companies were mostly 
concerned with the amount of royalties they have to pay, and whether IPR policies guarantee 
fairness and equity.1474  
 
Other participation barriers commonly mentioned were the availability of a budget, which 
largely depends on product relevance and business area where a company operates, as well as 
 
 
1466 Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author.  
1467 Interview with an industry expert, 18 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1468 Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author.  
1469 See, among others, A. Harcourt, G. Christou and S. Simpson, Global Standard Setting in Internet 
Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020); Gupta, ‘The role of SMEs and startups in standards 
development’; Thorstensen, Weissinger and Sun, ‘Private standards’.  
1470 Interview with an industry expert, 23 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1471 It should be noted that even though all interviewees were affiliated with large commercial firms 
involved in many standardization activities, they all mentioned concerns of participation. 
1472 Although “older” players sometimes also operate following the open source model, they are already 
established on the market and have experience with the IPR Policy applicable to their standardization activities. 
Interview with an expert from an SDO, 4 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1473 Interview with an industry expert, 25 January 2018, on file with the author; Interview with an industry 
expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author; Interview with an industry expert, 18 April 2018, on file with 
the author. In some cases of participation in Bluetooth SIG, an individual really had to convince the director of 
his company to participate in an SDO that, at first glance, had an adverse IPR Policy. Interview with an industry 
expert, 18 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1474 Interview with an industry expert, 21 February 2018, on file with the author. 
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SDOs’ participation models; and time.1475 Financing participation in standardization meetings 
is especially challenging for smaller stakeholders or individuals, which mostly engage in 
standards development on a voluntary basis.1476 For NSOs, involvement in standardization 
processes depends on the availability and willingness of their members.1477 But also scientific 
background and human factor play an important role, especially since to a certain extent, 
standardization is akin to politics, and requires trust relationship between participants: to 
illustrate, lobbying occurs even where a standard’s proposal is sufficiently mature.1478 At the 
same time, large Western companies have also indicated their challenges to participate in 
China’s standards development processes due to limited voting rights.1479 
 
Some barriers that were mentioned by the experts are sector-specific: for telecommunications 
industry, one of the largest challenges is the raise of ecosystems outside the formal standards 
(for instance, Android), which appears a well-established practice for software developers.1480 
Moreover, different SDOs and industry alliances in wireless telecom sectors maintain their 
own confidentiality rules, which preclude outsiders from obtaining information on their 
working programs and contents of standards, crucial for effective cooperation.1481 For Internet 
standardization, effective participation is impossible without understanding of the common 
language, technical ability to read documents,1482 as well as without remote participation 
facilities.1483 IETF culture and the way of communication was also noted as one of the 
challenges newcomers have to overcome:1484 for instance, unlike the modern practices, e-mails 




1475 Interview with an expert from an NSO, 19 January 2018, on file with the author; Interview with an 
industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author; Interview with an industry expert, 21 February 2018, 
on file with the author. Sometimes, participation model can be mitigated: in forensic cyber standardization, some 
experts that are not private companies may participate without official affiliation, bringing, for instance, unique 
law enforcement expertise. Interview with experts from cyber police authority, 11 January 2018. 
1476 Interview with an environmental management and radiation expert, 9 January 2018, on file with the 
author. An example is the difference between a large certification company who pays fees and hotels for their 
representatives, and a private certification consultant who is self-financed. 
1477 Interview with an expert from an NSO, 19 January 2018, on file with the author. There may be also 
difference between NSOs: DIN, for instance, has a business culture to participate in standardization, while NEN 
is more concerned with short-term business profits rather than long-term business profits. 
1478 Interview with an industry expert, 21 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1479 Interview with an industry expert, 16 January 2018, on file with the author; Industry expert’s answers 
to the questionnaire, received 27 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1480 Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author.  
1481 While some SDOs have indeed signed liaisons and partnership agreements, they do not appear 
sufficient in practice. Interview with an industry expert, 18 April 2018, on file with the author.   
1482 Interview with experts from cyber police authority, 11 January 2018, on file with the author; Interview 
with an expert from an SDO, 12 January 2018, on file with the author; Interview with an industry expert,* 16 
January 2018, on file with the author. In this context, language implies both English and technical language 
(although the “code language” is difficult to understand without English). Translations are usually voluntary.  
1483 Some of those challenges tried to be addressed by IETF in South America by getting a group together 
and teaching in their native language how to interact at IETF meetings: this resulted in increased participation of 
the South American experts in IETF. Interview with an industry expert,* 16 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1484 Interview with an expert from an SDO, 12 January 2018, on file with the author.  
1485 Interview with an expert from an SDO, 12 January 2018, on file with the author. The author 
experienced sending email to the wrong working group: the e-mail did not get deleted, but a warning was received.  
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It was also suggested that SDOs’ processes may affect stakeholders’ decision to join a 
particular standardization group. Typically, companies will screen the procedures of a newly 
formed SDO and will analyze the probability of market success of its standards,1486 as well the 
value of the standard for their business.1487 Each company follows its own internal process for 
reviewing SDOs’ rules,1488 and IPR Policies are subject to the most rigid analysis from 
potential members.1489 In addition, due account is taken of SDOs’ antitrust policies, and legal 
risks that companies may be exposed to by virtue of their involvement in technical 
discussions.1490 When operational framework of an SDO deviates substantially from the 
overarching procedural principles, or opens avenues for antitrust abuse, companies would 
contact the SDO to seek further explanations.1491 
 
Companies’ level of participation and acquiring of leadership positions (i.e. position in 
governance bodies, but also technical leadership, like chair of working group, editor, or a 
secretary)1492 will depend on how actively is an SDO involved in the sector of their interest.1493 
Some large companies, for instance, prefer to participate in SDOs with established 
infrastructure, but also a well-functioning secretariat.1494 However, it was also noted that 
business considerations always prevail: a company will always join an SDO where there is a 
commercial need to do so.1495 Participating in an SDO’s activities is thus a business decision 
that involves costs-benefits considerations.1496  
 
Procedural rules other than IPR and antitrust policies were found of less importance when 
considering participation in an SDO: once a company has established that an SDO develops 
standards that are relevant and has an acceptable IPR policy, and if there is sufficient funding 
for that company’s involvement in standardization processes,  procedural consideration would 
 
 
1486 Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 15 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1487 Although arguably, the value of a standard is not per se a reason to participate, since the industry will 
anyways adopt a successful standard. Interview with an industry expert, 25 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1488 Interview with an industry expert, 15 January 2018, on file with the author; Interview with an industry 
expert, 25 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1489 Naturally, stakeholders with large patent-portfolios would give preference to SDOs that operate 
following FRAND-based model and will be more cautious when joining a forum with a royalty-free based IPR 
policy. Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author.  
1490 Interview with an industry expert, 15 January 2018, on file with the author; Interview with an industry 
expert, 25 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1491 Interview with an industry expert, 15 January 2018, on file with the author; Interview with an industry 
expert, 13 June 2018, on file with the author. Some even follow a sort of portfolio approach to decide in which 
processes they should invest. Interview with an industry expert, 25 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1492 Interview with an industry expert, 25 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1493 Interview with an industry expert, 25 January 2018, on file with the author; Interview with an industry 
expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author.  
1494 Interview with an industry expert, 23 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1495 Interview with an industry expert, 13 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1496 Interview with an industry expert, 25 January 2018, on file with the author. Interview with an industry 
expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author. However, individual dimensions should also be considered: 
experts may be willing to get involved in standards development processes of a particular SDO not only with a 
purpose to influence a standard, but to simply be informed about the standard’s content or to network with other 
experts. Interview with an expert from an NSO, 19 January 2018, on file with the author. 
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generally not affect its decision to join the forum.1497 In that sense, companies only join when 
they feel comfortable,1498 and the decision whether to join an SDO is often straightforward and 
clear.1499 Interviewees shared that most of the times, companies find SDOs’ rules acceptable1500 
and are generally satisfied with procedural guarantees of SDOs where they currently 
participate, except for specific cases: some stakeholders have raised concerns regarding the 
updated IEEE policy;1501 others, on the contrary, criticized ETSI’s FRAND-based policy for 
providing little clarity and being too inflexible to adjust to the current needs of the industry.1502 
Some experts said to be reluctant to join some SDOs in the automotive sector for the reason 
that their IPR policies were rather opaque.1503 
 
3.1.4 Governance vs standards development processes   
 
Previous empirical studies suggested that stakeholders would prefer that SDOs governance 
processes (“policy-making”) follow processes that provide at least as many procedural 
safeguards as those for technical processes (“standards development”), and that both types of 
processes should follow the governance principles introduced in the regulatory frameworks.1504   
 
Some of the interviewed experts suggested that governance rules are not subjected to much 
controversies among SDO membership, since companies will only join if they find that an SDO 
is governed in a way they are satisfied with.1505 The existent differences were believed to be 
justified since the effect of SDOs policies is immediate and goes further than the effect of 
standards, which is mainly indirect and has a reputational risk, but typically would not lead to 
antitrust accusations or liability claims.1506 In this regard, whether governance and standards 
development processes are structured in a similar way largely depends on the SDO’s 
operational context and the functioning of its standards.1507 And while some experts noted that 
the “disconnect” between governance and standards development procedures, where it exists, 
is not justified,1508 others found that differences in voting procedures and quorum are 





1497 Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1498 Interview with an industry expert, 13 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1499 Interview an industry expert, 4 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1500 Interview with an industry expert, 15 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1501 Interview with an industry expert, 17 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1502 Interview with an industry expert, 13 February 2018, on file with the author. Interview with an industry 
expert, 21 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1503 Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author.  
1504 See the result of the stakeholder survey of the JRC Report.  
1505 Interview with an industry expert, 13 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1506 Interview with an industry expert, 25 January 2018, on file with the author.  
1507 Interview with an industry expert, 13 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1508 Interview with an industry expert, 16 January 2018, on file with the author. Interview with an industry 
expert, 17 January 2018, on file with the author.  
1509 Interview with an industry expert, 23 January 2018, on file with the author. 
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It was observed by the interviewees that SDOs’ structure and rules are typically driven by 
founding companies; other players would join if they consider these rules sufficient, fair and 
attractive for their business activities.1510 Nevertheless, the rules can be bend and redeveloped 
if the SDO’s functioning under the existing framework affects its marketability: experts also 
speak of the operational framework that is being “corrected on its own.”1511 Some experts have 
even suggested that while firms that have joined only recently have a “pragmatic” approach 
and may sometimes ignore the established procedural framework, companies that are well 
settled in an SDO’s culture act as watchdogs and ensure that the rules are properly followed.1512 
Large members would then get involved in co-negotiating of new governance rules, since they 
possess considerable experience and knowledge and have already sustained processes in 
matters related to SDO governance.1513  
 
Actors who are not satisfied with the course of discussion on governance processes would also 
voice their concerns,1514 in particular when a company suspects that the discussion is 
incompatible with its antitrust policy and may violate competition law.1515 Strategies to 
intervene include lobbying, e-mail exchange, speaking up at the meetings, and making sure 
that disagreements are noted.1516 Examples of such “protests” shared by the experts included a 
technical discussion within an SDO which was started by a working group member without 
having consulted the members of the technical committee above, while the rules prescribed the 
opposite.1517 
 
Interviewees also addressed the processes of amendment of SDOs rules and policies. Most 
large companies appear to be involved in the drafting of SDOs’ operational rules, especially 
once they disagree with the processes or contents of the new policies. The reason for that may 
be that stronger players with a strong position on the market have substantial resources and 
human capacity to engage into SDOs’ meetings.1518 For smaller user-stakeholders, governance 
is typically not an “active discussion.”1519 For NSOs, participation in governance processes is 
not a main task, but a responsibility to represent interests of their members that are affected by 
modifications of operational rules, and in particular amendments of IPR policies.1520 It was 
also mentioned in this context that, unlike decision-making on embedded technologies, which 
 
 
1510 Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 27 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1511 Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 27 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1512 Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1513 Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1514 I.e. Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 27 April 2018, on file with the author. 
Interview with an industry expert, 13 June 2018, on file with the author. 
1515 Interview with an industry expert, 25 January 2018, on file with the author; Interview with an industry 
expert, 15 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1516 I.e. Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 27 April 2018, on file with the author. 
Interview with an industry expert, 13 June 2018, on file with the author.  
1517 Interview with an expert from an NSO, 19 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1518 Interview with an industry expert, 25 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1519 Interview with an industry expert, 21 February 2018, on file with the author.  
1520 Interview with an expert from an NSO, 19 January 2018, on file with the author. 
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sometimes may need to happen rapidly, modifications of IPR policies should be performed 
with caution and respect procedural guarantees.1521 
 
Some experts noted that while in reality, changes to operational frameworks are accepted 
retroactively,1522 they should nevertheless be sufficiently accounted for1523 due to the 
democratic character of SDOs.1524 In this regard, the fundamental standardization principles of 
openness, transparency and ability to provide comments are believed to be necessary for both 
governance and standards development processes.1525 To illustrate, unbalanced IPR policy and 
unfair treatment during policy drafting is believed to have a discouraging effect on contributors 
of technology, and thus negatively affect standardization results.1526 Moreover, to foresee 
whether their efforts will result in benefits, stakeholders should be able to participate on an 
understandable basis, which is conditional upon the existence of clear rules.1527  
 
With regard to specific SDOs, experts generally noted that there is as such no difference 
between the governance processes and standards development processes in ETSI, since the 
major decisions affecting the ETSI’s operational framework are taken at the level of the whole 
membership in the General Assembly, and the Board decided on rather limited and technical 
issues.1528 Similarly to standards approval, policy decisions in the General Assembly are taken 
by consensus, except when the IPR policy is at stake; if consensus cannot be achieved, 
decisions are taken by voting, with the voting majority of 71%.1529 In IETF, governance and 
standards development processes were confirmed to follow the same model: both are drafted 
in specialized working groups and approved by rough consensus.1530 However, some informal 
differences were noted by the experts: for instance, due to concerns of dominance, there is a 
limit to the number of experts affiliated with one company that could be members of  IETF’s 
governance bodies.1531  
 
 
1521 Interview with an industry expert, 16 January 2018, on file with the author.  
1522 Interview with an industry expert, 7 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1523 Interview with an industry expert, 7 February 2018, on file with the author; Interview with an industry 
expert, 13 June 2018, on file with the author. 
1524 SDOs are suggested to be democratic since they are member-based and governed by contracts; 
Interview with an industry expert, 7 February 2018, on file with the author. The author however disagrees with 
the view that SDOs are democratic organizations, see chapter III.7. 
1525 Interview with an industry expert, 13 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1526 Interview with an industry expert, 16 January 2018, on file with the author.    
1527 Interview with an industry expert, 15 January 2018, on file with the author. Since global reach and 
technological excellence require participants of standards discussions to invest heavily in R&D and in manpower, 
stakeholders place high expectations on SDOs’ integrity and their processes. Interview with an industry expert, 
15 January 2018, on file with the author; Interview with an industry expert, 7 February 2018, on file with the 
author. 
1528 Interview with an expert from an SDO, 4 April 2018, on file with the author. ETSI’s technical decision-
making is furthermore delegated to the 3GPP Interview with an industry expert, 7 February 2018, on file with the 
author. 
1529 Interview with an expert from an SDO, 4 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1530 Interview with an expert from an SDO, 12 January 2018, on file with the author; Interview with an 
industry expert,* 16 January 2018, on file with the author; Interview with a legal counsel of an SDO, 18 January 
2018, on file with the author. 
1531 Exceptions are made if best qualified candidates appear to be affiliated with the same company. 




It comes as no surprise that the difference between governance and standards development 
processes has been often discussed by the experts in the context of IEEE IPR Policy Update. 
Some of noted that while IEEE had good technical processes, which provide many 
opportunities for balloting, reviews, and a comment-resolution program, its policy-making has 
departed from the WTO criteria.1532 To the contrary, ETSI was praised for its governance 
processes offering sufficient protection for minority, but criticized for being not enough 
flexible to accommodate the increasing needs of the industry.1533  
 
Experts have also shared their experiences with modifications of IPR policies in SDOs other 
than IEEE and ETSI. Controversial IPR Policy of TM Forum, a recently established association 
for software development, has been eventually modified after a strong protest from the 
industry.1534 To the contrary, modifications of the IPR Policy of ZigBee Alliance appeared a 
consensus-driven, but also time-consuming, processes, which did not escalate to a dispute 
despite the unhappiness of some companies with the new rules.1535 Amendment of IETF IPR 
Policy took about six years’ time: a public draft was made available in the RFC and received 
many comments, but at the last stage of the processes there were only few comments from the 
community, and consensus was deemed to be achieved rather easily.1536  
 
One of the remarkable differences between governance and standards development processes 
named by the experts was that the former are mostly attended by lawyers/business 
professionals, and the later by engineers,1537 since each of the two processes requires different 
skills and mind-set.1538 In particular, lawyers are actively involved drafting of operational rules, 
including IPR Policy, of newly established organizations.1539 One expert explained that 
imposing governance and accountability questions would unnecessary burden technical experts 
and prevent them from being involved in technical decision-making.1540 The number of lawyers 
 
 
1532 Interview with an industry expert, 16 January 2018, on file with the author. Apparently, requirements 
to follow WTO criteria were on the IEEE website, but then were replaced with the document which states that 
WTO criteria apply only to standards development. The author is not in possession of the previous documentation. 
Interview with an expert from an SDO, 19 January 2018, on file with the author.  
1533 Interview with an industry expert, 13 February 2018, on file with the author. It should be noted that 
similar changes to IEEE patent policy were introduced in ETSI but were not accepted since they did not get the 
full consensus: for some, this is safeguarding interests (i.e. Interview with an industry expert, 17 January 2018, 
on file with the author), while for other evidence of an outdated process (Interview with an industry expert, 13 
February 2018, on file with the author).  
1534 Interview with an industry expert, 13 June 2018, on file with the author.  
1535 Interview with an industry expert, 18 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1536 Interview with a legal counsel of an SDO, 18 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1537 Interview with an industry expert,* 16 January 2018, on file with the author; Interview with an industry 
expert, 25 January 2018, on file with the author Interview with an industry expert, 7 February 2018, on file with 
the author; Interview an industry expert, 4 April 2018, on file with the author; In other words, standards are written 
“by engineers and for engineers” and SDOs’ agreements “by lawyers for lawyers.” In a way, this confirms the 
“technological idealism” of David and Shurmer, ‘Formal standard-setting’, see chapter IV.3. 
1538 Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 27 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1539 The recent dispute related to an organization that did not take good example of other SDOs and started 
from scratch. The company still joined the organization after its rules were subjected to the reviews and after it 
was clear on which terms it joins. Interview with an industry expert, 25 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1540 Interview with an expert from an SDO, 12 January 2018, on file with the author. 
220 
 
and business professionals assigned by a company to participate in SDOs’ processes is also 
smaller than the number of engineers, since technical discussions are more common.1541 That 
said, sometimes different SDOs may attract different types of participants to their meetings: in 
ICANN, for instance, the amount of lawyers is larger than in IETF.1542  
 
3.1.5 Procedural guarantees in SDOs 
 
On occasion, experts have expressed their opinion on SDOs’ compliance with the established 
procedural principles, such as openness, transparency, consensus and balance: many have 
indicated that their preference lies with the SDOs that adhere to these principles, and in 
particular to those of the EU Regulation 1025/2012 and of the TBT Committee Decision/ “the 
principles of the WTO.”1543 In this regard, SDOs that comply the six criteria of the TBT 
Committee Decision were suggested to allow for inclusive participation, timely access to 
documents, impartiality and balance the interests of access to technologies and returns on 
investment in decision-making, but also to ensure that the selection of technology is objective 
and based on technical merits (rather than stakeholders’ strategic interactions).1544 Moreover, 
concerns regarding the balance in SDOs procedures were suggested to outweigh other 
procedural principles.1545 
 
Governance processes of the formal SDOs, such as ISO/IEC and CEN/CENELEC, were found 
sufficiently transparent, well-established and hence providing advanced procedural guarantees 
to the stakeholders; at the same time, it was observed that formal SDOs could not guarantee 
that the interests of all stakeholders were taken on board via their fast-track processes.1546 It 
was also noted that many specifications that have been swiftly drafted in consortia with very 
limited membership were subject to major revisions once submitted to the formal SDOs.1547 At 
the same time, 3GPP and IETF were praised for ensuring increased transparency and 
meaningful participation by sharing drafts of technical documents for participants’ review.1548 
 
By and large, consensus appeared a preferable decision-making model among most of the 
experts. Some found that consensus encourages stakeholders to make their best effort to resolve 
objections, while voting opens avenues for strategic behavior1549 and may lead to a situation 
 
 
1541 Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 27 April 2018, on file with the author.  
1542 The decision-making process still follows the same lines in ICANN, and is merely humming, while 
ICANN is charge with more political issues than IETF. Interview with experts from cyber police authority, 11 
January 2018, on file with the author.  
1543 Interview with an industry expert, 15 January 2018, on file with the author; Interview with an industry 
expert, 16 January 2018, on file with the author.     
1544 Interview with an industry expert, 16 January 2018, on file with the author.    
1545 Interview with an industry expert, 7 February 2018, on file with the author. Also confirmed in JRC 
report. 
1546 Interview with an expert from an NSO, 19 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1547 Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1548 Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1549 Interview an industry expert, 4 April 2018, on file with the author; this obviously applies for rules 
where consensus is instead of voting. Voting is very seldom used in 3GPP: while it is extremely big and has 
enormous input of about 500 delegates in some Working Groups and meetings taking place full week, consensus 
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where controversial questions are decided too soon, without proper deliberations and 
considerations of all positions.1550 Consensus-based decision-making was suggested to work 
particularly well in smaller groups, whose composition is transparent and whose decision-
making is based on mutual faith, rather than political considerations.1551 For larger 
standardization groups, and especially SDOs that function based on the national delegation 
principle, consensus-building is a challenging and lengthy process.1552  
 
Even those consortia which do not entirely fit a consensus-based model, are in practice believed 
to be members-driven: in Bluetooth SIG, the Board of Directives is only concerned with 
outlining standardization strategies and ensuring that the necessary procedural requirements 
are fulfilled, while the actual technical definition of standards is left to the SIG’s members in 
the working groups.1553 For IETF, consensus was mentioned as a necessary prong for openness, 
and could even be critical in matters such as organization of meetings and events.1554  
 
IETF’s benefits related to easy participation in its working groups due to the mailing list and 
the absence of membership fees, but also to the fact that IETF IPR policy does not require 
specific commitments.1555  Experts found that the main strength of IETF is that its formal rules 
are minimized to what is “exactly enough” to achieve a rough consensus and include the 
judgements of the best technical experts in the field.1556 At the same time, informal rules and 
extreme openness of IETF may sometimes unduly prolong standards development 
processes.1557 Moreover, due to its uniqueness, IETF, similarly to ICANN, is believed to be an 
irreplaceable institution for Internet Governance.1558 
 
Some experts found that in IETF, procedural guarantees are secured, inter alia, by  the absence 
of a veto, which precludes standards’ capture: this, according to the experts, surpasses IETF’s 
informal processes that sets low threshold for publishing a technical contribution.1559 
Nevertheless, some companies may still attempt to dominate IETF processes, for instance by 
 
 
is the way achieve the progress. Interview with an industry expert, 1 February 2018, on file with the author. Some 
organizations even used consensus to prevent voting. Interview with an industry expert, 18 April 2018, on file 
with the author. 
1550 Interview with an expert from an SDO, 12 January 2018, on file with the author; Interview an industry 
expert, 4 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1551 Interview with an experts from cyber police authority, 11 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1552 Interview with an expert from an NSO, 19 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1553 Interview with an industry expert, 18 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1554 One example that was shared is a meeting that was initially organized in the US, but since the delegates 
could not all come to the US the venue was changed.  Similarly, some participants were concerned with  a meeting 
taking place Singapore for the reason that it did not recognize same sex marriages: to resolve the issue, a separate 
diversity committee was formed. Interview with a legal counsel of an SDO, 18 January 2018, on file with the 
author. 
1555 Interview with an industry expert,* 16 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1556 Interview with an expert from an SDO, 12 January 2018, on file with the author.  
1557 Interview with an expert from an SDO, 12 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1558 Interview with experts from cyber police authority, 11 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1559 Interview with an expert from an SDO, 12 January 2018, on file with the author. 
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sending a large amount of their technical experts to the meetings.1560 Moreover, companies’ 
size, financial background and degree of involvement in technical processes appear to matter 
for their decision-making power within IETF, although indirectly: for instance, to be eligible 
for NomCom, an expert should have a record of attending IETF working groups’ meetings in 
person, which practically excludes those experts who participate remotely1561 (mostly due to 
the lack of funding of their employers). Hence, since NomCom appoints members of some 
IETF’s governing bodies, those who make the selection are typically affiliated with larger 
companies.1562 To ensure that all interests are taken on board IETF has recently implemented 
a requirement for remote participants to formally register for the online meetings.1563 In this 
regard, IETF rules were considered sufficiently flexible to accommodate new developments 
are believed to guarantee better outcomes:1564 this also related to IRP Policies, where some part 
of the industry may be moving towards royalty-free or open source licensing approach, 
requiring the revision of the existent rules.1565  
 
When discussing balance and participation, concerns have been raised with regard to the 
ETSI’s membership structure based on the units of contribution or companies’ turnovers. Some 
believed that ETSI’s so-called “buying vote” practice (weighted voting based on subsidiaries 
in Europe) may hurt SMEs and non-European companies1566 and allow large companies with 
high revenues to dominate the voting process.1567 It was also noted that ETSI allows to 
“increase” one’s voting power by joining through multiple entities.1568 This is illustrated by the 
2009/10 election process of the ETSI Board: although very transparent, it allowed companies 
to employ multiple Board members upon their election (it should be noted, however, that Board 
members serve in their professional capacity, but are supported by sponsorship from the 
company of their affiliation).1569 
 
Amongst procedural challenges that experts had encountered, some mentioned IEEE as lacking 
transparency and fair appeal systems,1570 and insufficiency of procedural guarantees for 
American and European stakeholders in Chinese SDOs.1571 In some cases, stakeholder 
 
 
1560 This was a practice of one major company until recently, Interview with an expert from an SDO 12 
January 2018, on file with the author.  
1561 Interview with an industry expert, 16 January 2018,* on file with the author.  
1562 Interview with an industry expert,* 16 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1563 Interview with an industry expert,* 16 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1564 In SDOs’ involved in Internet standardization, this may sometimes include changes to the SDOs’ 
terminology, and not as much to its operational rules: for instance, the term “child pornography” was replaced 
with “child sexual exploitation.” Interview with experts from cyber police authority, 11 January 2018, on file with 
the author. 
1565 Interview with an industry expert, 13 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1566 Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 27 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1567 Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1568 Interview with an industry expert, 17 January 2018, on file with the author. For instance, a company 
with a vested interest in standardization of SIM cards format has joined with multiple the ETSI Working Group 
with multiple entities and its proposal gained many votes, although the solution it offered was arguably not the 
best one. Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1569 Interview with an expert from an SDO, 12 January 2018, on file with the author.  
1570 Interview with an industry expert, 17 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1571 Interview with an industry expert, 16 January 2018, on file with the author.    
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consultation that did not result in a dialogue where an actors’ position was considered and 
properly addressed, discouraged smaller stakeholders from participating in SDOs’ 
processes.1572  
 
The design of SDOs processes may indirectly affect the quality of their standards, especially 
given the asymmetry of information, knowledge and expertise among the members of larger 
SDOs: some experts even highlighted those as the reasons why industry leadership may 
sometimes prefer to develop standards in consortia that than in formal organizations.1573 At the 
same time, the quality of technical work appeared to be monitored by participants of SDOs 
working groups: to illustrate, although the informal mechanisms of IETF allows virtually 
anyone to take part in technical discussions, absurd contributions are generally ignored.1574  
 
Most of the experts seem to agree that the processes of SDOs where they participate are well 
drafted with regards to procedural guarantees of stakeholders: as worded by one expert, the 
challenges are “not in the procedures, but in the way they are applied.”1575 Another expert 
observed that faith and mutual trust among SDOs members is more important than procedural 
guarantees.1576 Yet another one mentioned that a company will only invest in SDOs where it is 
able to participate on an understandable basis and following clear rules, which serve as a 
prerequisite for that company’s benefit from standardization activities.1577  
 
3.1.6 IPR Policies  
 
SDOs’ disclosure and licensing rules were addressed by the experts with regard to almost every 
interview question, including those on procedural guarantees and forum-shifting, and related 
to both the content of these rules as well as the processes of their drafting.  
 
It is evident that different IPR regimes attract different industries: RAND/FRAND are 
commonly preferred by innovators, but may be unappealing for implementors; in turn, royalty-
free policies in certain settings may not attract the right technology.1578 Likewise, while some 
experts found FRAND to be an open commitment and a promise,1579 others found that it should 
start being adopted to industry changes.1580 Moreover, it was admitted that FRAND and 
royalty-free-based policies may be differently implemented across the SDOs: in some 
organizations, royalty-free commitments already arise once a company joins the forum (i.e. 
 
 
1572 Interview with an environmental management and radiation expert, 9 January 2018, on file with the 
author. 
1573 Interview with an industry expert, 25 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1574 Interview with an expert from an SDO, 12 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1575 Interview an industry expert, 4 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1576 Interview with experts from cyber police authority, 11 January 2018, on file with the author.  
1577 Interview with an industry expert, 15 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1578 Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 27 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1579 Interview with an industry expert, 23 January 2018, on file with the author.   
1580 Interview with an industry expert, 13 February 2018, on file with the author; Interview with an industry 
expert, 9 April 2018, on file with the author; Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 27 April 
2018, on file with the author.  
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W3C),1581 while in others only when a participant has actually contributed with its 
technology.1582 
 
Many experts have also linked IPR policies with procedural guarantees and stated the 
importance of clear and balanced procedures for their amendments; some have also suggested 
that FRAND-based organizations are more transparent.1583 According to some experts, IPR 
policies that are fair should address such issues as the threat of unreasonable injunctions and 
calculate patent value based on ex-ante value of essential technology (thus, before the IPRs 
were incorporated into a standard).1584 Others expressed the view that due to the industry 
structure, IPR rules should not be dictated by the majority.1585 
 
Furthermore, IPR Policy may change as the SDO’s landscape and membership evolves: from 
the outset, ETSI’s membership did not have much variety and consisted predominantly of 
operators and manufacturers, later joined by infrastructure providers and handset makers; 
hence, the policy was agreed upon a much smaller group of participants than ETSI currently 
accommodates, was driven by different incentives, and did not take into account the increased 
complexity and surge of patents in telecoms industry.1586 Yet, while some experts highlighted 
the inadequacy of ETSI’s IPR Policy for modern standardization activity,1587 others have 
pointed out that ETSI IPR Policy works well since it is used by many SDOs1588 and follows 
the applicable WTO principles.1589 At the same time, the issue of open source technologies 
appears unresolved under the framework of almost all formal SDOs.1590  
 
That said, companies may also have different practices with regard to IPRs: some base their 
business models on patent monetarizing, while others use patent portfolio defensively; 
moreover, some stakeholders are both patent-holders and implementors.1591 Hence, the extent 
to which stakeholders are willing to accept SDOs’ IPR rules also depends on their business 
 
 
1581 Interview an industry expert, 4 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1582 Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author. This does not imply that 
royalty-free groups are in any aspects less successful. Interview with an industry expert, 13 February 2018, on 
file with the author.  
1583 Interview with an industry expert, 17 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1584 Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 27 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1585 Interview with an industry expert, 16 January 2018, on file with the author; Interview with an industry 
expert, 13 June 2018, on file with the author. 
1586 For instance, “license to everyone” was not an issue at that point in time, as it was clear that the license 
was meant for end-equipment. Interview with an industry expert, 9 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1587 Interview with an industry expert, 13 February 2018, on file with the author; Interview with an industry 
expert, 9 April 2018, on file with the author.   
1588 Interview with an industry expert, 17 January 2018, on file with the author; Interview with an industry 
expert, 23 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1589 Interview with an industry expert, 16 January 2018, on file with the author.    
1590 Interview with an industry expert, 17 January 2018, on file with the author; Interview with an industry 
expert, 23 January 2018, on file with the author. Yet, it was also noted that incorporation of open source did not 
get along with WTO principles. Interview with an industry expert, 16 January 2018, on file with the author.    
1591 Interview with an industry expert, 13 February 2018, on file with the author. 
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models, interests and reasons for joining that particular SDO.1592 In general, however, all 
experts appeared to agree that the principles of fairness and transparency are crucial for IPR 
policies, but also indicated other important elements, such as reciprocity, maintaining the 
FRAND commitment after sale of the asset/or transfer (in case an SDO is FRAND-based, that 
is),1593 and a reasonable compensation.1594 
 
3.1.7 Dispute resolution 
 
The descriptive analysis of SDOs’ governance and technical processes in chapter IV observed 
that not all organizations maintain equally open, balanced and transparent appeal and review 
processes, and generally discourage recourse to litigation.  
 
Following the experience of the most interviewees, disputes they are resolved in working 
groups at committee level, or by internal complaints, with chairman having an important role 
in ensuring that all disputes are either prevented or settled. Other leading roles, such as 
technical editors, may also be essential for both dispute resolution and standards development 
processes.1595 Some experts suggested that any failure in a standard or standards development 
process will be improved by itself simply because a standard will otherwise not be adopted by 
wide majority.1596  
 
Most of the interviewed experts appeared satisfied with the way disagreements are resolved 
within SDOs’ working groups. Smaller players, who often do not have large investment in 
R&D, prefer to avert disputes,1597 while larger stakeholders often take initiative once they 
disagree with procedural or technical decisions of a working group.1598 Especially in Internet 
standardization, stakeholders seem to favor “soft enforcement” over strict dispute resolution 
processes.1599 SDOs generally are not involved in enforcement actions, but their operational 
and legal frameworks may be used in disputes between their members.1600 Disputes outside 
SDOs (i.e. disagreements non-conformity decision of auditors) are resolved between the parties 
concerned, without that SDO’s involvement.1601 One expert referred to the DVB Forum’s  
policy of forced arbitration, which however has never been trigged by its members; this does 
 
 
1592 For instance, implementers would agree with FRAND as long as they have clarity and compensation 
is based on invention, which guarantees a fair balance and no injunctions threats. Interview with an industry 
expert, 13 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1593 Interview with an industry expert, 13 February 2018, on file with the author; Industry expert’s answers 
to the questionnaire, received 27 April 2018, on file with the author. This especially applies for ETSI and ITU.  
1594 Interview with an industry expert, 13 February 2018, on file with the author.  
1595 Interview with an industry expert, 18 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1596 Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 27 April 2018, on file with the author.  
1597 Interview with experts from cyber police authority, 11 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1598 Interview with an industry expert, 25 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1599 Interview with experts from cyber police authority, 11 January 2018, on file with the author.  
1600 Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 15 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1601 Meaning that SDOs are not involved in disagreements about establishing of non-compliance with their 
standards by auditors. Interview with an environmental management and radiation expert, 9 January 2018, on file 
with the author. 
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not mean, in another expert’s view, that this policy has been a success, since the absence of 
disputes may leave some issues unresolved.1602  
 
Internationally recognized SDOs were commended for having procedures that allow a national 
body to appeal a decision even in the latest phase of standards development.1603 However, most 
appeals in CEN/CENELEC and ISO/IEC relate to procedural issues, rather than the content of 
a standard: the substance of technical documents is left to the discretion of the members and 
technical experts.1604 Within ETSI, conflicts are preliminary resolved in working groups, and 
only when that has proven unsatisfactory, are appealed.1605 Dispute resolution mostly include 
“offline” discussions among stakeholders and seeking compromises: allegedly, it is easier to 
persuade working group participants to follow a certain solution once it is already supported 
by majority.1606  
 
In IETF, disputes are first filed with the IETF chair in a form of a request for consideration to 
review a certain decision.1607 Subsequently, the issue is handled by the IESG, which decides 
whether a contested decision is based on consensus, and ultimately, by the IAB; upon the 
decision of the latter, IESG can reconsider its recommendation.1608 Disputes can ultimately 
reach the ISOC Board of Trustees, although such cases have been rare.1609 The IAB serves both 
IETF and ISOC, but with regard to the latter it is only concerned with procedural appeals.1610 
Hence, even if IETF procedures are informal, appeals mechanisms still exist:1611 that said, 
reaching a closure remains a difficult exercise, especially due to the lack of consensus-based 
dispute resolution methods and attempts to pre-empt formal dispute resolution procedures by 
engaging in offline discussions.1612 
 
Nevertheless, some disputes within SDOs do result in court litigations, especially when they 
relate to the infringements of IPRs. It has been suggested that within ETSI, Court disputes on 
IPR matters are rather uncommon since the vast majority of conflicts is resolved by (bilateral) 
agreements.1613 Patent litigation was suggested to be limited in IETF and W3C, in part due to 
the organizations’ culture and – in comparison to telecoms, – small number of patents.1614 But 
generally, court litigation is not a preferred way to settle the disputes: its major disadvantage 
lies in the fact that all relevant documents and communications from ongoing standardization 
work are put on hold for discovery purposes: hence, regardless the outcome, litigation 
 
 
1602 Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 27 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1603 Interview with an expert from an NSO, 19 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1604 Interview with an expert from an NSO, 19 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1605 Interview with an expert from an SDO, 4 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1606 Interview with an industry expert, 7 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1607 Interview with an expert from an SDO, 12 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1608 Interview with an expert from an SDO, 12 January 2018, on file with the author; Interview with an 
industry expert,* 16 January 2018, on file with the author. Note that IAB does not review the facts of the case. 
1609 Interview with an industry expert,* 16 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1610 Interview with an expert from an SDO, 12 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1611 Interview with an expert from an SDO, 12 January 2018, on file with the author.  
1612 Interview with an expert from an SDO, 12 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1613 Interview with an expert from an SDO, 4 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1614 Interview with a legal counsel of an SDO, 18 January 2018, on file with the author. 
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negatively affects SDOs’ technical activities.1615 In a similar way, fundamental court decisions 
may impact stakeholders’ behavior in SDOs: for instance, following the decision in 
Rambus,1616 more attention was paid to when and how were IPR declarations filed;1617 upon 
the decision in Huawei,1618 ETSI modified its IPR policy to ensure that the FRAND 
commitments travels with the patent once the patent is sold to another company;1619 and the 
decision in James Elliott1620 is believed to have affected ETSI with regard to the possible 
liability claims for ENs that are not operating well.1621  
 
Again, the dispute around modifications of IEEE IPR Policy was addressed quite often, both 
as the example of a successful and unsuccessful dispute resolution process. IEEE was also 
praised for the good functioning of its escalation processes, which facilitated resolution of 
conflicts in 802.20 committee, where IEEE investigated, heard appeals and decided to reform 
the group under new leadership.1622 Disputes that lead to procedural changes were conducted 
in ECMA, which modified its procedure following complaints regarding the development and 
adoption of OXML standard,1623 and W3C, which agreed to implement a royalty-free based 
IPR Policy.1624  
 
Recent examples1625 of disputes within SDOs used by the experts included attempt to introduce 
reference implementation of standards in ETSI, and whether those should be done via open 
source and need an open source license (like, for instance, ATRI 2.0).1626 Except for ETSI and 
IEEE, FRAND-related disputes also took place within JTC1.1627 In non-traditional standard-
setting forum as ICANN, experts have witnesses discussions concerning an ICANN parallel 
created in Brazil for pervasive money surveillance.1628  
 
3.1.8 Suggested improvements  
 
Although most of the experts stated to be satisfied with current SDO processes and expressed 
no urgent need to modify SDOs’ operational rules, they mentioned that there is always some 
scope for improvement. The general agreement seems to be that where and how to modify their 
processes, voting rules or membership level should be left to the discretion of the SDOs; 
 
 
1615 Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 15 February 2018, on file with the author. This 
is while, ideally, individual cases sorted out in courts or arbitrations should not affect SDOs. Interview with an 
industry expert, 23 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1616 FTC Docket No. 9302 Opinion of the Commission in the Matter of Rambus Inc., (Aug. 2, 2006). 
1617 Interview with an industry expert, 25 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1618 Case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp [2015]. 
1619 Interview with an industry expert, 15 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1620 Case C-613/14, James Elliott Construction Ltd v. Irish Asphalt Ltd. 
1621 Interview with an expert from an SDO, 4 April 2018, on file with the author.  
1622 Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 27 April 2018, on file with the author.  
1623 Interview with an industry expert, 23 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1624 Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 27 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1625 Experts could not elaborate on the disputes.  
1626 Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author.  
1627 Interview with an expert from an NSO, 19 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1628 Interview with experts from cyber police authority, 11 January 2018, on file with the author. 
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however, it was also noted that SDOs should be prepared to adopt to the interests of the industry 
and offer members an attractive technological forum, while acting within the limits of the WTO 
criteria.1629 In any event, changes to SDOs operational frameworks may not occur arbitrary and 
should always be  justified. 1630 
 
When revising their operational frameworks, one of the relevant questions is to what degree of  
detail, and at what level, should procedures be specified,1631 taking into account the difference 
of SDOs’ landscapes; in formal SDOs, the revision processes should ideally be based on 
discussions with other SDOs for coordination and cooperation purposes.1632 Modifications may 
also be required for practical reasons: the example is the change of the Open Mobile Alliance 
rules on copyrights, which now permit to implement the content of some specifications in the 
Mission-Critical Push to Talk (MCPTT) initiative of the 3GPP (which facilitated provision of 
telecom services for emergency services and other governmental agencies).1633  
 
Some interviewees suggested that governance models of all SDOs could benefit from opening 
up and increasing contributions from non-members.1634 Others found that large global SDOs, 
such as 3GPP, would rather benefit from increased decision-making speed and less 
bureaucracy, and highlighted the need to strike a balance between input (amount of expertise 
and participants) and output (amount of standards) within larger SDOs.1635 Most experts 
welcomed increase use of Open Source models, and advised that in the nearest future, SDOs, 
need to manage integrating, and providing services to incorporate Open Source software 
development into FRAND-based standards.1636 The issue of Open Source should especially be 
addressed by formal SDOs, since in the opposite scenario, they risk losing their grip on 
standards development, and hence also their relevance for modern standardization activity.1637  
 
Experts also warned of SDOs’ recent tendency to carry out standardization projects in closed 
groups, or “workshops,” which can only be joined at the moment of their establishment, even 
 
 
1629 Interview with an industry expert, 16 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1630 Interview with an industry expert, 16 January 2018, on file with the author. Especially in such fast-
developing sectors as telecoms and ICT, SDOs governance should be paced to the needs of the industry. With 
the raise of open source, competition possibilities among SDOs are increasing as well. As an example, it was 
mentioned that ECMA IPR policy was modified to include a royalty-free option to prevent Java script 
standardization from moving to parallel community. Interview with an industry expert, 23 January 2018, on 
file with the author. 
1631 Interview with an industry expert, 15 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1632 Interview with an industry expert, 15 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1633 Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author.  
1634 Interview an industry expert, 4 April 2018, on file with the author.  
1635 At the same time, a high number of participants is a sign of trust into organization, and the only way 
to ensure that’s standards are broadly accepted. Interview with an industry expert, 7 February 2018, on file with 
the author. 
1636 Interview with an industry expert, 15 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1637 Interview with an expert from an NSO, 19 January 2018, on file with the author; Interview an industry 
expert, 4 April 2018, on file with the author. 
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by the members of SDOs wherein such groups were created.1638 While, admittedly, such 
practice may indeed accelerate standards development, it is also noted to be opaque; 
improvements could be made by granting access to information regarding the projects within 
those groups for every SDO member, and where possible, interested non-members, and by 
allowing them to join the “workshops” even when the group has already been formed.1639 
Likewise, SDOs’ Secretariat were sometimes experienced as being “too institutionalized” and 
“too active” in top-down initiation of technical work, which risks losing their membership-
driven character: as a solution, the Secretariats were invited to pay more attention to 
stakeholders’ requirements and implement a bottom-up approach to technical 
standardization.1640 Finally, it was noted that regulators and industry often lack a clear 
understanding of the terms standards, regulatory specifications and interoperability 
specifications: while ICT specifications support interfaces and entail no legal requirements, 
they are often promoted by governments as soft-regulation.1641  
 
Other general suggestions included improving feedback on parties’ communications and 
complaints regarding technical proposals, which in turn will encourage stakeholders’ 
participation;1642 implementing processes in formal SDOs to facilitate the adoption of consortia 
specifications;1643 speeding up technical processes while complying with the overarching 
procedural principles;1644 leveling requirements for NSOs and other formal SDOs;1645 and 
facilitating effective remote participation, whereby parties can understand and follow technical 
processes.1646 Moreover, it was acknowledged that in a longer run, business model for ICT 
standardization may need to be changed, especially with regard to copyrighted standards which 
are sold against a fee are referencing open source elements.1647 Similarly, current division of 
membership categories may have lost its functionality, and hence may need simplifications or, 
even, abolishment.1648 
 
Improvements were also deemed necessary for IPR Policies of some SDOs. Some experts 
recognized that ETSI’s IPR Policy could no longer be properly applied, in part due to the 
changed landscape of ICT patents, inconsistencies around FRAND-terminology and 
 
 
1638 Such practices are common in DIN and ETSI, although in the latter it is transparent to ETSI members 
and does not impose additional requirements for them to join. Interview with an industry expert, 23 January 2018, 
on file with the author. 
1639 Interview with an industry expert, 23 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1640 Example as increased work on Open Source. Interview with an industry expert, 23 January 2018, on 
file with the author.   
1641 Interview with an industry expert, 23 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1642 Interview with an environmental management and radiation expert, 9 January 2018, on file with the 
author. 
1643 Interview with an expert from an NSO, 19 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1644 Interview with an expert from an NSO, 19 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1645 Interview with an expert from an NSO, 19 January 2018, on file with the author. At the same time, 
Commission’s requirement for NSOs in this regard were noted heavier than for other types of SDOs.  
1646 Interview with an industry expert, 17 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1647 Interview with an expert from an NSO, 19 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1648 Interview with an industry expert, 17 January 2018, on file with the author.  
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uncertainties with regard to essentiality.1649 It was suggested, in line with the EC 
Communication of November 2017,1650 to introduce a more efficient control over IPR 
declarations and to improve their quality.1651 As such, increased transparency in ETSI database 
would benefit the industry: the poor quality of the database results in a situation where it is 
unclear whether patents are indeed essential and, if they are, to which standards release.1652 
However, increased transparency of the database is challenging to achieve given the 
differences in patent families or patent systems across the world, and sometimes even the 
expired essentiality, let alone the obvious question of who is going to bear the costs for the 
database improvement.1653 
 
3.2 Due process vs standards’ effectiveness  
 
3.2.1 The loss of alternatives  
 
As mentioned earlier, most of the interviewed experts acknowledged competition between 
SDOs and availability of alternative solutions in ICT standardization. Previous case studies in 
the field of standardization demonstrated that in some moment in time, the most prominent 
standards developed within the ETSI, IEEE-SA, IETF, W3C and Bluetooth SIG had an 
alternative to compete with:1654 in most cases, however, these solutions did not manage to 
replace the standards crafted within these five SDOs.1655 
 
For instance, promulgation of TCP/IP was jeopardized by ISO’s Open System Interconnection 
(OSI) - a seven-layer model of network architecture developed in the late 1970s. Although OSI 
initially gained global endorsement from governments, solutions developed by ISO were less 
effective and more challenging to implement than those offered by informal protocols set by 
IETF, in part due to the slow pace of ISO’s  standardization processes.1656 Likewise, the W3C’s 
shift to XHTML was unsuccessful; the SDO eventually decided to proceed with the HTML 
 
 
1649 Interview with an industry expert, 13 February 2018, on file with the author; Interview with an industry 
expert, 9 April 2018, on file with the author; Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 27 April 
2018, on file with the author. 
1650 ‘Communication from the commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European 
Economic and Social Committee: setting out the EU Approach to standard essential patents’ (29 November 2017) 
COM (2017) 712 final. 
1651 Interview with an expert from an SDO, 4 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1652 Interview with an industry expert, 16 January 2018, on file with the author.  At the same time, increased 
transparency is difficult at this point in time: assertion of essentiality can always be contested, and standards are 
never ready, meaning that the solution can be accepted 5 or 6 releases later. There is thus a lot of uncertainty due 
to the changing standard. Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1653 Some companies, for instance, prefer not to make use of the database, but rather provide explanations 
to their licensees, explaining the value of portfolios. Interview with an industry expert, 16 January 2018, on file 
with the author.  
1654 See, among others, JRC Report, Halpin, ‘The crisis of standardizing DRM’; Russel, ‘Rough consensus 
and running code’; B. DeLacey et al., ‘Strategic behavior in standard-setting organizations’ (2006)  Harvard NOM 
Working Paper No. 903214; Keil, ‘De facto standardization’.  
1655 Note that this discussion is different than the one on standards battles, like VHS vs Betamax, where de 
facto standards were competing for the market. The scenario this chapter describes is the one where a standard 
was developed in committees and was then subjected to competitive threat. 
1656 For an elaborative case study, see Russel, ‘Rough consensus and running code’. 
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specifications, which in meanwhile were developed by a the WHATWG consortium.1657 To 
the contrary, the first low cost and low power short-range technology was introduced by the 
infrared data interconnection standards (IrDA), but was swiftly found impractical since the 
type of connection it offered depended upon the line of sight between devices;1658 IrDA was 
soon replaced by the Bluetooth standard for unlicensed 2.45 GHz band, developed through 
cooperation between a number of companies in the Bluetooth SIG.1659 
 
When asked about the reasons why alternatives to many established standards were 
unsuccessful, interviewees expressed different opinions. In case of alternatives for 4G 
technologies, some experts stated that Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave 
Access  (WiMAX), an initiative within the IEEE, did not differ very much from 4G LTE 
standard crafted in 3GPP, at least on basic technological grounds: both standards were using 
the same Orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) radio technology and had a 
comparable performance.1660 Some suggested that LTE was eventually superior by offering 
capabilities to roll the technology out, for instance by introducing specified voice codec and 
improving handover between sessions.1661 Moreover, LTE standard followed the paths of 
already established set of specifications within the 3GPP,1662 building on existing infrastructure 
and continuing the GSM evolution: it incorporated previous technicalities and knowledge 
borne within the ETSI/3GPP ecosystem,1663 including relevant proprietary technology, and 
ensured backwards compatibility with earlier generations of cellular standards.1664 Another 
view regarding LTE’s success is that the commercial model for cellular technologies was 
largely set by mobile network operators, who had already invested into 3GPP technologies and 
even publicly announced their intention to follow LTE standard:1665 as a result, WiMAX gained 
support only from a part of the industry,1666 and could never reach the same coverage and global 
acceptance as the 3GPP’s LTE.1667  
 
A similar strand of thoughts applies to the failure of HiperLAN/1 and HiperLAN/2, set of 
WLAN specifications developed and approved by the ETSI in 1996 and 2000 respectively. 
 
 
1657 See Halpin, ‘The crisis of standardizing DRM’, p. 14. 
1658 Keil, ‘De facto standardization’, p. 208.  
1659 While the first Bluetooth technology was developed as a proprietary solution, the need for device 
manufacturers rendered standardization inevitable. For the summary of the initial staged of Bluetooth 
development; see C. Bisdikian, ‘IBM research report: an overview of the Bluetooth wireless technology’ (2001) 
RC 22109 (W0107-009). 
1660 Interview with an industry expert, 1 February 2018, on file with the author; Interview with an industry 
expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1661 Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1662 Interview with an industry expert, 18 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1663 Interview with an expert from an SDO, 4 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1664 Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 27 April 2018, on file with the author. But also 
biasing factors should not be excluded: those, however, were not mentioned by interviewers  
1665 Interview with an industry expert, 1 February 2018, on file with the author. Interview with an industry 
expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author. At the same time, it was noted by another expert that cellular 
operators as well device manufacturers were investing in both standards. Interview with an industry expert, 7 
February 2018, on file with the author. 
1666 Interview with an industry expert, 18 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1667 Interview with an industry expert, 7 February 2018, on file with the author. 
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Despite its initial technological supremacy,1668 HiperLAN was never able to achieve the 
commercial success of its US counterpart, IEEE’s Wi-Fi. One of the reasons for that may have 
been the fact that the major players on the market were already supporting the 802.11 standard 
– which also explains, in part, why some elements of the HiperLAN were implemented into 
802.11 series.1669 Experts also suggested that since Wi-Fi technology standardized in IEEE was 
already dominating the markets,1670 HiperLAN was purely late to attract the industry.1671 The 
fact that comparing unlicensed spectrum allowed only a limited number of standards (contrary 
to cellular networks)1672 may have as well contributed to Wi-Fi’s competitive advantage. At 
the same time, some also believed that HiperLAN was more complex and not well suited for 
unlicensed spectrum, while the access protocol defined by 802.11 was simply “good 
enough.”1673  
 
It should be noted that ETSI’s HiperLAN was not the only threat to the global acceptance of 
802.11 specifications: in 1996, a number of US-based firms1674 created HomeRF as a response 
to a slow and balkanized standardization processes within the 802.11 Working Group.1675 The 
technology rapidly concurred broadband Internet services but had to deal with the same 
challenges as the Wi-Fi specifications, such as the availability of silicon for the MAC/baseband 
chipsets:1676 however, while 802.11 standards required the incorporation of five chips, 
HomeRF used only two, which rendered the price of its products lower than the price of devices 
running on Wi-Fi. The price difference between the technologies narrowed only in 2000, 
followed by an introduction of two-chip Wi-Fi products, which moreover operated with the 
higher speed. Still, HomeRF could not win the competition with Wi-Fi: by mid 2001, when 
HomeRF devices supporting the same speed became commercially available, the WLAN 
market had already switched to the 802.11b.1677   
 
Apart from alternatives to the established standards, some experts also mentioned 
standardization failures. An example introduced by one expert is the IP Multimedia Sub System 
(IMS) standard, that was developed to allow various applications to use one platform for 
accessing underlying telecoms network. Although the standard was technically correct, 
network operators preferred to buy a particular application directly, rather than buying IMS 
platform which, despite higher costs, could have been profitable upfront investment.1678 It is 
 
 
1668 HiperLAN was operating at 23.5 Mb/s in dedicated spectrum at 5.15-5.30 GHz, while US WLAN 
products were only doing 1 or 2 Mb/s in the ‘‘crowded and unregulated’’ ISM bands. K. J. Negus and A. Petrick, 
‘History of wireless local area networks (WLANs) in the unlicensed band’ (2009) 11 info 36-56 at 43.  
1669 Ibid. 
1670 Interview with an industry expert, 7 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1671 Interview with an industry expert, 17 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1672 Interview with an industry expert, 7 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1673 Interview with an industry expert, 13 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1674 Namely, Intel, Microsoft, HP, Compaq, and IBM. 
1675 See Negus and Petrick, ‘History of wireless local area networks’. 
1676 HomeRF initially solved this problem by using a physical layer that is compatible with Proxim silicon 
in its products; Negus and Petrick, ‘History of wireless local area networks’, p. 42. 
1677 Ibid., p. 48. Note that for a while, HomeRF was also considered a thread to Bluetooth specifications; 
see Keil, ‘De facto standardization’, p. 210. 
1678 Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author. 
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only recently that the IMS gained commercial attraction, since many mobile operators started 
to deploy it as a part of mobile voice service for LTE.1679 Another example is the 
Enhanced Data Rates for GSM Evolution (EDGE), an enhancement of the 2G radio standards, 
that was developed around the time of 3G deployment in 3GPP and ETSI but did not get any 
market attraction then.1680 In this regard, it is quite common for standards to become successful 
at a later stage,1681 especially when they are created sooner than the industry has expected or 
has been prepared for. 
 
 3.2.2 Standards’ uptake by industry and markets 
 
Since ICT standards are voluntary, their uptake by the market will largely depend on whether 
they indeed achieve the objectives they pursue, i.e. the intended level of technological 
connectivity or interoperability.1682 This is not surprising, since the market is unlikely to follow 
a standard that is not sufficiently effective to address its demands; by the same token, regulators 
will not refer to an ineffective private standard, and would even consider governmental 
alternatives if they are more adequate to fulfil the intended objectives.1683 The resilience of ICT 
standards thus depends on their effectiveness and fulfilment of technical requirements. 
 
Experts interviewed for the purpose of this study preferred referring to “successful” rather than 
“effective” standards or SDOs.1684 Many explained that standards are almost never predestined 
for global implementation: success of SDOs is usually not taken for granted at the moment of 
their establishment,1685 and only about 25% of standards developed in SDOs achieve the means 
they pursue and are accepted by the markets,1686 which most experts already see as a sufficient 
reason to refer to SDOs developing those standards as “successful.” Some experts took the 
view that standards which are published are already by definition “successful:” abysmal failure 
is usually recognized and corrected before a standard is finalized or, in a worst-case scenario 
being referring the standard to the drafting committee with a different set of players.1687 
 
In this context, the reasons for standards’ success may differ. From the perspective of 
companies on the downstream market, standards are successful only when the sale of  products 
running on those standards is high: companies then do not only see the return of their 
investments and efforts, but also obtain sufficient leverage to create new markets or, in general, 
improve their competitive position on existing ones.1688 Elements of standards’ success may 
 
 
1679 Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1680 Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1681 Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1682 See Chapter II.4 discussing effectiveness of ICT standards.  
1683 Recall that deviation from ineffective standards is allowed by the regulatory frameworks of WTO, US 
and EU.  
1684 Both terms are used interchangeably in this study. During the interviews, it was explained that 
“effective” standards are standards that “achieve the means they pursue,” See Annex II.B. 
1685 Interview with an industry expert, 1 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1686 Interview with an industry expert, 17 January 2018, on file with the author.  
1687 Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 27 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1688 Interview with an industry expert, 18 April 2018, on file with the author. 
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likewise vary per sector: for instance, forensic Internet standards are typically employed by 
governments, whereas the requirements on standards’ substance are set by industry: in this 
regard, the work conducted in IETF and ICANN is believed to achieve – although slowly – the 
means it pursues, simply because there is no alternatives to influence Internet governance.1689 
Moreover, while traditional standards development processes are encountered in the field of 
telecommunications, software developers are accustomed to a different model, which rather 
follows de facto standardization:1690  in this regard, some experts also highlighted the link 
between enormous success of mobile telecommunications systems and the high degree of 
technology standardization and suggested that the main advantages of telecom standardization 
systems within SDOs is their global reach1691 and the ability to facilitate collaboration between 
companies.1692  
 
In turn, success of Web standards lies in their open nature as well as royalty-free licensing of 
patents incorporated in those standards, although proprietary standards with royalties may 
achieve industry recognition when their scope is clear.1693 When discussing the relationship 
between IPRs and standards’ success, some experts even suggested that standardization 
initiatives driven by companies whose business model is focused on the maximum deployment 
of their patents may fail since some technologies, despite their quality and maturity, may simple 
not be welcomed on the market.1694 To illustrate, expertise in development video codec often 
comes from companies whose business model (at least, for this sector), is not IPR-driven, 
unlike it is the case for other industries.1695 MPEG codec, arguably, did not have a proper view 
on how to resolve and avoid IPR issues; HEVC codec was developed in a RAND working 
group, where uncertain licensing costs and patent pools fuelled dissatisfaction of the 
industry.1696 In this regard, AV1, an open, royalty-free video codec recently developed by Open 
Media Alliance, is believed to offer increased technological advancement comparing to the 
HVEC, while being available for more companies.1697  
 
When asked whether and why do the prominent ICT standards, i.e. 3G/4G, Wi-Fi and 
Bluetooth, achieve the means they pursued, experts typically mentioned to the role of 
technological advancement, increased demand for interconnectivity and digitalization on 
global scale. They also suggested that standards’ success relies on compliance with users’ 
requirements,1698 common interest of SDO’s members to bring new technology on the market 
 
 
1689 Interview with experts from cyber police authority, 11 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1690 Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1691 Interview with an industry expert, 15 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1692 Interview with an industry expert, 17 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1693 Interview an industry expert, 4 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1694 Interview with an industry expert, 18 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1695 Interview an industry expert, 4 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1696 Interview an industry expert, 4 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1697 Interview an industry expert, 4 April 2018, on file with the author.  
1698 In this regard, users may not always be sure about their requirements and preferences, which adds 
additional challenges for technology developers. Interview with an industry expert, 1 February 2018, on file with 
the author.  
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and the choice of the right momentum to introduce that technology.1699 In this regard, past 
experiences in cellular mobile industry demonstrated that time and technical domain are two 
crucial elements of standards’ success.1700 And yet, superior and complex technology does not 
always win the battle for the market: factors as consumer preferences, first-mover advantage 
of a standard, “locking-in” the industry or even the price of a standard1701 should also be taken 
into account.  
 
Many experts have highlighted that global promulgation of ICT standards is depended on the 
interoperable nature of electronic products: devices manufactured by different suppliers 
constitute a part of a larger ecosystem provided by interconnectivity, in which they need to 
“communicate” and exchange information.1702 To illustrate, while products supporting ZigBee 
standard owe their success to the standard’s maturity and availability of silicon solutions, 
ZigBee has also gained in popularity due to the high sale volumes of electronic devices 
implementing the standard.1703 Standards’ success thus depends on the demand for products 
running on it, and visa-versa.  
 
Furthermore, the uptake of ICT standards depends on industry’s ability to implement them. For 
instance, experts developing Bluetooth specifications were guided by their practical 
implementations and usage simplicity rather than strict language formalism: as a consequence, 
specifications were easy to read, but open to conflicting interpretation, requiring additional 
time to resolve technological struggles.1704 The issue was addressed by Bluetooth testing and 
qualification programs, which allow adopters to assess whether the specifications are 
implemented correctly and function as expected. 
 
In this regard, it is also not uncommon for a standardized technology to grow into a service and 
to create the need for specific sort of interoperability, as it was the case with the Short Message 
Service (SMS).1705 In a similar vein, some standard have developed a “life of their own” and 
are used for other purposes than were pursued by their creation, as the GSM’s successors, 
addressing their own part of the market and at the same time, leaving sufficient room for new 
technologies.1706 In addition, standards’ marketing concept was mentioned as an element of 
success for global standards: for instance, Bluetooth’ trademark remains recognizable among 
the industry, and continues to play a role in market promotion of Bluetooth specifications.1707  
 
Experts also observed that to be embraced by the markets, standards need to be of a high 
quality:1708 SDOs producing questionable standards are believed to be less successful by 
 
 
1699 Interview with an industry expert, 15 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1700 Interview with an industry expert, 17 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1701 Interview with an industry expert, 17 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1702 Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1703 Interview with an industry expert, 18 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1704 See Bisdikian, ‘IBM research report’, p. 6.  
1705 Interview with an industry expert, 17 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1706 Interview with an industry expert, 18 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1707 Interview with an industry expert, 23 January 2018, on file with the author.  
1708 Interview with an industry expert, 18 April 2018, on file with the author. 
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definition.1709 But apart from quality, whether a standard is going to be adopted by the market 
would depend also on its suitability to resolve technical issues,1710 timely availability of 
qualitative solutions it proposes,1711 and the achievement of critical mass at the early stages of 
its deployment.1712 Other “success factors” mentioned by the experts include: existence of 
competing standards (and their possible elimination due to the slow development process), 
publicity about standardized technologies,1713 markets’ preferences, reputation of 
standardizing parties1714 and – perhaps the most important – industry belief that the standard 
enshrines the best possible technology1715 and is promising in a long-term future (as it was the 
case with Bluetooth). Some have also suggested that to keep their advantageous position on 
the market, standards should always be subject to improvement.1716 
 
Another view suggests that global success behind ICT standards should not as much be 
attributed to their technological supremacy, but rather to their role as drivers of downstream 
markets. Wireless telecommunication standards such as GSM, Wi-Fi and Bluetooth were quite 
unique in delivering cutting-edge technologies that, while operating in completely different 
application areas and on different markets, could nevertheless be combined in one consumer 
device.1717 The global adoption of TCP/IP protocols was enabled by the expansion of the 
Internet1718 and increased availability of devices that could connect to it. And when consumer 
is willing to purchase interoperable devices to ameliorate user experience, as it is proved to be 
the case with products supporting Bluetooth specifications, suppliers are also incited to 
incorporate interoperability standards into their products; the higher the volume of standards’ 
implementations, the lower is the price per technology unit, which adds additional benefits 
standards incorporating those technologies.1719  
 
3.2.3 Procedural guarantees and standards uptake  
 
Procedural guarantees in SDOs standards development and governance processes were not 
mentioned as the main prongs of standards’ effectiveness by the interviewed experts; yet, they 
were also not left completely unnoticed. One expert stated that institutional design of standard-
 
 
1709 Interview with an industry expert, 13 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1710 Interview with an industry expert, 25 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1711 Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 27 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1712 Interview with an industry expert, 23 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1713 Interview with an industry expert, 25 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1714 Interview with an industry expert, 23 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1715 Interview with an industry expert, 13 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1716 In other words, “no standards release is perfect.” Interview with an industry expert, 21 February 2018, 
on file with the author. In this regard, it was noted that one of the factors behind the success of Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC) is that its standards for sustainable forest management are continuously re-assessed and upgraded 
following the feedback of its members, Interview with an environmental management and radiation expert, 9 
January 2018, on file with the author. 
1717 Interview with an industry expert, 18 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1718 Before the set of protocols was established, Internet activity was fairly limited. Interview with an 
industry expert,* 16 January 2018.   
1719 In relation to Bluetooth specifications, it was also noted that the technology is quite affordable and also 
dedicated to the market segment. Interview with an industry expert, 18 April 2018, on file with the author.  
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setting committees plays a role in SDOs’ ability to create a “win-win situation” for both 
standards creators and users: however, standardization should merely be viewed as a business 
tool, and not a goal in itself,1720 which leaves SDOs’ with a role of facilitators of business 
transactions among interested parties.  
 
Some experts suggested that standards crafted in formal European or global SDOs, such as 
CEN, CENELEC, ISO and IEC, increase their chance of success since they are by definition 
endorsed by governmental organizations during well-established and transparent processes.1721 
Yet, legitimacy gained by this recognition may be thwarted by the so-called fast-track 
procedures offered by these institutions.1722 This is especially the case for the field of ICT, 
characterized by a sheer abundance of informal consortia that are rarely focused on national 
representation and legitimacy aspects.1723  
 
To the contrary, other experts suggest that fast-track procedures increase legitimacy by offering 
additional scrutiny and enhancing standards’ quality and consistency.1724 Given that ICT 
standards developed by global bodies such as ISO and IEC are not subject to wide industry 
acceptance, companies prefer to conduct their technical work in consortia where the 
development time is shorter, and consensus may be achieved with a limited group of actors.1725 
Sometimes, companies may even act strategically and join multiple standardization fora to 
observe which technology is winning.1726 Shortcutting standards processes, or engaging in 
strategic behavior around standards development can be viewed as a response to the slow 
processes of formal SDSs and an attempt to accelerate deployment of new technologies: 
endorsement of standards developed in informal bodies through a fast-track process of a formal 
SDO legitimizes the process of their development by opening up the standard for comments 
from a broader community.1727   
 
Among other SDOs, 3GPP’s institutional set up was praised for allowing different opinions 
and accepting technical proposals from various companies, which facilitates the achievement 
 
 
1720 Interview with an industry expert, 15 January 2018, on file with the author. It was also clarified it is 
“one of the tools in the toolbox” to develop this win-win situation for those whom you need to make this standard 
a success; in an opposite scenario, market players will prefer monopoly to standardization. Interview with an 
industry expert, 15 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1721 Interview with an expert from an NSO, 19 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1722 Interview with an expert from an NSO, 19 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1723 Interview with an expert from an NSO, 19 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1724 Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1725 Interview with an expert from an NSO, 19 January 2018, on file with the author. Interview with an 
industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author. The author notes that it is not clear from the interviews 
whether experts found that consortia exist because ISO’s standards are ineffective, or ISO standards are ineffective 
because of the consortia. To the author’s opinion, both statements hold.  
1726 Interview with an expert from an NSO, 19 January 2018, on file with the author. This also appeared to 
be the tactics in companies supporting both WiMAX and LTE technologies, see supra n 1665. 
1727An example provided is the standard for compact disk, which initially was controlled by two companies, 
but was eventually opened up as an IEC standard, allowing parties who were initially not involved to make 
changes. Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author.  
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of a truly global solution.1728 Also IETF was mentioned as having well-functioning governance 
and procedures: some experts attributed the popularity of the transmission control protocols to 
IETF’s institutional setting and operational approach mentioning, however, that those should 
not be considered a sole success factor behind the TCP/IP global acceptance.1729 Unlike it was 
the case for formalized platforms or international organizations, the culture of IETF did not 
preclude any actor from putting forward technical proposals or publishing a draft 
specification,1730 ensuring that the input was broad enough to satisfy the community’s need for 
functioning protocols and networks.1731  
 
Some experts noted that probability of standards’ success may be identified based on the 
composition of a standards development group: the more common interests the participants 
have, the more likely it is that the standard they develop will be widely adopted.1732 Others, 
however, suggested that while it is impossible to see in the beginning of standardization 
processes whether a standard will indeed become successful, participants would typically 
discover the flaws before the standard is finalized and try to correct them or, in worst case 
scenario, resume the processes in a different setting.1733 In this regard, increased openness and 
transparency were believed to contribute to standards’ success but also cause drawbacks in 
standards development process.1734  
 
The latter is illustrated in the scholarship. One of the main challenges accompanying Bluetooth 
specifications was the enormous success of the SIG among the industry: the more players 
joined the promoters group, the more difficult it became to align their interests, which in turn 
affected the pace of standards development.1735 The composition of the promoters’ group 
caused additional troubles: to ensure the future installed base for adoption of the new 
technology, experts had to take into account the installed base of electronic devices; 
accordingly, next to mobile phone operators, the promoters’ group was comprised of leading 
firms in semiconductor and person computer industry, who were fierce rivals in the respective 
product markets.1736 At the same time, the fact that the initial promoters had a prominent 
position on the target markets of Bluetooth sent a signal to those markets that the developed 
technology has a high probability of success, encouraging its adoption.1737 Moreover, the SIG’s 
 
 
1728 Interview with an industry expert, 17 January 2018, on file with the author. Interview with an industry 
expert, 7 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1729 Interview with an expert from an SDO, 12 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1730 Interview with an expert from an SDO, 12 January 2018, on file with the author; Interview with an 
industry expert,* 16 January 2018, on file with the author; Interview with a legal counsel of an SDO, 18 January 
2018, on file with the author. 
1731 Interview with an industry expert,* 16 January 2018. 
1732 Interview with an industry expert, 15 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1733 Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 27 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1734 Interview with an expert from an SDO, 4 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1735 Allegedly, it is for this reason that Microsoft was hesitant to support Bluetooth operating system; Keil, 
‘De facto standardization’, pp. 208-9.  
1736 Keil, ‘De facto standardization’, p. 210. At the same time, the initial composition of the promoter group 
had a clear task allocation, since the work of the technology drivers was supported by the market knowledge of 
device manufacturer. 
1737 Keil, ‘De facto standardization’, p. 211. 
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semi-open structure, where the promoters’ group is strictly limited and adopter group 
extremely open, represented a combination of control and market reputation of close platforms 
and market diffusion and standard promulgation advantages of open platforms.1738 
 
Some interviewees expressed the view that standards’ success on the market may indeed 
depend on such factors as the operational framework and governance model of an SDO where 
it was established, but only in part: in other words, procedural guarantees are not necessarily 
sufficient to define standards’ effectiveness.1739 Others suggested that standards’ success is 
almost never a matter of an institutional framework, but only industry adoption.1740 Again 
others believed that governance and procedures fall under a broader picture to define successful 
SDOs which companies are comfortable to join.1741 And while procedural elements may not 
be crucial at the initial stages of standards development, they seem to become relevant when 
the standard is adopted.1742 In that sense, a lot appears to depend on the environment of 
standardization groups and the services offered by SDOs to its members.1743 
 
Does this imply that procedural safeguards put forward by the regulatory frameworks are, in 
reality, of trivial importance? One of the questions asked to every expert interviewed for this 
study sounded as follows: is it possible to have an effective standard developed by ill-defined 
procedures that do not respect the principles of due process?1744 As a first reaction, interviewees 
seemed to agree that such standard will be successful if the market pressure is high enough, 
emphasizing the markets’ power to decide which standard is effective, and which is not.1745 On 
a second thought, however, it was suggested that lack of procedural guarantees will diminish 
the input from all relevant actors, which will result in less technological maturity of a standard 
and, as a consequence, diminish its effectiveness. Almost all experts agreed that a standard that 
is not mature, correct or complete, is less likely to be interoperable and will create 
dissatisfaction among both industry and consumers.1746 Standards development process that 
excludes parties by definition create incentives to establish a competing standard; in turn, a 
 
 
1738 Ibid.  
1739 I.e. Interview with an industry expert, 15 January 2018, on file with the author. Interview with an 
industry expert, 23 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1740 Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 15 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1741 Interview with an industry expert, 13 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1742 Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1743 Examples are the interoperability testing (IOP) in Bluetooth or certifications by the Wi-Fi Alliance. 
IOP testing ensures that standards are correctly implemented and helps to address all technical failures prior 
standards’ release on the markets; Interview with an industry expert, 18 April 2018, on file with the author. As 
another example, the development of IEEE 515 standards was focused on users rather than manufacturers during 
both drafting and testing stages, which ensured that products were safe, increasing industry’s confidence; 
Schneiderman, Modern Standardization, p. 83. Likewise, some SDOs maintain programs like Education, Demos, 
Plugfests and Conformance Testing and Certification that intend to increase the adoption of their standards and 
may as well contribute to their success, industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 15 February 2018, 
on file with the author. 
1744 It was explained that due process encompasses such procedural principles as transparency, 
participation, consensus, etc.  
1745 One of the interviewees provided an example of Java as a successful standard developed in a processes 
where procedures were somewhat questionable. Interview with an industry expert, 23 January 2018, on file with 
the author.   
1746 I.e. Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author. 
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process which is open for inclusion of broad range of interests and provides opportunities to 
contribute and to make changes (recall that this is one of the criteria of “openness”), renders 
other parties more inclined to accept the outcome, even when the amendment they suggested 
have not been realized.1747 
 
3.3. Observations and takeaways from the interviews 
 
Although the abovementioned considerations represent the views of a limited subset of the 
actors involved in ICT standardization, they indicate these actors’ preferences and tendencies 
and allow for some observations. Being self-regulatory bodies, SDOs may differ in 
implementation of due process principles into their operational frameworks;1748 these 
differences become more apparent in practice, and as such depend on both exogenous and 
endogenous factors, i.e. regulatory framework in which the SDOs operate, industry 
preferences, and membership. In this regard, SDOs operating in the ICT sector are distinctive 
due to, among others, increased consortia activity, interdependence of their technical work 
(especially in the IoT standardization), IPR-intensive environment, and far-reaching network 
effects of their standards.  
 
In seems that in such highly technical environment, procedural guarantees are rarely perceived 
as barriers for participation in SDOs, unless they are discouraging IPR contributions for 
specific sectors. Whether or not to join a certain SDO remains, at least according to some 
experts, a commercial decision, and processes become relevant only when they affect 
companies’ commercial purposes. In all likelihood, this is different for non-commercial 
stakeholders who pursue other objectives by participating in global standardization.1749  
 
Yet, it has been acknowledged by the experts that the procedural rules in SDOs are sometimes 
breached, and these breaches require rectification. Large companies, which are usually the 
leaders of standardization activities, typically act as the “watchdogs” of procedural guarantees 
in SDOs, as they are often founders of these organizations and have a good knowledge of their 
procedures. Since the degree of involvement in SDOs governance and standardization 
processes mostly depends on companies’ resources and willingness to invest, the leading role 
of big companies is definitely not surprising.   
 
It appears from the interviews that transparency and coherence are sometimes challenging in 
ICT environment due to SDOs’ confidentiality rules. Openness and participation may also face 
difficulties due to the lack of technological knowledge and “understanding of language,” 
especially by non-Western experts. Some SDOs have addressed this issue by launching 
initiatives in non-Western countries. This illustrates how openness and transparency can be 
targeted through other procedural principles, in this case, concerns of developing countries.  
 
 
1747 Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author.  
1748 See Chapter IV. 
1749 However, since (almost) all experts interviewed for this study were affiliated with commercial 




From all procedural principles, experts appear to attach the most value to balance and 
avoidance of dominance. Even when SDOs’ practices appear to run afoul of due processes, 
modifications of their rules and procedures should be carried out with consent from, and upon 
an agreement with, its membership, in order to preclude SDOs from being hijacked by one 
interest group.1750 Avoidance of dominance becomes particularly important when SDOs’ 
processes give rise to antitrust concerns – due to potential liability of SDOs, but also individual 
liability of their members. Antitrust liability is thus a strong factor contributing to compliance 
with due process.  
 
The threat of liability and increased costs may also explain why disputes within SDOs rarely 
make it to litigation. As demonstrated further this in chapter, processes are typically discussed 
auxiliary to other issues, such as IPR licensing or antitrust accusations. By and large, 
procedural questions are resolved within the governance bodies and technical committees of 
SDOs according to their internal procedures, without any “checks” by external actors. This 
seems to sit well with the experts, who generally view procedural disagreements as internal 
matters of SDOs.1751 
 
When the work of an SDO does not fulfill the expectations of some participants, the tendency 
appears to establish a new, specialized group or consortium, rather than switching to an already 
existent SDO; often, the work of such group will be brought back to the initial SDO. It is thus 
questionable whether the threat of forum-switching is credible and whether it may incentivize 
SDOs to modify their procedures: although frequently mentioned by the experts, many 
examples provided in the interviews and in the past studies demonstrate that “voting with the 
feet” does not occur that often. Especially since the global adoption of a standard is facilitated 
by broad industry participation in its development and, given the commercial importance for 
companies to be engaged in standard-setting processes, moving the entire standardization 
project to another organization seems unlikely based on the theoretical findings of this research.  
 
By far the most controversies among experts surrounded the divide between governance and 
standards development processes. Whether the two types of processes should follow the same 
procedural principles would largely depend on the SDOs: stakeholders, once accepting SDOs’ 
membership and joining its working groups, generally agree with how the organizations 
structure their procedures. Some interviewees noted that procedural guarantees should also 
relate to SDOs’ governance; in particular, it is the WTO principles of TBT Committee Decision 
that were praised by the experts, however, without explaining whether and why should these 
principles apply for every type of SDO and for both governance and technical processes. This 
 
 
1750 Almost everyone except for one interviewee suggested it; that person, however, asserted that changes 
would be made as necessary, that the organization will make them happen as a natural process, which still indicates 
certain consent, or approval, at the higher level. Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 27 April 
2018, on file with the author.  
1751 Some experts approached by the author, and who did not agree to participate in this study, found the 
word “dispute” rather negative for SDOs’ activities. 
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observation is quite remarkable, since it indicates that the WTO principles are evolved into the 
“threshold” for legitimacy in private standardization communities and are stretched to 
governance and even IPR policies (which, in turn, does not appear from the analysis of the 
regulatory frameworks).1752 Hence, interpretation of the principles is more important for the 
industry than the intention of the regulatory frameworks from which these principles are 
derived. 
 
From current shortcomings of regulatory frameworks, namely addressing governance issues, 
copyright of private standards and inclusion of non-commercial interests,1753 experts 
particularly addressed the difference between governance and standards development 
processes: this may be explained by the recent discussions on procedural guarantees in SDOs’ 
bodies developing IPR policies.1754 The issue of copyrights of standards was sporadically 
mentioned by some experts when addressing potential improvements of SDOs’ architecture. 
Balance of interests was only mentioned in commercial and industry terms, which comes as no 
surprise due to the interviewees’ background and affiliation.1755 
 
Experts’ views provide no unilateral answer which governance models should be considered 
as the best one. A general conclusion seems to suggest that the processes should be clear and 
predictable, while at the same time flexible and responsive to industry advancement. 
Procedural rules should be “sufficiently good,” and the markets are left to decide whether 
standards developed according to these processes are “good enough” for standards’ global 
adoption.1756 In the complex environment of ICT standardization, SDOs’ processes are 
believed to be “self-correcting” and their quality relies on industry acceptance, experts’ 
prudence and technical logic.   
 
Nevertheless, some experts linked good procedures to standards’ effectiveness and success. 
But while standards developed in formal SDOs were believed to have increased legitimacy, 
they do not always appear more successful: IETF informal protocols still won over the ISO’s 
alternative because at that time, market needed faster solutions. In this regard, it is remarkable 
that only Internet and Web standards, established in rather informal groups, were subject to 
serious “replacement” attempts, such as the OSI and XHTML: in turn, GSM and Wi-Fi rivals 
in turn never made it to the large market.   
 
During the interviews, many reasons for standards’ success were named, including quality, 
timing, first mover-advantages, industry lock in, implementation, and commercial availability 
of hardware devices. It is their uniqueness and network effects which allowed ICT standards 
to grow into the fundamental part of globalized society. When addressing standards’ success, 
 
 
1752 See Chapter III.7. 
1753 See Chapter III.7. 
1754 See Section 5 of this chapter. 
1755 Some even mentioned that the notion of public interest is unclear. Interview with an industry expert, 
13 February 2018, on file with the author. 
1756As explained by one expert, companies are driven by their product groups and by the ecosystem they 
create to sell the products into.  Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author. 
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however, due consideration should also be given to a sharp distinction between telecoms and 
Internet standardization, since the decision-making around the initial versions of Internet and 
Web standards was more attributable to researchers’ personal considerations than it was the 
case for telecoms and wireless networks standards, which unfolded slightly later and from the 
outset were driven by commercial enterprises.1757  
 
Procedures, in this regard, enable technical work in a manner that suits SDOs particular setting 
and their members, and facilitate fast solutions and better implementation, which eventually 
reflects on quality of standards. Standards’ adoption appears conditional on broad input from 
the industry, but this input can take many forms and is not limited to “active and effective” 
participation. Commercial success of many standards was mainly a consequence of resolving 
collective action problems by getting the relevant players – mostly private companies, but 
sometimes also governments or even individuals – to agree on both technical and policy issues 
surrounding standardization processes: GSM and its subsequent generations are a good 
illustration of it.1758 
 
Despite some disagreements, mostly related to IPR policies, experts interviewed for this study 
found the processes of SDOs where they participate functionable and were generally satisfied 
with them.1759 Effectiveness and technical features of standards seem to outweigh procedural 
guarantees: the latter serve to support the technical process, and are of importance when 
establishing a new SDO or when standards are proposed for a global adoption by the industry.  
Design of governance and standards development processes is entrusted to SDOs self-
regulation and to the experience of participants. While there is due respect to regulatory 
frameworks, governments’ involvement in the design of SDOs’ processes does not appear 
desirable.  
 
3.5 Further suggestions for empirical research  
 
The abovementioned observations represent the opinion of a narrow subset of stakeholders. In 
an ideal scenario, it is the experience of all stakeholders participating in SDO that provides the 
full picture of SDOs’ compliance with due process principles and allows to offer more 
constructive suggestions with regard to improvement of procedural guarantees in SDOs. Such 
analysis goes beyond the scoping review of SDOs’ procedures and embraces systematic 
observations of technical meetings as well as well-founded empirical predictions for the 
consequences of institutional changes within SDOs. These exercises would require a high level 
of interdisciplinarity and should be ideally performed not only by lawyers, but also statisticians, 
political scientists, economists and engineers with a profound knowledge and understandings 
 
 
1757 This does not mean, however, that personalities engaged in standards development have no relevance 
for the course of standardization meetings; the contrary was suggested in the interview with an industry expert, 
25 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1758 J. Pelkmans, ‘The GSM Standard: explaining a success story’ (2001) 8 Journal of European Public 
Policy 432-53. 
1759 No experts have indicated not be willing to work in IEEE or ETSI, although not supporting their IPR 
Policies, although some mentioned being “cautious” about participation.  
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of complex technical issues. Bearing in mind the great institutional variety across SDOs, the 
suggested empirical study should thus be performed on a case by case basis, taking into account 
the specifics of each particular organization. 
 
In this regard, further qualitative and quantitative analyses of stakeholders’ experience with 
SDOs’ processes through distribution of survey is highly encouraged. It should be 
acknowledged, however, that while conducting a survey among SDOs members indeed has 
substantial benefits, it may not always represent the best empirical methods when studying 
standardization processes. There is a risk that a survey yield a little amount of responses for 
drawing substantial conclusions. Presumably, experts are reluctant to answer the survey 
questions due to the time constraints,1760 lack of interest in academic research on 
standardization,1761 or hesitancy to unwillingly contribute or participate in any sensitive 
discussion.1762 
 
Despite its limited scope and a number of caveats, the desk and empirical studies performed in 
this research could be useful for creating a future framework for an empirical study of due 
process in SDOs that is based on their current governance models and the first-hand experience 
of stakeholders. Meticulous examination or SDOs’ institutional landscape, together with 
practical contribution of experts that have considerable knowledge and experience with 
standardization, introduces the important differences between various types of SDOs and 
allows to draw theoretical assumptions as regards the appropriateness of their governance 
models and procedural rules for the regulatory setting in which they operate. In turn, these 
theoretical assumptions allow to formulate hypotheses about stakeholders’ satisfaction with the 
existing governance and procedures of SDOs. Experiences with SDOs’ processes may differ 
depending on such factors as stakeholders’ affiliation, membership or years of involvement in 
SDOs’ activities. Identifying the sources of discontent among different stakeholder groups is 
an important step to establish whether current procedures truly function according to their 
expectation, and where a change is at order.  
 
4. Dispute resolution in SDOs: case studies 
 
4.1 Relevance of procedural disputes 
 
Resolution of disputes between SDOs’ stakeholders, or between an SDO and its members, is 
one of the most contentious issues discussed in the context of procedural guarantees in SDOs. 
While the scholarship on global governance and private regulation suggests that dispute 
resolution mechanisms of private regulators are to benefit from legal expertise and increased 
 
 
1760 Experts are usually full time employed, and sometimes even attend standardization meetings on a 
voluntary basis.  
1761 This may also transform in lack of understanding of (the relevance) of the questions, for instance when 
legal or procedural questions are asked to engineers. In this regard, the design and wording of the survey questions 
is of crucial importance. 
1762 I.e. on IPR issues.  
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due process offered by non-technological actors outside an SDO,1763 such “external” review is 
not particularly welcomed by SDOs and their stakeholders and may be considered as an 
unnecessary intervention in technical processes.1764 In this context, it is of particular relevance 
to study how some of the procedural disputes that arose within ICT SDOs have been resolved 
and which was the effect, if any, of these disputes on standardization ecosystem. 
 
It should be noted that in this study, “dispute” does not assume a negative connotation and does 
not only refer to litigation or arbitration processes. Rather, the word “dispute” should be 
understood as challenges and disagreements between SDOs’ stakeholders. Such “disputes” are 
common in all standards development processes, and arguably improve the ultimate quality of 
standards by offering additional checks and reviews.1765 Hence, a large number of appeal and 
review proceedings that have taken place, or are still ongoing, in many SDOs qualify as 
“disputes” in the context this research.1766 This study thus aims to reflect how the “disputes” 
are resolved either by SDOs’ leadership (i.e. chairs, governance bodies) or, when 
disagreements are escalated, by “external” actors (i.e. courts).  
 
This section discusses three disputes where stakeholders challenged rules and processes of 
three levels of SDOs’ governance: standards development processes, governance/policy-
drafting processes and appeal processes.1767 As such, the three disputes differ in their subject-
matter and were resolved by different bodies. In the first case study, an SDO was a defendant 
in a court case on antitrust liability and exclusion of technologies. In the second one, policy-
making processes of an SDO were claimed unbalanced and excluding interested stakeholders; 
the dispute was handled by the SDO’s dispute resolution bodies, and its operational rules were 
ultimately scrutinized by an organization charged with its accreditation as a national standards 
 
 
1763 See chapter II.5 and chapter III.7. 
1764 This appears from interviews as well as from the procedural analysis of chapter IV. 
1765 See section 3 of this chapter. 
1766 Examples that are not discussed in this study include the amendment of IEEE Constitution, proposed 
in 2014 which, among other things, introduced new actors in the Board of Directors (IEEE Executive Director) 
and removed some Constitutional provisions to the Bylaws, which can be changed by the Board of Directors 
without the voting of IEEE Membership (see chapter IV.4.): while the proponents believed that the changes will 
increase IEEE’s efficiency without changing current structure or operations of the organization, the opponents 
argued that the changes will lead to concentration of power at the top of the organization. Interview with an expert 
from an SDO, 19 January 2018, on file with the author. See also ‘Information regarding the proposed IEEE 
constitutional amendment’,  available at ; ‘Opposition to IEEE constitutional amendment’ (July 31, 2016) 
available at https://ieee-sensors.org/announcements/opposition-to-the-ieee-constitutional-amendment/. Another 
example revolves around the DensiFi SIG, established to expedite the work on 802.11ax standard that was 
conducted in the 802.11 TGax. DensiFi was a rather limited group governed by only a few members, and DensiFi 
members were voting as individual members of TGax, which allowed them to block other proposals while 
favoring their own It is the exclusion of some technical proposals. The formal investigation launched by IEEE 
found that DensiFi breached the SDOs’ internal rules prohibiting dominance of standardization processes through 
‘“superior leverage, strength or representation” with the effect of excluding viewpoints of non-SIG participants 
from “fair and equitable consideration” within the 802.11ax Task Group. See ‘In the matter of the appeal of 
Ericsson, Graham Smith, and InterDigital concerning the action taken by the IEEE-SA Standards Board at the 
close of the investigation into the 802.11ax dominance complaint’ (January 5, 2017) available at 
http://www.ieee802.org/appeal_decisions/Ericsson_Smith_InterDigital_17_0106/Appeal_Brief_and_Appendix_
SASB_Appeal_(2017.01.05).pdf; see also JRC Report, p. 70. 
1767 This division correlates with table 2.  
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body. In the third case study, it is the approval of a standard by SDO’s leadership that was 
challenged on appeal to its membership. And while the lack of procedural guarantees was not 
the only claim raised in these three disputes, the arguments presented by the parties, and the 
ultimate decisions of the dispute resolution authorities, bear important consequences for 
standardization ecosystem and spark a wide-ranging discussion on procedural guarantees in 
SDOs.  
 
Due to the limitations set by the research, these case studies do not aim to offer a detailed 
reconstruction of dispute resolution processes, and neither do they aim to judge the 
appropriateness of parties’ arguments or the outcomes of the disputes. Nor does this section 
aim to compare the disputes, acknowledging their institutional and material differences. Rather, 
the three disputes should be viewed within the context of procedural guarantees in SDOs, in 
which they reflect current discussions and challenges in standardization ecosystem. 
 
4.2 Collusion and due process in standards development: TruePosition vs Ericsson, ALU, 
Qualcomm, ETSI and 3GPP 
 
The TruePosition case is remarkable for sparking the discussion on clarity and binding effect 
of SDOs’ working procedures and on potential abuse of power by working groups’ chairs.1768 
TruePosition, a developer of technology for determining callers’ location by emergency 
responders,1769 accused three large companies, Qualcomm, Ericsson and Alcatel-Lucent USA 
(ALU) (summarized by the Court as “Corporate Defendants”) as well as two SDOs, 3GPP and 
ETSI, of obstructing TruePosition’s superior positioning technology from the inclusion into 
the LTE standard with the purpose of promoting the rival technology of uncertain quality 
developed by the Corporate Defendants.1770 
 
The TruePosition’s location technology, Uplink-Time Difference of Arrival (UTDOA), was 
the successor of its Uplink Time of Arrival (UL-TOA), which did not make it into the 2G 
specifications due to the market preference of the alternative Enhanced Observed Time 
Difference (E-OTD) developed by Ericsson.1771 However, Ericsson’s technology did not meet 
the regulatory requirements of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regarding the 
location accuracy.1772 The UTDOA was then developed by TruePosition as a “work around” 
solution compliant with FCC’s demands, which was standardized into 2G and 3G releases as 
 
 
1768 The latter, according to the TruePosition’s arguments, is an “extraordinary powerful position;” as noted 
by one of the interviewees, this position is mostly filled by large companies leading a. particular standardization 
activity, Interview with an industry expert, 25 January 2018, on file with the author.  
1769 Such technology was used in mobile cell phones, for instance, when dialling 911. 
1770 Trueposition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel. Co. (Jan 6, 2012), No. 11-4574, 2012 WL 33075 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 
6, 2012). 
1771 TruePosition believed that this was due to the fact that  market of that time was dominated by RAN 
vendors, but no conspiracy claims were filed against that decisions in the time when 2G releases were developed. 
Trueposition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel. Co. (Aug. 21, 2012), No. 11-4574, 2012 WL 3584626 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 
2012), at 15-6. 
1772 Ibid., p. 17. 
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of 2004.1773 According to TruePosition, UTDOA was unique in using location measurement 
units (LMUs), equipment located at multiple cell towers, for collecting timing information that 
was necessary to determine a mobile handset’s location;1774 other technologies, including 
Ericsson’s Observed Time Difference of Arrival (OTDOA), were less advantageous since they 
depended on the handset to perform calculation.1775 
 
In its complained filed in 2011, TruePosition asserted that the decision not to adopt UTDOA 
into the LTE standard violated of §1 of the Sherman Act (conspiracy) and, with regard to 
Ericsson and ALU, also §2 of Sherman Act (monopolization);1776 the Amended Complaint 
filed in 2012 only alleged combination conspiracy in violation of §1 of the Sherman Act.1777 
Interestingly, while LTE standard containing 4G technology has been developed by 3GPP and 
not ETSI, the latter faced similar accusations by being an organizational partner of 3GPP and 
providing administrative support for the standards development meetings where alleged 
anticompetitive conducts have taken place.1778 The Corporate Defendants, in turn, argued that 
TruePosition failed to prove that it suffered from an antitrust injury; ETSI furthermore asserted 
the lack of jurisdiction of the US Courts.1779 
 
In essence, TruePosition submitted that the affiliates of Qualcomm, Ericsson and ALU held 
key functions in the relevant committees and collaboratively manipulated the 3GPP processes 
with a result of inclusion their own technologies into specifications, eliminating competition 
from TruePosition’s technologies;1780 and that 3GPP and ETSI facilitated conspiracy by failing 
to perform their tasks of monitoring and enforcing compliance with 3GPP rules, despite having 
witnessed the alleged conduct during the meetings as well as having been notified of 
anticompetitive conduct by TruePosition.1781 The Claimant invoked a number of conducts it 
 
 
1773 Ibid., pp. 17-8. 
1774 Ibid., p. 15. The location was ultimately determined by measuring the difference in the time they 
receive a signal sent over a cellular network in the ordinary course from the handset. 
1775 Ibid., Complaint TruePosition Inc. v. LM Ericsson Telephone Company, Qualcomm Inc., Alcatel-
Lucent. S.A., Third Generation Partnership Project and European Telecommunications Standards Institute, filed 
on July 20, 2011, Case 2:11-cv-04574-RK, at 20-3. 
1776 Ibid. 
1777 The Amended Complaint was filed in February 2012 to the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania. The Court, referring to the earlier case law (i.e.  Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 547 
F 3d 266, 273 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Consol. Metal Prods., Inc. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 846 F 2d 284, 294 (5th 
Cir. 1998))., which stated that exclusions of some products are in the nature of SDOs activities do not constitute 
antitrust violations, found that TruePosition failed to provide evidence of a conspiracy against UTDOA between 
the Defendants.  
1778 Trueposition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel (Jan. 6, 2012) at 17. ETSI was dismissed from the action on 
August 10, 2012. 
1779 Trueposition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel (Jan. 6, 2012) at 18. 
1780 The specification at issue was 2008 Work Item Release 9 And 3GPP Standards. OTDOA technology 
required specialized hardware and software of the type manufactured by Qualcomm in every handset, as well as 
RAN equipment of the type manufactured by Ericsson and ALU. TruePosition alleged that Ericsson and 
Qualcomm each hold patents that are essential to the implementation of OTDOA. Trueposition, Inc. v. LM 
Ericsson Tel (Aug. 21, 2012) at 15. 
1781 TruePosition submitted that exclusion from the standard guarantees company’s commercial failure and 
is likely to lead to absolute foreclosure from the market and that uncertainties as regards the implementation of 
UTDOA in LTE will also harm the selling of this technology for 2G and 3G. See Complaint filed by TruePosition 
on July 20, 2011. 
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deemed anticompetitive, which all took place within RAN Plenary meetings or TSG Working 
Groups, including: chairmen’s acceptance of proposals that were prepared privately by the 
Corporate Defendants and that were intentionally submitted after the deadline without 
providing for any possibilities of review and response, in violation of due process safeguards 
of 3GPP; the chairman’s (affiliated with Ericsson) rejection of TruePosition and AT&T’s 
requests to consider UTDOA technology for inclusion into specifications; and the fact that 
UTDOA technology was submitted to rigorous restrictions that were not imposed on OTDOA, 
despite TruePosition’s successful demonstration and testing of the technology and even though 
this decision lead to an inevitable delay of standardization processes.1782  
 
TruePosition insisted that neither Ericsson or ALU have previously succeeded in opposing 
UTDOA independently, meaning that they needed to coordinate their efforts to preclude 
TruePosition’s technology from being adopted into LTE standard. Together with Qualcomm, 
the three companies “wielded sufficient power in the marketplace to avoid serious commercial 
repercussions from a major customer that they could not, otherwise, face acting alone.”1783 
Such unfairly gained competitive advantage, according to TruePosition, stems from 
conspiracy. The Court found that the allegations against the Corporate Defendants (emphasis 
added) were plausible both on the grounds of agreement on conspiracy and unreasonable 
restriction on trade – the two elements of §1 of the Sherman Act.1784 Accordingly, 
TruePosition’s allegation of antitrust injury was deemed proven. 
 
In the meantime, 3GPP responded with counterclaims, alleging, among other things, that that 
TruePosition breached its contractual obligations toward the SDO under 3GPP Working 
Procedures.1785 More specifically, 3GPP rules stated that TruePosition should have followed 
objection and appeal processes by discussing their position with the Working Group’s 
chairman and bring the issue to the Project Coordination Group (PCG).1786 The SDO insisted 
that compliance with these provisions was crucial to ensure fair and impartial standards 
development process that is based on technical merits; without the recourse to its appeal 
procedures, 3GPP cannot reverse or modify decisions of its Study and Working Groups.1787 
3GG furthermore submitted that by filling a lawsuit, TruePosition undermined standardization 
process since it attempted to include technology through juridical intervention rather technical 




1782 Ibid. Some experts interviewed for this research were of the opinion that position that the chairman, 
even when the chairman is not a staff member, does not represent the decision of ETSI, since chairmen are elected 
and have to comply with ETSI rules under their own liability. Interview with an expert from an SDO, 4 April 
2018, on file with the author. 
1783 Trueposition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel (Aug. 21, 2012) at 23. 
1784 Ibid., at 41. 
1785 Trueposition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel. Co. (Oct. 9, 2012) 977 F. Supp. 2d 462 (E.D. Pa. 2013). While 
the Counterclaims were filed on four Counts, this study only addresses Count I. 
1786 Ibid., p. 468. 
1787 Ibid. 
1788 Ibid., p. 468. 
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TruePosition, however, maintained that breach of contract could not be claimed by 3GPP since 
the Working Procedures did not constitute a contract, and hence were non-binding.1789 The 
Court agreed with this statement and found that albeit the provisions were indeed material and 
essential and implied parties’ obligations and entitlements, the terms of the rules of procedure 
were too indefinite to be enforceable: in other words, the language of the articles was 
ambiguous regarding parties’ obligations, since they did not define which actions would 
constitute a breach of those provisions and which sanctions will be imposed in case of 
violation.1790  
 
The case ended with a settlement,1791 leaving many questions unexplored, such as whether and 
when can an SDO be accused of conspiring with its members by not intervening in their 
anticompetitive behavior. For the ETSI, the settlement was necessary due to the increased costs 
of litigation,1792 which also fueled uncertainties among its stakeholders regarding the 
membership fees and consequences for the members in case ETSI would have been found 
liable.1793 Although the case is not believed to have drastically affected ETSI’s or 3GPP’s 
operational rules,1794 some changes to ETSI Directives related the costs of litigation with ETSI 
were implemented.1795 To ensure that ETSI cannot be held liable for chairmen’s decisions, 
antitrust trainings for chairs and vice chairs were put in place.1796 Overall, this case illustrates 
the need of clear and enforceable working procedures to safeguard SDOs from antitrust 
liability, as well as SDOs’ tendency to resolve the disputes internally, rather than in Courts (i.e. 
the requirement to exhaust internal appeals procedures prior to access to litigation).  
 
4.3 Collusion and due process in governance processes: “innovators” vs “implementers” in 
IEEE-SA1797 
 
Procedural controversies related to modification processes of SDOs’ rules, namely the IPR 




1790 Ibid., pp. 470-73, citing “To be enforceable, an agreement must be certain about ‘the nature and extent 
of its obligation[s].’” Shell’s Disposal & Recycling, Inc. v. City of Lancaster, 504 F App’x 194, 202 (3rd Cir. 
2012) (quoting Am. Eagle Outfitters, 584 F.3d at 585). “That requirement does not mean that the presence of any 
interpretive ambiguity renders an agreement unenforceable.” Id. (citing Am. Eagle Outfitters, 584 F.3d at 585). 
“Rather, a contract fails for indefiniteness when it is ‘impossible to understand’ what the parties agreed to because 
the essential terms are ambiguous or poorly defined.” Id. (Am. Eagle Outfitters, 584 F.3d at 585).  
1791 Press Release, ‘TruePosition and Ericsson settle Antitrust litigation’ (July 31, 2014) available at 
https://www.ericsson.com/en/press-releases/2014/7/trueposition-and-ericsson-settle-antitrust-litigation. 
1792 Interview with an expert from an SDO, 4 April 2018, on file with the author.  
1793 Interview with an industry expert, 23 January 2018, on file with the author.   
1794 Interview with an expert from an SDO, 4 April 2018, on file with the author.  
1795 Interview with an industry expert, 23 January 2018, on file with the author (Article 18.1 of ETSI Rules. 
of Procedure). A couple of years later, a proposal to delete this provision was successfully opposed by SMEs and 
the EC; see ‘SME friendly dispute resolution in standardization at risk’ (May 4, 2016) available at 
https://www.digitalsme.eu/sme-friendly-dispute-resolution-standardisation-risk/. 
1796 Interview with an industry expert, 15 January 2018, on file with the author; Interview with an expert 
from an SDO, 4 April 2018, on file with the author. 




Update was not subjected to litigation; instead, companies used internal appeal procedures of 
IEEE and, once those have been exhausted, sought the decision of ANSI Executive Council 
(ExSC). The aftermath of IPR Policy Update underlines one of the questions that sit at the 
center of this research, namely: do SDOs’ governance processes have to offer the same 
procedural safeguards as it is required from SDOs’ standards development processes?  
 
The brief history of IEEE IPR policy modifications is sketched in the descriptive analysis of 
IEEE governance and standards development processes.1798 Especially the 2015 IPR Policy 
Update was criticized for its departure from common practice:1799 for instance, it has been 
questioned whether the substance of the new IEEE Patent Policy and the process of its adoption 
could potentially breach EU competition law.1800 The proposed revisions as well as the drafting 
and process of the 2015 IPR Policy were not opposed by the DoJ.1801 
 
Discussions on IPR Policy amendments were carried out by the Ad Hoc committee, that was 
appointed specifically for this purpose by IEEE-SA Patent Committee (PatCom) during its 
meeting in March 2013.1802 The committee was composed of seven 2013 PatCom members, 
an upcoming 2014-2015 PatCom member, a 2014-2015 PatCom non-voting member, one 
IEEE staff member and two non-voting members of the 2016 BoG (the secretary and the 
administrator).1803 Within the following 15 months, a draft of the Policy Update was put 
together by a subcommittee of the Ad Hoc. Given that neither the minutes of the Ad Hoc 
committee’s meetings, nor those of the subcommittee were made publicly available, the course 
of the discussions and the rationale behind the decisions taken at those meetings remain 
unknown; allegedly, this accountability gap was filled by the presentation of reports at the 
PatCom meetings and the IEEE-SA Patent Forum.1804  
 
Once approved by the Ad Hoc committee, the draft was submitted for an online public review. 
This process was followed for each of the four drafts produced by the Ad Hoc, and generated 
the total of 680 comments, of which 547 were responded to by the Ad Hoc. The forth and the 
 
 
1798 See Chapter IV.4. 
1799 IEEE is claimed to be the first SDO regulating FRAND royalties and referring to commercial 
essentiality. See J. G. Sidak, ‘The Antitrust Division’s devaluation of standard-essential patents’ (2015) 48 The 
Georgetown Law Journal Online 48-73 at 59. As noted above, similar changes to patent policy were not accepted 
in ETSI or ITU due to the lack of consensus among the SDOs’ membership, Interview with an industry expert, 
15 January 2018, on file with the author; Interview with an industry expert, 16 January 2018, on file with the 
author; Interview with an industry expert, 17 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1800 Zingales and Kanevskaia, ‘The IEEE-SA patent policy update’, p. 195; Petit, ‘The IEEE-SA revised 
patent policy’. 
1801 Business Review Letter to the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (2 February 2015) 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/311470.htm, at 6. 
1802 PatCom Meeting Minutes of 4 March 2013, available at http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/ 
0313mins.pdf. 
1803 As it appeared from the author’s conversations with different parties, while those opposing the 2015 IPR 
Policy Update claimed that there was no open call for experts to participate in amendment processes, IEEE staff 
members asserted that there were sufficient opportunities to join the process. The author does not possess any 
documentation that proves or disproves either of the statements. 
1804 M. A. Lindsay, Business Review Letter Request to Assistant Attorney General, W.J. Baer (30 September 
2014) available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2015/02/17/311483.pdfpdf, at 13-15. 
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last version incorporated some of the suggested modifications.1805 It needs to be mentioned that 
all members of IEEE committees have a fiduciary duty towards the SDO and act in their private 
capacity; nevertheless, it was believed by the opponents of the policy1806 that affiliation of 
PatCom and Ad Hoc committee members had played a significant role in the final approval of 
the revised policy by PatCom in June 2014. This process of simple majority voting resulted in 
a favorable vote from 3 individuals who were also members of the Ad Hoc committee affiliated 
with companies known as the driving forces behind policy modifications.1807 The negative 
votes came from the two individuals who were not part of the committee and, on the contrary, 
have opposed the changes during the commenting process. The Chair, also the member of the 
Ad Hoc, abstained. 
 
The draft IPR policy was subsequently submitted for consideration to the IEEE-SA Standards 
Board (SASB), which discussed the proposed policy Update in its open session held in August 
2014. The SASB accepted PatCom report in a secret balloting process, eventually approving 
the new Policy with 14 votes in favor and 5 votes against.1808 In December 2014, the draft was 
also accepted by the Board of Governors with  9 votes in favor, 3 against and one recusing.1809 
Subsequently, and allegedly to gain more legitimacy,1810 a further approval was sought and 
obtained from the Board of Directors at a meeting in February 2014.1811 
 
It appears thus that while the Policy Update was contested at the “lower” level of the process, 
it managed to reach sufficient support at the “higher” level by the BoG (75% in favor, which 
also complies with the IEEE-SA benchmark of consensus for standards approval) and the 
Board of Director.1812 The procedural questions thus remain at the “lower” level with Ad Hoc 
committee, PatCom and SASB.1813  
 
 
1805 See M. A. Lindsay and K. Karachalios, ‘Updating a patent policy: the IEE experience’ (2015) 3 CPI 
Antitrust Chronicle 1-6,  p. 4.  
1806 This was suggested in a number of interviews, but also in some scholarly articles. See, for instance, R. 
Hoffinger, ‘The 2015 DOJ IEEE Business Review Letter: the triumph of industrial policy preferences over law 
and evidence’ (2015) 3 CPI Antitrust Chronicle 1-24.  
1807 See PatCom Meeting Minutes of 10 June 2014, available at 
http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/0614patmins.pdf. 
1808 Unlike the minutes of the PatCom meetings, the minutes of the SASB meetings do not reveal the identity 
of individuals behind every vote. Such form of paper balloting should therefore be considered “secret balloting.” 
IEEE-SA Standards Board Meeting Minutes of 20–21 August 2014, available at 
http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/0814sasbmin.pdf.  
1809 See IEEE-SA Board of Governors Resolution of December 2014, available at 
https://standards.ieee.org/about/bog/resolutions.html; IEEE Standards Association Board of Governors (BoG) 
Meeting Minutes of 5 December 2014, on file with the author. 
1810 Interview with an industry expert, 13 February 2018, on file with the author; Industry expert’s answers 
to the questionnaire, received 27 April 2018, on file with the author; this was also suggested by IEEE staff on 
various occasions. 
1811 See Lindsay and Karachalios, ‘Updating a patent policy’, p. 4.  
1812 Recall that the Board of Directors is a democratically elected body of IEEE which represents various 
interests.  
1813 This approval by high level bodies was also contested. As one expert suggested, the BoG believed that 
the decision will eventually benefit the broader community, but since BoG is not comprised of  commercial actors, 
its judgement of “right” and “wrong” in commercial space is questionable. Interview with an industry expert, 15 




In August 2014, an appeal was filed by a number of stakeholders disadvantaged by the 
substantive and procedural aspects of the updated Patent Policy before the BoG.1814 In their 
complaint, a group comprised of Qualcomm Incorporated, Alcatel-Lucent USA Incorporated, 
Fraunhofer- Gesellschaft e.V., InterDigital Incorporated, Nokia Corporation, Nokia Solutions 
and Networks Oy, Panasonic Corporation, and SanDisk Corporation asserted that the Policy 
was not drafted by all interested stakeholders and that the process that lead to its adoption ran 
afoul with the principle of consensus, which requires a substantial agreement reached between 
directly and materially affected interest groups and implies a consideration of all diverging 
views and objections.1815 The appeal was however rejected by the BoG on the ground that it 
was not related to an inaction of the SASB, since the decision of SASB to hold a joint meeting 
with the PatCom constituted an “action” and pursuant to IEEE internal rules, should have been 
appealed within 30 days following its notification (the appeal at issue was filed within 60 days 
as  an “inaction”).1816 Moreover, the BoG Appeal Panel stated that even if the appeal had been 
filed timely, “inaction” has already been remedied by the voting on draft policy approval within 
the SASB.1817  
 
A second appeal, this time related to the SASB approval of draft policy modifications, was 
filed before the BoG in September 2014,1818 but was again unsuccessful: the BoG Appeal Panel 
found that the arguments did not demonstrate how the appellants were adversely affected by a 
standard or by a lack of action in IEEE standardization process, and rejected the appeal on the 
ground of a failure to establish a prima facie case.1819 
 
A year later, another appeal was filed to the ANSI Executive Standards Council (ExSC) by 
Alcatel-Lucent, Ericsson and Qualcomm, this time related to ANSI’s reaccreditation of IEEE 
as an Accredited Standard Developer (ASD).1820 The appeal was rejected by the ANSI ExSc 
Panel for the reason that ANSI Essential Requirements, compliance with which serves as a 
basis for the ASD accreditation, did not apply to the SDOs’ governance processes,1821 meaning 
 
 
IPR policies by relying on voting, which resulted in IEEE’s departure from FRAND principles, and that the role 
of staff should have been more limited. Interview with an industry expert, 13 June 2018, on file with the author. 
1814 Appellants’ Appeal Brief of 11 August 2014, on file with the author.  
1815 Ibid. 
1816 Section 5.8.3 of IEEE-SA Standards Board Operations Manual. 
1817 IEEE-SA BoG Appeal Officers Decision, 18 September 2014, on file with the author. 
1818 Appellants’ Appeal Brief of 18 September 2014, on file with the author. 
1819 See IEEE-SA BoG Appeal Officers Decision, 22 October 2014, on file with the author; Section 5.4 of 
the IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws. 
1820 For explanation on ANSI accreditation, see Chapter III.4. 
1821 ANSI Executive Standards Council, Summary Decision, 25 February 2016, on file with author. It is 
worth noting that the ANSI Intellectual Property Right Policy Committee was asked to vote on compliance of the 
proposed IEEE Patent Policy with the ANSI Patent Policy. The results of this balloting (15 votes in favor of 
compliance, 10 votes against and 11 abstained) arguably indicate a considerable degree of doubt between the 
members of the ANSI IPR Policy Committee.  
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that SDOs are free to draft their policies in a process that is not necessarily open and consensus-
based.1822   
 
How did the process of IPR Policy Update affected the industry? While some proponents of 
the new IPR Policy maintain that the implemented changes were necessary for the type of 
standardization activity that IEEE is involved in, they nevertheless agree that such changes 
would not work for all SDOs, noting that IPR policies are not static, but evolving.1823 
Moreover, they seem to share ANSI’s view that each SDO should modify standardization 
policies in the way it deems appropriate.1824 Those on the other side of the spectrum indicated 
to join IEEE projects with extra caution,1825 for instance by reducing their participation and by 
submitting negative LOAs.1826 The amendment of IEEE-SA IPR Policy also reflected on other 
SDOs: for instance, in 2014 IEEE wanted to join ETSI as a partner in OneM2M, but the 
cooperation could not take place since IEEE’s amended IPR Policy was not compatible with 
the one of ETSI.1827 Moreover, the question remains how did the Policy Update affect the 
output quality of IEEE standardization: so far, the scholarship has not been conclusive on this 
matter, highlighting that the low number of positive LoAs creates uncertainties for 
implementers, but also that IEEE standardization activity is thriving.1828  
 
In the author’s view, the main take-away from this case study is that, even in such a complex 
institutional setting as the one of IEEE, policies that are designed in a non-consensus manner 
 
 
1822 Recently, ANSI withdrew accreditation of two 802.11 standards developed under the updated IPR 
Policy. In the absence of any official statement from the ANSI, a suggestion that the reason behind ANSI’s refusal 
to accredit the new standards relates to the terms of the 2015 Patent Policy, or negative LOAs, remains speculative. 
See ANSI Standards Action (March 1, 2019) Vol. 50 (9) available at 
https://share.ansi.org/Shared%20Documents/Standards%20Action/2019-PDFs/SAV5009.pdf, at 15; L. Nylen 
‘Electrical engineer institute’s new Wi-Fi measures won’t get American National Standards designation’ (March 
2019) MLex, available at https://mlexmarketinsight.com/insights-center/editors-picks/antitrust/cross-
jurisdiction/electrical-engineer-institutes-new-wifi-measures-wont-get-american-national-standard-designation. 
At the same time, the fact that the new Wi-Fi standards did not get accredited by ANSI did not appear to affect 
the industry, so far. 
1823 Interview with an industry expert, 13 February 2018, on file with the author; Industry expert’s answers 
to the questionnaire, received 27 April 2018, on file with the author. They also suggested that the process of IPR 
Policy Update followed applicable standardization rules.  
1824 Interview with an industry expert, 13 February 2018, on file with the author; in this regard, see also G. 
Ohana, ‘Diversity in standards development: a response to Katznelson’ (2015) IEEE 9th International Conference 
on Standardization and Innovation in Information Technology (SIIT). 
1825 Interview with an industry expert, 23 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1826 Interview with an industry expert, 13 June 2018, on file with the author. 
1827 Interview with an industry expert, 17 January 2018, on file with the author.   
1828 See K. Gupta and G. Effraimidis, ‘IEEE patent policy revisions: an empirical examination of impact’ 
(2019) 64 The Antitrust Bulletin 151-71; R. Katznelson, ‘Perilous deviations from FRAND harmony: operational 
pitfalls of the 2015 IEEE patent policy’ IEEE 9th International Conference on Standardization and Innovation in 
Information Technology (SIIT) (2015);  R. Katznelson, ‘The IEEE controversial policy on Standard Essential 
Patents: the empirical record since adoption’, most recent version available at http://bit.ly/IEEE-LOAs; T. 
Pohlmann, ‘Empirical study on patenting and standardization activity in IEEE, IPlytics GmbH’ (March 2017) 
available at 
https://asoft20107.accrisoft.com/atfrand/clientuploads/news/IPlytics_2017_Patenting%20and%20standardizatio
n%20activities%20at%20IEEE.pdf; K. Mallinson, ‘Development of innovative new standards jeopardised by  




are likely to result in division among the membership and, sooner or later, affect SDO’s 
standardization activity. Similarly to the TruePosition case, procedural complaints included 
“inaction” – failure of an SDO to ensure compliance with its procedural rules. At the same 
time, many stakeholders tend to oppose non-technical interference in technical processes by 
the Secretariats and SDOs’ staff members. It seems thus that the intervention and “disciplining” 
from SDOs’ officials is still desirable once it is suspected that stakeholders do not adhere to 
SDOs’ internal rules. 
 
4.4 “Dictatorship” in approval and appeal processes: researchers and civil society vs browser 
vendors and content-providers in W3C  
 
One of the recent examples of procedural disputes took place in W3C and, similar to the 
TruePosition case and disagreements on IEEE-SA Policy Update, revolved around openness 
and consensus of SDOs’ processes. The dispute in W3C is however unique in the sense that it 
questioned the very appropriateness of the SDO’s rules, namely whether one person can have 
a “final word” in approving a Recommendation for web standards.1829 This, in turn, sparked a 
broader discussion on whether, and to what extent, should technical processes be influenced 
by political and societal considerations.  
 
The dispute concerned standardization of Digital Rights Management (DRM) system by the 
means of adopting Encrypted Media Extensions (EME) as a W3C Recommendation. In brief, 
DRMs administer information access by prohibiting unauthorized use of contents,1830 in a way 
allowing companies to influence hardware and software user behavior.1831 Due to this 
questionable nature, there have been no official standard for DRMs; however, DRMs could be 
integrated in web browsers via the extensions in HTML5 specifications.1832 
 
Opponents of DRMs suggested that DRM standardization in W3C runs afoul with the SDO’s 
main principle of open web that is available for all users, and may moreover risk legal 
consequences for W3C members.1833 In turn, media companies and browser-owners were 
convinced that standardizing DRMs via W3C will guarantee security and accessibility while 
balancing the rights of content creators, providers and users.1834 Moreover, they found that 
 
 
1829 This has even been called a “crisis” for the W3C, and it was suggested that the future of the SDO is at 
stake. See Halpin, ‘The crisis of standardizing DRM’. 
1830 D. L. Burk and T. L. Gillespie, ‘Autonomy and morality in DRM and anti- circumvention law’ (2006) 
4 TripleC 239-4.  
1831 Examples are region encoded video games or protocols that are designed to prevent users from reselling 
or illegally sharing that movie or preventing from recording live stream. The copyright-restricted publications are 
prevented from playing on a user’s computer unless the user pays to access it first. See M. S. Daubs, ‘HTML5, 
Digital Rights Management (DRM) and the rhetoric of openness’ (2017) 3 Journal of Media Critiques 77-94. 
1832 Ibid.  
1833 For the list of objections, see Halpin, ‘The crisis of standardizing DRM’; C. Doctorow, ‘Boring, 
complex and important: a recipe for the web’s dire future’ (21 September 2017) WIRED, retrieved from 
http://www.wired.co.uk/article/w3c-eff-open-standards-web-cory-doctorow?platform=hootsuite.  
1834 The rationale for accessibility was that more individuals could engaged in web without the fear for 
lawsuits, and that the Web needs to be extensible to include access to protected content without depending on 
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standardization of DRMs would allow W3C to regain control over a practice that has already 
been widely adopted and implemented by the industry.1835  
 
The discussion on whether or not to standardize DRMs in W3C took place for nearly a decade; 
eventually, it was Microsoft, Google and Netflix, which joined W3C relatively recently, that 
in 2012 submitted a joint proposal to W3C HTML Working Group, where they suggested 
development of Encrypted Media Extensions (EME) that enable displaying DRM-protected 
content the browsers without the use of plug-ins. Soon after, the first DRM working group was 
created, where the technical work continued as an unofficial task force, upon approval by a 
chair (affiliated with Microsoft).1836 In 2013, standardization moved to the HTML Media 
Extensions Working Group lead by browser-vendors and DRM producers: the group’s 
composition naturally caused frustration amongst the DRM opposition.1837  
 
As the work matured, various W3C members and societal actors started to raise their 
concerns.1838 One of the most fiercest opponents, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), 
suggested to adopt a “covenant,” with which W3C members would be able to make a legally 
binding commitment not to prosecute security researchers investigating EME-related DRM 
systems, and hence “protect” them from the liability under the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DCMA). However, the vote on the covenant has never took place; instead, W3C merely 
observed lack of consensus within the membership regarding the issue.1839 EME was published 
as proposed recommendation in March 2017,1840 and  promoted to the W3C Recommendation 
in July 2017 by the decision of the W3C Director, which was taken following the procedure 




third parties’ plug-in. See ‘W3C publishes Encrypted Media Extensions (EME) as W3C Recommendation’ (18 
September 2017) available at https://www.w3.org/2017/09/pressrelease-eme-recommendation.html.en. 
1835 As it was suggested by experts, the functionality was already there, and the EME specification just 
remove functions out of plug into browsers, moving the functionality around. Moreover, W3C represented a more 
independent forum; allegedly, if the standard was not approved in W3C, it would have been still developed in 
other SDOs with a less transparent process. Interview an industry expert, 4 April 2018, on file with the author.  
1836 See Halpin, ‘The crisis of standardizing DRM’. 
1837 The JustNet Coalition (JNC) has called EME a form of “digital colonialism,” as JNC claimed that EME 
excludes those in the Global South who are struggling for access to information at the expense of a few North 
American and European corporations. See ‘Open letter from Just Net Coalition to Sir Tim Berners-Lee seeking 
his urgent intervention to stop acceptance of Encrypted Media Extensions as a W3C standard’ (April 12, 2017). 
1838 See, for instance, D. O’Brien, ‘Lowering your standards: DRM and the Future of the W3C’ (October 
2, 2013) available at https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/10/lowering-your-standards. 
1839 See e-mail of Cory Doctorow  (12 July 2017) available at  
https://www.w3.org/TeamSubmission/2017/SUBM-sdbp-20170302/; and of Phillippe le Hégaret (16 March 
2017) available at https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-html-media/2017Mar/0016.html. It was suggested 
by the interviewed expert that while the proposal of EFF remained the same, despite suggestions to improve, the 
compromises of the W3C sufficiently addressed controversies around privacy and security. Interview an industry 
expert, 4 April 2018, on file with the author.  
1840 E-mail of Phillippe le Hégaret (16 March 2017) available at 
https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-html-media/2017Mar/0016.html. 




The decision of the Director was promptly appealed by the opposing members, who stated that 
the overruling of formal objections to EME by the Director was improper since the W3C 
membership has not been consulted on negotiation of a covenant to protect EME’s users against 
anti-circumvention regulation.1842 On appeal, the decision to publish EME recommendation 
was upheld by 58.4% of membership (108 members voted in favor, 57 opposed and 20 
abstained) which, despite the positive result for EME proponents, marks a departure from 
consensus.1843 Upon the adoption of the recommendation, a number of (now former) W3C 
members, including EFF, announced their withdrawal from the SDO for the reason of their 
“collapse of confidence in the W3C process.”1844  
 
In addition to consequences for user experience, on which the author is not in a position to 
judge,1845 the dispute around EME’s adoption inspired a broader debate on standardization 
processes and, more specifically, whether W3C should limit its discussions to merely technical 
issues, or also include political considerations. Clearly, DRMs supporters found that W3C is 
not an appropriate forum for social or political debates; the opponents meanwhile maintained 
that the EME Recommendation does not represent consensus of web community, but rather 
paves the way for Web-domination by a selected group of media companies.1846 This poses the 
question whether current practices for web standardization still hold in the modern society 
where the technical aspects of web standardization are becoming intertwined with broader 
political issues. 
 
4.5. Observations and takeaways 
 
Although fairly different, the three examined disputes revolve around similar procedural issues, 
namely openness, consensus and balance of interests in SDOs’ processes. In case of 
TruePosition, standards development processes were deemed unfair and excluding due to the 
alleged hijacking by a group of stakeholders; the amendment process for IEEE-SA IPR Policy 
which, following the taxonomy of this research, is a part of SDOs’ governance processes, was 
claimed to lack openness and consensus and hence to safeguard the interest of only a part of 
IEEE membership; the approval of EME Recommendation, and the subsequent appeal process, 
 
 
1842 “In the absence of a call for consensus on a covenant, it was improper for the Director to overrule the 
widespread members’ objections and declare EME fit to be published as a W3C Recommendation”  
https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-html-media/2017Jul/0005.html. See the e-mail of Cory Doctorow (12 
July 2017) available at https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-html-media/2017Jul/0009.htm; and the e-mail 
of H. Halpin (7 July 2017) available at https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-html-
media/2017Jul/0003.html. 
1843 W3C Publishes Encrypted Media Extensions (EME) as a W3C Recommendation (18 September 2017). 
Apparently, it was clear from the very beginning that the Recommendation would not get approved, hence the 
decision of the Director was necessary. Interview an industry expert, 4 April 2018, on file with the author. On a 
side note, the procedure of appeal has never before been invoked by the W3C.   
1844 I.e. Doctorow, Boring, complex and important (2017). 
1845 Halpin suggests that user experience is harmed by a new capability that introduces new attack surface 
in a browser; Halpin, ‘The crisis of standardizing DRM’. 
1846 Daubs, ‘HTML5, Digital Rights Management (DRM) and the rhetoric of openness’. 
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were suggested to depart from industry consensus on a topic that is of a great importance for 
civil society.  
 
In all three cases, the alleged exclusion from a process was underlined by different reasons: 
inclusion of competing technology into a standard, promoting interests of a particular group 
within an SDO, or accelerating standards adoption (or, as suggested by some experts, ensuring 
that the standard is adopted at all). In all three cases, disadvantaged stakeholders asserted that 
lack of openness and consensus have adverse effects on SDO’s technical performance: 
adoption of inferior technology, reluctance of innovators to contribute to standards 
development, and negative impact on user experience. Remarkably, those opposing the three 
developments noted dissatisfaction with the leadership, either questioning the neutrality of the 
chair, or invoking the failure of the members of the governance body (or the Director) to take 
into account the opposing views. Ultimately, in all three cases, SDOs’ members were 
concerned that the absence of open and consensus-based process can trigger SDOs’ liability 
and will have consequences for future disputes in which these SDOs may be involved.1847 
Hence, maintaining good procedures that follow applicable best practices principles of 
standardization can shield SDOs form undesired liability claims. 
 
It is true that the complexity of the technical discussions in SDOs’ working groups may compel 
SDOs’ decision-makers to limit openness and consensus-building: after all, any multi-
stakeholder discussion requires compromises and sometimes, difficult choices. At the same 
time, it should not be neglected that by providing technical interoperability or access, some 
standards serve as public goods and affect community that is much wider than SDOs’ 
membership or industry representatives: as it appears from the previous chapters, such 
principles as balance, openness and consensus, even when presented as “best effort” 
requirements, are the crucial elements of legitimation of such standards under any legal 
framework, and ensure that standards are adopted and used by the global community.  
 
How far should SDOs go to ensure compliance with their internal rules, but also with the due 
process principles imposed “externally" by the legal ecosystem in which these SDOs operate? 
This question should be answered while considering institutional differences between SDOs, 
their operational field, as well as the evolvement of their standards from purely “technical” 
decisions into the principal elements of private governance. 
 
5. Tendencies and best practices in ICT standardization 
 
5.1 Legitimacy of standards development processes according to the industry players 
 
What are the main reasons behind the legitimacy of SDOs and their standards? While there are 
many analytical lenses and approaches to study legitimacy, whether the rule-making power is 
 
 
1847 See the e-mail of Cory Doctorow (12 July 2017) (W3C); Interview with an expert from an SDO, 19 
January 2018, on file with the author. (IEEE-SA); Interview with an industry expert, 23 January 2018, on file with 
the author (ETSI).  
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indeed legitimate depends upon its origins and effects.1848 Scholarship on management and 
organizational studies suggests that standards are legitimized by their voluntary nature, 
cooperative and inclusive standard-setting process and ability to serve potential users,1849 but 
also the quality of SDOs’ decision-making processes.1850 In the context of transnational private 
regulation, it is the combination of private autonomy to adopt SDOs’ standards, and procedural 
requirements according to which they are developed that ultimately provides the necessary 
legitimacy to ensure compliance with these standards.1851 In turn, the recent study on SDOs’ 
governance suggests that legitimacy of SDOs is multifaceted and is achieved through 
compliance with legal norms as well as through market forces.1852 
 
The interviews conducted with the experts identify three main types of legitimacy,1853 namely: 
1) derived from the endorsement by governmental authorities (“public law legitimacy”); 2) 
derived from compliance with procedural requirements (“procedural legitimacy”); and 3) 
derived from the particular scientific expertise behind standards development (“epistemic 
legitimacy”).1854 Each of these three kinds of legitimacy is discussed below. 
 
5.1.1 Public law legitimacy 
 
It is not uncommon for privately driven regulation to seek and obtain legitimacy through public 
law mechanisms. Standards for business conduct are legitimized through their implementation 
in States’ regulatory policies, which moreover provide enforcement mechanisms to ensure that 
these standards are complied with.1855 Legitimacy of EU private regulatory arrangements is  
achieved ex post through EU free movement and competition rules.1856 In turn, transnational 
professional associations derive their legitimacy through participation of domestic private 
 
 
1848 J. Black, ‘Constructing and contesting legitimacy and accountability in polycentric regulatory regimes’ 
(2008) LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers, n. 02-2008. In this regard, Cafaggi also notes that 
regimes that are based on freedom of contract have different legitimacy responses from the regimes based on the 
protection of fundamental rights and the environment. Cafaggi, ‘New foundations’, p. 15. 
1849 Botzem
 
and Dobusch, ‘Standardization cycles’; Boström, and Tamm Hallström, ‘NGO power’; 
Brunsson, ‘Organizations, markets and standardization’, p. 23. 
1850 C. Joerges, H. Schepel and E. Vos, ‘The law’s problems with involvement of non-governmental actors 
in Europe’s legislative processes: the case of standardization under the New Approach’, EUI Working Paper No. 
99/9, p. 42. 
1851 Cafaggi, ‘The many features’. 
1852 JRC Report, p. 128.  
1853 Not every interviewee used the word ‘legitimate’ or ‘legitimacy’: sometimes it was also referred to 
standards uptake, compliance, or acceptance and effectiveness.  
1854 Another relevant type of legitimacy is consent-based legitimacy; while not mentioned directly by the 
experts, some indeed referred to participation in SDOs, and adoption of SDOs’ standards, only when firms feel 
comfortable. Yet, since participation in SDOs and adoption of its standards is voluntary, this type of legitimacy 
is not analysed separately in this study, but is rather perceived as a form of the other legitimacy types. 
1855 D. Vogel, ‘The private regulation of global corporate conduct’, in W. Mattli and N. Woods (eds.), The 
Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 153. 
1856 Mataija, Private Regulation, p. 17. 
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bodies in their rule-making:1857 in transnational setting, States’ role is the one of catalysts that 
coordinate and support various regulatory activities.1858 
 
As discussed earlier, standards endorsement in public law, or by organizations that are 
recognized in (inter)national law, acquire binding force as well as increase their legitimacy.1859 
Such recognition occurs, for instance, through the publication of a reference to a European 
Harmonized Standard in the OJEU, or through incorporation by reference of a private voluntary 
standard by US regulatory agencies,1860 but may also be driven by endorsement of 
(inter)national Courts and tribunals.1861 Approval by democratic bodies, such as parliaments or 
governmental institutions, may compensate for non-democratic rule-making of SDOs, 1862 and 
thus also pay due regard to public interest.  
 
Governmental endorsement appears an important legitimation element even in very narrowly 
specialized scientific domains. For instance, it has been once suggested that ICANN is an 
inappropriate forum to discuss internet governance since it is driven by private parties and, 
allegedly, does not take into account concerns of States.1863 Some standardization attempts in 
cloud computing have also failed, allegedly due to, the decision of stakeholders to develop 
standards informally rather than in an SDO endorsed by regulators.1864 The CASE standards 
for forensic language, while developed by expert community, have presumably gained its 
legitimacy and wide support among the stakeholders due to the involvement of governmental 
agencies in its administration.1865 At the same time, it should be acknowledged that 
governmental endorsement of an industry activity may be prone to lobbying by private 
firms.1866 
 
5.1.2 Procedural legitimacy 
 
Legitimacy can also be derived from the fact that decision-making in non-State regulation 
occurred following the appropriate procedure. In transnational governance, legitimacy arises 
from participatory mechanisms that represent fair, transparent, accessible and open processes, 
and that also offer mechanisms to handle objections and include third parties in decision-
 
 
1857 To the contrary, legitimacy of national, self-regulated professional associations is ensured by an 
explicit transferal of powers from public bodies to such associations. See R. B. Stewart, ‘Enforcement of 
transnational public regulation’ (2011) in EUI Working Papers, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 
Private Regulation Series-06, RSCAS 2011/49. 
1858 Abbott and Snidal, ‘The governance triangle’. 
1859 See especially chapter III. 
1860 See Chapter II 
1861 See, for instance, TBT case law in chapter III.3. 
1862 See JRC Report, p. 127. 
1863 Schneiderman, Modern Standardization, p. 6. 
1864 See note 1465 in chapter V. 
1865 This is the assumption of the author, based on the rationale that governments may not feel completely 
comfortable to fully delegate forensic standardization to private actors.  
1866 An example provided by one of the experts was a long-time rejection of the Dutch government to 
accept the danger of asbestos, allegedly due to the strong lobby of private companies. Interview with an 
environmental management and radiation expert, 9 January 2018, on file with the author. 
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making.1867 Fairness and justice in procedure provides space for hybridity and opens avenues 
for alternatives, arguably enhancing the quality of regulatory outcomes.1868 For global 
governance organizations, procedural legitimacy claims can also be observed from information 
available on websites, such as reports, working programs, and decisions of their governance 
bodies,1869 which echoes the requirement of transparency.  
 
Due process principles for standardization discussed in this study aim to ensure that the 
outcomes of SDOs processes are legitimate under certain set of legal rules;1870 in this context, 
procedural legitimacy is linked to public law legitimacy. These principles also safeguard a 
balance of interests in SDOs and, ideally, protect standards development from being dominated 
by a single (group of) interest; in this sense, procedural legitimacy also contributes to 
standards’ quality1871 and facilitates their uptake by the market, for standards that favour only 
certain (type of) stakeholders would ultimately not be adopted at the global level.1872 
 
To illustrate, standards developed in an open process of a formal organization may sometimes 
be easier accepted by the market, as opposed to proprietary alternatives. In late 1990s, the battle 
for 56K modem standard raged between X2 and Flex, two symmetric network technologies 
supported by two different groups of firms.1873 Industry’s reluctance to agree on a unified 
standard resulted in market fragmentation and increased transaction costs.1874 The solution 
came from ITU, whose V.90 specification became widely used in computer equipment and 
facilitated the rapid grow of the market.1875 Despite its slow, government-driven process and 
lack of enforcement power on a national level, ITU managed to offer infrastructure for the 
resolution of IPR issues1876 and attracted the support of all major industry players, even though 
 
 
1867 Mattli and Woods, ‘In whose benefit?’ p. 4; S. Botzem, and S. Quack, ‘Contested rules and shifting 
boundaries: international standard-setting in accounting’, in M. Djelic and K. Sahlin-Andersson 
(eds.), Transnational Governance: Institutional Dynamics of Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 2006), p. 284. 
1868 Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, pp. 16 and 163. 
1869 See J. Steffek, ‘Discursive legitimation in environmental governance’ (2009) 11 Forest Policy and 
Economics 313-318.  
1870 See Chapter III. 
1871 There is indeed some evidence that standards development processes that were guided by common 
interests deliver technological outcomes of enhanced quality: for instance, in case of cellular industry, Technical 
Basis for Regulation (TBR) 21 of the ETSI defined different variations of analog telephone systems of European 
countries and brought to an end the fragmentation of the European market for telephone equipment. Following 
this example, Canada’s and US analog telephone standards were merged in the effort of Telecommunications 
Industry Association (TIA) TR-41 committee. See Krechmer, ‘Open standards requirements’. 
1872 This appears from the interviews with experts.   
1873 X2 was supported by US Robotics and Flex, which was developed later, by Rockwell, Lucent and 
Motorola. 
1874 See Greenstein and Rysman, ‘Coordination costs and standard setting’. 
1875 Ibid., p. 5. 
1876 Note that resolution of IPR issues was also one of the main factors of ETSI’s success developing GSM 
standard, as opposed to national arrangements. In this regard, one of the main challenges in GSM development 
was involvement of Motorola. While holding the largest SEP-portfolio for GSM specifications, Motorola mainly 
followed the US practice by refusing to make general declarations on licensing of its SEPs and instead offering 
cross-licensing agreements, which risked monopolization by firms who could afford Motorola’s technology. Since 
GSM was one of the first standards whose development was impeded by licensing practices, there was no official 
policy or guidelines which would govern the inclusion of SEP into technical specifications: the strategy commonly 
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the SDO could not actually guarantee the fulfillment of its scheduling claims and the new 
standards was incompatible with both X2 and Flex.1877  
 
Interestingly, success of ITU’s V.90 is underpinned by the reasons directly opposite to those 
with which the experts explained the promulgation of Bluetooth specifications. Parties 
involved in definition of V.90 technical specifications were willing to accelerate the process 
since they believed that the 56K modems will be rapidly obscured by broadband technologies 
and that the market-opportunities for deploying 56K modems would be short-lived.1878 In case 
of Bluetooth specifications, however, it is the belief in long-term relevance of the Bluetooth 
technology that incentivized the members to work on its development and subsequently, to 
adopt it into their hardware devices.1879 
 
Next to the “external” procedural principles, SDOs processes should follow the SDOs’ 
“internal” rules, which are tailor-made for every organization and accepted by members when 
joining an SDO. Adherence to these rules can be scrutinized by SDOs’ governance bodies, for 
instance by means of appeal processes against an alleged breach of SDO’s rules (i.e. IEEE-SA 
IPR Policy Update) and rectified through the corrective measures available under the 
operational framework of an SDO. Non-compliance with SDOs’ internal rules may be 
challenged in Courts as a breach of contract (i.e. Trueposition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel). By the 
same token, compliance with external procedural rules can be safeguarded by SDOs (i.e. IEEE-
SA IPR Policy Update; DRM EME approval in W3C) as well as scrutinized by Courts (i.e. 
EMC Development, NSS Labs vs. Symantec). These possibilities for “internal” and “external” 
review arguably strengthen the importance of procedural legitimacy in standardization.  
 
But even when a regulatory institution supplies extensive participatory mechanisms, the 
legitimacy of its rule-making should not be taken for granted, especially when its rule-making 
does not satisfy the “demand-side” of regulation.1880 Compliance with a set of procedural 
requirements thus does not immediately assure flawless implementation of standards,1881 and 
nor, as it appears from the interviews, does it guarantee standards’ acceptance on global 
markets.  
 
5.1.3 Epistemic legitimacy 
 
Legitimation of private regulation can also occur through decision-making that is driven by 
specific expertise. To manage complex, rapidly evolving regulatory fields, rule-makers should 
have specialized technological knowledge and skills, typically possessed by narrowly trained 
 
 
followed by the CEPT was to avoid standardization methods which are not available free of charge. See R. 
Bekkers, G. Duysters and B. Verspagen, ‘Intellectual property rights, strategic technology agreements and market 
structure: the case of GSM’ (2002) 31 Research Policy 1141-61. 
1877 Greenstein and Rysman, ‘Coordination costs and standard setting’, p. 10.  
1878 Ibid., p. 17, n. 10. 
1879 Interview with an industry expert, 18 April 2018, on file with the author. 
1880 See Mattli and Woods, ‘In whose benefit?’. 
1881 Wiegmann, Blind and de Vries, ‘Multi-mode standardization’, p. 1375. 
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actors.1882 In some particular domains, such expertise-driven regulatory schemes, despite being 
voluntary, may nevertheless be preferred over formal arrangements.1883  
 
In global politics, absence of expertise may risk the regulatory outcomes not to achieve the 
ends pursued by the institution, which is likely to shatter the belief of norm-receivers and affect 
their compliance with the rules established by this institution, eventually rendering regulation 
ineffective.1884 In turn, legitimacy of industry-driven normative schemes is premised on the 
relevant knowledge and expertise claims behind the regulatory results, and on shared norms 
and values of the epistemic community defining the rules.1885 To achieve epistemic legitimacy, 
expertise in organizations should be genuinely present, decision-making in organizations 
should be based on expert considerations and should fall within the scope of the expertise.1886 
At the same time, organizations that are epistemically legitimate should be capable of 
generating effective rules by means of providing opportunities for discussions and evaluation 
of various views and interests, promoting diversity and reducing the risk of opportunistic 
interventions.1887  
 
It is incontestable that standardization is driven by experts in the relevant fields. Scientific-
based decision-making is endorsed in many, if not all, SDOs and was emphasized by the 
interviewed experts. Even SDOs’ management and administration staff usually have technical 
background.1888 According to the interviewees, it is this combined expertise that drives the 
stakeholders to SDOs and that ensures that SDOs’ processes result in high-quality 
technological experts-based solutions. 
 
While this type of legitimacy appears the most valuable in ICT standardization, it also has its 
flows. A common limitation to expertise-based decision-making in SDOs is that standards 
development, despite being considered as a purely engineering exercise, in practice still 
includes political and commercial considerations, and may even be influenced by individuals 




1882 M. Djelic and K. Sahlin-Andersson, ‘Introduction: a world of governance: the rise of transnational 
regulation’, in M. Djelic and K. Sahlin-Andersson (eds.), Transnational Governance: Institutional Dynamics of 
Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 7; Shapiro, ‘“Deliberative,” “independent” 
technocracy’, p. 343.  
1883 For instance, the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes prefers for all forensic labs to use 
an ISO standards; however, due to the differences [in their regulatory systems and operations of their labs], 
Member States often prefer the use of best practices. Interview with experts from cyber police authority, 11 
January 2018, on file with the author. 
1884 In this regard, see F. Scharpf, ‘Problem-solving effectiveness and democratic accountability in the EU’ 
(2003) MPIfG Working Paper 03/1; I. Clark, ‘Legitimacy in a global order’ (2003) 29 Review of International 
Studies 75-95; I. Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and authority in international politics’ (1999) 53 International Organization 
379-408. 
1885 Bexell, ‘Global governance’, pp. 291-3; Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, ‘Introduction: a world of 
governance’, p. 7.  
1886 JRC Report, p. 125. 
1887 Keohane, ‘The contingent legitimacy of multilateralism’, p. 15. 
1888 JRC Report, p. 128. 
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Another drawback of relying on epistemic legitimacy is the lack of external scrutiny. While 
technical issues in standards development can be addressed by the working groups’ chairs of 
SDOs, they cannot, and should not, be subjected to review by Courts:1889 the opposite will 
indeed undermine the scientific character of SDOs processes and cause frustration among 
technical experts. At the same time, limiting external review of SDO processes may conceal 
standards development from legitimacy through public law. 
 
Ultimately, in non-State governance, epistemic regulation is likely to represent the perspectives 
of a narrow interest group,1890 which creates tensions with inclusive regulation and democratic 
control. A suggested solution to have a democratically driven community “coordinating” 
experts’ work (“experts on tap and not on top”) would not be feasible in complex technological 
setting where the ultimate decision-maker in required to possess the knowledge of complex 
technical issues.1891 Epistemic regulation should thus occur in processes that protect wider 
interests groups and prevent concertation of power, in a way compensating for the democratic 
deficit.  
 
5.2 Legitimacy and effectiveness of ICT standards 
 
As noted earlier, legitimacy in ICT standardization is multifaceted. Legitimation of standards 
development occurs through endorsement by authorities, compliance with procedure, 
expertise-driven decision-making and acceptance by the markets. And whereas all these 
elements are relevant to a certain extent, no single form of legitimacy would suffice. Different 
types of legitimacy complement and prevent each other simultaneously, and further case-
specific analyses would be required to establish whether and how are particular standardization 
schemes legitimate from the perspective of various stakeholders. 
 
In any event, and precisely because of their voluntary nature, legitimacy of ICT standards 
would predominantly be derived from their effectiveness and acceptance on the market.1892 At 
first glance, this crucial element of legitimacy appears to rely entirely or market forces and 
industry preferences; however, standards acceptance also seems to have procedural dimension. 
As suggested by many experts, it is the combination of inclusive and open procedures, 
possibility to review the decisions, transparency and balance of interests that improves 
standards’ quality and ultimately ensures their acceptance. And while compliance with 
procedural principles is not crucial for the global acceptance of ICT standards, it feeds both 




1889 Recall the case EMC Development, where the CJEU looked at CEN’s processes for standards 
development, rather than the technical contents of the standard.   
1890 Shapiro, ‘“Deliberative,” “independent” technocracy’, p. 343. 
1891 Ibid. 
1892 If a voluntary ICT standard that is not used, even if legitimacy from public law, procedural and 
epistemic perspective, it does not achieve the means it pursued, and less legitimate alternatives will eventually 
take over.   
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In this regard, it is possible that ICT standards differ from standards in other sectors, such as 
labor or environment, where increased public law scrutiny would be more desirable due to 
public interest concern. It is also possible that with the evolvement of the ICT standards into 
stronger regulatory norms, additional “external” scrutiny by public law actors would be 
required. This, however, is an issue that should be further elaborated on by regulatory 
authorities, who should work in tandem with SDOs to prevent the regulatory capture of their 
processes while ensuring that standards development also takes into account a wide range of 
the relevant interests. 
 
5.3 Due process in governance by ICT standardization  
 
The above-mentioned considerations regarding best practices in the industry with regard to 
standards’ legitimacy and effectiveness question whether increased compliance with due 
process in ICT standardization is desirable. An argument in favor of stricter adherence to 
procedural rules is the need to safeguard public interest and to ensure that the decisions taken 
by SDOs would benefit the community, and not only its fraction. Expertise-driven rule-making 
intrinsically lacks representation of all relevant interests, not to mention that in reality, SDOs 
appear to be driven by large companies. Yet, as observed earlier in this study,1893 ICT 
standardization has evolved from purely technical activity to a form of private governance that 
affects wider society. With the addition of such “public interest function,” ICT SDOs are 
arguably required to offer increased procedural and substantive safeguards that ensure 
legitimacy and effectiveness of their standards, as well as their compliance with the applicable 
regulatory requirements.  
 
To exist as effective regulatory institutions, SDOs require independence and representativeness 
to guarantee openness and due process, and expertise and operational capacity for effective 
regulation.1894 In this regard, SDOs should offer sufficient accountability mechanisms, which 
in turn provide access to general scrutiny of good governance and fair procedures.1895  
 
From the theoretical and legal viewpoint, such guarantees should be provided by increased 
participation, access to dispute resolution and balance of interests. However, a “one-size-fits-
all” approach to procedural guarantees does not appear feasible when analysing operational 
frameworks of a number of SDOs, which differ significantly due to their historical background, 
institutional features and preferences of their membership. The prevailing opinion among the 
experts seems that, apart from separate cases and suggested minor improvements, the ICT 
standardization system operates satisfactorily with regard to compliance with due process 
principles, and that any changes to the current landscape may disturb the work of a well-




1893 See Chapter II. 
1894 See Abbott and Snidal, ‘The governance triangle’, p. 46. 
1895 Mataija, Private Regulation, p. 260. 
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The unavoidable question that arises in this context is what should be the role of governments 
in ICT standardization process? Although governmental involvement to ensure increased 
procedural safeguards is likely to contribute to public law legitimacy of ICT standards, it may 
diminish their epistemic, and possibly also procedural legitimacy, since due process 
requirements are formulated as “best practice” efforts and provide SDOs’ with sufficient 
margin for their implementation.1896 Even when interference from governmental actors may 
help to safeguard public interest and address human rights concerns and, arguably, facilitate 
achievement of balance between different interest groups, it is unlikely to be accepted by the 
members of SDOs, which may eventually result in their withdrawal from collective standards 




What ensures the resilience of SDOs and grants legitimacy to their standards: SDOs’ 
compliance with the applicable regulatory requirements, inclusiveness and balance of their 
operational processes or their technological supremacy? This chapter argued that each of these 
elements have a role to play when it comes to SDOs’ legitimacy and effectiveness, and no 
single element is sufficient. It appears from the experts’ reactions that self-regulatory nature of 
SDOs, their flexibility to adopt to the market needs and technical excellence of their 
membership prevails over procedural principles. Yet, when viewed from the lens of private 
governance, increased due process and inclusiveness in ICT standardization is at order. Indeed, 
when considering the emerging regulatory role of ICT standardization, epistemic legitimacy 
may not suffice: SDOs need to take due consideration of the variety of interests affected by 
their standards, and provide sufficient mechanisms for their participants to challenge the 
decision-making of their governance and technical bodies while at the same time, ensuring that 
their technical processes do not get stalled.  
 
This especially concerns SDOs’ dispute settlement processes. SDOs generally prefer the 
disputes to be handled internally and by their own governance bodies. While this ensures 
expertise and lowers SDOs’ costs, it also jeopardizes compliance with due processes when the 
appeals are handled by non-lawyers, or even by members who may have vested interests in the 
outcomes of the procedure. Most importantly, submitting SDOs’ processes to an “external” 
review instead of to SDOs’ governance bodies increases the chances of including public 
interest and societal concerns in SDOs’ decisions.  
 
The question remains whether SDOs’ are indeed appropriate fora for discussing societal 
concerns. Arguably, due to the increased regulatory and societal importance of ICT standards, 
SDOs can no longer maintain their status of merely technical organizations. However, many 
industry experts actively involved in SDOs’ processes seems to disagree with that idea. 
Subjecting SDOs’ processes to external review may thus be perceived by SDOs’ as a disturbing 
interference into their processes, and their standardization activities may then risk moving to 
 
 
1896 See Chapter III. 
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less “controlled” platforms with less procedural guarantees. The potential endorsement of such 
standards by formal SDOs may not compensate for procedural shortcomings during their 
development, especially in case these standards will be implemented by a large subset of the 
industry. If SDOs or public regulators were to increase compliance with due process principles, 
they should first ensure that there is a shift in the mentality of SDOs’ participance, which 




VI. CONCLUSION: DUE PROCESS, BALANCE AND CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE  
 
1. Findings and observations 
 
This study aimed to explore the extent to which current ICT standardization complies with the 
applicable procedural and substantive requirements, and whether increased scrutiny of SDOs 
operating in the ICT sector is desirable to guarantee due process. Starting from the premise that 
technical standards, even if voluntary, often have normative consequences, it examined the 
legal landscape in which SDOs operate and provided meticulous analysis of rules and 
procedures of five SDOs, which was also enriched by qualitative empirical research.  
 
By and large, the findings of this study suggest that SDOs comply with the applicable due 
process requirements to the extent that is acceptable by their membership and the industry 
sector in which they operate. While this implies that in standards development committees, 
technological considerations generally outweigh procedural concerns, it does not necessarily 
mean that the two are contradictory, since balanced and inclusive processes have a positive 
effect on standards’ quality. Although theoretical findings of this study propose that SDOs 
could benefit from increased due process, possibly safeguarded by some type of external 
review, practical considerations suggest that SDOs’ processes should be left to the market 
forces. In this regard, while the standardization landscape is continuously changing, it remains 
crucial for SDOs to preserve balanced procedures that prevent domination by any interests 
group(s). 
 
1.1 Due process requirements of the applicable regulatory frameworks 
 
The first stage of the analysis explored procedural and substantive guarantees that SDOs should 
offer following the applicable requirements of the WTO, EU and US legislation. Procedural 
principles for standardization include transparency, openness, consensus, effectiveness, 
coherence, review and balance of interests. While their definition may differ per regulatory 
framework, these principles also build on each other, and hence should be viewed holistically. 
Indeed, compliance with procedural requirements shields SDOs from certain types of liability 
or even allows for their standards to be endorsed by national legislators. Yet, since due process 
principles are generally formulated as “best practice” requirements, SDOs have a wide margin 
when incorporating these principles into their operational frameworks.  
 
1.2 SDOs’ compliance with due process requirements  
 
To understand how SDOs implement due process requirements, this study examined rules and 
procedures of five organizations developing global ICT standards. The SDOs that were 
analysed have their own procedural mechanisms in place that are tailored to the specific sector, 
membership and type of standards. Although this study observed certain limitations in SDOs’ 
frameworks, such as restricted participation in governance processes and sometimes lack of 
appeal and review possibilities for stakeholders affected by SDOs’ governance and technical 
decisions, the interviews conducted for the purpose of this study suggested that SDOs’ 
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procedural safeguards generally appear satisfactory for their participants. Challenges related to 
SDOs’ processes seem to arise when a (group of) stakeholder(s) is excluded, or alleges to be 
excluded, from SDOs’ decision-making processes. This is due to the fact that, apart from 
procedural issues, exclusion also has technical and business consequences for those affected 
by a particular standard or having vested interests in standards development. These 
consequences are aggravated when exclusion triggers liability of an SDO and its members.  
 
Furthermore, while standards development processes are traditionally believed to be guided by 
consensus, SDOs appear to attach more significance to balance and lack of dominance. Indeed, 
the requirement of “balance” may be subject to different interpretations: some scholars 
suggested that the principle of balance in the context of antitrust law requires SDOs to promote 
a balanced representation of appropriately defined categories of interests and is therefore 
different from the requirement to provide safeguards against dominance.1897 This study, 
however, submits that the requirement of balance is first and foremost meant to ensure that 
standardization processes are not hijacked by one group of stakeholders, regardless if they are 
in horizontal or vertical relationship with other groups, since a standard tilted towards one 
group of interests while excluding others is less likely to achieve the means it pursues.1898  
 
1.3 Due process and standards’ legitimacy  
 
From the legal viewpoint, compliance with procedural principles endows SDOs with public 
law legitimacy as well as procedural legitimacy. Due process holds SDOs to a higher standard 
of good governance, shields them from legal liability and, in part, compensates for democratic 
deficit of their rule-making. It appears from the interviews that from an engineering viewpoint, 
compliance with certain procedural requirements does not appear as essential as the technical 
features of standards, yet it definitely contributes to standards’ quality and effectiveness, and 
hence also to their epistemic legitimacy. This, however, does not imply that procedural 
legitimacy is sufficient to guarantee the effectiveness of standards as a form of private 
governance.1899 Due process and technical decision-making are thus not mutually exclusive, 
 
 
1897 See J. Baron and P. Larouche, ‘Antitrust and balance of interests in standards development: lessons 
from NSS Labs. V. Symantec’ (September 2019) Competition Policy International, who view balance as a vertical 
relationship between interests categories of groups, and dominance as a horizontal relationship between 
competing technology.  
1898 For instance, an international standard ISO 1581-2, which was supposed to set appropriate level of 
biocide tributyltin used in antifouling paints so that the paints used for ships do not disturb the hormone level of 
water organisms, appeared to be based on inaccurate calculations and to take into account environmental concerns; 
unsurprisingly, the development of this standard was dominated by large paint producers. A. Gottlieb, H. Verheul 
and H. De Vries, Project Verbetering formele normalisatieproces – CASE ISO 15181: Paints and varnishes – 
Determination of release rate of biocides in antifouling paints (2003) Delft: Ministry of Economic Affairs. As it 
was suggested by a number of interviewed experts, voluntary interoperability standards that are dominated by 
particular group of actors to the detriment of other interests are less likely to be adopted by global stakeholders. 
1899 A similar conclusion with regard to procedural legitimacy and success of global governance regimes 
was reached by Besheim and Dingwerth, who suggest taking into account the complexity of global governance, 
the fact that the importance of procedural legitimacy varies across different stages of governance processes, and 
that different stakeholders may attach different value to procedural legitimacy. M. Besheim and S. Dingwerth, 
‘Procedural legitimacy and private transnational governance: are the good ones doing better?’ (June 2008) SFB-
Governance Working Paper Series Nr. 14, at 26. It should be noted, however, that while deliberation indeed 
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provided that procedural requirements are adjusted to the needs of the particular sector and 
industry. 
 
It should also be considered that due process principles have evolved over time. Initially, 
procedural requirements for national standardization committees merely ensured that standards 
are not adopted over objections; nowadays, the applicable legal frameworks also tend to refer 
to the principles that are more of administrative nature, such as appeal and review. Likewise, 
standards are not anymore made “by engineers and for engineers,” but have broader political 
and social consequences. These changes are also noticeable in SDOs’ institutional architecture 
and their membership, which reflects, for instance, commercialization of the Internet and 
redefining global technology leadership.1900 SDOs’ frameworks should thus offer sufficient 
level of flexibility to adapt to the changing demands of their environment, meaning that they 
have to include technical, market, political and, increasingly, societal ideology.  
 
1.4 Achieving and maintaining due process in ICT SDOs 
 
SDOs’ processes should accommodate the needs of multiple interests of their members and 
participants, and be paced to technological development: in the ever-changing landscape of 
ICT standardization, subject to vested interests and different concerns, this may create 
challenges not only to achieve, but also to maintain due process. In the view of the increased 
regulatory and participatory concerns arising from ICT standardization, self-regulatory 
mechanisms of SDOs currently do not provide for sufficient procedural guarantees. Even when 
assuming that SDOs’ processes will eventually balance commercial and technical interests, 
their operational frameworks may still fall short on due process when broader societal issues 
are at stake.  
 
In theory, involvement of governmental actors may facilitate due process in technocratic 
governance,1901 in part because governments tend to be more successful in securing such public 
values as human rights. To that end, governmental actors can be involved in ICT 
standardization by means of a public-private partnership, where governmental authorities and 
SDOs interact to clarify and develop applicable legal rules and institutional norms.1902 
Governments can also provide “ex post” control by scrutinizing SDOs’ procedures against due 
process requirements, for instance when selecting a private standard to be referenced in 
legislation. It should be noted, however, that any type of “clarification” of SDOs processes by 
governmental authorities may be perceived as an attempt to intervene in SDOs’ self-regulation 
and should thus be performed with caution.1903  
 
 
promotes the sense of legitimacy, it may also legitimize bad decisions – hence, involving a larger group of 
stakeholders in decision-making may sometimes even decrease the quality of these decisions. C. R. Sunstein, 
Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 56.  
1900 See Nickerson and zur Muelen, ‘The ecology of standards processes’. 
1901 Lessig observed in this context that code-based regulation, although offering many benefits, still lacks 
transparency. See Lessig, Codes and Other Laws. 
1902 Such “tandem” approach was suggested by the JRC Report. 




In this regard, while it should be acknowledged that the applicable legal frameworks fall short 
of taking into account the needs of ICT standardization,1904 “redefining” these frameworks and 
clarifying their principles may not be the optimal solution to ensure due process in SDOs. For 
instance, the recent attempt to bring some clarity into TBT/ISO instruments with the updated 
ISO/IEC Guide 59 indeed addressed the arising issues of modern (ICT) standardization that 
have previously been omitted in the WTO framework, such as the inclusion of patented 
technologies, absence of appeal mechanisms and procedural guarantees in SDOs’ governance 
bodies: yet, the scope of the updated Guide also became limited the national bodies, and thus 
made no improvement towards ensuring procedural safeguards in private SDOs developing 
ICT standards. This, however, should not come as a surprise due to the continuing reluctance 
of the TBT Committee to address the issue of private standards.1905  
 
To the contrary, improving due process “from within” the organization may be a more plausible 
solution for ICT SDOs. Such improvements may include clarifying the vague elements of 
SDOs’ operational frameworks, strengthening SDOs’ dispute settlements mechanisms, but also 
clarifying the repercussions of non-compliance with procedural requirements. Yet, procedural 
guarantees are only useful when stakeholders are aware of them and are familiar with their 
functioning. Naturally, there is a considerable risk that promoting due process mechanisms 
among SDOs’ participants may increase the amount of appeals and even overload the 
governance bodies of SDOs, resulting in expanding SDOs’ administrative and management 
staff and thus, increasing the costs for their members; on the long run, however, it may also 
provide less possibilities to abuse SDOs’ processes.1906 
 
Some issues will always remain pertinent: for instance, exclusion of certain interests and 
technologies is intrinsic to ICT standardization.1907 And while it is impossible to design SDOs 
processes that will completely eliminate any possibility of exclusion, it is quite feasible for 
SDOs to have effective mechanisms that allow a broad range of stakeholders to challenge 
exclusion in a procedure that gives due respect to their interests.  
 
2. Outlook on global ICT standardization  
 
2.1 Challenges in implementing due process   
 
ICT standardization is evolving faster than the regulatory frameworks by which it is governed. 
Changes in SDOs’ institutional landscapes, as well as increasing cooperation between a large 
 
 
1904 The TBT instruments being the most characteristic example of these shortcomings.  
1905 Note that ISO/IEC Guide 59 is discussed here as a WTO instrument due to the close cooperation 
between the ISO and the TBT Committee.  
1906 While one may expect that internal dispute resolution processes are likely to discourage Court 
litigation, this may not always be the case for SDOs: disagreements on IPRs, for instance, are typically not handled 
by SDOs governance bodies.   
1907 The term “exclusion” should be understood in a broad sense, meaning exclusion of technologies for 
being adopted into a standard, but also exclusion from governance processes.  
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number of SDOs, currently witnessed in the development of IoT standards, may pose 
challenges for implementing and maintaining due process. For instance, SDOs may need to 
consider how to implement open source solutions in their standards and whether they need to 
adjust their frameworks to the OpenStand movement, currently supported only by Internet 
SDOs. This raises the questions of compatibility of IPR policies of SDOs cooperating in 
standards development, but also of the appropriateness of copyrighted private standards, 
especially since the recent decisions of the EU and US courts have added confusion to this 
issue.1908 
 
Arguably, concerns of balance in SDOs are becoming increasingly important and are gaining 
attention from governmental authorities. Recently, the DoJ recalled the need of SDOs to ensure 
the balance of interests in order to benefit from SDOAA in its intervention in the NSS Labs 
case.1909 As such, this intervention indicates the growing interest of the DoJ with the balance 
in SDOs, for now at least for antitrust purposes. From this perspective, it is important that 
governments clarify their expectations with regard to the principle balance of interests, and that 
these requirements are reasonable for SDOs’ activities.  
 
Recent years have also witnessed increased concerns of due process in SDOs’ governance 
processes, especially with regard to drafting and amending their IPR policies. While SDOs 
have a larger freedom to design their governance processes than standards development 
processes, it remains unclear whether this model will still hold in the future. In this regard, 
clarifications whether due process requirements of each regulatory framework apply to SDOs’ 
governance processes are much welcomed, although it should be acknowledged that such 
clarifications may not sit well with the self-regulatory character of SDOs.  
 
2.2 ICT standardization, global trade and geo-politics   
 
Standards and technical harmonization have always been essential for international trade. For 
example, standards were high on the States’ trade agenda when concluding multilateral trade 
agreements1910 as well as during the recent Brexit negotiations.1911 With growing digitalization, 
the role of ICT standards in international trade will increase even more, most likely putting 
under question the WTO’s status quo with regard to SDOs developing such standards. But the 
expansion of ICT standardization does not take away more “traditional” concerns of standards 
and global trade, such as openness of international standards bodies, fairness towards 
 
 
1908 Case C-613/14, James Elliott Construction Ltd v. Irish Asphalt Ltd.; American Society for Testing & 
Materials v. Public.Resource.org, Inc. (ASTM), No. 1:13-cv-01215 (TSC), 2017 WL 473822, (DDC Feb. 2, 
2017), amended by No. 17-7035, DC Cir. (2018). 
1909 NSS Labs, Inc v. Symantec Corporation, No. 18-cv-05711, Statement of Interest of the United States 
(ND Cal, June 26, 2019). 
1910 European Parliament, ‘Trans-Pacific Partnership: geopolitical implications for EU-US Relations’ 
(2016) available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/d-
us/dv/03_1_tppstudy_/03_1_tppstudy_en.pdf. 
1911 European Commission, Notice to Stakeholders, ‘Withdrawal of the United Kingdom and EU Food 




developing countries and informed participation in standards bodies. Especially the latter 
appears a growing apprehension among Western companies joining Asian standardization 
projects, who fear that the lack of access to and understanding of due process rules and 
applicable legislation in other jurisdictions may challenge their participation in regional 
SDOs.1912  
 
As any type of standardization, ICT standardization is susceptible to geo-political 
developments. Redefining countries’ international borders, even if it does not occur frequently, 
will still affect the composition as well as decision-making quorums of international and 
regional SDOs that operate following the national representation model.1913 Especially those 
SDOs producing standards to be used in national legislation should be prepared for the impact 
of such changes in geo-political landscape. 
 
Political agenda can also influence international competition in ICT standardization. A recent 
example of 5G demonstrates that rivalry for technological leadership does not only occur 
between companies, but also between States,1914 and may even influence national innovation 
policies.1915 Unlike previous efforts in wireless standardization, IoT and 5G standardization is 
characterized by increasingly active participation of Chinese companies which, despite being 
recent market entrants, have already established themselves as the leaders of future ICT 
standardization. At the same time, China’s past endeavors to promote their home-grown 
standards nationally and globally as a part of China’s indigenous innovation policy have given 
rise to concerns of protectionism and unfair trading practices.1916 Global introduction of such 
standards as TD-SCDMA, EVD and WAPI, although not crowned with success, demonstrated 





1912 This was suggested by multiple interviewed experts.  
1913 The UK, for instance, is an ETSI member with the largest number of votes (29), which may result in 
an interesting situation after Brexit. Arguably, BSI’s membership in ESOs will not be affected by Brexit since 
standards that ESOs develop are European, and not only EU standards (recall that for ETSI, it is CEPT 
membership that counts). Yet, harmonized standards created by ESOs have regulatory consequences in the EU, 
which may affect for UK voting power in HSs voting. In this regard, CEN and CENELEC agreed to apply a 
transition period from the date of Brexit until 31 December 2020, during which BSI will have full membership 
rights and obligations. CEN/CENELEC, ‘European standardization addressing Brexit’s impact’, available at  
https://www.cencenelec.eu/News/Brief_News/Pages/TN-2018-083.aspx.  
1914 European Commission, ‘2019 rolling plan for ICT standardization’ (March 2019), available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/2019-rolling-plan-ict-standardisation; Office of Science and 
Technology Policy, ‘Ensuring America reaches its 5G potential’ (30 May 2019) available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/ensuring-america-reaches-its-5g-potential/.  
1915 For instance, in 2018, the US Committee on Foreign Investments in the US (CFIUS) prevented the 
acquisition of Qualcomm by Broadcom, partly on the ground that the acquisition may weaken competition for 
Huawei’s increasing role and technological leadership in IoT. 
1916 Such tension between “techno-nationalism” and “techno-globalism” still shapes industrial policies of 
many States and in particular, in emerging economies, where governments employ a great variety of means to 
promote indigenous innovation. M. Murphree and D. Breznitz, ‘Indigenous digital technology standards for 
development: The case of China’ (2018) 1 Journal of International Business Policy 234-52. 
1917 Murphree and Breznitz, ‘Indigenous digital technology’; Wu, ‘Interplay between patents and 
standards’; Gibson, ‘Globalization and technology standards game’. 
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2.3 “Exclusion” by means of governmental restrictions  
 
Geo-political tensions in ICT standardization increase once countries adopt legal measures that 
influence relationships with foreign companies and, as a consequence, restrict their 
participation in certain SDOs. For instance, a number of Western governments have pledged 
to exclude China-based Huawei from participating in building their national 5G infrastructure 
due to security concerns related to Huawei’s hardware,1918 while in 2018, the US prohibited its 
federal agencies to purchase telecommunications equipment and services supplied by Chinese 
manufacturers.1919 A recent example is the designation of Huawei and its affiliates on the US 
Export Administration Regulation (EAR) entity list (August 2019), which requires US firms 
to seek licenses for any commercial transaction with Huawei and as such, may disincentivize 
any business with this company. 
 
In response to this measure, a number of US-based SDOs rushed to qualify what the Huawei 
listings in EAR would mean for this company’s participation in their standardization processes. 
SDOs’ communications ranged from the plans to limit participation of Huawei’s affiliates in 
peer-reviewed processes of scientific publications (IEEE-SA)1920 to placing the burden of 
ensuring that technical contributions do not include any information prohibited by US export 
controls regulations entirely on their members (3GPP).1921 While the proposed measures may 
seem appropriate for sustaining SDOs’ activities, they also question these bodies’ commitment 
to the well-established principles of impartiality and openness.  
 
In reality, it remains ambiguous as to which actions should be taken by SDOs in case one of 
their participants is subjected to restrictions under national law. Can SDOs be held liable when 
standards development in their committees induce security issues? Do SDOs owe their 
members a duty to eliminate sanctioned parties from all parts of their standardization activities, 
and would such “duty” sit well with the requirements of openness and inclusive 
 
 
1918 See, for instance, Joint Media Release, ‘Government provides 5G security guidance to Australian 
carriers’ (23 August 2018) available at https://www.minister.communications.gov.au/minister/mitch-
fifield/news/government-provides-5g-security-guidance-australian-carriers. 
1919 H.R. 4747, 115th Cong. (2018); Federal Acquisition Regulation; FAR Case 2018-017, Prohibition on 
Contracting for Certain Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services or Equipment (August 7, 2019) (to 
be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3, 12, 13, 39, & 52). 
1920 IEEE, ‘Compliance with US Trade restrictions should have minimal impact on IEEE members around 
the world’ (29 May 2019) available at https://www.ieee.org/about/news/2019/compliance-with-us-trade-
restrictions.html?utm_source=twitter&utm_campaign=huawei&utm_medium=social; revoked by IEEE, ‘IEEE 
lifts restrictions on editorial and peer review activities’ (2 June 2019) available at 
https://www.ieee.org/about/news/2019/statement-update-ieee-lifts-restrictions-on-editorial-and-peer-review-
activities.html?utm_source=twitter&utm_campaign=huawei&utm_medium=social. 
1921 3GPP, ‘Statement regarding engagement with companies added to the U.S. Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR) Entity List in 3GPP activities’ (3 June 2019), reversed with a clarification that information 
regarding contributions, meetings and documents distributed via 3GPP emails is publicly available and thus not 
subject to EAR, while non-public information that  is “not contained or not intended to be contained in 3GPP 
contributions, documents or emails” may be. The latest statement also confirmed that while 3GPP meetings are 
being conducted as “business as usual,” it is still the responsibility of Individual Members to ensure compliance 




standardization? Will participatory restrictions affect the quality and global adoption of SDOs’ 
standards?  
 
As food for thought, this study offers four options of how SDOs could address the issue. The 
first option, already attempted by a number of SDOs, is to limit participation of Huawei and its 
affiliates in SDOs’ processes and by this means, to shield SDOs and their members from 
liability risks and potential legal consequences. This scenario, however, may induce Chinese 
stakeholders to abandon participation in global SDOs and to prioritize national standards 
instead, leading to international fragmentation of IoT and increased market barriers for foreign 
companies.1922  
 
The second option for SDOs is to (temporary) move their standardization activities to a global 
organization based outside the US. However, while shielding US-based SDOs from potential 
legal risks, this will not resolve the issue for US companies that would still need to apply for 
an export license to do business with Huawei. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a similar 
rationale was employed in the aftermath of the US Iranian Sanctions Program, albeit in a 
different way: in order not to risk being in one standardization committee with Iranian 
stakeholders, oil and gas companies preferred to carry out standardization activities in US-
based American Petroleum Institute (API), where participation of Iranian nationals was (at that 
time) impossible due to the US entry restrictions for Iranian nationals. The API standards were 
subsequently put through the ISO fast-track process and adopted as global ISO standards.1923 
Also this scenario, while offering certain advantages, implies exclusion of vital stakeholders 
from global standardization processes.  
 
The third option is incorporating US-based SDOs in countries that do not have any export 
restrictions for Huawei. Unlike the strategies previously discussed in this and other studies, 
such as “voting with the feet” or “leaving the room,” this scenario implies the physical 
movement of SDOs’ Secretariat. Naturally, such initiative comes with many hurdles, including 
arrangement for new office premises and increased legal support in transition period, and it is 
thus the question whether SDOs, and their members, will find such efforts justifiable. 
 
The fourth and last option is for SDOs not to take any action, leaving the responsibility of 
complying with applicable export restrictions entirely to their members. Such strategy is the 
least cost-intensive for SDOs but may also create uncertainties for both Chinese and US 
stakeholders and, again, discourage their participation in these SDOs’ activities. Arguably, 
such uncertainty can be mitigated by higher degree of rules and regulations that clarifies how 
stakeholders are expected to act in certain situations: this may mean that this last strategy may 
be effective when supported by some type of clarification from governmental authorities 





1922 Such fragmentation has already been witnessed in 3G and 4G standards.  




3. Future Research Agenda 
 
The need for standardization research in the context of various disciplines is ever-growing, and 
is especially relevant for lawyers. To name a few, legal research on standardization may include 
jurisdiction over SDOs disputes, and advancing research on SDOs liability under private, 
antitrust and export controls laws. In particular, analysing the interplay between trade law, 
national security law and standardization is much welcomed given the recent developments on 
this turf.  
 
Advancement of empirical research on SDOs’ governance and procedures is likewise desirable. 
Future studies may examine how modifications of SDOs’ operational frameworks affected 
different groups of actors, or focus on the birth and death of SDOs in a historical and 
institutional context, illustrating how procedural safeguards have evolved with time. Similarly, 
due research attention should be paid to the role of leadership in SDOs’ and their committees, 
and whether and how is this role evolved in time.  
 
Standards development is characterized by many movements and transformations: standards 
“travel” from one SDO to another, individuals change their affiliation, and stakeholders acquire 
memberships in different SDOs and create new consortia. Research addressing each of these 
movements will certainly enrich academic scholarship on standardization, but also facilitate 
understanding behavior patterns in various types of SDOs.  
 
Even though future research on standardization is multidisciplinary, particular aspects of 
certain disciplines should not be neglected. Legal scholars, while giving due consideration to 
the fact that private specifications can create normative effects, should nevertheless preserve 




ANNEX I. LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
 
 
1. Interview with an environmental management and radiation expert, 9 January 2018, on 
file with the author. 
 
2. Interview with experts from cyber police authority, 11 January 2018, on file with the 
author. 
 
3. Interview with an expert from an SDO, 12 January 2018, on file with the author. 
 
4. Interview with an industry expert, 15 January 2018, on file with the author. 
 
5. Interview with an industry expert, 16 January 2018, on file with the author.  
 
6. Interview with an industry expert* (former SDO governance bodies member), 16 
January 2018, on file with the author.   
 
7. Interview with an industry expert, 17 January 2018, on file with the author. 
 
8. Interview with a legal counsel of an SDO, 18 January 2018, on file with the author. 
 
9. Interview with an expert from an NSO, 19 January 2018, on file with the author. 
 
10. Interview with an expert from an SDO, 19 January 2018, on file with the author. 
 
11. Interview with an industry expert/expert from SDO, 22 January, on file with the author. 
 
12. Interview with an industry expert, 23 January 2018, on file with the author. 
 
13. Interview with an industry expert, 25 January 2018, on file with the author. 
 
14. Interview with an industry expert, 1 February 2018, on file with the author. 
 
15. Interview with an industry expert, 7 February 2018, on file with the author. 
 
16. Interview with an industry expert, 13 February 2018, on file with the author. 
 
17. Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 15 February 2018, on file with 
the author.  
 
18. Interview with an industry expert, 19 February 2018, on file with the author. 
 
19. Interview with an industry expert, 21 February 2018, on file with the author. 
 
20. Interview with an expert from an SDO, 4 April 2018, on file with the author. 
 
21. Interview an industry expert, 4 April 2018, on file with the author. 
 




23. Interview with an industry expert, 18 April 2018, on file with the author. 
 
24. Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 27 April 2018, on file with the 
author. 
 









My name is Olia Kanevskaia, I am a PhD Candidate at Tilburg Law School, working on 
international standardization. My research is focused on the governance and due process in 
Standards Development Organizations, and hence I am very interested in stakeholder's 
experiences during standards development processes. I was advices to contact you by (…) 
with regard to a possible interview.  
 
Your participation in this study will be much appreciated and will also allow me to 
implement. Some practical insights in my academic work. Of course, I would not refer to you 
personally or to (…) in my PhD thesis, but to the industry. If necessary, I will be happy to 
provide any other information regarding my research. 
 
 








ANNEX II(B). SAMPLE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
GENERAL QUESTIONS STAKEHOLDERS 
 
1. What are the strongest advantages of the SDO(s) in which (…) participates? Would/did 
(…) consider changing the forum for the development of (a particular) standard (s)? 
 
 
2. Is (…) involved in drafting operational rules of the Standards Development 
Organizations (SDOs)? (eg. IPR Policies; membership rules; voting rules). Do these 
processes differ significantly from standard-setting, and if so, are these differences 
justified? 
 
3. Which challenges does (…)  face in SDOs? (please list 2-3). 
 
4. In your opinion, do SDOs in which (…) participates provide sufficient procedural 
guarantees (i.e. standard-setting procedure is transparent and open; stakeholders’ 
concerns are heard, substance/procedure can be appealed)? Is additional procedural 
scrutiny necessary and if so, by whom should it be performed?  
 
5. Are you aware of any (procedural) disputes in which (…) is/was involved? If so, are 
you content with the way the disputes were resolved?  
 
6. Would you say that standards developed in SDOs in which (…) participates achieve 
the ends they pursued and are widely accepted by industry? Is the success of these 
standards attributable to the operational framework of these SDOs?  
 
7. Do the SDOs in which (…) participate need to modify their standards development 
rules? If so, how would you like to see them changed? 
 
8. Do the SDOs in which (…) participate need to modify their governance models/IPR 
Policies/membership rules? If so, how would you like to see them changed?  
 







1. What was (…) experience in developing GSM, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth 
standards/specifications? What would you say are the main success-factors of these 
standards, and what were the main challenges during their development?  
 
2. In your opinion, was/is (…)’s involvement in standards developing processes affected 
by the disputes, FTC/EC investigations and court cases on antitrust? (eg. …), and if so, 
how?  
 
3. Are you aware of any modifications of governance rules in ETSI/IEEE/Bluetooth SIG? 
How would these changes affect (…)’s position in these SDOs?  
 




ANNEX III: PILOT SURVEY AMONG SDOs MEMBERS 
 
Compliance with Procedural Requirements in Practice: a Qualitative Survey 
 
Although this exercise is suggested for the future research, a pilot study was conducted among 
members of some SDOs, or their working groups, that were analysed in Chapter IV of this 
study. And while the results of these explorative study are insufficient to represent a 
meaningful contribution, they may be useful future empirical studies on SDOs procedures and 
governance.  
 
1. Methodology  
 
1.1 Research question  
 
The goal of the proposed empirical study is to predict the correlation between the type of 
stakeholders, their membership status and years of involvement in a particular SDO, and the 
extent to which they are satisfied with the processes of that SDO. The research question guiding 
this qualitative study is as follows: which (type of) stakeholders are (not) satisfied with the 
current governance model and working procedures of SDOs? Since this type of question aims 
to identify an outcome, rather than finding out “how” and “why” are procedural rules complied 
with, the best strategy to answer it is by conducting a survey among SDOs’ members.1924  
 
While in case of technology standardization, surveys are in principle subject to the same 
caveats as interviews (i.e. experts who may either represent position of their firms or, to the 
contrary, generalize their own experience in particular circumstances to common practices in 
SDOs), pseudonymized surveys can be expected to encourage independence and target larger 
respondents-group, offering results that are as closest as possible to the real-life practice.  
 
1.2 Survey design 
 
The five surveys, each for an SDO examined in Chapter IV, were designed based on the 
reviewed operational documents and contributions from the experts. The questions of the 
surveys go to the root of standardization activities and aim to reflect how the three different 
types of procedures that take place in SDOs, namely (1) standards development processes, (2)  
governance processes and (3) dispute resolution processes, are perceived by different types of 
SDOs’ actors with regard to their procedural guarantees.  
 
The typology of actors is derived from the SDOs’ operational framework. For ETSI, the 
stakeholders were classified according to their membership (full, associate, or observers); for 
IEEE-SA’s working groups, according to their membership (voting, non-voting, aspirant, and 
ex officio) and participation in other sponsors and working groups of IEEE-SA; for IETF, in 
 
 
1924 Yin, Case Study Research. 
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the absence of formal membership, the distinction was made whether stakeholders participated 
solely through the mailing or have also attended IETF’s meetings.1925  
 
The surveys also contained a set of questions that aimed to classify stakeholders according to 
their affiliation and the years of their involvement in a particular SDO: for the sake of 
consistency, these questions were (almost) identical for all five SDOs.1926  
 
Firstly, the type of affiliation stakeholders could choose from while filling in the survey 
reflected entities commonly involved in ICT standardization: governmental bodies, network 
operators, service providers, device manufacturers, users, research bodies, and 
consultancies.1927 Although representation of this types of stakeholders is not expected to be 
equal across all organizations (network operators for instance are commonly represented in 
ETSI’s standardization activities but are less likely to join IETF), participation of this type of 
actors is not precluded in any of the five SDOs. To accommodate the responses of stakeholders 
that do not fit in any of the proposed affiliation types, a last category termed “other” was added. 
 
Secondly, stakeholders were asked whether they have been involved in an SDO for 1) more 
than 15 years; 2) between 5 and 15 years; 3) between 1 and 5 years; 4) recently joined. The 
milestones of 15 and 5 years can be explained by the evolution of the cellular and wireless 
technologies that experienced significant breakthrough in the beginning of 2000 (i.e. Wi-Fi 
802.11g) and mid 2010 (i.e. rolling out of LTE). The milestone of 1 year was used in this 
question to separate stakeholders who have joined very recently from those who already have 
some experience with the SDOs’ processes. 
 
To answer the research question, the surveys introduced three identical sets of statements that 
respondents had to rank as 1) yes; 2) somewhat; 3) no; 4) don’t know.1928 The sets of statements 
related to (i) standards development processes; (ii) governance processes; and (iii) dispute 
resolution or appeal mechanisms: to avoid confusion between (i) and (ii), these processes were 
explained accordingly for each SDO, following the typology adopted in this chapter.1929 The 
statements of each of the three sets of questions related to stakeholders’ representation at the 
relevant institutional level; stakeholders’ awareness of the relevant processes; transparency, 
clearness and accessibility of the relevant processes (which, more than other procedural 
principles, was emphasized by the interviewees on various occasions); and the need for 
modification of the relevant processes. For (i) and (ii), the closing statement suggested that the 
relevant processes offered sufficient procedural guarantees; for (iii), the closing statement 
 
 
1925 While the surveys were also designed for W3C and Bluetooth SIG, they were not distributed among 
their members, leaving these two organizations outside the scope of this study.  
1926 See Annex III Supplement A: Surveys. 
1927 For ETSI, the category “NSB” (national standards body) was added. 
1928 See Annex III Supplement A: Surveys. 
1929 For ETSI, for instance, (i) proposal for standardization project, technical meetings among experts, 
approval of standard/technical specification; (ii) drafting and modifying of ETSI Directives, rules of procedure, 
IPR policy, membership agreements. The latter was especially important since some stakeholders may tend to see 
IPR Policies as a part of standards development processes, rather than governance processes.  
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suggested that the dispute resolution system provides less need, or no need at all, for litigation 
or dispute resolution outside the SDO/working group. 
 
Since the role of governments in ICT standardization has been discussed during the interviews 
with experts,1930 the last question was identical for all five surveys and asked whether there 
was a need for increased governmental scrutiny in an SDO’s standards development and 
governance processes.1931 Respondents could choose out of four options (1) yes, only for 
standards development processes; (2) yes, only for governance processes; (3) yes, for both; (4) 
no, for both.  
 
1.3 General Hypotheses1932  
 
Some general hypotheses can be formulated from the research question. These hypotheses are 
tested by the questions that are identical for all five SDOs and relate to their affiliation and 
years of involvement in an SDO’s activity.  
 
(1) There is no correlation between stakeholders’ affiliation and their satisfaction with 
procedural guarantees offered by the SDOs.  
 
As it appears from the SDOs’ operational rules, and was later confirmed by the experts, all 
types of affiliations are presumed to have equal rights and responsibilities within the five 
SDOs, and hence should not be treated differently. Frustrations with procedures arise by a 
particular set of actors and in particular situations, e.g. IPR Policy change contested by 
innovators in IEEE, or reluctance of the membership to modify IPR Policy, contested by 
implementers in ETSI. 
 
(2) Stakeholders who have been involved in an SDO’s activity for a longer time have a 
better knowledge of the procedures that those who have recently joined.  
 
The longer a stakeholder has been participating in the activities of an SDO, the more experience 
did (s)he gain with its standards processes, governance rules and dispute settlement.1933 Those 
who have been active in an SDO for a long time are likely to have witnessed certain operational 
changes and their consequences. In turn, those who joined recently typically pay less attention 
to the procedures, as long as those are fair and not detrimental to their business practices.1934  
 
(3) Irrespective of their affiliation or years of involvement in an SDO, stakeholders do not 




1930 For instance, interview with experts from cyber police authority, 11 January 2018, on file with the 
author; Interview with an expert from an SDO, 12 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1931 See Annex III Supplement A: Surveys. 
1932 For consistency, SDO-specific hypotheses will be explained in the following sections. 
1933 This applies to companies as well as to individuals.  
1934 This was suggested in the interview with an industry expert, 21 February 2018, on file with the author. 
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Although most of the experts agreed that there is always a room for improvement, none of them 
has actually indicated that there is an urgent need to change current SDOs’ processes. Rather, 
they questioned whether the processes are applied correctly by all participants. Those who are 
not satisfied with procedural aspects would express their concerns,1935 and all procedural or 
substantial failures in standards development process would then be corrected in the process of 
deliberations.1936 
 
(4) Irrespective of their affiliation or years of involvement in an SDO, stakeholders prefer 
that neither standards development nor governance processes are subjected to increased 
governmental scrutiny.   
 
ICT standardization is driven by large technology companies. Governmental agencies 
participate in SDOs on an equal footing with commercial enterprises,1937 although in 
exceptional cases, increased governmental involved is desired.1938 But even in ETSI, where the 
Commission has a unique power to propose ENs, private sector remains dominant: first, the 
Commission does not have a membership status in the ETSI (recall also that the survey was 
intended for the members)1939 and second, the NSOs, while having important role in standards 
approval and implementation, are also largely comprised of private companies.1940  
 
1.4 Survey distribution 
 
A contact person from each of the five SDOs was consulted in order to seek permission for 
distributing the surveys among the stakeholders, and to verify whether the questions posed in 
the surveys were formulated correctly and according to the jargon of a particular SDO. From 
the five organizations targeted by this study, only three allowed for the survey to be distributed 
among their members, or among the members of the relevant working groups.  
 
The surveys were hosted at Qualtrics software and were distributed via an e-mail containing a 
link to the online questionnaire,1941 among three groups of participants, namely the ETSI 
membership, subscribers of IETF general mailing list, and members of the IEEE-SA 802.11 
WLAN Working Group.1942 In ETSI, the survey was shared with the whole membership by the 
ETSI Secretariat; members of IEEE-SA 802.11 WLAN Working Group were approached 
 
 
1935 Interview with an industry expert, 25 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1936 Industry expert’s answers to the questionnaire, received 27 April 2018, on file with the author.  
1937 Interview with an expert from an SDO, 12 January 2018, on file with the author.  
1938 For instance, forensic standards, where it will be too dangerous to let the market decide. Interview with 
experts from cyber police authority, 11 January 2018, on file with the author. 
1939 This, of course, does not apply to IETF, which does not have formal membership. 
1940 Interview with an expert from an NSO, 19 January 2018, on file with the author.  
1941 The questionnaire was hosted by Qualtrics following Tilburg University regulation on data 
management, and in compliance with the GDPR requirements.  
1942 These limitations stem from the rules of SDOs: some preferred that their members are not approved 
by non-members; in others, members could only be approached individually. It was practically impossible to 
contact all members of IEEE-SA, since working groups allow participation without IEEE-SA membership. For 
this reason, but also because of the importance of WLAN standards, 802.11 was selected. Note that for the sake 
of simplicity, the figures of this section refer to IEEE.  
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individually per e-mail by the author; subscribers to IETF general mailing list received a 
general e-mail targeting a broader IETF community sent by the researcher. The surveys were 
distributed in May 2018, and the answers were received between May and August 2018.  
 
1.5  Caveats and limitation  
 
Certain limitations of the empirical method selected for the purpose of answering the research 
question should be acknowledged. Firstly, most of the potential respondents are private parties; 
although pseudonymized surveys provide little incentives to submit false, or untrue, responses, 
whether or not the answers were provided in good faith cannot be verified. Secondly, despite 
that the expressions “standards development processes” and “governance processes” were 
explained, certain terms used in the surveys may still be subject to different interpretation: for 
instance, stakeholders may have different benchmarks for “transparency” and “accessibility,” 
or may have multiple affiliations: especially the latter appears to be an increasing phenomenon 
due to the rapid changes in the industry.1943 Finally, the responses rates of the surveys are 
usually too low for drawing any general conclusions whatsoever.  
 
 
2.  Survey results  
 
As mentioned earlier, the purpose of conducting the surveys among the SDOs members was 
rather explorative: although the responses do not count towards the overall conclusion of this 
study, they give future researchers a flavor of what can be expected from similar surveys. In 
this regard, it is still interesting to consider the results that, although limited, allow to test out 
the hypotheses.  
 
2.1 Respondent group  
 
As common when case studies are conducted by the means of survey distribution, the number 
of responses received was fairly low. For ETSI, the number of responses was 43, which equals 
5,3% of the ETSI’s membership (876 at the moment when survey was conducted). For 802.11 
WLAN Working Group, the number of responses was 32, which is 7,3% of the Working 
Group’s membership (437 at the moment when survey was conducted), and 13,1% of members 
who could have actually been reached by surveys since their e-mail could be obtained in public 
domain (245 e-mail have been sent out to 802.11 Working Group members). Surprisingly, 
given its open character and relatively easy way to reach the stakeholders, the lowest number 
of responses was received from IETF and equals 18. Since IETF has no formal membership, 
and subscription to its general e-mail is open for an unlimited number of stakeholders, it is 




1943 Interview with an expert from an SDO, 12 January 2018, on file with the author.  
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From those respondents, a part has omitted some questions, or did not finish the survey.1944 
The number of stakeholders who did not proceed with the survey after responding the first 
question1945 (“drop-outs”) is 9 for ETSI, 1 for 802.11 WLAN Working Group and 4 for IETF. 
It is remarkable that the surveys circulated through the secretariat generated the largest number 
of responses, but also the largest number of “drop-outs”; the smallest amount of “drop-outs” 
was witnessed by the group of stakeholders which received the survey in a personal e-mail.  
 
Given these flaws and the low amount of responses, performing a quantitative analysis to 
establish the total number of stakeholders with a particular response will lack robustness. 
Hence, it was attempted to identify any patterns in the answers of different types of 
respondents.  
 
2.2  Respondents’ profile  
 
Mapping of respondents’ profile offers a good understanding of the context in which the 
responses should be analysed. A large part of ETSI respondents were Manufacturers (27,8%) 
followed by governmental agencies/bodies (19,4%), Consultancies (13,89%), NSBs (11,1%) 
and Network Operators (11,11%), Service Providers (5,6%) and Research Bodies (5,6%). No 
respondents fill in the category of Users or User Associations, but some were independent 
expert (1) or test house (1). The vast majority of respondents were full Members (90,9%); only 
2 observers (a Governmental Body and an NSB) and 1 Associate Member (Consultancy) took 
part in the survey. Almost half of the respondents were engaged in ETSI’s standards 
development for more than 15 years (47,1%), most of which were Network Operators and 
Consultancies. Less have joined between 5 and 15 years ago (32,3%), even less between 1 and 
5 years ago (14,75) and only 2 members have joined recently (5,9%).  
 
Fig. ETSI.i about here 
 
In 802.11 WLAN Working Group, the overwhelming majority of respondents were voting 
members (93,6%), with one Aspirant Member and one Ex Officio member. Most respondents 
identified as Device Manufacturers (71%), followed by Consultancies (12,9%), Research Body 
(9,7%) and “Others” (6,5%), of which one respondent specified to be affiliated with an 
Infrastructure Manufacturer. Most of the respondents were involved in 802.11 Working Group 
activities for more than 15 years (41,94%), followed by those who participated from 5 to 15 
years, (29%), and from 1 to 5 years (22,6%); only two have recently joined the Working Group 
(6,5%). 23 of the total number of respondents indicated to also participate in other 802 Working 
Groups; most of them were members of 802.18 Radio Regulatory TAG (26,1%) or 802.1 
Higher Layer LAN Protocols Working Group (21,7%), followed by 802.15 Wireless Personal 
 
 
1944 Missed questions have been facilitated by the design that allowed skipping the questions. This was a 
cautious choice since it was decided that it is better to have stakeholders that hesitate answering certain questions 
to proceed with the survey and thus to prevent drop-outs. It was the author’s believe that, even if this choice of 
survey design may indeed affect the accuracy of the result, it may also encourage participation.  
1945 Those stakeholders did not proceed further than Q1.  
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Area Network (WPAN) Working Group and 802.19 Wireless Coexistence Working Group 
(each 17,4%); 802.22 Wireless Regional Area Networks (8,7%) and 802.24 Vertical 
Application TAG and 802.3 Ethernet Working Group (each 4,4%). The results are too limited 
to draw any valid conclusions regarding cross-participation of stakeholders in IEEE-SA 802 
Working Groups; however, such type of analysis may be of interest for future empirical 
research on institutional aspects of IEEE-SA.  
 
Fig. IEEE.i about here 
 
Most of IETF respondents were affiliated with Research Bodies (42,9%), followed by Device 
Manufacturers, Users and Consultancies (each 14,3%), Network Operators and Service 
Providers (each 7,1%). Remarkably, as it was the case for 802.11 WLAN Working Group, no 
responses were Governmental Bodies participating in IETF.  The majority of respondents were 
involved in IETF standardization for more than 15 years (42,9%), less were involved between 
5 and 15 years (35,7%), some between 1 and 5 years (14,3%) and only one has recently joined. 
Most of the respondents indicated to participate in IETF standardization through both mailing 
lists as personal meetings (85,71%), including Research Bodies and Consultancies, who are 
traditionally assumed to have a limited or no budget for attending the meetings.1946 Only two 
respondents, a Device Manufacturer and a Research Body, participated merely through the 
mailing lists.  
 
Fig. IETF.i about here 
 
2.3  Standards Development  
 
A) ETSI  
 
SDO-specific expectations 
Based on the analysis of ETSI’s operational framework and contributions from the experts, it 
is expected that governmental agencies and NSBs are frequent participants of ETSI’s standards 
development (due to the regulatory importance of ETSI’s standards), and that full members are 
represented more often than associates or observers (due to the allocation of voting rights for 
ENs). Respondents who have been in ETSI for a while are expected to be more aware of 
standards development procedures than the newcomers and for this reason, they also perceive 
the rules as clearer and more transparent. In line with the general hypothesis, it is not expected 
that any of the respondents, irrespective of affiliation or years of involvement, would like to 
see the procedures change; likewise, all respondents, except for a few manufacturers,1947 are 





1946 Interview with an environmental management and radiation expert, 9 January 2018, on file with the 
author. 
1947 This appears from interviews with some companies. 
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Survey Observations  
Almost all responded manufacturers indicated to be frequent participants in standards 
development meetings, while the opposite appeared for NSBs. Not all full members were 
involved in standards development meetings, while one associate member was a frequent 
participant. As expected, newcomers and observers were not often represented in standards 
development processes. Furthermore, the majority of respondents was aware, or somewhat 
aware, of standards development procedures, with a curious exception of a consultancy that 
has been a full member for than 15 years. At the same time, while the 2 recently joined 
members were only “somewhat aware” of standards development procedures, all members who 
are involved for more than 15 years responded the question with a “yes.” All respondents 
indicated that the procedures were, or were somewhat, clear, transparent and accessible, 
including NSBs who were not often represented at standards development meetings. While a 
small part of respondents indicated that procedures could be “somewhat” modified, the 
majority still answered with a “no;” only 2 manufacturers who have been full members for 
more than 5, and one even more than 15, years indicated that modifications are desired. None 
of the respondents found that standards development processes offer insufficient procedural 
guarantees: from the 2 respondents who indicated “yes” for the previous question, 1 found 
ETSI’s processes to “somewhat” offer procedural guarantees, and 1 indicated “I don’t’ know.” 
 
Fig. ETSI.ii about here 
 
 
B) 802.11 WLAN Working Group  
 
SDO-specific expectations 
Since the respondent group is largely dominated by voting members and manufacturers, 
expectations related to affiliation and membership status are quite limited. As in ETSI, it may 
be expected that respondents that are active within the Working Group for a longer time are 
more aware of standards development procedures and, for this reason, find those clearer and 
more transparent. Likewise, those participating in other working groups of IEEE-SA are 
expected to have a better understanding of IEEE-SA procedures and argue for their 
transparency and increased procedural guarantees (due to their versatile experience in IEEE-
SA). Given that the interviewed experts, even when they indicated not to support the 
amendments of IPR policy, were generally of a favorable opinion on IEEE standards 
development processes, respondents are not expected to support any modifications of standards 
development processes, and to consider them as offering sufficient procedural guarantees.  
 
Survey Observations  
Although the majority of respondents indicated to be often represented at standards 
development meetings, 2 voting members and an aspirant member, device manufacturers that 
joined the Working Group within last 15 years and a recently joined research body respectively, 
appeared not to be actively involved in standardization activities. Respondents who indicated 
to be involved in other 802 working groups generally appear to be often represented in 802.11 
standards development activities and to be well aware of how the 802.11 procedures work 
289 
 
(except for two respondents who indicated “somewhat”).1948 Those not participating in the 
meetings were also aware, or somewhat aware, of how the procedures work: indeed, those 
involved for more than 15 years have stated a clear “yes” to the second question, while 
stakeholders that joined later also indicated “somewhat.” Likewise, most of the respondents 
found the processes to be, to be somewhat, clear, transparent and accessible: this time, 
however, “somewhat” was also selected by some of those who were involved in 802.11 
standardization for more than 15 years. Remarkably, “somewhat” was seldomly selected by 
those who were participating in other working groups.  
 
A significant group of respondents, including device manufacturers, a research body and a 
consultancy, indicated that they would like to see the procedures modified: although this 
amount is still lower than the majority, this response is in a stark contrast the response provided 
by ETSI members. Among those in favor of process modifications, 2 have joined between 1-5 
years ago, 2 between 5 and 15, and 2 were involved in IEEE-SA for longer than 15 years; in 
turn, the newcomers indicated that processes may be “somewhat” modified. Yet, those 
involved in other 802 working groups preferred to stick with “somewhat” or with “no.” The 
majority of respondents nevertheless found standards development processes to offer, or to 
offer somewhat, sufficient procedural guarantees. Respondents that were involved in other 802 
working groups also agreed with this determination; only 2 device manufacturers who are also 
voting members active in IEEE-SA between 1 and 15 years responded “no,” and one of them 
indicated earlier not to be often represent at standards development meetings.  
 
Fig. IEEE.ii about here 
 
 
C) IETF   
 
SDO-specific expectations 
Again, since the respondents were predominantly research bodies, little can be learned from 
the differences among affiliations. Yet, it may be expected that those respondents who 
participate only through the mailing list will be less often represented in IETF standardization 
and hence, are also less aware of its procedures. In line with the general hypothesis and the 
specific expectations for ETSI and 802.11 Working Group, those who have been longer 
involved in IETF activities are expected to have a better knowledge of its standards 
development procedures. In general, it also expected that respondents would find the 
procedures sufficiently clear, transparent and accessible, and would not favor any changes to 
standards development processes: as mentioned during the interviews, it is the open procedure 
of IETF that makes it an attractive forum for Internet standardizers and ensures its success as 
an SDO.  
 
Survey Observations  
 
 
1948 It should be acknowledged that the question was aiming at IEEE-SA procedures, not those of 802.11, 
while the respondent group was limited to 802.11. 
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As expected, those participating only via mailing list were only “somewhat” involved in IETF 
standards development. From all respondents, only one user that recently joined indicated not 
to be often engaged in IETF standardization, while at the same time taking part both in e-mail 
exchanges and meetings. The respondent however was somewhat aware of how the procedures 
work, while the rest of the survey participants indicated “yes” to this question (even those who 
took part only through the mailing list). Furthermore, all respondents, including those involved 
only through the mailing list, found procedures to be, or to be somewhat, clear, transparent and 
accessible. Modifications were supported only by 2 respondents – both participant of IETF 
meetings, and one of whom was a recently joined participant that was not often involved in 
standardization meetings, while the second has been in IETF between 5 and 15 years. The 
majority of respondents further agreed that IETF standards development processes offer, or 
offer somewhat, sufficient procedural guarantees; a “no” was submitted only by one 
consultancy which however has been involved in IETF meetings and mailing lists for more 
than 15 years.  
 
Fig. IETF.ii about here 
 
 
2.4 Governance Processes  
 
A) ETSI  
 
SDO-specific expectations 
Given ETSI’s formal membership, it is expected that members are generally familiar with 
ETSI’s governance model and that, following ETSI’s operational framework, both full and 
associate members are represented in the governance bodies. In this regard, governance 
procedures are expected to be found clear and transparent by the majority of respondents. Since 
IPR policies are defined as a part of governance processes, it is expected that only a small part 
of manufacturers would advocate for the change and would find the processes not to offer 
sufficient procedural guarantees; in general, however, it is exactly the consensus-based 
governance processes of the ETSI that were praised by the most interviewees, which renders it 
unlikely that the majority of respondents will favor any modifications.  
 
Survey Observations  
Governance bodies of ETSI appeared to be comprised of different types of members, with an 
exception of a research body and consultancies, of which one was “somewhat” represented. 
The only associate member who responded to the survey questions did not participate in 
governance processes; remarkably, one of the two observers responded “somewhat,” which is 
at odds with ETSI’s operational model that, principle, does not allow observers to take part in 
governance processes.1949 Moreover, representation in ETSI’s governance bodies did not 
appear conditional upon the years of involvement in its standardization activity: those who 
have recently joined indicated to participate in governance processes, while the majority 
 
 
1949 See chapter IV.  
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respondents who have been a member for more these 15 years indicated not to be represented 
in ETSI’s governance bodies. 
 
Most of the respondents also indicated to be, or to be somewhat, aware of ETSI’s governance 
model: “no” was indicated by, surprisingly, two full members who have been involved in ETSI 
for a long time – a governmental body and a consultancy. Observers appeared to be 
“somewhat” aware of ETSI’s governance processes, while a respondent that joined recently 
indicated a clear “yes.” The majority also found ETSI governance processes (somewhat) clear, 
transparent and accessible, except for one manufacturer who has been a full member between 
1 and 5 years. As expected, most of the respondents did not favor any change of ETSI’s 
governance processes: modifications were supported only by a network operator and a device 
manufacturer, both full members for more than 15 years; a governance body involved between 
1 and 5 years responded with “somewhat.” At the same time, none of the respondents indicated 
that ETSI’s governance processes did not offer sufficient procedural guarantees; “somewhat” 
was selected by minority of the survey participants, including an observer.  
 
Fig. ETSI.iii about here 
 
 
B) 802.11 WLAN Working Group  
 
SDO-specific expectations 
Governance processes of IEEE-SA are particularly interesting due to the recent disputes and 
dissatisfaction of an industry subset with the amendments of its IPR policy. Hence, based on 
the case study of IEEE-SA Policy change and interviews with experts, the responses are 
expected to differ from those concerning IEEE-SA standards development processes. 
According to the IEEE-SA’s operational framework, only those members appointed by the 
relevant (IEEE) bodies can be represented in IEEE-SA’s governance bodies;1950 this allows to 
assume that most of the respondents would indicate not to participate in governance processes, 
and have less awareness of the procedures than, for instance, the ETSI respondents have for 
ETSI governance processes. Respondents that are long-standing working group members and 
are involved in multiple 802 working groups are expected to have increased awareness of 
IEEE-SA governance processes due to their experience (for instance, with IPR Policy changes 
in 2007 and 2015, and its effect on different standardization activities). Given the disputes 
around the IPR Policy, a subset of manufacturers is expected to find procedures not transparent 
or clear, as well as to offer little procedural guarantees, and would also advocate for their 
modification. In this regard, the difference in responses will presumably be noticeable from 
their affiliation rather than the years of involvement or participation in other working groups, 
since the updated policy directly affects participants with large patent portfolios (typically a 
subset of manufacturers, network operators, service provides and research bodies).   
 
Survey Observations  
 
 
1950 See Chapter IV.  
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About1/3 of respondents that indicated to be voting members are represented, or somewhat 
represented, in IEEE-SA’s governance bodies: these include device manufacturers and 
consultancies that have been involved in IEEE-SA for longer than 5 years. Participation in 
other working groups is not linked to representation in IEEE-SA governance bodies. 
Nevertheless, the majority of the respondents indicated to be aware, or somewhat aware, of the 
IEEE-SA governance model: “no” was selected by two voting members who are device 
manufacturers participating between 1 and 5 years, and who are not represented in IEEE-SA 
governance bodies. Likewise, two voting members who are device manufacturers did not find 
the procedures clear, transparent and accessible: this time, however, one of the respondents 
indicated to be with IEEE-SA for longer than 15 years. Respondents involved in other 802 
working groups were aware, or somewhat aware, of the governance model, but some 
nevertheless found the processes being unclear and not transparent.  
 
Curiously, the majority of the respondents would not like to see the governance processes 
modified, while some have also indicated “somewhat:” a clear “yes” was supported by 
manufacturers and a consultancy, some of which were long-standing members for more than 
15 years, and one between 1 and 5 years. The majority of the respondents participating in other 
802 working groups, however, did not support modifications of the procedures. Most of the 
respondents also found that IEEE-SA governance processes offer sufficient procedural 
guarantees; the dissenting respondents were voting members affiliated with device 
manufacturers and participating in IEEE-SA activities between 1 and 5 and more than 15 years.  
 
Fig. IEEE.iii about here 
 
 
C) IETF  
 
SDO-specific expectations 
In theory, operational procedures of IETF allow any actors to join a dedicated working group 
and perform the work on IETF governance; however, since the respondents are mostly research 
bodies, little can be assumed with regard to different affiliation. It is expected that long standing 
members have increased knowledge of IETF governance processes and are often represented 
in IETF governance bodies; on the contrary, whether or not a respondent participates only 
through the mailing list or also attends IETF meetings should not matter for his or her 
perception of governance model, since the processes are clearly defined by the documents 
available on the IETF website. Moreover, IETF processes are likely to be found transparent 
and clear and not needing any modifications – again, since it is the particular governance model 
of IETF that has contributed to its institutional success.  
 
Survey Observations  
From what can be concluded based on the limited responses, representation in IETF 
governance bodies is not conditional on stakeholders’ affiliation; however, most of the 
respondents that take part in governance processes have indeed been involved in IETF for more 
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than 15 years and have attended IETF meetings.1951 At the same time, not every meetings’ 
attendee has indicated to be represented in the governance bodies of IETF. Most of the 
respondents were aware of IETF’s governance model, with only two answering “somewhat” 
aware: those have participated in IETF between 5 and 15 years and have been involved both 
through the mailing list and meetings. Likewise, the majority found that the governance 
processes are, or are somewhat, clear, transparent and accessible, disregarding respondents’ 
affiliation, years of involvement or participation methods. Two respondents, a user that has 
recently joined and a consultancy active for more than 15 years, both participating in the 
meetings, indicated that they would like to see IETF governance processes modified; the 
majority however responded “somewhat” to the question on procedural changes, and some 
have indicated a “no.” Only one respondent mentioned that IETF governance processes do not 
offer sufficient procedural guarantees; remarkably, this respondent has been involved in the 
organization for over 15 years and participated both in mailing lists and meetings. The rest of 
the respondents were almost equally divided between “somewhat” and “yes.” 
 
Fig. IETF.iii about here 
 
 





Since the ultimate appeal body in ETSI is its General Assembly, it may be expected that all 
types of respondents are well represented and aware of dispute mechanisms available within 
the ETSI framework. At the same time, given the low number of disputes mentioned by the 
interviewees, respondents are not expected to have much experience with appeals or dispute 
resolution, which in turn may also affect their awareness of the relevant procedures and the 
ability to judge their transparency. Like it was the case with governance processes, those 
involved in ETSI standardization for longer time may have more experience with its dispute 
settlement, which would affect their responses on the questions regarding awareness, 
transparency, and change of processes. Since the interviewed experts also indicated that 
internal disputes almost never result in litigation, it is also expected that most of the respondents 
will find that ETSI dispute mechanism provide less need, or no need at all, for dispute 
resolution outside ETSI.   
 
Survey Observations  
The majority of respondents indicated not to be represented in dispute resolution bodies; those 
who answered “yes” are affiliated with a governmental agency, network operator or 
manufacturers, and are all full members. Remarkably, an observer has indicated “somewhat.” 
 
 
1951 For some bodies, such as NomCom, this is a prerequisite.  
1952 This section is not provided with tables, mainly because the response rate for this particular question 
was the lowest. It still introduces some very minor findings for the purpose of future research. 
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Moreover, most respondents that have participated in dispute resolution processes are long-
standing ETSI members, from 5 years until over 15 years. Although most of the respondents 
indicated to be aware, or somewhat aware, of appeals and dispute resolution procedures, a 
number of survey participants responded “no;” surprisingly, all of them were full members half 
of which have been involved in ETSI standardization for more than 15 years. Furthermore, 
almost all respondents found the dispute resolution processes to be, or to be somewhat, clear, 
transparent and accessible: a “no” was submitted by a manufacturer who has been a full 
member of ETSI between 1 and 5 years. The respondents unanimously agreed that ETSI’s 
dispute resolution procedures do not need any modifications and, in general, ensure that there 
is less need, or no need at all, for bringing the disputes outside the SDO. The latter was 
contested by an NSB, involved as an observer for more than 15 years, which was the only “no” 
response to the statement.   
 
 
B) 802.11 WLAN Working Group 
 
SDO-specific expectations 
Similarly to IEEE-SA governance bodies, members of dispute resolution bodies are selected 
or appointed: since appeal boards are often comprised of a limited number of stakeholders, it 
is expected that ever lower number of respondents will indicate to be involved in dispute 
settlement bodies. At the same time, the recent experience with appeal of IPR Policy 
modifications may have contributed to respondents’ awareness of the procedures and also 
affect their perception of transparency and procedural guarantees accorded by the procedure. 
Like it was the case for ETSI, it is expected that internal appeal mechanisms of IEEE-SA ensure 
that there is less need, or no need at all, for dispute resolution outside the SDO. Furthermore, 
respondents who are involved in IEEE-SA standardization for a longer time, or are also 
members of other 802 working groups, are expected to have increased awareness of the 
procedures, but not necessarily to be often represented in dispute settlement bodies, since the 
selection criteria do not depend on the years of involvement or range of contribution. 
 
Survey Observations  
Most of the respondents, except for one voting member (device manufacturer) and one ex 
officio member (consultancy) active in IEEE-SA for more than 15 years are not represented in 
the IEEE-SA dispute resolution bodies. The majority, however, indicated to be somewhat 
aware of how appeal and dispute procedure work: among those who stated “no” were 
respondents who joined between 1 and 5 years ago, but also those who were involved for a 
longer time, even more than 15 years. Likewise, the majority found the dispute settlement 
processes to be somewhat transparent, clear and accessible: a “no” was submitted by only one 
voting member, a device manufacturer involved in IEEE-SA standardization for more than 15 
years and participating in other IEEE-SA working groups. Remarkably, none if the respondents 
preferred the dispute settlement mechanism to be changed, although a fair number answered 
“somewhat.” At the same time, some found that dispute resolution outside IEEE-SA is still 
necessary despite the internal processes of the SDO: those respondents have been involved in 





C) IETF  
 
SDO-specific expectations 
The expectations for ETSI and IEEE regarding affiliation and years of involvement are 
generally also applicable to IETF appeals and dispute resolution procedure. Yet, due to the 
complexity of the IETF structure and different mechanisms for the selection of dispute 
settlement members,1953 only a small number of respondents is expected to be represented in 
dispute resolution processes. Similarly to the expectations regarding IETF governance 
processes, respondents that participate both through the mailing list and meetings are presumed 
to be more aware of the dispute resolution processes, which in turn may affect their reactions 
to the statements. Ultimately, little litigation in IETF standardization has been noted both in 
the scholarship as by the interviewed experts: accordingly, it is expected that the last statement 
will be generally responded by “yes,” disregarding stakeholders’ affiliation, years of 
involvement or method of participation. 
 
Survey Observations  
An equal number of respondents indicated to be represented and not to be represented in IETF 
dispute resolution bodies; from all respondents that joined up to 1 year ago, only those affiliated 
with device manufacturers or network operators indicated to be “somewhat” represented. None 
of those who only join via mailing list participle in dispute resolution processes. Almost all 
respondents found dispute resolution processes (somewhat) clear, transparent and accessible: 
the only one respondent that answered “no” was a consultancy that have been involved through 
both mailing lists and meetings for longer than 15 years; the same stakeholder indicated that 
the procedures should be subject to modifications, while the majority responded with a “no.” 
As expected, it was also found that dispute resolution procedures of IETF (somewhat) provide 
less need for litigation outside IETF.  
 
 
2.6 Governmental Scrutiny  
 
The last question of the survey aimed to test hypothesis (4), namely that respondents, 
irrespective of affiliation of years of involvement in an SDO or SDO-specific membership 
conditions and participation method, would prefer not to submit standards development or 
governance processes to increased governmental scrutiny (note that the question was posed 
using the word increased, and not merely “governmental scrutiny”; this choice of wording was 
deliberate since many have argued that SDOs are already subject to certain public law control 
given that they do not exist in a legal vacuum and have to comply with provisions of WTO 
law, antitrust law, and the laws of the country of their establishment). Since the question 









Indeed, the majority of the respondents, including NSBs, found that there was no need for 
increased governmental scrutiny for standards development or governance processes. Few, 
however, were of the opposite opinion: “yes for both” was indicated by most of the respondents 
that were affiliated with governmental bodies, but also by one manufacturer and one 
consultancy - all full members that have joined ETSI in various periods of time.  
 
Fig. ETSI.iv about here 
 
 
B) 802.11 WLAN Working Group 
 
Although the majority of survey participants indicated “no for both,” the responses of the 
working group participants are more varied than those of ETSI members. Increased 
governmental scrutiny for standards development processes was supported by one voting 
member, a research body involved in IEEE standardization between 1 and 5 years and that did 
not participate in any other working groups. In turn, increased governmental scrutiny for 
governance processes was found plausible by manufacturers, voting members that have joined 
IEEE-SA in different periods of time, some of whom moreover were involved in other 802 
working groups. A smaller part of manufacturers and a consultancy, that as well have joined 
in different periods of time and participate in other working groups, indicated “yes for both.” 
The two recently joined respondents only indicated “no for both.” 
 





Again, the majority of the respondents, as it was suggested in the hypothesis, did not find 
increased scrutiny of standards development or governance processes of IETF necessary. 
However, “yes for both” was indicated by three respondents (a network operator, device 
manufacturer and user), who have been participating either only through the mailing list or 
have also attended the meetings, and none of whom have been in IETF for longer than 15 years. 
One respondent – a research body involved in IETF activities between 5 and 15 years both 
through meetings and mailing lists, found that increased governmental scrutiny was desire only 
for governance processes, while none of respondents answered “yes” for standards 
development processes.  
 
Fig. IETF.iv about here 
 
 





As mentioned earlier, the extremely low number of the responses does not allow to draw any 
meaningful conclusions that would substantially contribute to the descriptive and normative 
part of the research. Nevertheless, some results of the pilot surveys offer interesting perspective 
and are worth consideration.  
 
It seems, for instance, that stakeholders which do not often participate in standards 
development processes are still aware of the applicable procedures and are even satisfied with 
them, while, with regard to IETF, those who take part in the meetings may be more critical 
towards the applicable procedures than those who only contribute remotely. The wish of some 
stakeholders to modify standards development, governance or dispute resolution processes of 
some SDOs is not necessarily fueled by the lack of procedural guarantees, or the absence 
transparency and accessibility of the procedures; changes to SDOs’ operational frameworks 
may so much as be supported by their long-standing members. Likewise, longer involvement 
in an SDO’s activity does not necessarily mean increased knowledge on its governance and 
dispute resolution processes, nor does it seem to correlate with representation in the relevant 
bodies (although based on the survey results, the opposite can be argued for IEEE-SA dispute 
settlement bodies). At the same time, governance processes seem more accessible than dispute 
resolution processes.  
 
Especially the latter raise a number of questions, since the survey questions on dispute 
settlement have been left blank or marked by “Don’t know” by a significant share of 
respondents. Two assumptions can be derived from this fact: the first one suggests that the 
disputes within SDOs do not occur frequently, or are resolved bilaterally by the parties, which 
explains the lack of knowledge and experience of stakeholders with appeals and dispute 
procedures. The second assumption, however, is that dispute settlement procedures are just not 
sufficiently important for stakeholders; once a dispute arises, it is usually the lawyers who will 
go to the meetings to resolve disagreements between the parties, and not the actual engineers 
conducting technical work of SDOs’ committees. Each of this assumptions was supported by 
a number of interviewed experts.1954 
 
Survey responses have thus provided food for thought for future standardization researchers, 
but also, at least in part, tested out the hypothesis formulated for this specific exercise: 
 
Hypothesis 1: there is no correlation between stakeholders’ affiliation and their satisfaction 
with procedural guarantees offered by the SDOs. – This hypothesis was generally confirmed 
by the responses, although the was little variety in stakeholders’ affiliation in responses of the 
802.11 WLAN Working Group and of IETF;   
 
Hypothesis 2: stakeholders who have been involved in an SDO’s activity for a longer time have 
a better knowledge of the procedures that those who have recently joined. – This hypothesis 
was generally not confirmed by the responses, especially in relation to governance and dispute 
 
 
1954 See Chapter V. 
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resolution processes. In certain cases, however, “newer” stakeholders were indeed somewhat 
less aware of the procedures than long-standing members; 
 
Hypothesis 3: irrespective of their affiliation or years of involvement in an SDO, stakeholders 
do not find that an SDO’s processes should be modified. – This hypothesis was largely 
confirmed by the responses from all three surveys, although sometimes modifications were 
indicated to be desirable by the minority of respondents; 
 
Hypothesis 4: irrespective of their affiliation or years of involvement in an SDO, stakeholders 
prefer that neither standards development or governance processes are made subject to 
increased governmental scrutiny. – Also this last hypothesis was confirmed. Yet, it also 
appeared that increased governmental scrutiny is sometimes preferred by a certain type of 
stakeholders in certain organizations, such as for instance governmental agencies in ETSI. 
Some respondents also indicated that increased governmental scrutiny was desirable for 
governance processes, while standardization processes were largely found not to be needing 
any governmental intervention.   
 
It is worth adding that, as it was suggested by the interviewees, procedures and governance 
models are not considered vital among SDOs’ members, but rather come as a part of the whole 
picture of standardization. Perhaps, the lack of interest has been an underlying reason of the 
low amount of responses generated by the surveys.  By way of conclusion, it may be suggested 
that stakeholders are generally satisfied with the way the procedures work, meaning that no 
major changes are required from the side of SDOs.  
  
3.  Further research suggestions 
 
The pilot surveys open avenues to further research questions. Different lenses than those 
suggested by this study may be used to verify whether stakeholders are satisfied with the 
procedures and whether a change in operational frameworks of SDOs is at order. Indeed, the 
surveys can also be modified to better fit the purpose of the future research: new questions may 
include type of modifications to processes that may be desired by stakeholders, or may attempt 
to find out the extent to which different types of procedures are deemed important by 
stakeholders (by asking them to rate different statements). Instead of distributing the survey 
among all SDOs members, it may target only specific working groups or technical committees, 
such as those of 3GPP;  likewise, it may include SDOs with different institutional settings, such 




ANNEX III SUPLEMENT A: SURVEYS 
 
 
Governance and Standards Development 
Processes in ETSI 
 
Q0  
Ticking the box “I agree” signifies your consent to take part in the study 
“GOVERNANCE AND STANDARD-SETTING PROCESSES OF STANDARDS 
DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS IN THE ICT SECTOR”. Before ticking the box, 
please read the Information Sheet provided together with this form carefully and ask the 
researcher for clarifications when needed. 
  
 I understand and confirm that 
 1. I have read and understood the information about the research project and my 
participation in it, as provided in the Information Sheet 
 2.I have been given the opportunity to ask questions and receive clarifications about the 
project and my participation as well as the safeguards in place to avoid misuse of the 
collected data. 
 3. I have been given sufficient information about the internal mechanisms at the host 
institution level to ensure that the researchers involved in the project satisfy the highest 
standards of reliability, impartiality and independence. 
 4.I participate in the project voluntarily. 
 5.I understand I am free not to participate in the project and can withdraw my participation at 
any time without providing reasons, and at no consequence for me. 
 6. The procedures regarding collection of data, privacy, data protection and confidentiality 
have been clearly explained, i.e., 
 - use of data for the purpose of scientific research; 
 - confidentiality obligations of the research team members; 
 - etc. 
 7. The use of the data in research, publications, and archiving has been explained to me, 
including retention and availability of anonymous research data to other scientific research 
practitioners for a period of ten years. 
 8. I agree to participate in the aforementioned study under the terms and conditions 
explained to me, and specifically to the processing of my personal data for the purposes of 
scientific research only.  
                    The survey does not require to provide any names, affiliation or contact 
information directly identifying participants. All responses will be treated anonymously, and 
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the outcomes of the survey are only stored and processed by using programs which are 
indicated by the university as trustworthy.  
o I agree  (11)  
 
 
Q1 Participant is currently affiliated with 
o Governmental Agency/Body  (1)  
o National Standards Body  (2)  
o Network Operator  (3)  
o Service Provider  (4)  
o Manufacturer  (5)  
o User/User Association  (6)  
o Research Body  (7)  
o Consultancy  (8)  




Q2 In ETSI, the entity of participant's affiliation has a status of  
o Full Member  (1)  
o Associate Member  (2)  
o Observer  (3)  
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Q3 Participant has been engaged in ETSI's standardization activity  
o For more than 15 years  (1)  
o Between 5 and 15 years  (2)  
o Between 1 and 5 years  (3)  
o Recently joined  (4)  
o  
 
Q4 Standards Development (proposal of standardization project, technical meetings among 
experts, approval of a standard/technical specification). Which of the following apply? 
 Yes (1) Somewhat (2) No (3) Don't know (4) 
Participant is often 
represented at ETSI's 
standards 
development 
meetings (1)  
o  o  o  o  
Participant is aware 
of how ETSI 
standards 
development 
procedures work (2)  
o  o  o  o  
Standards 
development 
procedures are clear, 
transparent and 
accessible for ETSI 
members/participants 
(3)  
o  o  o  o  
Participant would 





o  o  o  o  







concerns are heard; 
decisions can be 
appealed) (5)  





Q5 Governance Processes (drafting and modifying of ETSI Directives, rules of procedure, 
IPR Policy, membership agreements). Which of the following apply?  
 Yes (1) Somewhat (2) No (3) Don't know (4) 
Participant is 
represented in ETSI 
governance 
body/bodies (1)  
o  o  o  o  




o  o  o  o  
ETSI governance 
processes are clear, 
transparent and 
accessible for ETSI 
members/participants 
(3)  
o  o  o  o  
Participant would 
like to see ETSI 
governance model 
modified (4)  







concerns are heard; 
decisions can be 
appealed) (5)  








Q6 Dispute Resolution/Appeal Mechanisms. Which of the following apply? 




bodies (1)  
o  o  o  o  
Participant is aware 
of ETSI’s dispute 
resolution 
mechanisms, and 
knows when and 
how a decision of an 
ETSI body, officer or 
working group can 
be appealed (2)  
o  o  o  o  
Dispute resolution 
processes are clear, 
transparent and 
accessible for ETSI 
members/participants 
(3)  
o  o  o  o  
Participant would 




o  o  o  o  
The current dispute 
resolution system of 
ETSI provides less 
need/no need at all 
for dispute resolution 
outside ETSI (5)  








Q7 Is there is a need for increased governmental scrutiny of ETSI's standards development 
and governance processes?  
o Yes, only for standards development processes  (1)  
o Yes, only for governance processes  (2)  
o Yes, for both  (3)  






Governance and Standards Development 





Ticking the box “I agree” signifies your consent to take part in the study 
“GOVERNANCE AND STANDARD-SETTING PROCESSES OF STANDARDS 
DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS IN THE ICT SECTOR”. Before ticking the box, 
please read the Information Sheet provided together with this form carefully and ask the 
researcher for clarifications when needed. 
  
 I understand and confirm that 
 1. I have read and understood the information about the research project and my 
participation in it, as provided in the Information Sheet 
 2.I have been given the opportunity to ask questions and receive clarifications about the 
project and my participation as well as the safeguards in place to avoid misuse of the 
collected data. 
 3. I have been given sufficient information about the internal mechanisms at the host 
institution level to ensure that the researchers involved in the project satisfy the highest 
standards of reliability, impartiality and independence. 
 4.I participate in the project voluntarily. 
 5.I understand I am free not to participate in the project and can withdraw my participation at 
any time without providing reasons, and at no consequence for me. 
 6. The procedures regarding collection of data, privacy, data protection and confidentiality 
have been clearly explained, i.e., 
 - use of data for the purpose of scientific research; 
 - confidentiality obligations of the research team members; 
 - etc. 
 7. The use of the data in research, publications, and archiving has been explained to me, 
including retention and availability of anonymous research data to other scientific research 
practitioners for a period of ten years. 
 8. I agree to participate in the aforementioned study under the terms and conditions 
explained to me, and specifically to the processing of my personal data for the purposes of 
scientific research only.  
   






Q1 Participant is a  
o Voting Member of 802.11 WLAN Working Group  (1)  
o Non-voting Member of 802.11 WLAN Working Group  (2)  
o Aspirant Member of 802.11 Working Group  (3)  
o Ex Officio Member of 802.11 Working Group  (4)  
 
 
Q2 Participant is currently affiliated with a 
▢ Governmental Agency/Body  (1)  
▢ Network Operator  (2)  
▢ Service Provider  (3)  
▢ Device Manufacturer  (4)  
▢ User/User Association  (5)  
▢ Research Body  (6)  
▢ Consultancy  (7)  
▢ Other:  (8) ________________________________________________ 
 
 
Q3 Participant is engaged in standardization activities of 802.11 Working Group 
o For more than 15 years  (1)  
o Between 5 and 15 years  (2)  
o Between 1 and 5 years  (3)  





Q4 Participant is also active in the following IEEE 802 Working and Study Groups  
▢ 802.1 Higher Layer LAN Protocols Working Group  (1)  
▢ 802.3 Ethernet Working Group  (2)  
▢ 802.15 Wireless Personal Area Network (WPAN) Working Group  (3)  
▢ 802.16 Broadband Wireless Access Working Group  (4)  
▢ 802.18 Radio Regulatory TAG  (5)  
▢ 802.19 Wireless Coexistence Working Group  (6)  
▢ 802.21 Media Independent Handover Services Working Group  (7)  
▢ 802.22 Wireless Regional Area Networks  (8)  





Q5 Standards Development (proposal of standardization project, technical meetings among 
experts, approval of a standard/technical specification). Which of the following apply? 
 Yes (1) Somewhat (2) No (3) Don't know (4) 




meetings of the 
IEEE-SA Working 
Groups (1)  
o  o  o  o  
Participant is aware 
of how IEEE-SA's 
standards 
development 
procedures work (2)  
o  o  o  o  
Standards 
development 




of IEEE-SA and its 
Working Groups (3)  
o  o  o  o  
Participant would 












concerns are heard; 
decisions can be 
appealed) (5)  







Q6 Governance Processes (drafting and modifying of IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws and 
Operational  Manual, and IEEE-SA Operations Manual). Which of the following apply?  
 Yes (1) Somewhat (2) No (3) Don't know (4) 
Participant is 
represented in IEEE-
SA's  governance 
body/bodies (1)  
o  o  o  o  




o  o  o  o  
Governance 
processes of IEEE-





o  o  o  o  
Participant would 
like to see 
governance model 
modified (4)  
o  o  o  o  
Current governance 





concerns are heard; 
decisions can be 
appealed) (5)  








Q7 Dispute Resolution/Appeal Mechanisms. Which of the following apply? 




bodies (1)  
o  o  o  o  
Participant is aware 
of IEEE-SA dispute 
resolution 
mechanisms, and 
knows when and 
how a decision of an 
IEEE-SA body, 
officer or working 
group can be 
appealed (2)  
o  o  o  o  
Dispute resolution 





o  o  o  o  
Participant would 





o  o  o  o  
The current dispute 
resolution system of 
IEEE-SA  provides 
less need/no need at 
all for dispute 
resolution outside 
IEEE-SA (5)  








Q8 Is there a need for increased governmental scrutiny of IEEE-SA's standards development 
and governance processes? 
o Yes, only for standards development processes  (1)  
o Yes, only for governance processes  (2)  
o Yes, for both  (3)  




Governance and Standards Development 
Processes in IETF 
 
Q0  
Ticking the box “I agree” signifies your consent to take part in the study 
“GOVERNANCE AND STANDARD-SETTING PROCESSES OF STANDARDS 
DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS IN THE ICT SECTOR”. Before ticking the box, 
please read the Information Sheet provided together with this form carefully and ask the 
researcher for clarifications when needed. 
  
 I understand and confirm that 
 1. I have read and understood the information about the research project and my 
participation in it, as provided in the Information Sheet 
 2.I have been given the opportunity to ask questions and receive clarifications about the 
project and my participation as well as the safeguards in place to avoid misuse of the 
collected data. 
 3. I have been given sufficient information about the internal mechanisms at the host 
institution level to ensure that the researchers involved in the project satisfy the highest 
standards of reliability, impartiality and independence. 
 4.I participate in the project voluntarily. 
 5.I understand I am free not to participate in the project and can withdraw my participation at 
any time without providing reasons, and at no consequence for me. 
 6. The procedures regarding collection of data, privacy, data protection and confidentiality 
have been clearly explained, i.e., 
 - use of data for the purpose of scientific research; 
 - confidentiality obligations of the research team members; 
 - etc. 
 7. The use of the data in research, publications, and archiving has been explained to me, 
including retention and availability of anonymous research data to other scientific research 
practitioners for a period of ten years. 
 8. I agree to participate in the aforementioned study under the terms and conditions 
explained to me, and specifically to the processing of my personal data for the purposes of 
scientific research only.  
   





Q1 Participant is affiliated with a 
o Governmental Agency/Body  (1)  
o Network Operator  (2)  
o Service Provider  (3)  
o Device Manufacturer  (4)  
o User/User Association  (5)  
o Research Body  (6)  
o Consultancy  (7)  
o Other:  (8) ________________________________________________ 
 
 
Q2 Participant has been participating in the activities of IETF 
o For more than 15 years  (1)  
o Between 5 and 15 years  (2)  
o Between 1 and 5 years  (3)  
o Recently joined  (4)  
 
Q3 Participant is involved in IETF activities  
o Only through the mailing lists  (1)  








Q4 Standards Development (proposal of standardization project, technical discussions via the 
mailing list, technical meetings among experts, approval of a standard/technical 
specification). Which of the following apply? 
 Yes (1) Somewhat (2) No (3) Don't know (4) 
Participant is 
often engaged in 
e-mail exchange 
or at standards 
development 
meetings of IETF 
Working Groups 
(1)  
o  o  o  o  
Participant is 










and accessible for 
participants (3)  
o  o  o  o  
Participant would 




modified (4)  
o  o  o  o  
Current standards 
development 







can be appealed) 
(5)  








Q5 Governance Processes (drafting and modifying of BCP RFCs, IPR Policy and Working 
Groups charters). Which of the following apply?  





body/bodies (1)  
o  o  o  o  
Participant is 
aware of IETF's 
governance model 
(2)  
o  o  o  o  
Governance 




participants (3)  
o  o  o  o  
Participant would 
like to see 
governance model 
modified (4)  
o  o  o  o  
Current 
governance model 







can be appealed) 
(5)  








Q6 Dispute Resolution/Appeal Mechanisms. Which of the following apply? 




bodies (1)  
o  o  o  o  
Participant  is 
aware of IETF's 
dispute resolution 
mechanisms, and 
knows when and 
how a decision of 
an IETF body or 
Working Group 
can be appealed 
(2)  




and accessible for 
participants (3)  
o  o  o  o  
Participant would 




modified (4)  
o  o  o  o  
The current 
dispute resolution 
system of IETF  
provides less 
need/no need at 
all for dispute 
resolution outside 
IETF (5)  








Q7 Is there is a need for increased governmental scrutiny of IETF's  standards development 
and governance processes?  
o Yes, only for standards development processes  (1)  
o Yes, only for governance processes  (2)  
o Yes, for both  (3)  






























Fig. ETSI.v  
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This dissertation aimed to bring theoretical considerations on the processes of Standards 
Development Organizations (SDOs) in the ICT sector closer to practice by analysing whether 
the current ICT standardization complies with applicable procedural and substantive 
requirements, and whether an increased scrutiny of SDOs operating in the ICT sector is 
desirable to guarantee due process. The study is premised on two hypotheses: (1) given the 
increased regulatory importance of ICT standards, it has become challenging for SDOs to offer 
sufficient procedural and substantive guarantees to satisfy all stakeholders that have varying 
interests in standards development; (2) increased scrutiny of SDOs’ processes by governmental 
authorities, when performed with caution and respect to the industry demands, can improve the 
quality of SDOs’ decision-making and, ultimately, the effectiveness of their standards. The 
study was performed through the following research methods: (a) review of applicable 
legislation, regulatory documents, judicial decisions and academic scholarship; (b) descriptive 
analysis of governance and technical processes of five SDOs (ETSI, IEEE-SA, IETF, W3C 
and Bluetooth SIG); and (c) qualitative empirical research through case studies, open-ended 
interviews and surveys.  
 
The findings suggest that ICT standards have evolved from a purely technical activity to a form 
of governance: yet, the character of SDOs still remains self-regulatory. Procedural principles 
of the applicable legal frameworks, namely transparency, openness, consensus, effectiveness, 
coherence, review and balance of interests, constitute “best practice requirements” that are 
further implemented by each SDO in the way that it is acceptable by their membership and the 
industry in which they operate. While SDOs generally comply with these principles, some 
appeared to fall short on providing opportunities for participation in their processes or offering 
functional mechanisms for appeal and review: these procedural shortcomings, however, do not 
seem to deter the major industry players. SDOs are thus faced with a considerable challenge to 
follow due process requirements while being sufficiently flexible to adapt to market, technical, 
political and societal developments. SDOs should also maintain balanced procedures that 
prevent their standards development processes from being tilted towards one group of actors 
and by this means, ensure their quality and market acceptance.  
 
Most of the challenges related to SDOs’ processes arise when a (group of) stakeholder(s) is 
excluded, or alleges to be excluded, from decision-making processes of technical committees 
and governance bodies. In this regard, it is generally recommended that SDOs procedures are 
improved internally, rather than through governments-driven processes. A “one size fits all” 
approach for SDOs’ governance is not desirable due to the fundamental differences in SDOs’ 
institutional architecture, membership and standards. Yet, it was also found that in case of 
major disagreements, SDOs may benefit from review of their processes by courts, which would 
allow for considerations of under-represented interests: such review, however, should be 
performed with caution and due account of industry needs and operational field. 
 
This study contributes to the research field by offering a holistic analysis of legal rules and 
procedural principles for industry-driven SDOs; providing a systematic overview of SDOs’ 
governance and standards development procedures; and including practical considerations 
from qualitative empirical evidence. 
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